

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 19

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 157 THROUGH 172

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
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17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

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Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
1-----	23 11-15-45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2-----	24 11-15-45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3-----	87 11-16-45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4-----	142 11-16-45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5-----	153 11-16-45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.
6-----	153 11-16-45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.
7-----	172 11-17-45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8-----	233 11-19-45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8-A-----	1792 12-18-45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-B-----	1792 12-18-45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-C-----	1792 12-18-45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8-D	2480 1-5-46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11-19-45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11-20-45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11-21-45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11-21-45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11-21-45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11-21-45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11-23-45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

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16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed " <i>Modus Vivendi</i> ," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115; (c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42	990 12-5-45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43	997 12-5-45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44	1001 12-5-45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45	1019 12-5-45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46	1027 12-5-45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47	1041 12-5-45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850"; dispatch 300850 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48	1044 12-5-45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48-A	2093 12-31-45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49	1053 12-6-45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1).
50	1053 12-6-45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

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51	1053 12-6-45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).
52	1053 12-6-45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12-6-45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12-6-45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12-6-45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12-6-45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12-6-45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12-6-45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12-6-45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12-6-45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12-7-45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12-10-45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.
63	1345 12-11-45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64-----	1544 12-13-45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65-----	1541 12-13-45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66-----	1642 12-15-45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (961255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67-----	1642 12-15-45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68-----	1675 12-15-45	1689	Log of U. S. S. <i>Boise</i> for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69-----	1677 12-15-45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70-----	1695 12-15-45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71-----	1696 12-15-45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72-----	1696 12-15-45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73-----	1700 12-15-45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

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74	1703 12-15-45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 10, 1941.
74-A	2768 1-19-46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12-15-45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11-15-45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meisner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12-15-45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12-17-45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12-17-45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12-17-45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12-17-45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12-17-45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).
83	1754 12-17-45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (#31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12-17-45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

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96	2091 12-31-45	1989	Memorandum dated July 10, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12-31-45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12-31-45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China."
99	2094 12-31-45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12-31-45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12-31-45	2023	Log of U. S. S. <i>Enterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12-31-45	2107	Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12-31-45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, <i>Enterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12-31-45	2122	"U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12-31-45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12-31-45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1-4-46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date intro- duced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A----	2479 1-5-46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108-----	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109-----	2476 1-5-46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110-----	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111-----	2495 1-15-46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112-----	2496 1-15-46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113-----	2558 1-16-46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A----	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B----	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113-C----	3449 1-31-46	2538	(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

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114	2558 1-16-46	2508	WPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1-16-46	2721	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123-----	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124-----	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125-----	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the <i>U. S. S. Wright</i> from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126-----	2767 1-19-46	2832	(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127-----	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128-----	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129-----	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130-----	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Taiwan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131-----	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132	2917 1-21-46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132-A	5137 2-20-46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1-23-46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1-23-46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1-23-46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1-23-46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1-23-46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1-23-46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139.-----	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140.-----	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141.-----	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142.-----	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A-----	3324 1-29-46	3318	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B-----	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C-----	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D-----	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143.-----	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144.-----	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145.-----	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 38.)
147	3929 2-7-47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2-7-46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2-8-46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158-----	5201 4-11-46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159-----	5201 4-11-46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160-----	5240 4-11-46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161-----	5241 4-11-46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161-A----	5464 5-23-46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162-----	5269 4-11-46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A----	5464 5-23-46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163-----	5292 4-11-46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. <i>Helena</i> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164-----	5292 4-11-46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165-----	5292 4-11-46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166-----	5468 5-23-46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

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167	5468 5-23-46	3652	(a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 28, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and anti-aircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date intro- duced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5-23-46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5-23-46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5-23-46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5-23-46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5-23-46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5-23-46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Utah</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 157

(This Exhibit consists of reports, findings, and conclusions of the Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements (See table of contents attached to this Exhibit) and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee Record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 158

(This Exhibit is a compilation of documents relating to United States-British conversations concerning the Japanese situation, and consists of the following items:

1. Memorandum of conversation dated February 7, 1941 concerning the Far Eastern situation and attached aide-memoire.
2. Letter dated February 11, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to Secretary Hull with two telegrams, A and B, each dated February 11, 1941 attached.
3. Paraphrase of message dated February 15, 1941 for the President from Prime Minister Churchill.
4. Memorandum for the President dated February 22, 1941.
5. Paraphrase of telegram from the British Ambassador, Tokyo to the Foreign Office, April 13, 1941.
6. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Stark dated April 29, 1941 with attachments dated April 25, and 28, respectively.
7. Memorandum for the President from Secretary Knox enclosing a reply to certain U. S. proposals dated May 8, 1941 from Rear Admiral Danckwerts.
8. Memorandum of conversation dated October 17, 1941 concerning U. S.-Japanese relations between Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Halifax, with attachment dated October 16, 1941.
9. Telegram dated November 5, 1941 (5 sections) from Ambassador Winant to the Secretary of State being a message for the President from Prime Minister Churchill.
10. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Halifax and Mr. Welles dated November 12, 1941 concerning U. S.-Japanese negotiations with attachment dated November 11, 1941.
11. Paraphrase of memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Mr. Dening of the British Embassy November 14, 1941.
12. Letter dated November 29, 1941 from the British Embassy, Washington to Secretary Hull.
13. Letter dated December 1, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to Secretary Hull with enclosures dated November 30, 1941.
14. Letter dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to the President enclosing paraphrase of a report from London on the military situation delivered to the President from the British Embassy on December 8, 1941.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: February 7, 1941.

file →

SUBJECT: The Far Eastern Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. E. M. Butler,
Counselor of the
British Embassy,
and
Mr. Hamilton

COPIES TO:

In leaving with me the attached aide-memoire of February 7 marked "very confidential", Mr. Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy, said that the Embassy had just received two telegrams from the British Foreign Office containing confidential information which the Embassy was instructed to communicate to the American Government. Mr. Butler said that the information was as follows:

The first telegram, dated February 6, was to the effect that according to reliable information the Japanese Embassy in London on February 4 received instructions to refuse to a minimum its contacts with the British and to be prepared to leave on short notice; that these instructions were discussed at the Japanese Embassy in London, that some members of the Embassy

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were dismayed by the instructions while others were not; that it was believed at the Japanese Embassy that the instructions had reference to some scheme of cooperation with Germany advocated by the Japanese military party.

The second telegram, also dated February 6, was to the effect that the notification date referred to in the first telegram was either February 9 or February 12 (the telegram as received by the British Embassy was garbled and the Embassy had not yet worked out whether the correct date was February 9 or February 12); that there was some indefinite reference to the plan in question being linked up with the Soviet Government and Chinese Communists; that the proposed action was being carefully planned so as not to appear to affect United States interests; that the movement of the United States Fleet was regarded as of a routine character; and that there was a good deal of talk at the Japanese Embassy in London about war.

Mr. Butler added that it was possible that the British Ambassador might ask to talk to the Secretary of State and to the President in regard to the information set forth in the two telegrams under reference.

FE:MMH:NEB

3444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Very Confidential.

AIDE MEMOIRE

Evidence is accumulating that the Japanese may already have decided to push on Southward even if this means war. Press reports indicate that Japan is using her position as mediator between Thailand and Indo China to gain, besides a preferential economic position, a Naval Base at Camranh Bay, Air Bases in Southern Indo-China and control of the Indo China customs. There is also reason to suppose that some military agreement with Thailand, directed against our territories and the Netherlands East Indies is under consideration.

The following are a few "straws in the wind":

(a) His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo reports a general feeling amongst the Japanese that a crisis in the Far East will come within the next few weeks.

(b) Cancellation of sailings of Japanese ships to the United States and the commandeering of ships by the Japanese Government have been reported. These reports have not so far been confirmed by the British Naval authorities in Singapore.

(c) Japan is continuing to supply munitions to Thailand. For instance, a Japanese steamer arrived at Bangkok on January 29th with the following war material for the Thai Government: 8,000 bombs, 20 tanks and 10,000 cases containing unspecified arms and ammunition.

(d) A telephone conversation was intercepted between two Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang to the effect that the Japanese attack would take place on February 10th. The Netherlands authorities attach no undue importance to the conversation but think that it cannot be disregarded.

(e) A Japanese Naval Officer recently stated to students of the Malay language that time was very short indeed.

(f) The time-table of the "Asaka Maru" which is taking a Naval Mission to Berlin and may be bringing back machinery and certain metals, seems to indicate that action is not contemplated until the middle of March.

(g) A French source in Indo China reports concentrations in Formosa and Hainan.

While none of these indications may be conclusive in themselves, their accumulative effect is to suggest that a further movement is impending. Most of this information has already been given to the United States Naval Attache in London.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Washington, D. C., February 7th 1941.

3446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

**BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D C**

Substance of Telegram A Received at the
British Embassy from the Foreign Office on February 11th. 1941

The consequences of the Japanese movements in Indo-China and Thailand have been reviewed once more by the Chiefs of Staff, who have furnished an estimate of the immediate danger to be anticipated. This estimate is as follows:-

The Japanese are now engaged in a movement designed both to increase their hold on Indo-China and to obtain strategic facilities in Thailand. According to the information in the possession of the British authorities it is unlikely that the Japanese will be content with this; it is probable that they are contemplating more drastic action, the exact nature of which is as yet uncertain. The general effect of the present Japanese movement is to weaken the strategic position of the British Empire in the Far East by enabling the Japanese to secure vantage points near Singapore. If the Japanese movement were to be extended, not only would this tendency be increased but the Japanese might obtain important economic resources which would greatly strengthen their capacity to carry on a war.

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11/2/41
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It is felt certain that the Japanese are acting with the encouragement of Germany and that they are planning more vigorous aggressive measures in direct agreement with the German Government. For these measures to help Germany, they must directly

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affect British interests and are therefore probably designed to force Great Britain into war with Japan. Such a war would expose to attack British communications with Australia and New Zealand, and British trade in the Far East and in the Indian Ocean, and might even jeopardize the communications between the United Kingdom and the Middle East. The efforts which the British authorities would be bound to make to prevent excessive damage to these vital interests would weaken their whole war effort against Germany. Indeed, if the threat to Singapore became imminent, the British authorities might be forced temporarily to transfer the British fleet from the Mediterranean in order to free naval forces for action in the Indian Ocean.

It will be appreciated what a profound set-back this last step would constitute. Thus war with Japan would inevitably lengthen the war with Germany and would, indeed, make ultimate British success improbable without the full participation of the United States.

Hence, while the direct danger to American interests in the Far East constituted by a further Japanese movement is clear, the indirect danger to the United States is ever more serious. Indeed, it seems evident that Japanese aggression against British interests in the Far East represents a serious threat to the safety of the United States on

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account of its effect on the British war effort as a whole. It is essential, therefore, in the interests not only of the British Empire but of the United States, to take steps which will prevent the Japanese from taking the plunge.

Substance of Telegram B received at the /7/11
British Embassy from the Foreign Office on February 11th.

In your further talks with the United States Government you will no doubt call attention to the views of the Chiefs of Staff. The important point to emphasize is that the initiative lies with Japan. If Japan is bent on war in combination with Germany, mere attempts on our part to avoid the issue are unlikely to be successful. The only thing likely to avert war is to make it clear to Japan that further aggression will meet with the opposition both of the United States and of ourselves.

A joint declaration to the Japanese by the United States and the British Empire that any attack on the Netherlands East Indies or on the British possessions in the Far East would involve Japan in war immediately and irreparably with both the United States and the British Empire is obviously the course most likely to achieve this end. It is realised, however, that such a proposal may present certain difficulties from the point of view of the United States.

So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned the Foreign Secretary has made it clear to the Japanese Ambassador that if British territories are attacked they will be defended with the utmost vigour. Speaking to the Japanese Ambassador on February 7th, Mr. Eden said that while His Majesty's Government had no aggressive intentions they did not intend to sacrifice the British possessions in the Far East at the dictation of any power. Nor were His Majesty's Government prepared to agree that Japan alone was entitled to control the destinies of the peoples of the Far East. Great Britain intended to

discharge/

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discharge her obligations to those people in that part of the world for whom she was responsible and if British territories were attacked, the British people would undoubtedly defend them with the utmost vigour.

It would be most useful if the President, when seeing the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival, could speak to him in somewhat similar terms and make plain beyond the possibility of misunderstanding the interest of the United States in Far Eastern affairs. If a joint declaration on the lines indicated above is impracticable then it is clearly of the greatest importance that the United States Government should independently go as far as they can to make plain their attitude to the Japanese Government.

With this object in view you should seek an interview with the President and in placing before him on the most comprehensive lines our information regarding the present situation in the Far East, inform him of the line already taken by the Foreign Secretary with the Japanese Ambassador in London.

You should furthermore point out that in the view of the British authorities the situation would be greatly improved if in addition to any statement or warning that the United States Government may see fit to make to Japan, the American naval forces in the Far East were to be increased, either by sending reinforcements to Manila or despatching a detachment to Singapore. At this stage of events the most effective check upon further Japanese adventures would appear to be some definite move on the part of the American Fleet.

MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 15, 1941 FOR THE
PRESIDENT FROM MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL
(PARAPHRASE)

There are indications, from many drifting straws, that the Japanese mean to make war on us, or to do something which would compel us to make war on them, during the next few weeks or months. Personally I am not sure that this is not a war of nerves which is intended as a cover for Japanese advances in Indochina and in Siam. Nevertheless I consider that I should let you know that should the weight of the Japanese Navy be thrown against us, situations beyond the capacity of our own naval strength would confront us.

Japan would not be likely, in my opinion, to dispatch such a large military expedition as would be necessary to besiege Singapore. Doubtless they would occupy oil fields and strategic centers in the Netherlands East Indies and vicinity which they desire and in this manner acquire a much better position for a subsequent full scale onslaught against Singapore. Also they would make raids on the ports and coasts of New Zealand and Australia, thus arousing much anxiety in those countries who have already sent to the Middle East all of their best-trained men. However, I fear most of all an attack by raiders, which might include battle cruisers, against our communications and trade routes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. By inviting disaster elsewhere we could dispatch some powerful warships into these great expanses of ocean. But escorts would be few and far between and it would be necessary for all shipping to go into convoy. This would constitute an extremely serious additional limitation and disarrangement of our entire war economy. Moreover, it would end altogether all the military reinforcements which we had intended to develop in the Middle East from Indian and Australasian resources.

Should there be a threat of a major attack of New Zealand and Australia we would be compelled, of course, to remove our navy from the eastern Mediterranean. Such an action would result in disastrous military possibilities in that area, a certainty that some accommodation would have to be made by Turkey, and the reopening of German oil supplies and German trade from the Black Sea. Thus, Mr. President, you will see what an awful weakening of our war effort would come about, merely should Japan send her battle cruisers and her 12 cruisers carrying 8-inch guns into the eastern oceans, and still more should there be any serious invasion threat against New Zealand and Australia.

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There are some who consider that in Japan's present mood she would have no hesitation to entertain an attempt to make war against both your country and mine. Although it is my personal belief that the ~~odds~~ *odds* are definitely against such an event, one cannot tell. Whatever you are able to do to instill in Japan anxiety as to a double war may succeed in averting this danger. Nevertheless should we alone be attacked, it would be difficult to overstate the grave character of the consequences.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Dispatches
Hull folder*

Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
February 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Renshaw in Secretary Hull's office phoned the following paraphrase of a message for the President from the Former Naval Person:

"Have received better news concerning Japan. It seems Jap Foreign Minister is shortly going to Moscow, Berlin and Rome for the purpose of covering the failure of action against us. The fear of the U. S. appears to have postponed attack which seemed imminent. While completely understanding your situation pending enactment of Bill on which our hopes depend, the more these fears can be aroused the better.

"Appreciation given in my last message to you of naval consequences subsequent to Jap attack against us remains the same in all circumstances."

The message is dated February 20, 1941.

TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT TOKYO TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.
APRIL 13, 1941 (PARAPHRASE)

We have been furnished the information below by a secret source of reliability who is in touch with the Prime Minister of Japan and who has been accurate on two previous occasions, namely, (1) advance notice (3 weeks) of the military alliance in the Three-Power Treaty of September 1940, and (2) the occupation of the Island of Hainan 14 days before the event.

We learn from this source that there is now at Hainan and Formosa an expeditionary force, with transports at hand, of from 12 to 15 divisions. On the pretense of manœuvres and at a time in mid-March when the disembarkation of foreigners at Nagasaki was forbidden, a total of 8 or 10 divisions were sent to Formosa. The expeditionary force is composed of these troops plus several divisions, 3 or more, which were already in Hainan.

There is a plan for the synchronization of a direct attack on Singapore with German action in blocking the Suez Canal in order that the passage of British naval forces may be prevented. It is said that an attack on the Suez Canal of devastating force is about to be launched. It is the idea of the Japanese that if an attack on Singapore is made soon, America will not be prepared to intervene, since opinion is not united at home and the United States is pre-occupied with such matters as aid to Britain, the battle of the Atlantic and the submarine menace. However, here is a Japanese fleet at Formosa besides light naval forces which are based in the Mandates. The original plan of taking Indochina bases was abandoned since that would have warned America which might have taken action. The current plan for a direct surprise attack on Malaya in force does not entail the use of such bases. Last night, although American newspaper correspondents had a story along these lines, they were unable to send it.

File No. : 740.0011 P. W./191.

SECRET

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In reply refer to Exhibit
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

29 April 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am sending by special officer messenger copy of the questions you asked us to send to the British when we were last in the White House, and also an enclosing copy of their reply.

Please note the "secret status".

Betty

Op-12-VED
A16-1/EF13
(Serial 5)

SECRET

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April 25, 1941.

SECRET

My dear Admiral Danckwerts:

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has instructed me to convey to you his view that the provisions of paragraph 6 of the main report of ABC-1 ought to apply to major changes in the disposition of the forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, even in advance of the time that the United States may enter the war. He proposes, therefore, to keep the British Chief of the Naval Staff informed as to all contemplated shifts of United States naval forces, and to invite the advice of that officer concerning such movements.

2. I have already informed you orally that one aircraft carrier and five destroyers are now en route from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and that the primary reason for this movement is because the U.S.S. RANGER (Atlantic Fleet) is soon to undergo an extensive navy yard overhaul.

3. However, the Chief of Naval Operations has in contemplation other changes of a more important nature. He therefore requests that you obtain the opinion of the Chief of the Naval Staff as to the following:

- (a) With due regard to the existing political situation in the Far East, and to the present strength of the United States Atlantic Fleet, would it be advisable, at this time, for the United States to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic three battleships, four light cruisers, and two destroyer squadrons? (Note that this force is nearly equal to the force to be transferred after the United States enters the war.)
- (b) If Axis pressure forces the British Mediterranean Fleet to leave the Mediterranean Sea, would this Fleet remain in the Indian Ocean or Far Eastern waters? Would it be desirable at the time this British fleet retires to the eastward, for the United States simultaneously to shift strong naval forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic?

Sincerely,

/s/ R.E. Turner,

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.

Rear Admiral V.H. Danckwerts, C.M.G.,
British Embassy,
1100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

Copy to:

War Plans Division, U.S. Army
Rear Admiral H.D. Gurney, U.S.N.

|| COPY ||

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Washington, D. C.

NOT SECRET

28th April, 1941

My dear Admiral Turner:

I have to-day received a telegraphic reply from the British Chiefs of Staff to the contents of your letter dated April 25th, 1941 (Op-12-VED A16-1/EF13(Serial 5..))

2. The Chiefs of Staff express their gratitude for the proposals made in paragraph 1. of your letter, and ask that the Chief of Naval Operations may be informed of their full agreement with these proposals.

3. As regards the provision of reciprocal information, the Chiefs of Staff feel sure that the Chief of Naval Operations will appreciate the difficulty of providing a day to day report of all changes, but propose that a regular periodical summary of British major dispositions should be communicated by them. They suggest that it might be rendered weekly, and would be glad to know if this suggestion would be satisfactory to the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. The Chiefs of Staff consider that the move proposed in paragraph 3(a) of your letter would be advantageous. It would make more forces available for Western Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 2, and in the event of the United States entering the war would reduce the time taken for United States' Naval forces to relieve the British force at present based on Gibraltar. The Chiefs of Staff feel satisfied that the consequential reduction in the strength of the United States' Pacific Fleet would not unduly encourage Japan.

5. As regards the question posed in paragraph 3(b) of your letter, while the Chiefs of Staff do not anticipate that any such contingency is likely at present, they state that should the circumstance arise, and the Suez Canal still be open, the Mediterranean Fleet would probably be sent into the Indian Ocean in the first place. In that event they agree that a further transference of Naval forces from the United States' Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic would be desirable.

British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

-2-

6. If the Mediterranean Fleet was not able to pass direct into the Indian Ocean owing to the blocking of the Suez Canal, the Fleet would be brought into the Atlantic through the Western Mediterranean; an operation which the Chiefs of Staff consider feasible. In this event, and assuming that no other capital ship force had been sent to the Far East or Indian Ocean, a further reduction in the strength of the Pacific Fleet would be undesirable.

7. As regards the reference to the movement of the Mediterranean Fleet being limited to the Indian Ocean as a first stage, I believe it to be the views of the Chiefs of Staff that if Japan was a belligerent it would not be advisable to send to the Far East itself, to be based on Singapore, a naval force weaker than that put forward in ABC-1, Annex III, Page 15. Until, therefore, that strength was available it would be their intention to retain the Mediterranean Fleet (three battleships, etc.) in the Indian Ocean based probably in Trincomalee.

8. Nevertheless, I interpret their reply to mean that in their view a U.S. naval strength similar to that of the Mediterranean Fleet could be transferred into the Atlantic, in addition to those units proposed in paragraph 3(a) of your letter, if the Mediterranean Fleet moved into the Indian Ocean and Japan still remained a non-belligerent. It will be realized that such a further transfer to the Atlantic from the Pacific Fleet would facilitate an earlier despatch to the Far East of additional British naval forces which, in conjunction with the Mediterranean Fleet, would provide the necessary strength for satisfactory operation from Singapore in the event of Japan entering the war.

9. If the Chief of Naval Operations wishes to pursue this matter further, perhaps we might have a discussion on the subject, after which I could question the Chiefs of Staff in more detail.

Yours sincerely

V.H. Danckwerts

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner,
U. S. Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

My Dear Mr. President: I am
attaching herewith
a formal reply to from
the Defence Committee of
the British Cabinet to
the query. we put to
Adm. Danksbury on Transfer
of part of the Pacific fleet
to the Atlantic.

Yours sincerely

J.K.

REPLY TO CERTAIN UNITED STATES PROPOSALS**SECRET**AIDE MEMOIRE.

Inform U.S. authorities that the issues raised by this proposal have been considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and that as such a move vitally affects Australia and New Zealand we have obtained their opinions.

2. Our opinion which is concurred in in general by both Australia and New Zealand is that any marked advance by the U.S. Navy in or into the Atlantic would be on the whole more likely to deter Japan from going to war than the maintenance of the present very large U.S. Fleet at Hawaii, and further that it might exercise a profound influence on the present critical situation in Spain, Turkey and Vichy France. You should therefore strongly encourage American action in this sense.

3. The problem for the U.S. authorities is so nicely to judge the degree of the transfer that while still retaining the deterrent effect of a strong U.S. Fleet in the Pacific, there will also be the deterrent effect of an increased U.S. Fleet in the Atlantic.

4. It is not only the strength but also the composition of the Fleet in the Pacific which will act as a deterrent, and in our view the necessary effect will not remain unless the Fleet in the Pacific consisted of not less than 6 capital ships and 2 aircraft carriers. Inclusion of the latter is considered of the greatest importance.

8th May, 1941.

W. J. P. Smith

Re Administ.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: OCTOBER 17, 1941

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,
LORD HALDAX

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador called and handed me the at-
tached copy of a memorandum of conversation between the Am-
bassador of Japan and himself yesterday.

The Ambassador said that he understood the difficulties
of this country and Japan in finding ways and means of keep-
ing up the appearance of not-too-strained relations between
our two countries while the present government of Japan en-
deavors to improve public sentiment and opinion in support
of the basic principles for which this Government stands and
which envisage a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific
area. The Ambassador said he would communicate with his
Government in order to see if it had any suggestions along
this line, which would ask the Government of Japan to move
in our direction on the fundamental issues involved.

FW 711.94/2357

11/11/41

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1. The Japanese Ambassador asked rather mysteriously this morning for an interview with me, and came to see me this afternoon.

He began by recalling a conversation that we had had when he had first arrived in Washington as to the desirability of maintaining peace in the Pacific. Inwardly, as I knew, he had been talking with Mr. Hull, and from those three or four principal points of difficulty had emerged.

The first point concerned the Japanese attitude. The Ambassador did not develop this in detail beyond saying that the Japanese Government wished for a more moderate exhibition of the Japanese attitude that they had hitherto felt. He said that the United States Government should be aware of this attitude.

He then went on to say that the Japanese Government was not in a position to make any concessions in the Pacific, and that they were not in a position to make any concessions in the Pacific.

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He then went on to say that the Japanese Government was not in a position to make any concessions in the Pacific, and that they were not in a position to make any concessions in the Pacific.

711.94/2587

03/21

There is some question as to whether it is a point which involves the great interests of the country.

But the Ambassador did not attach any special importance of policy. He said that it was a point which was never in a general sense a principle of policy, and that the Emperor's wishes would be followed.

The outbreak of a war between Japan and the United States, reported in the United States, was of great importance, and might be disastrous.

Everything in the Japanese mind was directed towards the United States, and the only difference was as to the price that should be paid for it.

4. Reverting to the Tri-Partite Pact, the Ambassador said that though we might disagree, the Japanese Government of the time had regarded adherence to it as the only policy that was possible for Japan to pursue, having regard to the evidence of what he called Anglo-Japan cooperation against Japan.

Freezing and embargo laws were not likely to affect very seriously the ordinary Japanese consuming public, who were accustomed to low standards, but would create difficulty for Japanese business, which was pressing, that some way out must be found.

5. I said that nobody wanted to strangle Japan, either here or in the British Commonwealth, provided Japanese policy was no longer such as to constitute a threat. Moreover, if he would allow me to say so, Japanese economic difficulties were of her own making, and certainly, she could not get out

3.

of the difficulties largely created by one war by plunging into another.

Both the United States and Great Britain wanted to see peace preserved in the Pacific, and there was no reason why peace should not be maintained if the Japanese Government abandoned its expansionist policy, and were willing to recognize principles which both the United States and Great Britain wished to see maintained.

But do not let the Japanese Government make the mistake of backing the wrong horse. I could well understand that many people in Japan might be misled by the succession of apparent Japanese victories, but let them remember that none of these victories had yet brought Germany within sight of the only victory that would win the war.

It might indeed well be urged that they had largely exaggerated German difficulties, and that the strain that they would impose would end by becoming intolerable.

The Ambassador said that many in Japan agreed with this view, and that he himself was of opinion that one victory or two victories were not the same thing as a war.

Returning to his main point, he asked me whether I thought that it would be possible to find any sound ground for the modified statement of value in giving the matter the same importance as the original statement. He said that the latter of the two points to which he had referred at the outset of our conversation, which he thought it would be extremely difficult for any Government to solve quickly.

We know how close the relations of the United States Government and the United States Government were. We hoped that it would be an opportunity for the United States Government to do it. We would be very glad to do it.

1. The Commission has received information that the following individuals have been identified as being involved in the activities of the Communist Party, U.S.A., in the State of New York:

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

3468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

-A-10257, December 1, 1941. (SECTION 101, CHAPTER 1, TITLE 18, U.S.C.)

Resistance was not offered until the ship was within 100
yards, but it was then the ship was hit by a
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Age Group	Total (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Unknown (%)
18-24	28	25	30	25
25-34	22	20	24	20
35-44	18	16	20	16
45-54	12	10	14	10
55-64	8	6	10	6
65+	4	3	5	3

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1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1038.

— *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997

Figure 11.10: A plot of $\log_{10}(\text{number of species})$ versus $\log_{10}(\text{number of individuals})$.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

• Wages in Indochina in 1950 to 1951

Journal of Clinical Pharmacy and Therapeutics, 1995, 20, 1-10

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... ..

— *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997

1. *Chrysomelids* (Coleoptera: Chrysomelidae) 10

— *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997

[illegible]

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1990; 263: 1025-1026.

C. J. ...

— *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997

100

3472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

-2- 5257, November 5, 5 p.m., (SECTION THREE) from
London.

of the Pacific hand upon it. Indeed it is not too
much to say that the outcome of the whole war may
hang upon it. If China had the air force she needs
I should be making no appeal to you, because I should
feel confident of my ability to defeat the invaders.
But I have nothing that I can call an air force to
fight against what the Japanese would bring to bear
upon me, for we may be sure that they will use their
flies (group undecipherable) and their strongest. If
however in this battle Japan's air force can be
checked or even crushed, her power to enter upon
what I have called fresh enterprises will be much
diminished. It is true that you may will remain
strong, but still there is a good deal to be done
without which you will be unable to do what you
wish to do.

W. A. F.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

10-11-7, November 6, 6:00 AM from London

If the $\mathcal{H}$ -norm is not a norm, then $\mathcal{H}$ is not a Hilbert space.

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...all the streets:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation


DATE:

November 12, 1941

SUBJECT: United States-Japanese negotiations

PARTICIPANTS: British Ambassador, Viscount Halifax;
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: S, PA/D, Eu, PA/H, FE



F-711.34/2340-4/10

The British Ambassador called this morning at his request.

The Ambassador read to me a memorandum (the text of which is attached herewith) reporting on a recent conversation between the British Ambassador in Tokyo and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I told the Ambassador that, as the Secretary of State had frequently pointed out to the Japanese Government, the British Government would be informed fully of the basis for any projected negotiations between Japan and the United States if the present conversations now in progress gave any definite promise that such negotiations would be undertaken. I communicated to the Ambassador, in

At a recent interview in Tokyo the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs told His Majesty's Ambassador that negotiations with the United States had now been proceeding since last April, and that his experience in such matters made him pessimistic about the outcome of a military process. In the Privy Council impatience was now taking the place of the hopes originally placed in the discussions, and it was therefore highly desirable to discover the way out before feeling became too exacerbated. Matters were being discussed which were of the utmost concern to British interests and Mr. Tojo said he was therefore somewhat surprised that His Majesty's Government were taking no part in the discussions. While he could understand that in the early stages we might prefer to leave matters in the hands of the United States Government, a point had now been reached where a breakdown might have repercussions upon British interests. The Minister said he had a strong impression that, for reasons best known to themselves, the United States Government were deliberately dragging out the negotiations. If this were so it would of course be impossible for the Japanese Government to continue them.

Speaking for himself, Sir Robert Craigie told the Japanese Foreign Minister that he felt sure that there had been no desire in any quarter deliberately to drag out the negotiations. But as he understood the position, the United States Government had been unable to elicit sufficiently definite assurances and undertakings in regard to Japan's future/

711.34/1000-0/101

future intentions, and this might lead to a hitch.

The objective under discussion was an ambitious one - namely, the settlement of the situation as a whole - and it was obvious that a task of this magnitude would require time as well as patience on both sides. As regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the negotiations, Sir Robert Blandford stated that it was one of helpful expectancy, and that while the Foreign Secretary was desirous of seeing a settlement reached which would be just to all the parties concerned, he was equally anxious not to intervene in any manner likely to hamper the discussions between the United States and Japan.

Upon receipt of the above report of his interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sir Robert Blandford was instructed to speak to him as follows:

Although His Majesty's Government are not fully acquainted with the details of the conversations which have been taking place, they are aware that the United States Government have been seeking a basis of discussion with the Japanese Government towards a general settlement in the Far East. The British Government believe such a settlement to be in their commonest interests as well as those of Japan and it is their earnest desire that it should be achieved. It cannot be expected however that all the living should be in the situation, and no advantage is seen in entering into negotiations unless some basis

For/

-3-

for discussion can be agreed upon in advance which establishes principles upon which agreement will be sought. The British Government have been content to leave this part of the proceedings in the hands of the United States Government who are well aware of the British position. Moreover the United States Government have assured the British Government (and it is believed that they have so informed the Japanese Government) that should actual negotiations become possible the British Government will at once be consulted. At that point the British Government will be very ready to collaborate with the United States and Japanese Governments in seeking a solution of their joint problems.

Sir R. Craigie was further authorised, at his own discretion, to urge upon the Japanese Government the advantage of a supreme effort to reach agreement with the United States, as against the desperate risks to Japan of allowing a situation to develop in which it might no longer be possible to control the issue of peace or war.

THE BRITISH LEGATION,

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

November 11th, 1941.

3482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO MR. HORNBECK BY MR. DENING OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY
NOVEMBER 14, 1941 (PARAPHRASE)

It may be of interest to the Department of State to have the following indications as to the possibility of an attack on Thailand by the Japanese. According to a report by the British Ambassador to Japan, there are several factors which indicate that early in 1942 is the most likely time for action against Thailand unless other factors result in precipitation of the crisis earlier.


It is stated by the British representative at Bangkok that there is no rain in Thailand from approximately mid-November until May and thus the dry weather lasts from December through April. He also reports that in the flat country, that is, Central Thailand and Cambodia, during the dry season the earth in the rice fields is baked hard. He was informed that at that time it is not difficult to improvise airdromes for temporary use, and suggests that if an attack on Thailand is contemplated by the Japanese, the beginning of 1942 may well be the best time for it.

Information has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, that there are at present about 30,000 Japanese troops in Cochin-China and Cambodia and that one and perhaps two tank regiments are included among these. Large quantities of anti-aircraft guns, motor transport and other transportation material have been imported, including small vessels which could be used for transport as far as the new boundary, situated in the northern end of Tonle Sap Lake. It is known that there are a number of air fields in the North which have either asphalt or concrete runways and which can be used at any time of the year. There are in the South metal runways at Tourane, Penon, Penh and Angkor, as well as an asphalt runway at Tan Son Nhut. Work is proceeding rapidly on the construction of runways at other fields in the South, at which heavy bombers will be used.

File No.: 740.0011 P. W./1465.

*Documents requested by
the British Minister were
forwarded by Mr. Nathan
on Dec. 9, 1941 to the
British Ambassador
H. H. H.*

✓ DCR
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.



29th November, 1941.

Re: "The Japanese"

Dear Mr. Hull,

When I got back to the Embassy this morning I found a telegram from Eden asking whether it would be possible to let him see the text of the document given to the Japanese.

I have already told him of its general character as you described it to me, but I have no doubt, if you have no objection, he would be grateful for the opportunity of seeing the text.

Yours very sincerely,

(for the Ambassador)

R. J. L. H.

The Honorable Mr. Wendell Hull,

Secretary of State to the United States.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D C

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PS/ATB

(Continued on page 2)

Harper

The Honorable Earl Russell,
Secretary of State, United States.

It is conceivable that United States Government may raise with you the question of the compatibility of the operation referred to with our treaty of non-aggression with Thailand. It may be useful for you to know therefore that we have given careful consideration to this point.

4. In July last we informed the Thai Government that we should regard the grant of bases to Japan as an infraction of that treaty. Similarly (although we have as yet made no communication to the Thai Government) we should not feel we could allow the treaty to be a bar to our entering Thailand if a Japanese invasion occurred or was clearly impending. But it would be greatly preferable if in these eventualities we could act in co-operation with the Thai Government. If therefore it were decided to undertake the operation, we should naturally do our best to secure Thais' consent. It would be important however not to reveal to the Thai Government prematurely the existence of our plan owing to the danger of leakage to the Japanese.

30.11.41.

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 8th, 1941.

Secret.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein copies of
the latest report received from London
on the military situation.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

PARAPHRASE OF A REPORT FROM LONDON ON THE MILITARY SITUATION DELIVERED TO
THE PRESIDENT FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY ON 8TH DECEMBER

The information provided is based on reports received up to 7 a. m., 7th December, 1941.

(I) NAVAL REPORTS:

Air reconnaissance reported at 3:15 a. m. 6th December, 2 Japanese convoys of 25 and 10 ships (respectively), escorted by cruisers and destroyers, by Point Cambo (Cochin China) on a course of 270 degrees West. Contact has been lost and there is no further news at present. The armed boarding vessel mentioned in yesterday's summary was sunk by torpedo aircraft. She had on board 300 British wounded and 100 prisoners of war. 201 persons were rescued. A small British merchant vessel was sunk off Cromer last night, it is thought by a mine.

(II) MILITARY REPORTS:

LIBYA. 6th December. We maintained pressure with our mobile columns on the whole front Bardia-El Adem and also on the enemy lines of communication behind. Latest reports indicate that the enemy has concentrated his forces South of El Adem and is moving South-East towards El Gobi which is held by our troops.

RUSSIA. German pressure on Moscow continues.

(III) AIR OPERATIONS:

6th December. Spitfires damaged seriously storage systems and buildings at two alcoholic distilleries in the Cherbourg Peninsula. Our aircraft also attacked similar targets in the Dunkirk area. Off the Norwegian coast a Hudson claimed hits on a 7,500 ton merchant vessel and Beauforts probable hits on a 4,000 ton merchant vessel and a 5,000 ton tanker.

LIBYA. Nothing further to my previous report.

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN. 5-6th December. 20 Wellingtons attacked Naples for five hours. Over 25½ tons of bombs were dropped, two 4,000 pounders starting a large fire in the torpedo factory, while other bombs fell on the arsenal, air frame works, and the railway. We lost one aircraft.

(IV) G. A. F. 6th December.

A German bomber was destroyed by our fighters South of Plymouth.

MALTA. 5-6th December. Some 20 bombers approached the island during a period of nine hours. Only 8 crossed the coast and caused some damage.

(V) AIRCRAFT CASUALTIES:

In operations over and from the British Isles—German 1.

(VI) 6th December.

The transfer from the Baltic States to Finland of broad gauge locomotives and rolling stock, including tank wagons, will help to relieve the transport situation and assist German economic exploitation. This confirms reports that the whole railway system in the Baltic States is in the process of being converted to standard gauge and also the opinion that Germany intends to convert the gauge of all railways in occupied Russia.

(VII)

Both empty and full oil trains from and to Italy have regular military escorts on the Rumanian-Hungarian section of the route which indicates the degree of unrest in Hungary and Rumania.

FURTHER REPORT 7th DECEMBER, 1941

Report received at 17:40 G. M. T. today from the Commander-in-Chief in China that the Japanese were attempting to land from 5 ships at Kota Bharu on the East coast of Malaya, immediately South of the Siam Malaya frontier.

EXHIBIT NO. 159

This Exhibit is a compilation of material relating to United States—Chinese conversations concerning the Japanese situation, and consists of the following items:

1. Memorandum for the President by Lauchlin Currie dated May 10, 1941 concerning the Chinese aircraft program attaching two documents, one prepared by the Chinese Mission and the other written by Dr. Hornbeck.
2. Telegram from Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek dated July 8, 1941.
3. Telegram from Minister of Communications dated July 8, 1941 with attached telegram from Berlin dated July 4, 1941.
4. Cable to Lauchlin Currie from Owen Lattimore, Chungking, dated July 22, 1941.
5. Memorandum for the President from Sumner Welles dated August 7, 1941 with two enclosures, being
 - (1) A note for the Secretary of State dated August 2, 1941 from the Chinese Ambassador with enclosure and
 - (2) Communications to the American Embassy, Chungking, dated August 7, 1941.


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Chinese Aircraft Program

In connection with your consideration of the tentative aircraft program for China which I submitted yesterday, you may find the attached documents of some interest. The one without a title was prepared by the Chinese Mission here and the other was written by Dr. Hornbeck.


Lauchlin Currie

Singapore is the key to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Its position determines the control of eastern Asia regardless of the fate of the Philippines. All steps taken so far by Japan indicate their intention to prepare for a move against Singapore.

One may assume that although Singapore is well fortified, small British land, sea, and air forces there are likely to find it difficult to sustain for long the full impact of the Japanese fleet, air, and land forces unless outside assistance be given.

The recent Soviet-Japanese pact has enabled Japan to release at least ten crack divisions and some five hundred first line planes now in Manchuria for operation in other theaters of war.

Singapore could be saved by active intervention of the entire United States fleet with its attendant dangers and complications.

There is, however, a powerful means to check Japanese attack on Singapore and the South Seas or to assist in the effective defence of the beleaguered key fortress, without the intervention of the United States fleet, and that is the creation of a small but efficient air force in China.

This force would constitute a threat to the flank of a Japanese advance southward. Every Japanese move, concentrations on Formosa or Hainan, convoys of transports into China, Siam, or further west, transport of troops across Indo-China, and above all, Japanese air concentrations in Tonkin and Cochin China would be watched systematically, but more important, exposed to constant attack and diversion.

The configuration of southeastern Asia exposes Japan to such action on the part of an efficient hostile air force. Such a force located between the Burma frontier and the province of Kweichow, mostly on high plateaus, has only to cover some 350 miles to reach the Japanese air concentrations at Hanol, where hundreds of planes are crowding the few airports which the topography of the country permits to utilize. Further, it would interfere with Japanese military transports and troop concentration on Formosa, Hainan, Paracels Island, which are all within easy range. The force could as easily attack concentrations of Japanese planes, troops, and shipping in southern Indo-China and Siam.

The Japanese are sprawled all over China and the existence of this air force would enable the main body of the Chinese regular armies to undertake counter-offensive operations with good assurance of success, which they cannot do at present until so provided with the requisite air arm. The Japanese armies in central China depend exclusively for their supplies on the long and winding Yangtze, which provides an ideal target for an air force operating on interior lines. With the initial strength of the new air force the Chinese troops could launch counter-attacks, the main purpose of which would be not only to hold existing Japanese forces in China but to compel the continuous dispatch of strong reinforcements.

Finally, the main industrial areas within Japan, the triangle Kobe, Kyoto, Osaka, as well as Yokohama and Tokyo, could be attacked by bombers operating from existing air fields in China.

[2] All the above objectives can be achieved efficiently and successfully by a force of 500 planes composed of 350 pursuits and 150 bombers. The existing lines of communication from ports of entry from the west permit to supply and maintain in the field such a force, and would be doubly assured if urgently supplemented by some 35 transport planes of the DC-3 type. The American-operated China National Airways Corporation estimate that this would give an additional capacity of 4,000 tons monthly from the rail head in Burma and over the most difficult section of the Burma highway.

The full strength of 500 planes could be reached by three stages.

The first stage when the 100 P-40's now on the water reach China and the pilots and ground crews now volunteering for service are already in the field. In July the force of pursuits could begin protecting the ways of access to China and particularly the Burma highway.

Second stage. A force ready to operate in September and composed of 200 pursuits and 100 bombers could be constituted if immediate decision were taken and intense preparations were made to supply an additional 100 pursuits and 100 bombers to be shipped during the month of May.

Third stage. By the first of November a full force of 500 craft would be ready to operate by shipment in June and July of 150 pursuits and 50 bombers. In addition, replacements at the rate of 15 percent would have to be provided.

The gradual development of the operations would by then permit the full force to attack all the objectives at the end of the rainy season. From the first

of November there is six months of clear weather over Burma and Yunnan, permitting extensive operations. Thus preparatory work would be accomplished under the cover of bad weather and the force would be ready to operate at the best season, provided immediate decision and requisite practical steps are taken, which would imply certain diversions of planes, equipment, and personnel, and concentrated preparation (including the question of shipping).

Permission has already been obtained to recruit pilots and ground crews for the P-40's already on the way. If permission is given to recruit an additional 150 pilots and 300 technical men for ground crews, the personnel of the force could be in the field by the end of July. There are 1,200 Chinese pilots and a large number of ground crews available in China; one-third experienced, one-third with fighting experience, and the remainder requiring more training, and the existence of this renders it possible to limit the number of the foreign members of the force.

With this personnel and aircraft in operation this autumn, not only the determined Japanese move toward the south could be prevented or rendered difficult, but should this move materialize, vitally effective assistance would be afforded to the defenders of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies by constant attacks in the rear of the enemy forces.

To sum up:

Effective air operations in China should follow a carefully planned program which includes the procurement, shipment, assembly, and operation of specified types of airplanes in order to attain prescribed tactical and strategical objectives.

[3] The general outline of such a program follows.

First Phase

Airplanes Required:

1. 100 bombardment, modified Lockheed Hudson type.
2. 100 pursuit, P-40 type.
3. 100 pursuit, P-43 type.

Note: Of the above listed airplanes, 100 P-40's have been procured and are en route to China.

Volunteer Personnel:

1. 100 pilots.
2. 160 technical and clerical.

Note: These men are now being employed.

Tactical Objectives:

1. Defence of air bases, Burma highway, supplies in transit and in storage in Yunnan province and industrial establishments in vicinity of Kunming, Yunnan, by:
 - a. Local operation of pursuit airplanes.
 - b. Counter-offensive operations of bombardment airplanes.

Strategical Objective:

To force the Japanese to divert a portion of the air force now available for expeditionary use to the defence of his bases in Indo-China and counter-offensive operations in Yunnan province.

Time Schedule:

1. The 100 pursuit airplanes, P-40 type, may begin initial operations early in July, 1941.
2. The 100 bombardment airplanes, Lockheed Hudson type, and 100 pursuit airplanes, P-43 type, may begin operations early in September if the airplanes of both classes are made available without delay.

Second Phase

Airplanes Required:

1. Maintenance of initial strength of:
 - a. 100 pursuit, P-40 type;
 - b. 100 pursuit, P-43 type;
 - c. 100 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson type, by regular monthly replacement of losses.
2. Provision of additional airplanes of following classes, types, and numbers:
 - a. 100 pursuit, P-43 or P-47.
 - b. 50 pursuit, P-89.
 - c. 50 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson, B-26 or B-23.

3492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[4] Volunteer Personnel:

1. Increase volunteer personnel as follows:
 - a. Pilots, 150 additional.
 - b. Technical, clerical, 250 additional.

Tactical Objectives:

1. Defence of all establishments in Yunnan province.
2. Attack Japanese air bases in Indo-China and on Hainan Island.
3. Attack Japanese supply dumps in Indo-China and Hainan Island.
4. Attack Japanese supply vessels, transports, tankers, and small naval vessels in harbors of Indo-China and Hainan Island and at sea between those places.
5. Occasional raids on Japanese industrial establishments in Japan.
6. Attack Japanese supply vessels on Yangtze River.
7. Support of offensive operations of Chinese armies.

Strategical Objectives:

1. Force diversion of considerable portion of available Japanese air force to defence of Japanese establishments on South China coast and in Japan and to counter-offensive operations in interior of China.
2. Enable Chinese armies to assume operations which will make necessary heavy reinforcement of Japanese troops in China.
3. Destruction of Japanese supplies and supply ships in order to handicap operations of an expeditionary force to the south of Indo-China.
4. Destruction of Japanese factories in order to cripple production of munitions and essential articles for maintenance of economic structure in Japan.

Time Schedule:

1. The increase of the air force from 300 to 500 airplanes (350 pursuit and 150 bombardment) should be completed by October 31, 1941.

When the railway between the Burma Road and Siang Yun is completed, and this could be effected by June, 1942, sufficient carrying capacity would be amply provided for the maintenance in the field of 1,000 combat planes, or indeed any strength it is desired to build up to.

Table of approximate distances in statute miles

	Kun-ming	Kweilin
Hainan (Klungchow).....	610	380
Formosa (Taihoku).....	1,190	720
Paracels Island.....	800	590
Hanoi.....	335	430
Saigon.....	1,025	1,055
Bangkok.....	805	1,045
Siam-Malaya border line.....	1,340	1,520
Singapore.....	1,655	1,750
Manila.....	1,400	1,030
Soerabaja.....	2,360	2,300
Calcutta.....	950	

	Chu-chow	Heng-chow	Kan-chow	Kian	Manila
Nagasaki.....	730	1,150	1,060	1,020	1,460
Kobe.....	1,060	1,485	1,410	1,360	
Osaka.....	1,085	1,510	1,435	1,385	1,780
Tokyo.....	1,355	1,780	1,690	1,645	2,010

December 4, 1940

Revised April 23, 1941.

The importance of Singapore to the defense of the British Isles and the British Empire and to the interests of the United States

1. The importance of Singapore to the immediate defense of the British Isles lies in the fact that any major naval power based in Singapore could command the Indian Ocean and the maritime routes of access to the raw materials and man-

power of India, Malaya, and most of the Dutch East Indies. While the British Isles could perhaps carry on without access to these materials and to this manpower, the effect of such a loss upon the economic and financial resources of the British Isles—would be considerable. Such a loss by seriously weakening our own economy (rubber, tin, jute, quinine, vegetable oils, tungsten, antimony, mica are among the supplies that might be lost to us) would adversely affect the extent of our economic aid to the British Isles.

2. More important, the British Isles cannot carry on in a defensive position for an indefinitely prolonged period. However strong defensively, they must in time succumb unless a sustained offensive can successfully be launched against Germany. It is from this point of view [2] that Singapore assumes its greatest importance in the defense—as directed to ultimate survival—of the British Isles; i. e., the *long-term defense of the Isles*.

From point of view of ultimate offensive action against Germany, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East are areas of major and of obvious importance affording as they do (1) the key to an invasion of Europe through the disaffected occupied countries of the Balkans or through a weakened and perhaps collapsing Italy and (2) a possible means of once more bringing into action against the Axis the French forces in Syria and in North Africa. The significance of Singapore to the defense of the British position in the Near East lies in its domination of the only remaining effective lines of communication for the supply of materials and troops to that area. If these Japanese gained possession of Singapore it would seem that they could not only control Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies but most or all of the Indian Ocean as well. (See attached summary of distances from Singapore to various points.)

Troop reinforcements for the British forces in the Near East come from Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma, South Africa and/or the British Isles. Supplies for these forces come from some or all of the foregoing areas and/or [3] from among the following: Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Western Hemisphere. As British naval power cannot ensure uninterrupted passage of the Mediterranean by British transports or by British merchant vessels (even though the increasingly doubtful assumption be made that the Axis powers will at no time during the war be able to close the Straits of Gibraltar), the only sure (for the present) route of access to the Near East from the areas named above is via the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

3. It must also be remembered that one of Britain's major weapons against Germany is the blockade. The rôle of Suez and of the Eastern Mediterranean in the enforcement of the blockade is readily apparent. Singapore's rôle is hardly of less significance. The regions of the Indian Ocean and of the Pacific eastward and southward and northward from Singapore are vast reservoirs of supplies. While Great Britain controls the routes to those reservoirs, Germany can be kept in larger measure from drawing on them. Should Great Britain lose that control, not only would the British Isles be deprived of those supplies but those supplies would in substantial measure be made available to Germany—via the Persian Gulf and the Caspian and via Vladivostok. In the event of loss by the British both of [4] Singapore and of their position in the Near East, the Axis Powers would have direct and full access to each other and these supplies could, therefore, be made *directly* available to Germany with the result that all effectiveness of the strategy of the blockade would be lost.

In brief, were Singapore to be taken by Japan, Great Britain's tasks, both of (1) defending the British Isles and of (2) winning the war, would be rendered vastly more difficult and her chances of survival be greatly diminished.

4. Singapore is, furthermore, important from point of view of more obviously direct interests of the United States. Were Singapore to fall, the blockade of China (except for the inadequate and unreliable northwest route from Russia) could be made complete and the defeat of China by Japan would be facilitated. The control over the natural resources of the South Seas area which Japan would acquire if it took Singapore has already been indicated. Our own position in the Philippines—a far more valuable possession both economically and strategically than is usually recognized—would, of course, be strategically prejudiced.

It is in its effect upon China's resistance, however, that the fall of Singapore to Japan would most [5] conclusively affect (adversely) the direct interests of the United States (other than and in addition to our interest in survival of the British Empire). Were China to succumb we would be less able than now to protect our interests in the Far East. Our historic Far Eastern policy and our whole position in the Far East would be seriously compromised.

Not the least of the disastrous results of China's defeat would be a serious drop, as a result of such a blow to our prestige, in popular morale in this country and in the morale of the peoples of South America. The only remaining counterweights to the power and influence in the Far East of Japan would be those of Russia. With the collapse of China, Japan would be master in East Asia and in the South Seas, and Japan would be able to draw freely upon China's natural resources and manpower. The security of Australia and New Zealand—to both of which we are bound by increasingly strong ties—would be endangered. In addition, Japan's access to the great economic resources of India would be definitely facilitated and Japanese political influence in India would increase.

The increase in Japan's strength vis-à-vis the United States which would result from these various developments would be notable, and Japan's ability to challenge our [6] economic (and before long our political) position in Central and South America would be vastly increased. At the same time, our general commercial and strategic position would be considerably weakened—by our loss of the Chinese, Indian and South Seas markets for our exports (and by our loss of much of the Japanese market for our goods, as Japan would become more and more self-sufficient) as well as by inevitable restrictions upon our access to the rubber, tin, quinine, jute, tungsten, tung oil and other vital materials of the Asian and Oceanic regions.

5. It has been suggested that Japan would be only too glad to sell to the British and to us the products of the region, and that in fact, therefore, our (and the British) economic situation would not be adversely affected. The fate of British and American trade in Manchuria and in North China is persuasive evidence that our (and British) export trade would certainly suffer. Whether Japan's ability to dictate the terms upon which we could acquire rubber, tin, and other products would also prove harmful to us in *times of peace* need not concern us. The *present* and the *immediate futures* are *times of war*, and in the war that is raging not only is Japan an open if nonbelligerent partner of Germany and Italy but the United States is openly aiding Great Britain and China.

[7] Japan must—while and so long as she is an ally of Germany—aid Germany in the latter's attempt to destroy the British Empire, and toward that end Japan must give support to Germany's attempts to hamstring the British in their operations—both general and particular—of resistance. Consequently, were Japan to acquire control of Singapore (i. e. control of the key ways to the vast natural resources of Asia and the South Seas) it could not with any warrant be expected that she would freely sell to the British or to us—we being Britain's greatest armorer and supplier—what we severally and jointly need (with our expanding requirements) of the strategic materials of the Orient.

6. There is little if any warrant for the view, rather lightly advanced in various quarters (and made without consideration of the above-enumerated reasons why successful Japanese aggression southward would make Germany's defeat far less likely), that, if and when Germany shall have been defeated, it would be an easy matter for Great Britain and/or the United States to put Japan out of any advanced positions which Japan may or might have taken while British and American attention and efforts were concentrated upon problems in the Atlantic and in Europe. Were the Japanese during the present war to occupy Singapore without having had to pay a huge [8] price, the Japanese Empire would be at the end of the war a very different entity from that which it is today, an entity much more powerful in a military sense than it is now. Is there any warrant for an assumption that at that point the British would be so powerful that they would and could move with success against such a Japan as would then exist? It may well be doubted, also, whether the people of the United States would at that point be willing to embark upon far-flung overseas operations for the mere purpose of driving the Japanese out of points in which they had established themselves on the western side of the Pacific.

DISTANCES FROM SINGAPORE TO VARIOUS POINTS, IN STATUTE MILES BY GREAT CIRCLE MEASUREMENTS

West coast of Ceylon—1,700 miles.

(Note: If Singapore could not be defended, certainly Ceylon could not be— from Colombo to the mouth of the Gulf of Aden it is 2,000 miles and from Colombo to the northwestern tip of Sumatra it is 1,100 miles. Furthermore, Italian East Africa would be available for minor bases, thus permitting the distances from Colombo to the coast of Italian East Africa—2,000 miles at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden; 2,700 miles at the frontier between Kenya and Italian East Africa—to be halved. Bases at Singapore, Sumatra, Colombo and Italian East Africa would give Japan control of the Indian Ocean with consequent ability to blockade India and to cut all communications to the Gulf of Aden.)

Mouth of Gulf of Aden—3,700 miles.

Northwestern point of Australia—1,800 miles.

(From Java, which is controlled by Singapore, the distance is 1,200 miles.)

West coast of Borneo—400 miles.

Southern tip of French Indochina—450 miles (thus controlling Gulf of Siam)

Jolu in Sulu archipelago of Philippines—1,250 miles.

China Folder

Telegram from General Chiang Kai-shekDated July 8th, 1941

From most reliable sources originating from Japan it is learned that a secret agreement has been concluded and signed between Germany, Italy and Japan on the 6th of July, covering on the one hand recognition of Japanese spheres of interest, and on the other Japanese undertaking to advance southward and against Siberia. Please communicate the news to the President immediately.

Since the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the Soviets have repeatedly announced their desire to conclude definite military arrangements with or against Japan. Will you ask the President if he would be in favor of such an arrangement, and if the situation is allowing for a military pact between China, Russia and Great Britain with the friendly support of the United States.

Confidential

Telegram from Minister of CommunicationsDated July 8, 1941

The Government has secured definite information that the recent Japanese Imperial Conference made the decision to move southward against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies first before coping with the Siberian problem.

In accordance with this information all departments of the Government have received instructions from the Generalissimo to take immediate measures to meet this action.

Confidential

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Telegram from Berlin

Dated July 4, 1941

Replying to your telegram No. 19 during Matsuka's visit to Berlin although understanding was reached as to the respective spheres of interest and responsibility the three Axis partners were unable to agree on the tempo of action. Germany and Italy desired immediate Japanese advance southward to which Matsuka would not agree owing to the then prevailing situation.

I now learn that since the outbreak of the Russo-German conflict complete agreement has been reached which calls for early action against Vladivostok by Japan, simultaneous with consolidation of Japanese bases in Indo-China and Thailand preparatory to an advance southward against the British and the Dutch.

Our friends here declare that we should be by no means discouraged by developments and hope that you may still be able to visit Switzerland.

Owing to the severance of diplomatic relations I am routing my telegram through Switzerland. I am proceeding there myself and hope to maintain contact with our friends from there.

Confidential

APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram addressed to you by General Chiang Kai-shek under date of July 31, 1941, together with a copy of a note from the Chinese Ambassador, dated August 2, forwarding a copy of the telegram in question. As General Chiang's message, in which he conveys to you his gratitude for your having acceded to his request to place Chinese assets in this country under freezing control, refers to other requests which he has made in the interest of strengthening China, it seemed advisable that reply should be made to his telegram without awaiting your return. I accordingly sent today a reply to General Chiang by telegraph through our Embassy at Chungking and enclose a copy of my telegram herewith. I trust that my reply meets with your approval.

Enclosures:

1. From Chinese Ambassador, August 2, with enclosure.
2. To American Embassy, Chungking, August 7.

CHINESE EMBASSY,
Washington, August 2, 1941.

HONORABLE SUMNER WELLES,
Acting Secretary of State

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARYS I have just received a telegraphic message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which he desires to be conveyed to the President. I shall be grateful if you will be so good as to transmit it to its high destination.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

HU SHIH.

Enclosure: Telegram as above.

Translation

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHUNGKING, JULY 31, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am most grateful to you for having acceded to my request to place all Chinese assets under freezing control. This is additional evidence of your desire to assist China in every possible way, and is appreciated by the Chinese people in that spirit.

I am sure that the action of your Government in freezing all Japanese assets will prove an important body blow to the aggressor.

The Chinese Government is sincerely grateful to you and your Government for having brought about concerted action, on both these measures, by practically all the friendly powers who are fighting aggression.

I am confident that my other requests which I have made to you in the interest of strengthening China's fighting power and meeting the emergency situation of the Far East, will receive your kind attention at the appropriate time.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

X X

NAVAL RADIO
AUGUST 7, 1941.

AMEMBASSY,
Chungking.

Please inform General Chiang Kai-shek that the Chinese Ambassador promptly delivered to me for communication to the President General Chiang's gracious expression of appreciation of this Government's action in freezing Chinese assets in this country pursuant to General Chiang's request. State further that the communication will be promptly conveyed to the President, who is absent from Washington at this moment; and that, speaking for the President, I reaffirm that it is the desire and purpose of the people and Government of the United States to aid China in concrete ways in the struggle which the Chinese Government and the Chinese nation are most courageously making to preserve and maintain China's place and perform China's function as one of the great independent nations of the world.

EXHIBIT NO. 160

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Year History
Index*

December 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Remarks of the President on
the occasion of the meeting of his
Cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at
9:00 with legislative leaders, on
December 7, 1941.

(. indicates inaudibility)

. The conversations were interrupted for six weeks to two months. They were then resumed, with the same objective in mind. Despite the Japanese move into Indo-China, they continued until about two weeks ago, when we received indications from various sources—Europe and Asia—that the German government was pressing Japan for action under the tripartite pact. In other words, an effort to divert the American mind, and the British mind, from the European field, and divert American supplies from the European theatre to the defense of the East Asia theatre. About two weeks ago we began to realize that the probability of Japan being in earnest was so slim that it was time to make a final and definite effort to pin them down on the one subject that they had never ever been pinned down on, and that was that they were to agree to cease their acts of aggression, and that they would try to bring the China war to a close.

The result was that the Secretary of State sent a message on that point, to find out whether Japan would be willing to discuss or consider that point of non-aggression. That was the 26th of November. From that time on we were getting more and more definite information that Japan was headed for war, and that the reply to the Secretary of State would be in the negative.

About a week ago, in adding up some of the information in addition to that, moving 100,000 men in Southern Indo-China, the importance of that lies in the fact that geographically Indo-China was at a hub, from which any attack can be made in a number of directions. It is only a very short distance from there to the Philippines in the east. It is a relatively short distance from [2] there down to the Dutch East Indies, which is the most industrial part—southwest there is Singapore—fortified. To the west there is the Malay peninsula, parts of Thailand, and parts of the Malay Straits, and slightly to the northwest is the whole of Thailand—Siam, an independent kingdom, practically surrounded on two sides by England and France. Only a short distance from there, of course, lies Burma, and the entry—the bottleneck to the Burma Road, a short distance from Siam. We are getting a very large proportion of our supplies—rubber, tin, etc.—from that whole area of southwestern Pacific, and we are getting out over the Burma Road—two-way road—we are getting a large amount of very important material, such as tungsten and some oil—for the manufacture of paint.

In addition to that, of course, is the fact that if the Japanese did move to the south, to the Dutch East Indies, from Indo-China, the Philippines would be virtually surrounded. They would have the Japanese on both sides—Indo-China—the Mandated Islands to the west, this side of the Philippines, and the Dutch Indies, and the Japanese possessions in the South. They would be completely encircled by a military power.

And so the thing went along until we believed that under the pressure from Berlin the Japanese were about to do something And so yesterday I sent a final message to the Emperor The Japanese, we learned, were to bring the Secretary of State today a reply to his note of November 26. Actually, in point of fact (?), they telephoned to the State Department, after Hawaii had been attacked, for an appointment. They came to the State Department—[3] they were given an appointment within three-quarters of an hour, and they actually arrived at the State Department one hour after the terrific bombing attack on the Island of Oahu.

Which of course was an act which is almost without parallel in relationships between nations, equaled only by the Japanese episode of 1904, when two squadrons—cruisers—lying in the Harbor of Korea (?) and without any warning—I think on a Sunday morning, by the way—Japanese cruisers sank all of them. There are other parallels, of course, such as the descent on Denmark and Norway in this war, without any warning whatsoever. In fact right in the face of their treaties of non-aggression.

. Sending that message to Congress, which is—after you have read and studied it—one of the most . . . falsehoods that I have had . . .

And finally while we were on the alert—at eight o'clock—half-past seven—about a quarter past—half-past one, a great fleet of Japanese bombers bombed our ships in Pearl Harbor, and bombed all of our airfields. Shortly thereafter this was followed—about eleven o'clock, three hours later—by a third attack, which was not as violent, but most of the damage had already been done. The casualties, I am sorry to say, were extremely heavy. I cannot say anything definitely in regard to the number of ships that have been sunk. It looks as if out of eight battleships, three have been sunk, and possibly a fourth. Two destroyers were blown up while they were in drydock. Two of the battleships are

badly damaged. Several other smaller vessels have been sunk or destroyed. The drydock itself has been damaged. Other portions [4] of the fleet are at sea, moving towards what is believed to be two plane carriers, with adequate naval escort.

In addition to that, this afternoon, in Guam—Guam was being bombed by two squadrons of Japanese planes, and we know—and it is entirely possible that at this moment Guam—which was not defended except by a few Marines, without much in the way of guns—in all probability has fallen to the Japanese.

Wake Island was also attacked, and we have no further word at the present time.

We believe that Manila was attacked, but that has not proved true, and it is possible that other ports of the Philippines—some ports in Mindanao—have been attacked. Those are merely reports.

... Three or four, probably, of the landing fields were very heavily bombed, and a very large number of aircraft were destroyed in the hangars, or on the fields.

I have no word on the Navy casualties, which will undoubtedly be very heavy, and the best information is that there have been more than one hundred Army casualties and more than 300 men killed and injured.

I do not know what is happening at the present time, whether a night attack is on or not. It isn't quite dark yet in Hawaii. I suppose it's four o'clock in the afternoon, and it will probably be dark in a couple of hours.

There might be . . . nothing definite on it . . . if the Japanese force turns out to be a good deal larger than we expected.

The fact remains that we have lost the majority of the battle [5] ships there. Of course, in the long run, probably most of them can be salvaged, or repaired, to take their place in the line of battle again. That, however, is a long process, and will last very many months, depending on the damage.

I think probably—Oh yes—one more thing—Out in Shanghai the one small gunboat we have there has been taken over by the Japanese, and a British gunboat has been blown up. We still have two hundred Marines there . . . and we are not certain yet whether they have been gotten out or not. Probably not.

The Japanese at the same time . . . which were set for one o'clock Washington time—the Japanese made an attack on the Malay peninsula. That is definite. And the British fleet now in Singapore is now conducting war operations against the Japanese ships in the Gulf of Siam, and on the eastern side of the Malay peninsula, at the north end—top north end of the Malay Straits, just short of the—we will have to look up the map—just short of the Siamese—Thailand part of that peninsula, short of what they call the (?) Isthmus.

The Dutch government has declared that a state of war exists between the Netherlands Indies and the Japanese.

The British cabinet is in session. I have heard nothing from them on that—just the fact. And at nine o'clock tomorrow morning, their time, a special session of the Parliament is being called.

The Japanese have attacked the Malay Straits.

Now I think that is all there is in the way of information, but it has been suggested that the Army and Navy losses, and the [6] rather definite statements that I have made about these ships, could not be spoken of outside, because we must remember that detailed military information, such as the damage to ships, or even the loss of personnel—that information is of value to an enemy. I think that is a matter of discretion, which all of you will accept.

Q. Didn't we do anything to get—nothing about casualties on their side?

The PRESIDENT. It's a little difficult. We think we got some of their submarines, but we don't know.

Q. Well, planes—aircraft?

The PRESIDENT. We did get, we think, a number of their Japanese planes. We know some Japanese planes were shot down, but there again—I have seen so much of this in the other war. One fellow says he has got fifteen of their planes, and you pick up the telephone and somebody else says five. So I don't know what the report on that is, except that somewhere Japanese planes have been knocked down on the Island. I should say that by far the greater loss has been sustained by us, although we have accounted for some of the Japanese.

Q. There is a story coming over the radio that we got one of their airplane carriers.

The PRESIDENT. I don't know. Don't believe it. It was reported about eight o'clock. I didn't believe it. A Japanese carrier has been discovered off the

Panama Canal and sunk by our forces. I wish it were true. But about the same time, the commanding officer [7] in the Canal Zone said they were on the alert, but very quiet.

So that is literally everything I have got here. I think I have even covered the rumors as well.

Of course, it is a terrible disappointment to be President in time of war, and the circumstances . . . came most unexpectedly. Well, we were attacked. There is no question about that.

I thought that tomorrow, if it was agreeable to Senator Norris (?) he would be good enough to ask me to deliver a short message. I can't tell you what is in it at this time, because of . . . I will probably have . . . It has been reported but not verified that Japan has done one of two things. She has sent out word that her army and navy are in a state of hostilities with the United States; and the other reports state that they have declared war on the United States.

I frankly—I haven't any specific information whether both of those are true or not. Of course, the fact is that the—it might be called the principal defense of the whole west coast of this country and the whole west coast of the Americas has been very seriously damaged today. That is why I thought I would ask you—after all, there are two sides—I would ask you if it was all right if you would let me come before you tomorrow—I think the regular Senate session tomorrow.

Q. Yes.

The PRESIDENT. The House—

Q. Twelve o'clock.

Q. May I make one suggestion, Mr. President, and that is that you come as early after twelve as possible, at your convenience. Are [8] you going to suggest what the resolution will be before we leave?

The PRESIDENT. I don't know yet.

Q. A resolution inviting you to come?

The PRESIDENT. A resolution asking me to come.

Q. You don't want to continue any further than that tonight?

The PRESIDENT. No. I think what's happened in the last nine hours. I don't know what's going to happen by twelve o'clock tomorrow.

Q. My suggestion was made for this reason—after the prayer and the reading of the Journal, we stopped the long speeches, but it is the habit now to ask unanimous consent (?) I would like to introduce this resolution as soon as the Journal is read. Then you could come in at an early enough hour.

The PRESIDENT. Half-past twelve?

Q. Yes, I think—

The PRESIDENT. In the Senate?

Q. Five minutes to get there. We have to get that resolution—

The PRESIDENT. The concurrent resolution?

Q. Yes.

The PRESIDENT. Well, if that's all right with you, I will I will come any time—roughly half-past twelve is all right with me. Is that all right?

Q. Yes, yes. Sam and I discussed that.

The PRESIDENT. Well, it is an awfully serious situation. There is a rumor that two of the planes—Japanese planes have a rising sun painted on them—but two of the planes were seen with swastikas on them. Now whether that is true or not, I don't know. It was a rumor, and therefore news until something a little more definite [9] comes in. But that is a rumor.

Q. I can't help wondering what can we do to do anything—

The PRESIDENT. The only specific thing to do . . . our ships—we don't know what ships—are out trying to get the Japs at this moment. . . . They can't send for fear of disclosing their position.

Q. There are two airplane carriers of the Japanese navy over there.

The PRESIDENT. Probably—in other words, if you take the timing out, those planes—carriers and their attending cruisers, and probably battleships—I don't know—at sundown last night, at about dark, were roughly twelve hours of darkness—standing in the dark, away from where they launched their planes. Now, let us assume that they launched those planes at a distance of a hundred miles at daylight. That means that they had twelve hours to get to that point in the dark, and running at perhaps 25 knots, that would be three hundred miles further away. In other words, at dark, last night, they might very well have been four hundred to five hundred miles away from the Island, and therefore out of what might be called a good patrol distance. Patrol out of a given point—800 miles under normal conditions, but 500 miles is a long way

for reconnaissance patrol. The planes run all through the night. At dawn they were one hundred miles away from their Island—they launched their planes—they steamed this way and that way, or reversed their course. The planes dropped their bombs and went back.

Q. Well, they were supposed to be on the alert, and if they had been on the alert. . . . I am amazed at the attack by Japan, but I am still more astounded at what happened to our Navy. They were all asleep. Where were our patrols? They knew these negotiations were [10] going on.

The PRESIDENT. . . . Here is a dispatch from General MacArthur in the Philippines. All possible action being taken here to speed defense. Pursuit planes are now reporting that by a counter-attack about fifteen enemy planes north of the Far (?) in Central (?) . . . which means that those Japs are over the Island of Oahu (?). Report has been received that bombing attack . . . far end of the Island of Mindanao . . . In all probability . . . attack may come from the Japanese Mandated Islands, which lie to the west of the Philippines. The only damage caused, said the report, is a hangar of a civilian airport. A report has just been received of a bombing attack on Camp John Hayes at Baguio.

That message was sent twenty minutes ago, and it is just about dawn in the Philippines at this moment—tomorrow of Monday.

Two hundred Marines are in Northern China (?). They have been asked by the Japanese army to disarm, to turn in all arms and ammunition, to assemble . . . The reply accepts the demands as of two o'clock today. That takes care of that. You have got the rest of it.

Q. That means two hundred of our Marines are now prisoners of the Japanese?

The PRESIDENT. Yes.

Well, any of you good people got any questions?

Q. I didn't hear you say anything about sinkings between Hawaii and Oahu.

The PRESIDENT. Those are two reports. One was an armed transport supposed to be carrying a load of lumber. Is that right Harry?

[11] Mr. HARRY (HOPKINS)? Yes, sir.

The PRESIDENT. And the other one is—that was 1,500 miles off San Francisco—the other report which might release the same—that an American merchant ship had been sunk 700 miles. But they are just flabby (??)

Q. If that report is true, it is pretty close to California, is that right. Harry?

Q. Mr. President, you said you don't know what you are going to say tomorrow. Are you going to detail to Congress all the facts you have at that time, assuming they don't get any better you might . . . so far as the Japanese—

The PRESIDENT. Active hostilities, yes.

Q. Yes, that is what I mean.

The PRESIDENT. Well, let me get a little more time on it.

Q. Yes.

The PRESIDENT. In other words, at my Press Conference, they start off with the question "If". It's a little bit of "if"—what I will say tomorrow at half-past twelve.

Q. Have you any report of a mass meeting in Tokyo to be held at 7.30, in which Togo and Tojo and some other officials were to make speeches?

The PRESIDENT. I heard that the Prime Minister is going to make a statement, or a declaration, or speech, in Parliament at two o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

Q. The radio inferred about eleven o'clock.

Q. That would be about 7.30 our time. That's another rumor. It isn't confirmed.

[12] Q. . . . make a formal declaration of war? They are so tangled up in the Axis that a declaration of war by Germany on us . . .

The PRESIDENT. We have reason to believe that the Germans have told the Japanese that if Japan declares war they will too. In other words, a declaration of war by Japan automatically brings . . .

Q. You haven't made any declaration yet?

The PRESIDENT. It is awfully difficult to know.

Q. Well. Mr. President, this nation has got a job ahead of it, and what we have got to do is roll up our sleeves and win this war.

The PRESIDENT. Doc (?) I am glad you said that because there are a lot of people all over the country who have been saying for the past few weeks—saying, well let's go in and clean up—blank—blank—blank. But of course that popular feeling—you can't do it—just wade in and clean them up.

Back in 1922-1923, I wrote an article for the Asiatic Magazine, and I pointed out at that time that from what I had seen of the Navy Department, war between

the United States and Japan would be won by us; but that it would be won primarily by the starvation and exhaustion of Japan—starvation or exhaustion. And always remember that they have no naval bases—they have nothing. And the old axiom used to be that a fleet loses five percent of its efficiency for every thousand miles it gets away from base. That is a rule of thumb. We saw our fleet at Hawaii, three thousand miles away to Japan itself . . . If anything happens to the ship, there is one thing in particular. If you are in home waters you can get it back to drydock or Navy Yard, but if you are in enemy waters [13] you have an awfully tough time getting back home. And therefore a fleet attack over in Japanese waters is almost an impossibility. And they are going to go through. We will have to, to prolong our national existence, but it makes this treacherous attack impossible in the future. We may have some very heavy losses. And the Japanese know perfectly well that the answer to her attack is proper strangulation of Japan—strangulation altogether.

Q. How big is the Russian Army now?

The PRESIDENT . . . The greater part of it is there. From our best information there will be no offensive on land from now on until the end of April.

Q. Not much danger in Siberia . . . ?

Q. Try to play this down, Mr. President, but I presume that we think of this problem—we probably have varied interpretations to place on the situation, so that we will probably have a declaration against Japan. Whether it goes any further will depend on conditions from now to then.

The PRESIDENT. I think we ought not to say anything about it—what action will be asked for, or what action will be taken by the Congress tonight.

Q. About all you can tell them is about the Message?

The PRESIDENT. But lots of things may happen.

Q. I was trying to get it from our points of view.

The PRESIDENT. The fact is that a shooting war is going on today in the Pacific. We are in it.

Q. By twelve o'clock tomorrow you will know whether Japan's formality has taken a declaration of war on us, or a state of war [14] exists.

Q. . . . Japan had stated that a state of war existed between us, or that war existed. That does not necessarily mean a declaration of war. That comes from some authority that has power to declare war.

The PRESIDENT. Bill, this is the only thing that we have—from Shanghai. Who is Stanton? Is he our Consul there?

Q. Consul of China.

The PRESIDENT. Captain Smith of the U. S. S. ? received a telephone call at 4:15 this morning. Japanese naval officers stated over the telephone that a state of war exists between my country and yours. I am taking control over the U. S. S. ? . . . That's the nearest official thing I have got, and that's a telephone message. I think we had better not say anything about it. Remember that out there it is nearly just about dawn. They are doing things, and saying things during the daytime out there, while we are all in bed.

Q. We are in bed too much.

Q. Well, if that's—well, that's all we can say.

The PRESIDENT. What?


Q. That is all we can say.

The PRESIDENT. Yes.

DECEMBER 7, 1941

EXHIBIT NO. 161

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
November 29, 1941



My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a very rough draft of what I have sent over to the State Department as a means of helping in the drafting of a message. I hope it may be helpful.

I have had the assistance of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in the summation of the military situation.

711.94
The news this morning indicates that the Japs are going to deliberately stall for two or three days, so unless this picture changes, I am extremely hopeful that you will get a two or three day respite down there and will come back feeling very fit.

Yours sincerely,

The President
En Route to
Warm Springs, Georgia

Enclosure

711.94/2540-32/35

CONFIDENTIAL

FILED

JUN 29 1943

To The Congress of the United States:

The relations between the United States and the Japanese Empire have now reached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to acquaint the Congress with the exact facts of the situation and their extremely serious implications.

For the past six months, conversations have been carried on between the Secretary of State and the President of the United States and the Foreign Minister and Premier of Japan, for the purpose of arriving, if possible, at some understanding agreeable to both governments. Throughout this entire period, the government of the United States has been steadfast in its support of basic principles which should govern international relations. The principles for which we have stood in these discussions may be summarized as follows:

(Insert here Secretary Hull's summary of our basic principles which he gave to Nomura.)

We have employed every effort of which we were capable to reach an agreement. With the utmost of forbearance and patience, we have sought to bring Japan into accord with us on these principles. These efforts have failed. Japan has refused to change her posture, and relations between the two nations are threatened with rupture.

In our negotiations, we have kept in close contact with the governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands Indies, and China. We have found these nations in complete agreement with the position we have assumed. In every proposal submitted to Japan, the rights and vital interests of these four nations have been faithfully represented. In the firm position which we have taken with respect to the Japanese attitude and conduct, we have had the moral support of these nations. We also have assurance of their material and military support if that becomes necessary.

[2] Simply stated, what we are confronted with in the Far East is a repetition of the tactics pursued by Hitler in Europe during the past two years. The methods which Hitler has used in Europe so successfully and which are being faithfully imitated by Japan, consist of a gradual expansion of power and control over neighboring peoples by a slow, progressive infiltration through which one nation after another is subdued and enslaved either by actual force or by threats of force.

If the Nazi power is to be defeated, the United Kingdom must not be overwhelmed. British military power mans the gate which holds back from the Americas the flood of German military strength. The supports of British power extend to all parts of the world. Weakening one support weakens the strength of the entire structure. A particularly important, possibly an essential part of that structure is Singapore, which, with the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies, furnishes great quantities of the raw materials required for the success of the American and British defense effort. The Southwest Pacific, important as it is to our economy, may be even more important as a military position, because it links together vital units of the British Commonwealth. Were Japan established in Singapore or the Netherlands Indies, the security of the British Isles themselves would be endangered, and thus the security of the United States threatened. Should this region fall, we would find that the brave troops of Australia, New Zealand, and India would necessarily be required at home to defend their own territories, and thus no longer could take part in checking the Nazi thrust to the east and to the south. The British position in the Near East would be undermined. Vichy France probably would fall completely under Nazi domination. Under Nazi control would then fall all [3] the territories and bases of that part of Africa which we see poised like a bludgeon over our friends in South America.

Japan has faithfully followed the familiar pattern of German aggression. Each proclaims a burning wish for peace, and each seeks that peace by making war on its neighbors, one by one. The united strength of these neighbors might once have checked this aggression, but each has faced his doom alone. Step by step, country by country, the sinister military power of Germany and Japan has swarmed forward until now, each abetting the other, both stand as remorseless threats to all remaining free peoples.

During the past 10 years, Japanese military power has moved westward into Manchuria; and then has moved southward through China into Indo-China and the islands of the sea. Today Japan has strong military, naval, and air bases which enclose three parts of the circle around the Philippine Islands, and directly front the British and Dutch in the southern rampart. Were the Malay States

3510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

and the Netherlands Indies to pass under Japanese military domination, two of our strong friends in the Far East would disappear. Standing alone, we then would see, surrounded and in a desperate plight, our territory in the Philippine Islands, and our friends, the Philippine people. We could not accept so intolerable a state of affairs.

The situation holds unmistakable threats to our vital interests. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber is a menace to our safety which cannot be tolerated.

Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted, and considerations of justice, humanity and the principle of equality between [4] nations, are restored, we will witness in that region of the world, precisely what has already transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler seeks dominion by ruthless force.

The progress and results of our patient negotiations with the Japanese Government demonstrate that Japan will not accept conditions which are fair, and which we believe are fundamental if peace and prosperity in the Pacific Area are to endure. It is clear that the Japanese Government has determined on immediate further military adventures. They have enlarged the sphere of the so-called "New Order" until now it even includes India, Australia, and New Zealand. Months ago Japan proclaimed total national mobilization. Their every available resource is devoted to military purposes. The Premier and other leaders, again and again, have appealed for Japanese unity in order (and I quote) "To tide over the gravest crisis that Japan has faced in all her glorious 1000 years of history" (end quote). Their leaders assure the Japanese people there is no hope of peace, and that large-scale war is directly ahead.

Information has reached us of dependable character that Japan contemplates further measures of aggression. She has assembled both land, sea and air forces for new conquests. She can go no further without seriously threatening the vital interests of Great Britain, the Netherlands Indies, Australia and ourselves. Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.

In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I have addressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts. In the meantime, while I await the result of this latest [5] effort toward peaceful solution, I felt it incumbent upon me to apprise the Congress, and through you, the people of the United States of the serious situation with which we are confronted.

*About Nov. 27, 1941
See Memorandum for
the President, Nov. 27, 1941.*

DRAFT RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM
THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF MATERIAL FOR POSSIBLE IN-
CLUSION IN THE PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON
THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN.

711.94/2540-3035

JUN 28 1943

FILED

Confidential File

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

For the President

*Memo which may be
helpful as to certain
portions of the message
to the Congress*

LTZ S



GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS:

I have come before you to report to you on the serious danger which is threatening this country and its interests in the Far East.

(here introduce such further opening matter as desired)

Our interest in the safety of the
Philippines, the Netherlands and
Malaysia.

For over forty years our government has been conducting the unprecedented experiment of training an Asiatic people in the methods of freedom and self-government as practiced by our own republic. While our immediate aim has been the development of this dependent Filipino people, thrown into our guardianship by the accident of war, into a self-governing and independent commonwealth, nevertheless we have other far-reaching interests in the success of that farsighted experiment. It is of the utmost value to the material welfare of the United States that there should exist in that portion of the world a friendly nation bound to us by the ties of association and gratitude which our long partnership in government has created. It has brought home to the nations and peoples of the Orient the name, the credit and the possibility of extensive commerce with the United States. It has helped to establish and stabilize close

relations on our part with that portion of the Pacific, including particularly Malaysia and the New Netherlands, which secure for us supplies of indispensable materials for our requirements both in time of peace and in war. Thus for every reason, both spiritual and material, it is of vital importance that the purpose which we undertook four decades ago should be carried out to its intended logical fruition and that the people of the Philippines should achieve their ultimate position in the family of nations, bound to us by such ties of origin.

Our relations to China

The American policy which was thus put into effect in regard to the Philippines was in essence of the same far-sighted character as that which during the same period we applied to our relations with China. We were the founders of the policy of the Open Door, - the policy which was subsequently legalized in the so-called Nine Power Treaty, and which endeavored to preserve for that great nation its territorial and administrative integrity and to permit it to develop without molestation its sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to obtain among the peoples of this earth.

The Axis attack upon this American policy
in the Far East

During the past decade, however, these enlightened policies of the American government, exemplified by our attitude towards China and the Philippines, have been endangered by a scheme of world conquest set on foot by the so-called Axis powers - Germany, Italy, and Japan. These nations have without provocation or excuse attacked and conquered and reduced to economic and political slavery most of the free governments of Europe. In the Far East their Axis has been represented by the government of Japan which in 1940 joined with Germany and Italy in a covenant avowedly aimed at the interests in the Orient of the government of the United States. Japan has for over five years been attempting to carry out such a scheme of conquest and spoliation in the Far East. In flat defiance of its own covenants in the Nine Power Treaty it has invaded and sought to overthrow the government of China. Step by step the fleets and forces of Japan, passing through the China Sea in the immediate proximity of the Philippine Islands, have also invaded and taken possession of Indo China. Today its forces are proposing to go further southward and are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into the territory of Thailand. This step would directly menace

the port and Straits of Singapore through which gateway runs the commerce of the world, including our own, between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

On the eastern side of the Philippines, Japan has also been extending its threatening activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation of the mandate under which it received the custody of those islands, it has been secretly establishing naval and air bases and fortifications directly on the line between the United States and the Philippine Islands.

By these steps Japan has placed itself in a position which encircles the western, northern and eastern approaches to our territory and interests in the Philippines. Should it go further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace the vital interests of the United States.

Our efforts to peacefully persuade Japan to abandon a policy of conquest in our neighborhood in the southwestern Pacific and the failure of that attempt

(Here describe the negotiations carried on by Secretary Hull and their failure)

The danger to our vital interests which now confronts the United States on the failure of these negotiations.

(In summary only)

First: Japanese policy of conquest and exploitation which is now being carried out in China has already utterly destroyed in the portions of China occupied by Japan the peaceful and profitable commercial relations which the United States had previously enjoyed.

It has devastated and has sought to conquer the nation which for many centuries by its devotion to the arts of peace and commerce has been the most stabilizing influence on the western side of the Pacific Ocean.

The Japanese policy threatens to transform a peaceful continent into one devoting itself to the practice of war and dominated by the military leadership of Japan.

Second: This Japanese campaign of conquest and exploitation is now approaching and encircling the Philippine Islands. It threatens the commerce of those Islands and endangers their physical safety.

If it is successful, it will destroy the farsighted experiment which America has been conducting in those Islands and terminate their hope of independence and their peaceful democratic government.

It will destroy the mutually profitable commerce which exists between those Islands and the United States and upon which the high standard of living of the Filipinos now depends.

It will ruin the lifelong efforts and investments of thousands of American citizens who have transferred their homes and business activities to the Philippines on the faith that American principles of freedom and American methods of government would continue in those Islands.

It will forever terminate the prestige and influence of the United States which the American experiment in the Philippine Islands has been establishing throughout the Orient.

Third: It will threaten to cut off and destroy our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies and the Malayan Settlements.

If the Japanese are permitted to carry out their threat to attack and conquer these friendly countries,

our imports from these countries will be interrupted and destroyed.

These imports, principally rubber, are vital to our welfare both in time of peace and war.

From those countries we receive our chief supplies of rubber. (Here add other items)

In time of war, with the spirit of exploitation and destruction of commerce which exists in the world today, such an interruption of our trade with the Netherlands East Indies and the Malayan States would be catastrophic.

EXHIBIT NO. 161A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

To: The Secretary of War

from: The Secretary of State

per

SKH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE**ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS**

Colonel Stimson:

This is just
as it stood at noon
yesterday: it has not
been passed upon, edited
or revised.

W.H.

[The first document inclosed was a copy of the draft of
a proposed message to Congress which is included in
Exhibit 19.]

2nd Review Copy

OPENING OF THE CONGRESS:

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(here introduce such further opening matter as desired)

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-3.

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-6.

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Additional paragraphs
supplied by Colonel Knox.

Turner

If the Nazi power is to be defeated, the United Kingdom must not be overwhelmed. British military power seals the gate which holds back from the Americans the flood of German military strength. The supports of British power extend to all parts of the world. Weakening one support weakens the strength of the entire structure. A particularly important, possibly an essential part of that structure is Singapore, which, with the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies, furnishes great quantities of the raw materials required for the success of the American and British defense effort. The Southwest Pacific, important as it is to our economy, may be even more important as a military position, because it links together vital units of the British Commonwealth. Were Japan established in Singapore or the Netherlands Indies, the security of the British Isles themselves would be endangered, and thus the security of the United States threatened. Should this region fall, we would find that the brave troops of Australia, New Zealand, and India would necessarily be required at home to defend their own territories, and thus no longer could take part in checking the Nazi thrust to the east and to the south. The British position in the Near East would be undermined. Vichy France probably would fall completely under Nazi domination. Under Nazi control would then fall all the territories and bases of that part of Africa which we now posed like a bludgeon over our friends in South America.

Japan

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During the past ten years, Japanese military power has moved westward into Manchuria; and then has moved southward through China into Indo-China and the islands of the sea. Today Japan has strong military, naval, and air bases which enclose three parts of the circle around the Philippine Islands, and directly front the British and Dutch in the southern respect. Were the Malay States and the Netherlands Indies to pass under Japanese military domination, two of our strong friends in the Far East would disappear. Standing alone, we then would see, surrounded and in a desperate plight, our territory in the Philippine Islands, and our friends, the Philippine people. We could not accept so intolerable a state of affairs.

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The progress and results of our patient negotiations with the Japanese Government demonstrate that Japan will not accept conditions which are fair, and which we believe are fundamental if peace and prosperity in the Pacific area are to endure. It is clear that the Japanese Government has determined on immediate further military adventures. They have enlarged the sphere of the so-called "New Order" until now it even includes India, Australia, and New Zealand. Months ago Japan proclaimed total national mobilization. Their every available resource is devoted to military purposes. The Premier and other leaders, again and again, have appealed for Japanese unity in order (and I quote) "To tide over the gravest crisis that Japan has faced in all her glorious 1000 years

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3534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT NO. 162

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

1083-a(JFB)
R#168

11 April 1946.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to your request of 9 April 1946, there is forwarded a photostatic copy of the log of the Watch Officer of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations from 1145, 6 December 1941 to 2000, 7 December 1941.

John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHEER,
Commander, USNR.

Encl.(1).

1145 - 1900 Dec. 6, 1941

at 1505 Lt. Clark phoned
from Port Director's office
in New York regarding
delayed departure of SS
Waller A. Huckinback. See
Memo on Op 10's board.
sum. taken recorded in box

Saw Secret despatches
061535 and 061730.

at 1750 Capt Macgruder,
Chief of Staff 4th N.Y.,
phoned to report Finnish
Cargo Ship "ADVANCE"
had been seized at
Pier 87, Phila. Walter
being kept secret,
Conversation recorded in
box

17 Nov 1900
1900, 6 Dec. to 0200 7 Dec.
at 2000 Major F. L. Harrison,
aide to the Secretary of War,
telephoned that the Secretary
of War desired the following
information by 0900, Sunday
7 Dec.: Compilation of

men-of-war in Far East,
British, American, Japanese,
Dutch, Russian. also
Compilation of American
men-of-war in Pacific
Fleet, with locations, and
a list of American men-of-
war in the Atlantic without
locations. Admirals Dugessoll,
Stark and the Secretary of
the Navy were consulted
and the Secretary directed
that the information be
compiled and delivered
to him prior to 1000
Sunday, 7 Dec.

at 2030 the Coast Guard
Duty officer telephoned to

report the following:

Finnish motor vessel Saimaa taken in protective custody by Coast Guard at 1645. Vessel anchored in Federal anchorage 21 B New York Harbor. Also Finnish S.S. Kuortane taken in protective custody at 1750 at Jack Frost Sugar Refinery dock, Edgewater New Jersey. Both vessels cooperative.

Sent signal 070145 clear to Alameda Station requesting that air transportation by navy plane be arranged for civilian engineers Stickel and Hansen urgently re-

qured to make emergency
repairs to U.S.S. Polaris
at Guantánamo - Both
men at Hotel Bristol Habana
unable obtain transportation
by rail because of strikes

Com one confidential

06 2330 — 3 Finnish S.S.
ship placed in protective
custody at 1745.

Action taken as in-
dicated on dispatches.

J. Lauer

0200-0800 — 7 Dec.

OPDC - Comdr. Redman

List prepared - details as
indicated on memo.

12/7/45

1100 to 1400 - 7 Dec 1941

Opds - Comdr Fernald

Read sec'd despatch 070715

no action taken.

Read sec'd despatch 070327. This was handled by C. D. O. - Op 20 and Op 12.

at 1105 Comdr Fernald D.O. called for release of information on Finnish ships. He was advised to call Capt Schuman.

The following officers not entered
2031: Lt Comdr Cummings in sec.

Capt Cardall - Preside

Lt Kramer - ONI

Capt Wilkinson - ONI

Capt Schuman - Op 10

Capt Metcalfe - Op 385

Lt Comdr Mason - Op 12

Capt Reatty - Secnav Aide

Capt Read - Op/V

Action taken as indicated
on despatches

G. H. Gillman

1400-2000

In connection with
Cinc Pac 1830 despatches
of this date all chiefs
of Bureau were in-
formed of contents.

Admiral Brainard and
Capt Shely arrived
at 1500. The following
day officers visited
this office.

Admiral J. J. J. J.

Capt. Griffin
 Capt. McCoy
 Capt. Wilkinson
 Comdr. Cary
 Comdr. Glover
 Comdr. Chapman.
 Action taken as in -
 directed on dispatches.
 W. H. Brown

EXHIBIT NO. 162A

**MESSAGES NOTED IN THE LOG OF THE WATCH OFFICER OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FROM 1900 6 DECEMBER TO 2000 7 DECEMBER 1941**

Table of Contents

- (a) Spenavo London to Opanav dispatch 061535, December 1941.
- (b) ComTaskGroup 4.6 to ComTaskFor 4 dispatch 061730, December 1941.
- (c) Opanav to Alusna Havana dispatch 070145, December 1941.
- (d) ComOne to OpNav dispatch 062330, December 1941.
- (e) CinCAF to Opanav dispatch 070327, December 1941.
- (f) CinCAF to Opanav dispatch 070715, December 1941.
- (g) CinCPac to CinCLant, CinCAF, Opanav, dispatch 071830, December 1941.

3544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

NAVY DEPT

RECEIVED
PROSECUTION

SPENAVS LONDON

OPNAV

PPPP
LONDON
S. 1000

DEC 6, 1941.

1603

OLSON

ROBINSON

AD COUNCIL ON ARMS

64535 ON 6446

ON 64535 (RECEIVED) IN THE DEPT. WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO RELEVANT PROSECUTOR.
COORDINATOR FOR THE DEPT. AND THE FOR OFFICERS AND MA. DEL. V. 17

THE ADMIRALTY HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING REPORT FROM SINGAPORE:

"AT 0905 TODAY TWO JAP FORCES WERE SIGHTED OFF CAMERON POINT
GEORGE STR. FIRST GROUP 25 TRANSPORTS & OA, 2 OL, 14 DESTROYERS.
SECOND GROUP TEN TRANSPORTS, 2 CRUISERS, 14 DESTROYERS.

ACTION: 300

RECORD COPY 100...19...300...300...300...

NAVY DEPT...GEN FILE.....

NO. 1...
OF 1...
P2A FILE...

TOP SECRET

THIS MATERIAL ONLY RELIED TO COMMUNICATIONS MATCH OFFICE & IN VIEW OF

Figure 1

DEVELOPMENT OF A

1. *Journal of Management Studies*, 1997, 34, 1, 1-14.
 2. *Journal of Management Studies*, 1997, 34, 1, 15-30.

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

11/11/19

00-10; 00-10

01-2

THIS SPACE IS FOR ABSTRACT OF PROCEEDINGS
REFERENCE NUMBERS OF INCOMING DISPATCH MUST BE ENTERED HERE

This copy for release and distribution in communication (other than a memorandum) requires the Communicator (OIA) to quote an additional WHITE House official.

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CINCPAC

OPNAV

SECNAV

7 DEC 1941

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SECNAV

PUSBY

PART 1-1000
PART 1-1000
PART 1-1000
PART 1-1000
PART 1-1000

THIS IS THE FIRST OF FIVE PARTS.

(1) WE HAVE MET AND DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH WE ARE FACED IN THE FAR EASTERN AREA.

(2) IN THE EARLY STAGES OF A WAR WITH JAPAN, IT SEEMS AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE INITIATIVE MUST NECESSARILY REMAIN WITH THE JAPANESE.

(3) IT IS CONSEQUENTLY NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO DRAW UP DEFINITE PLANS TO BE TAKEN INTO EFFECT BY ALL OUR FORCES AT THE OUT-
BREAK OF WAR, AND THE BEST WE CAN DO IS TO PREPARE THE
BUT ALL OF THE FACTORS THAT APPEAR TO US NOW TO BE THE MOST
PROBABLE JAPANESE ACTIONS. PLANS FOR DEFEAT OF AN ENEMY ARE
DRAFT AND DEFINITE AND READY.

(4) WE ARE AWARE THAT IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PRE-
VENT ANY JAPANESE SURPRISE ATTACKS ON THE PHILIPPINES. PART TWO
WILL FOLLOW.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

SHEET TWO OF 678327 CR8398

SECOND PART OF 678327.

(5) WE ARE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING INITIAL DISPOSITIONS:-

(A) BRITISH BATTLE FLEET TO BE BASED UPON SINGAPORE AND OPERATE AS REQUIRED FROM THERE AS A STRIKING FORCE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN THE CHINA SEAS, DUTCH EAST INDIES AND THROUGH THE MALAY BARRIER.

(B) CRUISER STRIKING FORCE TO BE BASED ON EAST BORNEO - "BURABAYA" - DARWIN TO ACT AS A STRIKING FORCE IN CONNECTION WITH AIR RECONNAISSANCE. THIS FORCE CAN PROVIDE COVER, AND WHEN NECESSARY, ESCORT, FOR CONVOYS WITHIN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES AND PHILIPPINE AREA OR FOR AN OCCASIONAL IMPORTANT CONVOY FROM AUSTRALIA TO SINGAPORE.

(C) THE MINIMUM CRUISER FORCE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN THE AUSTRALIA - NEW ZEALAND AREA TO DEAL WITH A MODERATE SCALE OF RAIDERS

SECRET

SEE ART 7(1)(2)
NAV. STIC

NOTE ORIGINAL COPY SENT TO COMNAV LONDON ON 14 OCT 1941 BY AIR

LATE RELEASE

PAGE 21

PROJECT 100-100000

FROM

SUBJECT

TO

DATE

BY

REMARKS

REMARKS

SHEET THREE OF 87927 CR0198

REMARKS

REMARKS

REMARKS

REMARKS

ATTACK OR ESCORT IMPORTANT CONVOYS.

(2) THE MINIMUM CRUISER FORCE TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TO ESCORT IMPORTANT TRADE.

(6) THE ACTUAL DISPOSITIONS OF FORCES TO GIVE EFFECT TO "B" ARE CONTAINED IN APPENDIX 1.

(PART THREE.)

(7) WE CONSIDER IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT ACTION IN THE FAR EAST AREA SHOULD BE CO-ORDINATED WITH THE MOVEMENTS OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, AND WE HOPE WE MAY BE INFORMED OF THE TIME TABLE VIZUALIZED FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THIS FLEET TO THUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLAN "RAINBOW V". THE RELEASE OF CRUISERS FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IS INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH THE MOVEMENTS OF THIS FLEET.

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT ONLY DELIVERED TO COMMUNICATIONS UNIT BY AIR MAIL

NAVAL MESSAGE		NAVY JOINT MESSAGE	
PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESS	MESSAGE	MESSAGE
FROM		PRIORITY	
RELEASED BY		ROUTINE	
DATE		EXPENSE	
BY COPIES		PRIORITY	
RECEIVED BY		ROUTINE	
RECEIVED BY		EXPENSE	

SHEET FOUR OF 67422 CR098

DELIVER STRAIGHTAWAY DESIGNATED THIS MESSAGE WILL NOT BE DELIVERED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY
 BRIDGE MAYOR WILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE TIME SET
 TEXT

(8) ALL OPERATIONS OF U.S. ARMY AIRCRAFT WHICH TOUCH THE OPERATION OF ANY NAVAL FORCES TO BE CO-ORDINATED THROUGH CINCAF.

(9) THE SETTING UP AND USE OF A JOINT HEADQUARTERS IS FOUND IMPRACTICABLE AT THIS TIME.

(10) STRATEGIC CONTROL. STRATEGIC CONTROL AS BETWEEN U.S. AND U.S. FORCES FOR THE PRESENT TO REMAIN UNDER RESPECTIVE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF AND THEIR OPERATION TO BE CO-ORDINATED UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION.

(11) TACTICAL COMMAND. THE POLICY IN FORCE IN NORTH ATLANTIC WILL BE FOLLOWED.

(12) WE CONSIDER THAT LIASON OFFICERS SHOULD NOW BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC AND BRITISH EASTERN FLEETS, AND ARE TAKING THE NECESSARY ACTION.

SECRET

NAVY JOINT MESSAGE
 NAVY JOINT MESSAGE

MAKES ORIGINAL COPY DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

O180AF

OPEAV

DEC 7 1941

O180APAC

R0818000

070327 (SHEET 6)

-8- MANILA IS THE ONLY SUITABLE BASE AVAILABLE, AND WE CONSEQUENTLY CONSIDER THAT THE NECESSARY MEASURES SHOULD BE PUT IN HAND TO ENABLE MANILA TO BE USED BY THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET. THE QUESTION OF JUST WHAT ACTION IS NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE WILL BE DISCUSSED BY OUR STAFFS.


-9- WE CONSIDER THAT WE SHOULD AIM AT HAVING MANILA AVAILABLE AS A BASE BY THE FIRST OF APRIL 1942, IF THIS CAN BE DONE.

(PART 5) -APPENDIX 1- SINGAPORE, BATTLESHIPS: PRINCE OF WALES, REPULSE, REVENUE, ROYAL SOVEREIGN; CRUISERS: MAURITIUS, ACHILLES, PROMP, DE RUYTER, (AUSTRALIA, (AND LATER HOBART))
 DESTROYERS: TEN BRITISH, 6 DUTCH, 4 U.S. (SEE NOTE).
 SOERABAYA - DARWIN - EAST BORNEO. HOULSON, MARBLEHEAD, CORNWALL, JAVA, 4 DESTROYERS (U.S. SEE NOTE).

SECRET

CONTINUED ON
PAGE 7.

101 000121



NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

SECRET

Capt. Griffin
 Capt. McCoy
 Capt. Wilkinson
 Comdr. Cary
 Comdr. Glover
 Comdr. Alexander.
 Action taken as in -
 dictated on dispatches.
 W. H. Brown

EXHIBIT NO. 162A

**MESSAGES NOTED IN THE LOG OF THE WATCH OFFICER OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FROM 1900 6 DECEMBER TO 2000 7 DECEMBER 1941**

Table of Contents

- (a) Spenavo London to Opnav dispatch 061535, December 1941.
- (b) ComTaskGroup 4.6 to ComTaskFor 4 dispatch 061730, December 1941.
- (c) Opnav to Alusna Havana dispatch 070145, December 1941.
- (d) ComOne to OpNav dispatch 062330, December 1941.
- (e) CinCAF to Opnav dispatch 070327, December 1941.
- (f) CinCAF to Opnav dispatch 070715, December 1941.
- (g) CinCPac to CinCLant, CinCAF, Opnav, dispatch 071830, December 1941.

3544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

SPENAVO LONDON

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

OPNAV

DEC 6, 1941.

1603

OLSON

ROBINSON

64535 ON 646

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. DATE 08-11-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW

THE ADMIRALTY HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING REPORT FROM SINGAPORE:

"AT 0900 TODAY TWO JAP FORCES WERE SIGHTED OFF CAMBODIA POINT
GEORGE ST. FIRST GROUP 25 TRANSPORTS & OA, 2 CR, 16 DESTROYERS.
SECOND GROUP TEN TRANSPORTS, 2 CRUISERS, 16 DESTROYERS.

ACTION:

30N

NO. 1

NO. 2

RECORD COPY 100...19...30...300...F...

PLA FILE...

NAVY...GEN FILE.....

TOP SECRET

THIS ORIGINAL COPY DELIVERED TO COMMUNICATIONS SECTION OFFICE IN PERSON

3546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NAVY DEPARTMENT



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THIS SPACE IS FOR ABSTRACT OF PREVIOUS REFERENCE NUMBERS OF INCOMING DISPATCHES

This copy for release and delivery to Communication Office. If necessary, the Communication Office requires an additional WHITE COPY for

100-1000

100-1000

CINCPAC

OPNAV

SECNAV

7 DEC 1945

V. M. B. M. P.

SECNAV

SECNAV

MURDY

PART	1	2	3	4	5
PART	1	2	3	4	5
PART	1	2	3	4	5
PART	1	2	3	4	5
PART	1	2	3	4	5

THIS IS THE FIRST OF FIVE PARTS.

(1) WE HAVE MET AND CONSIDERED THE PROBLEM WITH WHICH WE ARE FACED IN THE FAR EASTERN AREA.

(2) IN THE EARLY STAGES OF A WAR WITH JAPAN, IT IS NOT AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE INITIATIVE MUST INDIVIDUALLY REST WITH THE JAPANESE.

(3) IT IS CONSEQUENTLY NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO DRAW UP DEFINITIVE PLANS TO BE APPLIED TO ALL SITUATIONS AT THE OUT-
 SET OF A WAR, AND THE MOST WE CAN DO IS TO SET UP FOR THE
 A FEW ALTERNATIVE PLANS THAT APPEAR TO US AT THE PRESENT TIME AS THE
 PROBABLE JAPANESE ACTION. PLANS FOR DEFENSE AND OFFENSE ARE
 CRAFT AND DEFINITE AND READY.

(4) WE ARE AWARE THAT IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PRE-
 VENT ANY JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO WIN THE MILITARY INITIATIVE. PART TWO
 WILL FOLLOW.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

SHEET TWO OF 279327 CR8798

SECOND PART OF 279327.

(5) WE ARE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING INITIAL DISPOSITIONS:-

(A) BRITISH BATTLE FLEET TO BE BASED UPON SINGAPORE AND OPERATE AS REQUIRED FROM THERE AS A STRIKING FORCE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN THE CHINA SEAS, DUTCH EAST INDIES AND THROUGH THE MALAY BARRIER.

(B) CRUISER STRIKING FORCE TO BE BASED ON EAST BORNEO - "BURABAYA - DARWIN" TO ACT AS A STRIKING FORCE IN CONNECTION WITH AIR RECONNAISSANCE. THIS FORCE CAN PROVIDE COVER, AND WHEN NECESSARY, ESCORT, FOR CONVOYS WITHIN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES AND PHILIPPINE AREA OR FOR AN OCCASIONAL IMPORTANT CONVOY FROM AUSTRALIA TO SINGAPORE.

(C) THE MINIMUM CRUISER FORCE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN THE AUSTRALIA - NEW ZEALAND AREA TO DEAL WITH A MODERATE SCALE OF RAIDERS

SECRET

SEE ART 7(4)
NAV. 1158

MAKE ORIGINAL COPY OF THIS TO LONDON BY AIR ON 11/12/41 IN PERSON

SHEET FOUR OF 50,123 OF 1798

(8) ALL OPERATIONS OF U.S. ARMY AIRCRAFT WHICH TOUCH THE OPERATION OF ANY NAVAL FORCES TO BE CO-ORDINATED THROUGH CINCPAC.

(9) THE SETTING UP AND USE OF A JOINT HEADQUARTERS IS FOUND IMPRACTICABLE AT THIS TIME.

(10) STRATEGIC CONTROL. STRATEGIC CONTROL AS BETWEEN H.Q. AND U.S. FORCES FOR THE PRESENT TO REMAIN UNDER RESPECTIVE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF AND THEIR OPERATION TO BE CO-ORDINATED UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION.

(11) TACTICAL COMMAND. THE POLICY IN FORCE IN NORTH ATLANTIC WILL BE FOLLOWED.

(12) WE CONSIDER THAT LIASON OFFICERS SHOULD NOT BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC AND BRITISH EASTERN FLEETS, AND ARE TAKING THE NECESSARY ACTION.

SECRET

0180AF

OPBAT

DEC 7 1941

0180APAC

ROBINSON

070327 (SHEET 6)

-8- MANILA IS THE ONLY SUITABLE BASE AVAILABLE, AND WE CONSEQUENTLY CONSIDER THAT THE NECESSARY MEASURES SHOULD BE PUT IN HAND TO ENABLE MANILA TO BE USED BY THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET. THE QUESTION OF JUST WHAT ACTION IS NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE WILL BE DISCUSSED BY OUR STAFFS.


-9- WE CONSIDER THAT WE SHOULD AIM AT MAKING MANILA AVAILABLE AS A BASE BY THE FIRST OF APRIL 1942, IF THIS CAN BE DONE.

(PART 8) - APPENDIX 1- SINGAPORE; BATTLESHIPS: PRINCE OF WALES, REPULSE, REVENGE, ROYAL SOVEREIGN; CRUISERS: MAURITIUS, ACHILLE, TROMP, DE RUYTER, (AUSTRALIA) (AND LATER HOBART); DESTROYERS: TEN BRITISH, 6 DUTCH, 4 U.S. (SEE NOTE). SOURABAYA - DARWIN - EAST BORNEO. HOUSON, MARBLEHEAD, NORFOLK, JAVA, 4 DESTROYERS (U.S. SEE NOTE).

SECRET

CONTINUED ON
PAGE 7.

101-010111



NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

S E C R E T

3556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1-10-1941

1-10-1941

OUTGOING COPY

EXHIBIT NO. 163

UNITED STATES SHIP

HELENA

Wednesday

26 November

1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 104

REMARKS

00-04 Steaming under boiler Nos. 3, 4, 7, & 8, on fleet course 000° T and pgo, 119° psgo. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm, steaming at 12 knots, 118 rpm. Cruising turbines in operation. Steering control in Conning Tower. In company with Cruiser Division NINE (less USS BOISE) cruising in special division formation 9 T, USS HONOLULU, Guide, bearing 340° T, distant 5600 yds, formation axis, 340° T. COMCORBATFOR in USS HONOLULU. Average steam 549. Average rpm 118.2.

W. C. WELLS

Ensign, D-V(C), USNR.

04-08 Steaming as before on course 000° T and pgo, 349° psgo. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 2/3 standard speed, 12 knots, 118 rpm. Cruising turbines in operation. At 0415, sighted Cape KAMA Light on the Island of Lanai bearing 025°, distant 8 miles. At 0600, shifted ship's control to Bridge, lighted fires under boilers numbers 2 and 6. At 0600, changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. Commenced steering various courses to form column astern the USS ST LOUIS. At 0620, changed speed to 2/3 standard speed 12 knots, 118 rpm. At 0625, changed speed to 1/3 standard speed 6 knots, 58 rpm. At 0642, changed speed to 2/3 standard speed 8 knots 78 rpm. At 0645, set course 215° T and pgo, 201° psgo and assumed position in formation 1000 yards astern the USS ST LOUIS. At 0716, out in boilers number 2 and 6 on main and auxiliary steam lines. At 0726, changed course to 188° T and pgo, 174° psgo. At 0734, changed course to 028° T and pgo, 014° psgo. Average steam. 545. Average rpm 116.7.

R. L. COCHRANE

Ensign, U.S. Navy.

08-12 Steaming as before on course 028° T and pgo, 014° psgo. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at standard speed. Main turbines in operation. At 0800, mustered crew on stations, no absentees. At 0801, commenced steering various courses at various speeds conducting 6" 47 cal. control drill for DFB (T). At 0820, held Flight quarters. At 0901, catapulted plane #1108, pilot: Ens. P. GOLD-BAUM, 1-V(N), USNR, passenger, RUDKOSKY, K.V., RMJc, USN. At 0902, catapulted plane #1109, pilot: Lt-(jg), C.R. DOERFLINGER, USN, passenger, Ens. C.B. HANEY, 1-V(N), USNR. At 0903, secured from Flight quarters. At 0925, ceased DFB training runs. At 0930, General Quarters, Condition "AFFIRM" set, for DFB (T) firing runs. At 0937, shifted ship's control to Conning Tower. At 0945, commenced steaming various courses at various speeds conducting DSP (T) firing runs. At 1110, commenced firing DSP (T). At 1114, ceased firing. At 1115, changed speed to standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Changed course right to 000° T and pgo, 349° psgo. Secured from General quarters and Material Condition "AFFIRM". At 1117, shifted ship's control to Bridge. At 1118, changed course to right to 070° T and pgo, 057° psgo. At 1120, held Flight quarters to recover two aircraft, "DOC" method. At 1120, changed course right to 150° T and pgo, 140° psgo. At 1128, changed course left to 105° T and pgo, 095° psgo. Changed speed to 10 knots, 98 rpm. At 1134, plane #1109, hoisted aboard. At 1137, plane #1108, hoisted aboard. Let fires die out under boilers #2 and #6. At 1145, secured main and auxiliary steam stops on boilers #2 and #6. At 1150, changed course left to 325° T and pgo, 315° psgo. Changed speed to 20 knots, 198 rpm. At 1157, secured from Flight quarters. Average steam 547. Average rpm 203.6.

D. L. G. KING

Ensign, U.S. Navy.

12-16 Steaming as before on course 325° T and pgo, 314° psgo. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at full speed 20 knots, 198 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 1201, changed course left to 285° T and pgo, 374° psgo. At 1220, held Flight quarters to recover two aircraft, "DOC" method. Commenced maneuvering on various courses at various speeds to recover aircraft. At 1227, plane #1178 hoisted aboard. At 1231, plane #1089 hoisted aboard. At 1232, changed speed to

Approved: *R. H. ENGLISH*
R. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

E. L. FRYBERGER
E. L. FRYBERGER,
Lieut. Comdr.,
U.S. Navy.

3558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

N. Mar. 49
(Mar. 1950)

Page 1167

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP										HELENA		CL50																											
At Hawaiian Operating Area										(Name)		(Identification Number)																											
TO Thursday 27 November 1941										(Day)		(Date)																											
ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 10°										R. H. ENGLISH		Capt. J. D. May, Commanding.																											
Hour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	CLOUDS				SEA																				
															Form	Amount	Base	Top	Condition	Period																			
Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer	WIND	Barometer																	
97.2	9	9	9	3	090	065	4	29.90	75	70	78	BC	CICU	060	5	30	0																						
98.1	10	0	8	5	090	065	4	29.89	75	70	78	BC	CICU	060	5	30	0																						
98.3	10	0	10	7	270	230	5	29.87	75	72	78	BC	CIST	250	5	30	1	270																					
98.8	10	0	10	2	270	230	5	29.87	75	72	78	BC	CIST	250	5	30	1	270																					
98.3	10	0	9	7	090	230	5	29.87	76	72	78	BC	CIST	230	4	30	1	270																					
97.9	10	0	9	2	180	230	6	29.89	78	73	78	C	CIST	230	6	35	1	220																					
110.9	11	3	11	1	170	230	6	29.89	78	73	78	C	CIST	230	6	35	1	230																					
99.7	10	2	10	2	170	230	6	29.91	79	74	78	C	STCU	230	8	35	calm																						
99.8	10	2	9	5	170	230	5	29.92	81	76	78	C	AST	230	9	35	calm																						
72.0	7	4	7	5	170	230	5	29.91	77	72	78	C	AST	230	9	35	calm																						
74.2	7	6	8	100	320	4	29.90	77	72	78	C	STCU	320	8	35	calm																							
147.2	14	9	14	0	000	320	4	29.80	77	72	78	C	ACU	320	6	35	calm																						
a) Latitude 20° 34' N b) Longitude 157° 38' W c) Latitude 20° 24.0 N d) Longitude 157° 10.0 W e) Latitude 21-40.0 N f) Longitude 157-43.5 W Current: Set _____ Drift _____ Gyrocompass in Use _____ Error _____ Standard Mag. Compass _____ Compens. No. 88389 S. H. _____ 180° Error _____ 10° E Variation _____ 11° E Deviation _____ 1° W										Received None Expended 30623 On hand 456705 Distilled 25900 Received None Expended 32651 On hand 80195 BEFORE LEAVING PORT Draft for'd _____ Draft aft _____ AFTER ENTERING PORT Draft for'd _____ Draft aft _____ MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES: Maximum 88° F Minimum 78° F Inspected smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal.										DRILLS AND EXERCISES Morning _____ Afternoon _____ Division 1 _____ 2 Streamed bombing target. 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 Division tactics. 6 _____ 7 Set Condition III in AA Batteries. 8 _____ 9 Fire Drill. General quarters. Flight quarters.																			
128.9	13	1	12	6	270	320	6	29.83	80	73	78	BC	ACU	320	6	35	calm																						
150.1	15	2	14	2	180	320	10	29.83	80	75	78	BC	ACU	320	6	35	calm																						
157.4	15	9	14	7	VAR	350	12	29.83	83	74	78	BC	ACU	320	2	35	1	350																					
142.3	13	9	14	0	303	340	13	29.85	84	74	78	BC	CIST	320	3	35	1	340																					
191.5	18	8	18	5	303	325	13	29.87	80	75	78	BC	CUST	328	3	35	1	330																					
119.1	12	1	18	8	303	310	9	29.86	78	73	78	BC	CIST	310	3	30	1	310																					
104.3	10	6	8	0	100	310	9	29.85	78	73	76	BC	CIST	310	3	30	1	310																					
225.6	27	6	21	6	181	035	4	29.85	78	73	78	BC	CIST	310	3	30	1	310																					
121.9	12	1	11	9	180	035	4	29.91	76	76	78	BC	CIST	310	3	30	1	310																					
123.9	12	6	11	9	195	035	4	29.90	76	76	78	BC	CICU	000	6	30	1	000																					
194.5	19	7	18	4	115	010	5	29.89	75	70	78	BC	CICU	000	6	30	1	000																					
169.4	17	1	16	3	180	010	5	29.89	75	70	78	C	CICU	000	6	30	1	000																					
SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES																																							
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Run No. (Serial)</th> <th>1</th> <th>2</th> <th>3</th> <th>4</th> <th>5</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Time to submerge</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Greatest depth</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>																						Run No. (Serial)	1	2	3	4	5	Time to submerge						Greatest depth					
Run No. (Serial)	1	2	3	4	5																																		
Time to submerge																																							
Greatest depth																																							

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. N. HELENA

Date 27 November 1941

12-16 CONT commenced recovering bombing target. At 1533, recovered bombing target. At 1535, secured from divisional tactics. At 1545, sounded Flight Quarters, prepared to recover one (1) plane independently "CAST" method. Average steam 547. Average rpm 144.6.

H. S. Washburn
H. S. WASHBURN, Jr.,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

16-18 Steaming as before on various courses to recover aircraft. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at various speeds. Main turbines in operation. At 1601, plane #1108, hoisted aboard. At 1606, changed speed to 20 knots 198 rpm. Set course 303° T and pgo, 293° pstgo. At 1738, catapulted plane #1108, Ensign H.P. SAUNDERS, A-V(N), USNR, pilot; C'NEAL, W.H., Seize, USN, passenger. At 1739, catapulted plane #1109, Lt-(jg), DOERFLINGER, USN, pilot; HAMILTON, W.T., RMLO, USN, Passenger. At 1753, changed speed to 10 knots, 98 rpm. Average steam 550. Average rpm 155.3.

F. L. Bailey, Jr.
F. L. BAILEY, Jr.,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

18-20 Steaming as before on course 303° T and pgo, 293° pstgo. Standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm, steaming at 10 knots, 98 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 1800, changed course to 120° T and pgo, 109° pstgo. At 1818, commenced steaming on various courses at various speeds conducting NEP "Surprise" exercise. At 1818, General Quarters. At 1948, completed firing NEP "Surprise" and set course 180° T and pgo, 169° pstgo, at standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. Secured from General Quarters and Condition "AFIRM". Average steam 545. Average rpm 165.4.

L. J. Baird
L. J. BAIRD,
Lieut. (jg), U.S. Navy.

20-24 Steaming as before on course 180° T and pgo, 169° pstgo. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm, steaming at standard speed. Main turbines in operation. At 2001, changed course right to 340° T and pgo, 33F pstgo. Changed speed to 8 knots, 78 rpm. At 2013, plane #1109, secured on board. At 2020, plane #1108, secured on board. Changed course left to 180° T and pgo, 169° pstgo. Changed speed to 15 knots 148 rpm. At 2057, changed speed to 10 knots, 98 rpm. At 2129, changed speed to 15 knots, 148 rpm. Commenced steering various courses in accordance with zigzag Plan #13 on base course 180° T and pgo, 169° pstgo. At 2201, ceased zigzagging. Changed course left to 110° T and pgo, 098° pstgo. Changed speed to 20 knots, 198 rpm. At 2224, changed course right to 115° T and pgo, 104° pstgo. At 2305, sighted HONOLULU, ST LOUIS, PHOENIX bearing 076° T, distant 20000 yds. At 2330, commenced steering various courses at various speeds to take position in column 800 yds astern USS ST LOUIS. At 2345 took station in column astern USS ST LOUIS on course 180° T and pgo, 169° pstgo at fleet speed 12 knots, 118 rpm. Average steam 550. Average rpm 152.2.

P. V. Thompson
P. V. THOMPSON,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

Approved: *R. H. English*
R. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: *R. L. Fryberger*
R. L. FRYBERGER,
Lieut. Comdr.,
U.S. Navy.

U. S. NAVY, 43
(Mar. 1920)

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UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA

Thursday 27 November

1921

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 10

REMARKS

00-04 Steaming under boilers #3, 4, 7, and 8, on course 000° T and pge, 349° ptg. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 2/3 standard, 12 knots, 118 rpm. Cruising turbines in operation. Operating independently in the Hawaiian Operating Area. At 0015, held Fire Quarters for fire in the forward engine room. At 0022, fire was reported as false alarm. Secured from Fire Quarters. At 0030, changed course to 090° T and pge, 079° ptg. At 0139, sighted MOKAPUU Light, bearing 013° T, distant approximately 30 miles. At 0200, changed course to 180° T and pge, 169° ptg. At 0245, changed course to 270° T and pge, 258° ptg. Average steam 513.7. Average rpm 98.1.

W. C. BOLES,
Lieut. (jg), D-V(G), USNR.

04-08 Steaming as before on course 270° T and pge, 258° ptg, standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm, steaming at 2/3 standard speed 10 knots, 98 rpm. Cruising turbines in operation. At 0400, changed course right to 000° T and pge, 345° ptg. At 0430, changed course right to 090° T and pge, 078° ptg. At 0515, sighted MOKAPUU Light bearing 010° T, distant about 28 miles. At 0550, changed course right to 180° T and pge, 168° ptg. At 0636, changed speed to standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. At 0645, launched plane #1178, pilot: Ens. R.W. FLECK, A-V(N), USNR, passenger, SLATON, E.J., RM3c, USN and plane #1089, pilot: Ens. H.F. SAUNDERS, A-V(N), USNR, passenger, O'NEAL, W.H., Sea2c, USN. At 0650, launched plane #1109, pilot: Lt-(jg), G.R. DOERFLINGER, USN, passenger: HAMILTON, W.T., RM1c, USN; and plane #1108, pilot: Ens. P. GOLDBECK, A-V(N), USNR, passenger: Ens. C.B. HANEY, A-V(N), USNR. At 0651, changed speed to 2/3 standard speed 10 knots, 98 rpm and changed course left to 170° T and pge, 159° ptg. Average steam 541.9. Average rpm 101.7.

W. C. WELLS,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

08-12 Steaming as before on course 170° T and pge, 159° ptg, standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 2/3 standard speed 10 knots, 98 rpm. Cruising turbines in operation. At 0800, mustered crew on stations; No absentees. At 0900, changed course to 090° T and pge, 079° ptg. At 0900, the Summary Court Martial of which Lt-Comdr., J.A. MORROW, USN, is senior member met to try the case of TRIPLETT, J.R., Sea2c, USN and PEZOMELLA, A.J., F3c, USN. At 0941, stopped to recover sleeves from HONOLULU planes and to recover four (4) aircraft, "BAKER" method. At 0950, the Summary Court Martial of which Lt-Comdr., J.A. MORROW is senior member, adjourned. At 1016, recovered plane #1109. At 1019, recovered plane #1108. At 1021, recovered plane #1178. At 1024, recovered plane #1089. At 1025, commenced steaming on various courses at various speeds to form column on USS HONOLULU. At 1159, assumed position in column astern of the USS HONOLULU, distance 800 yards. Average steam 550. Average rpm 98.3.

R. L. COCHRANE,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

12-16 Steaming as before on course 000° T and pge, 349° ptg. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 10 knots, 98 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 1200, sounded Flight Quarters. At 1227, changed course to left to 270° T and pge, 258° ptg. At 1230, catapulted plane #1108, pilot: Ens. P. GOLDBECK, A-V(N), USNR, passenger: PARKER, D.R., RM1c, USN. At 1231, secured from Flight Quarters. At 1231, commenced steaming at various speeds on various courses to carry out divisional tactics. At 1235, streamed bombing target for Ex. A.A. 1. At 1245, set Condition III in AA Batteries. At 1500, OLCHSKI, EM., Seale, received fracture to the distal phalanx middle finger, right hand, while testing primers on the left gun of Mount Three (3). The man caught his fingers behind a powder case which caused injury. At 1506, secured from Condition III in AA Batteries. At 1507,

Approved: *R. H. English*
R. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: *E. L. Freyberger*
E. L. FREYBERGER,
Lieut. Comdr.,

U. S. NAVY

3562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Page 1172

ADDITIONAL SHEET

OFFENSE

Date 28 November 1941

16-20 Moored as before. At 1745, Yard Oiler #21, made fast to port quarter. At 1815, commenced fueling ship, draft forward 24' 4", draft aft 24' 5". At 1845, completed fueling ship having received 5294.46 bbls. of fuel oil. Draft forward 24' 5", draft aft 24' 8". At 1851, Yard Oiler #21, cast off.

W. W. JONES,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

20-24 Moored as before.

R. W. Fleck
R. W. FLECK,
Ensign, A-V(N), USNR.

Approved: R. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

E. L. Freyberger
E. L. FREYBERGER,
Lieut. Comdr., U.S. Navy.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

UNITED STATES SHIP		HELENA	Friday	28	November	1941
		(Ship)	(Day)	(Date)	(Month)	(Year)
ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 104			REMARKS			
00-04 Steaming under boilers 3, 4, 7, and 8 on course 180° T and pgo, 169° pstgo. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm, steaming at fleet speed, 12 knots, 118 rpm. Main turbines in operation. In company with CRUOIV NINE (less USS BOISE), as part of Task Force 1.5. In column 800 yards astern of the USS ST LOUIS. COMCRU-BATTOR in USS HONOLULU (O.T.G.). At 0116, was joined by DESDIV 2. At 0130, changed course to 270° T and pgo, 258° pstgo. Changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. At 0330, changed course to 315° T and pgo, 304° pstgo. Average steam 545. Average rpm 144.9. <i>D. L. G. King</i> D. L. G. KING Ensign, U.S. Navy. 04-08 Steaming as before on course 315° T and pgo, 305° pstgo. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 0600, changed speed to full speed, 18 knots, 178 rpm. At 0604, changed course to 000° T and pgo, 348° pstgo. At 0605, commenced zigzagging on base course 000° T and pgo, 348° pstgo. At 0649, ceased zigzagging and changed speed to 20 knots, 198 rpm. At 0655, changed course to 010° T and pgo, 359° pstgo. At 0655, commenced zigzagging on base course 010° T and pgo, 359° pstgo. Average steam 545. Average rpm 175.1. <i>A. V. Smith</i> A. V. SMITH Lieut. U.S. Navy. 08-12 Steaming as before, zigzagging on base course 010° T and pgo, 359° pstgo. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at full speed 20 knots, 198 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 0800, mustered crew on stations; no absentees. At 0831, changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. At 0843, ceased zigzagging and resumed base course 010° T and pgo, 359° pstgo. At 0851, commenced steaming on various courses in execution of signals for division tactics from COMCRU-BATTOR. At 0854, changed speed to 18 knots, 178 rpm. At 0930, changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm and commenced zigzagging according to plan on base course 350° T and pgo, 342° pstgo. At 0937, ceased zigzagging and commenced steaming on various courses in execution of signals as before. At 1043, left formation and proceeded independently on various courses at various speeds to approach the harbor entrance. At 1139, with Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoy #2 abeam to starboard entered Pearl Harbor, T.H., and commenced steaming on various courses at various speeds conforming to the channel. Captain and Navigator on the Bridge, COD at the Conn. Average steam 550. Average rpm 166.5. <i>W. C. Wells</i> W. C. WELLS Ensign, D-V(G), USNR. 12-16 Steaming as before on various courses at various speeds, entering Pearl Harbor, T.H. Standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 5 knots, 48 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 1203, passed buoy #16 abeam to starboard. At 1231, moored in Berth Cast 5, with port anchor chain out to buoy C-5, 1 5/8" wire stern line out buoy C-5-S. At 1307, secured main engines, unnecessary boilers. At 1309, secured steering gear. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. At 1353, commenced fueling ship; draft forward, 23' 6" draft aft: 24' mean: 23' 9". At 1353, commenced receiving aviation gas. At 1420, completed taking on aviation gas. Amount received, 1850 gals. At 1530, fuel barge cast off port quarter after delivering on board 152,502 gals fuel oil. At 1500, Lt-(jg), M.T. TING, left on three days leave. At 1545, pursuant to orders of Commanding Officer, the following named men left the ship, temporary duty and course of instruction in the RADAR, having been completed: HAMILTON, W.R., Jr., 262 31 70, GM3c, USN, SWEATTE, J.F., 262 64 59, Seale, USN, BURTON, N.D., 360 19 29, Seale, USN, EGAN, T.F., 223 58 65, Seale, USN, ZAVADA, E., 223 15 75, Seale, USN, NICHOLS, R.W., 287 41 15, Seale, USN, LING, C.K., 376 34 70, Seale, USN, SUTTON, R.E., 316 67 69, Seale, USN. <i>C. W. Brown</i> C. W. BROWN Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.						
Approved: <i>R. H. English</i> R. H. ENGLISH, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.			Examined: <i>E. L. Fryer</i> E. L. FRYER, Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.			
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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP **DELTA** **CLC**

AT **PERL HARBOR, T.S.** TO **SAFETY 22 SEPTEMBER 1941**

ZONE DESCRIPTION **PLUS 100** R. H. KIDDER DEPT. **R. H. KIDDER**

No.	Time	Lat.	Long.	Wind	Wave	Temp.	Bar.	Hum.	Vis.	Clouds	Moon	Stars	Current		Direction	Force	Remarks
													Lat.	Long.			
1	040	2	29.87	69	54	80	0100	000	1	25							
2	040	4	29.85	69	54	80	0100	000	2	25							
3	045	1	29.85	69	54	80	0100	000	3	25							
4	045	1	29.85	69	54	80	0100	000	4	25							
5	045	1	29.85	69	54	80	0100	000	5	25							
6	045	1	29.85	69	54	80	0100	000	6	25							
7	045	1	29.85	69	54	80	0100	000	7	25							
8	045	2	29.67	67	53	80	0100	000	8	25							
9	070	2	29.90	67	53	80	0100	020	9	25							
10	070	2	29.91	70	53	80	0100	020	10	25							
11	070	2	29.92	70	53	80	0100	020	11	25							
12	070	2	29.89	73	53	80	0100	025	12	25							
13	070	7	29.87	75	53	80	0100	030	13	25							

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Lat. **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Lat. **45200** Long. **30800** Dr. **9318**

Lat. **53849** Long. **33849** Dr. **33849**

Current: Lat. **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Standard Mer. Compass: **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Force: **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Variation: **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Deviation: **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Tested smokeless powder samples. Test normal.

No.	Time	Lat.	Long.	Wind	Wave	Temp.	Bar.	Hum.	Vis.	Clouds	Moon	Stars	Current	Direction	Force	Remarks
13	110	10	29.84	75	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
14	110	10	29.83	72	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
15	110	10	29.81	71	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
16	115	15	29.81	71	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
17	115	12	29.85	71	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
18	130	14	29.85	71	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
19	130	12	29.87	70	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
20	130	12	29.85	70	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
21	130	12	29.89	70	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
22	130	12	29.90	70	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
23	130	10	29.91	70	53	80	0100	330	1	25						
24	000	10	29.89	68	53	80	0100	330	1	25						




Standard Mer. Compass: **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Force: **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Variation: **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Deviation: **22211** Long. **21216** Dr. **629208**

Tested smokeless powder samples. Test normal.

UNITED STATES SHIP <u>HELENA</u>		Saturday 29 November 1941	
ZONE DESCRIPTION <u>Plus 10</u>		REMARKS	
00-04 Moored in berth C-5, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with port anchor chain to buoy C-5 and 1 5/8" wire stern line to buoy C-5-S. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: Various units of U.S. Pacific Fleet with ComBatFor 53PA in USS CALIFORNIA.		 L. J. BAIRD, Lieut. (jg), U.S. Navy.	
04-06 Moored as before.		 W. S. WELLS, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.	
08-12 Moored as before. At 0815, USS CHEN and USS UTAH stood in. At 0824, received the following stores for general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ens. R.E. BEISANG, D-V(G), USNR, and as to quality by FINDLEY, R.A., PHM2c, USN, from Oahu Cold Storage Co. 4000 lbs of ice. At 1045, received the following stores for the general mess, inspected as to quality by WILLINGHAM, B.W., PHM1c, USN, and as to quantity by Ens. P.O. ANDERSON, D-V(G), USNR, from Harders Co. Ltd. 400 lbs. of fruit mixture. At 1130, the Commanding Officer held mast at this date and awarded the following punishments: BURKE, J.J., Flc, USN; Offense: (1) Violation of section 6080 R.L.H. 1935 (malicious injury) (2) Resisting arrest (3) Obscene language. (4) Striking Shore Patrol. (5) Drunk. Punishment: Recommended for General Court Martial. COZAKOS, A.G., Sea2c, USN; Offense: AOL for a period of 23 hours, 30 minutes from 0100, 21 November 1941 to 0930, 22 November 1941. Punishment: Summary Court Martial. At 1145, received the following stores for general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ens. R.E. BEISANG, D-V(G), USNR, and as to quality by WILLINGHAM, B.W., PHM1c, USN, from Oahu Cold Storage Co. Lt., 1200 lbs of celery. At 1200, BURKE, J.J., Flc, USN, confined this date by orders of the Commanding Officer to await trial of General Court Martial.		 P. O. ANDERSON, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.	
12-16 Moored as before. At 1410, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, FISHELL, H.O., 381 36 84, Sea2c, USN, returned aboard in charge of HODGES, J.D., 382 27 75, Sea2c, USN; and MILLIGAN, A.G., 393 47 32; Sea2c, USN having completed two (2) weeks temporary duty at the Fleet Machine Gun School, Navy Rifle Range, Pearl Harbor, T.H.		 H. K. FAERBER, Ensign, U. S. Navy.	
16-20 Moored as before.		 C. R. DOERFLINGER, Lieut. (jg), U.S. Navy.	
20-24 Moored as before.		 B. T. KELLY, 2nd Lieut. USMC.	
Approved:  R. F. ENGLISH, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.		Examined:  E. L. FRYBERGER, Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N.	

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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA 0150

AT Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Sunday 30 November 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 104 R. H. ENGLISH CAPT. W. S. Thompson, Commanding

Index	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	WIND	BAROMETER	TEMPERATURE	WIND DIRECTION	CLOUDS				WIND FORCE	WIND VELOCITY	WIND DIRECTION	WIND VELOCITY
							Clouds	Clouds	Clouds	Clouds				
1	000	8	29.88	67	62	0	STCU	310	3	25				
2	030	8	29.89	67	62	80	STCU	315	5	25				
3	060	8	29.90	67	63	0	STCU	315	6	25				
4	090	8	29.90	66	62	0	STCU	315	6	20				
5	120	8	29.92	66	63	0	STCU	310	6	25				
6	150	8	29.93	67	60	0	STCU	310	7	20				
7	180	8	29.95	68	58	80	STCU	310	7	20				
8	210	8	29.98	71	60	80	STCU	310	7	20				
9	240	8	29.95	70	60	80	STCU	310	6	20				
10	270	8	29.95	70	60	80	STCU	310	5	20				
11	300	8	29.95	70	60	80	STCU	310	6	20				
12	330	8	29.95	69	50	80	STCU	310	4	20				

Latitude 26° 10' N Longitude 157° 13' W

Barometer 29.88 Thermometer 67.62

WIND DIRECTION 0 WIND VELOCITY 310

WIND DIRECTION 310 WIND VELOCITY 3

WIND DIRECTION 315 WIND VELOCITY 5

WIND DIRECTION 315 WIND VELOCITY 6

WIND DIRECTION 315 WIND VELOCITY 6

WIND DIRECTION 310 WIND VELOCITY 6

WIND DIRECTION 310 WIND VELOCITY 7

WIND DIRECTION 310 WIND VELOCITY 7

WIND DIRECTION 310 WIND VELOCITY 7

WIND DIRECTION 310 WIND VELOCITY 6

WIND DIRECTION 310 WIND VELOCITY 5

WIND DIRECTION 310 WIND VELOCITY 6

WIND DIRECTION 310 WIND VELOCITY 4

UNITED STATES SHIP

HELENA

Sunday

15 November

1900

Nov

15

FROM: SUBCOMMITTEE, FLEET LOG

REMARKS

00-01 Moored in berth 0-5, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with port anchor chain to buoy 0-1 and 1 5/8" wire starboard line to buoy 0-3-2. Boller 52 standing for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: Various units of U.S. Pacific Fleet with S.C.P. in SAN CALIFORNIA (COMBATANT).

W. O. Oakes
W. O. OAKES
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

01-02 Moored as before.

S. J. O'Sullivan
S. J. O'SULLIVAN
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

03-12 Moored as before. At 0600, mustered crew on deck. At 0700, held divine services on the foremast. At 0800, U.S. S.C. P. ship left to port quarter. At 0930, U.S. S.C. P. ship left.

P. V. Toulson
P. V. TOULSON
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

12-15 Moored as before.

E. S. Hatcher, Jr.
E. S. HATCHER, JR.
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

16-20 Moored as before.

E. A. Brown
E. A. BROWN
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

20-22 Moored as before. At 2100, set Condition Baker. At 2215, hoisted ship. At 2300, lighted ship. Secured from Condition Baker.

A. L. King
A. L. KING
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

Approved: *R. H. English*
R. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: *E. L. Fryberger*
E. L. FRYBERGER,
Lieut. Comdr.,
U.S. Navy.

No. 101, 60

CHAS. 100

Page 1129

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

 AT TO (Date) (Destination) (Month) (Day) (Year) (Hour) (Minute) (Second)

 ZONE DESCRIPTION E. B. King, Commanding

Hour	Lat. (N or S)	Long. (E or W)	BY	BY	BY	BY	WIND	BAROMETER	TEMPERATURE	WINDY	CLOUDS					SEA
											Wind	Amount	Direction	Force	Direction	
1																
2																
3																
4																
5																
6																
7																
8																
9																
10																
11																
12																

DRILL AND EXERCISES									
Morning					Afternoon				
1	Received	Expended	On hand	Drift	1	Received	Expended	On hand	Drift
2					2				
3					3				
4					4				
5					5				
6					6				
7					7				
8					8				
9					9				
10					10				
11					11				
12					12				
13					13				
14					14				
15					15				
16					16				
17					17				
18					18				
19					19				
20					20				
21					21				
22					22				
23					23				
24					24				

DRILL AND EXERCISES									
Morning					Afternoon				
1	Received	Expended	On hand	Drift	1	Received	Expended	On hand	Drift
2					2				
3					3				
4					4				
5					5				
6					6				
7					7				
8					8				
9					9				
10					10				
11					11				
12					12				
13					13				
14					14				
15					15				
16					16				
17					17				
18					18				
19					19				
20					20				
21					21				
22					22				
23					23				
24					24				

DRILL AND EXERCISES									
Morning					Afternoon				
1	Received	Expended	On hand	Drift	1	Received	Expended	On hand	Drift
2					2				
3					3				
4					4				
5					5				
6					6				
7					7				
8					8				
9					9				
10					10				
11					11				
12					12				
13					13				
14					14				
15					15				
16					16				
17					17				
18					18				
19					19				
20					20				
21					21				
22					22				
23					23				
24					24				



LOG BOOK

OF THE

U. S. S.

USFMA

LIGHT CRUISER *Ram*

COMMANDED BY

J. R. WELCH, CAPTAIN

U. S. Navy

RANK

Division

OFFICER, BATTLE FORCE

Squadron

UNITED STATES

Fleet

Attached to

Commencing

1 DECEMBER

1911

at

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII

and ending

31 DECEMBER

1911

at

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII

LIST OF OFFICERS

Attached to and on board of the U.S.S. HELENAby R. H. ENGLISH, Captain

U.S.N., during the period covered by this Log Book, with date of

reporting for duty, detachment, transfer, or death, from 1 December 1941 to 31 December 1941

NAME	RANK	DATE OF REPORTING FOR DUTY	DETACHED Date	DUTY
R. H. ENGLISH	Captain	24 July 41		Commanding.
V. G. BARRINGTON, Jr.	Commander	27 Feb. 41		Executive.
E. L. FRISBERGER	Lieut. Comdr.	5 Feb. 41		Navigator.
L. A. WOODSON	Lieut. Comdr.	18 Sept. 39		First Lieut. Damage Control Off.
E. S. WINDLE	Lieut. Comdr.	18 Sept. 39		Engineering Officer.
T. W. SMITH	Lieut. Comdr.	28 Aug. 41		Gunnery Officer.
F. L. GHEV	Lieut.	18 Sept. 39		Asst. Gunnery Off.
C. C. COOK, Jr.	Lieut.	18 Sept. 39		Eng. Watch & Cas Cont.
A. J. SMITH	Lieut.	18 Sept. 39		Asst. 1st Lieut.
L. J. BAIRD	Lieut. (jg)	18 Sept. 39		Watch & Div.
H. C. BOLES, D-V(G)	Lieut. (jg) USNR	1 Dec. 39		Watch & Div.
R. J. WATSON, E-V(G)	Lieut. (jg) USNR	13 May 41		Eng. Watch & Div.
F. L. FOLSON	Lieut. (jg)	18 Sept. 39		Main Battery Asst.
C. R. DOERFLINGER	Lieut. (jg)	5 March 41		Senior Aviator.
V. E. POST, D-V(S)	Lieut. (jg) USNR	1 Sept. 41		Ship Sec.
M. T. TING	Lieut. (jg)	18 Sept. 39		Communication Off.
M. C. WELLS, D-V(G)	Ensign, USNR	2 Dec. 39		Watch & Div.
R. W. FLECK, A-V(N)	Ensign, USNR	18 July 40		Jr. Watch & Div.
F. V. THOMPSON	Ensign	24 July 40		Watch & Div.
C. B. RADFORD, Jr.	Ensign	24 June 40		Radio Officer.
R. L. COCHRANE	Ensign	24 June 40		Watch & Div.
D. R. G. KING	Ensign	24 June 40		Watch & Div.
R. E. MILLER	Ensign	24 June 40		Engineer Instr.
N. E. FAERNER	Ensign	24 June 40		Watch & Jr. Div.
M. E. WESTPHAL, E-V(G)	Ensign, USNR	27 Jan. 41		Eng. Watch & Div.
F. GOLDBECK, A-V(N)	Ensign, USNR	28 July 40		Jr. Watch & Div.
H. F. SAUNDERS, A-V(N)	Ensign, USNR	10 Jan. 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
P. C. ANDERSON, D-V(G)	Ensign, USNR	15 Dec. 40		Jr. Watch & Div.
J. J. ARMSTRONG, D-V(G)	Ensign, USNR	27 Jan. 41		Watch & Jr. Div.
T. L. BAILEY, D-V(G)	Ensign, USNR	27 Jan. 41		Watch & Jr. Div. Optical Off.
H. A. BORDIAN, D-V(N)	Ensign, USNR	13 Dec. 40		Div. & Jr. Watch.

Reviewed and found to be correct.

E. L. Frisberger
 E. L. FRISBERGER,
 Lieut. Comdr., U.S. Navy.

Signature

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets.)

LIST OF OFFICERS

Attached to and on board of the U.S.S. HELENAby B. H. SPILLISH, Captain

U. S. N., during the period covered by this Log Book, with date

reporting for duty, detachment, transfer, or death, from 1 December, 1941, to 31 December, 1941

NAME	RANK	DATE OF REPORT FOR DUTY	DETACHED	REMARKS
<u>A. J. WACHSBERG, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	15 Dec. 40		Watch & Jr. Div.
<u>E. G. BRIDGEMAN, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	13 Dec. 40	5 Dec. 41	Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>A. WOOD, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	11 July 41		Div. & Jr. Watch
<u>M. E. FARRER</u>	Ensign	13 Mar. 41		Watch & Jr. Div.
<u>M. A. LUTHEMAN</u>	Ensign	13 Mar. 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>C. R. HUNTER, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	5 April 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>C. T. STONE, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	26 Apr. 41		Off. W.D.
<u>C. H. STEVEN, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	26 Apr. 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>R. J. KING, JR., D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	12 July 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>A. T. STEINBERG, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	26 July 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>T. C. LITMAN, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	10 July 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>M. A. KIMBLE, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	10 July 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>C. L. BARNES, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	10 July 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>A. E. DINE, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	10 July 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>C. E. WACHSBERG, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	11 July 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>M. A. HANSEN, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	29 Sept. 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>J. A. BRYAN, D-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	29 Sept. 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>C. E. HARTY, D-V(N)</u>	Ensign, USNR	10 Nov. 41		Jr. Watch & Div.
<u>M. E. KIRKMAN</u>	Ensign, (T)	18 Sept. 39		Elec. Off. Eng. D
<u>M. H. THOMAS</u>	Ensign, (T)	18 Sept. 39		Radio Elec. & Jr. Div.
<u>M. I. KING, MD-V(O)</u>	Commander, USNR	19 Nov. 41		Medical Officer
<u>T. J. BARNES, (IC)</u>	Lieut.	18 Sept. 39		Port Officer
<u>J. A. MOORE, MD-V(O)</u>	Lieut. (Jr.), USNR	27 July 41		Jr. Med. Officer
<u>T. H. HILL, (IC)</u>	Lieut. Comdr.	18 Sept. 39		Jr. Div.
<u>C. W. KIRBY, SC-V(O)</u>	Ensign, USNR	18 Sept. 41		Supply Officer
<u>J. B. MURPHY, CMC</u>	Lieut. (Jr.)	7 May 41		Deck 20 D.
<u>J. E. MARTIN</u>	Boatswain	2 July 41		Chaplain
<u>J. E. ANDERSON</u>	Cook	4 Apr. 41		Boats Jr. Div.
<u>M. J. ZONE</u>	Ch. Mach.	18 Sept. 39		Summer Jr. Div.
<u>T. H. SMITH</u>	Ch. Mach.	18 Sept. 39		Eng. Repair
<u>J. B. SCULLION</u>	Carpenter	4 Apr. 41		Eng. Watch & Div.
				CMC Jr. Div.

Examined and found to be correct.

A. L. FARRER
Lieut. Comdr., U.S. Navy.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with this report.)

H. M. S. 20

(Dec. 1941)

Page 1

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP										HELENA		0150									
At Pearl Harbor, T.H.										TO		Monday 1 December 1941									
ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 10										R. H. ENGLISH,		Capt. U. S. Navy, Commanding.									
Date	Hour	Lat	Long	Wind	Kts	Barometer	Thermometer	Humidity	Clouds	Sea	Sky	Temp	Wind	Kts	Barometer	Thermometer	Humidity	Clouds	Sea	Sky	Temp
1	1	130	4	30.00	64	60	BC	STCU	330	4	30										
2	2	330	4	30.00	63	60	BC	STCU	330	4	30										
3	3	330	6	29.99	63	60	D	STCU	330	7	25										
4	4	330	7	29.98	62	60	D	STCU	330	8	25										
5	5	330	5	29.98	62	60	BC	STCU	330	4	30										
6	6	330	5	30.01	62	60	OR	STCU	330	7	25										
7	7	330	5	30.02	62	61	OR	STCU	330	7	30										
8	8	330	5	30.04	63	61	BC	STCU	330	4	35										
9	9	350	4	30.05	65	63	C	STCU	330	7	35										
10	10	350	4	30.05	68	63	BC	STCU	350	4	35										
11	11	350	4	30.05	68	63	C	STCU	350	6	35										
12	12	350	4	30.02	69	68	C	STCU	350	6	35										
Latitude: Received None Expended 3177 On hand 623016 Longitude: Distilled 25100 Received None Expended 22364 On hand 80683 Compass: Set Before entering port Drift for'd 24' 4" Drift aft 24' 7" Gyrocompass in Use: After entering port Drift for'd Drift aft Standard Mag. Compass: Error Compass No. 8 H Error Variation Deviation Magnetic Temperatures: Maximum 84° Minimum 70° Inspected smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal.												DRILLS AND EXERCISES Morning: (2) planes for ILE Seabird and Lost Plane Drill. AA Director Tracking Drill. Afternoon:									
13	13	VAR	000	10	30.05	67	63	CP	CUNE	000	9	30	calm								
14	14	045	10	30.03	70	67	CP	CUNE	040	9	30										
15	15	045	10	30.02	70	67	CP	CUNE	040	9	30										
16	16	030	10	30.02	70	67	CP	CU	030	5	30										
17	17	030	14	30.04	70	66	CP	CU	030	4	30										
18	18	030	14	30.04	69	66	CP	CU	030	3	30										
19	19	030	14	30.05	69	64	CP	CU	030	3	30										
20	20	030	12	30.07	68	63	CP	CU	030	3	30										
21	21	030	12	30.09	67	63	CP	STCU	030	3	30										
22	22	030	12	30.08	70	62	CP	STCU	030	6	30										
23	23	030	10	30.05	70	61	CP	STCU	030	7	30										
24	24	040	12	30.02	71	62	CP	STCU	030	7	30										

SUBSIDIARY DATA - GERMANN

Run No. (Serial)	1	2	3	4	5
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (cribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

3574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

N. S. S. 10

Page 1782

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. HELENA

Date 1 December

1941

20-24 Manned as before.

J. J. Armstrong
J. J. ARMSTRONG
Rear Adm., D-V(3), USNR.

Approved: *R. H. English*
R. H. ENGLISH
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Endorsed: *S. L. Frymoyer*
S. L. FRYMoyer
Lieut. Commr.

This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with log sheets.

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UNITED STATES SHIP		RELENA	Monday	1	December	1941
TIME DESCRIPTION		Plus 10				
		REMARKS				
00-04	Moored in berth C-5, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the port anchor chain to buoy C-5, and 1 5/8" wire stern line to buoy C-5-S. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Yard and District Craft, S.O.P.A. (COMBATFOR) in USS CALIFORNIA.	H. F. SAUNDERS, Ensign, A-V(N), USNR.				
04-08	Moored as before. At 0515, blow tubes on #3 boiler.	I. D. SYMES, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.				
08-12	Moored as before. At 0800, held quarters for muster. Absentees: SZYMANSKI, P., Plc, USN, AOL since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 0810, hoisted #1 Motor Boat aboard for repairs. At 0830, A Camp Andrews Recreation Party of 16 men, JONES, J.E., SF1c, USN, in charge, left the ship. At 0836, hoisted out plane #1178, pilot: Ens. C.B. HANEY, A-V(N), USNR; Passenger: HAMILTON, W.T., Plc, USN. At 0845, hoisted out plane #1108, pilot: Ens. P. GOLDBECK, A-V(N), USNR, passenger: EUBANK, K.J., Plc, USN. At 1015, lighted fires under boilers #1, 2, 4. At 1130, hoisted plane #1108 aboard. At 1135, hoisted aboard plane #1178. At 1130, set in boilers #1, 2 and 4 on the main steam line.	H. A. BOWMAN, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.				
12-16	Moored as before. At 1220, completed making preparations for getting underway. At 1225, pilot O. H. OTTERSEN came on board. At 1235, got underway for Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., in obedience to ComCrBatFor despatch #302000 of 30 November 1941. Pilot at the Conn, Captain and Navigator on the Bridge. Steaming on various courses and at various speeds conforming to the channel. At 1311, moored port side to berth #3 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 1 5/8" wire bow and stern lines, 6" manila, forward and after bow and quarter spring lines and 8" manila bow and quarter breast lines. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, ComBatFor in the USS CALIFORNIA (SCPA). At 1320, secured Special Sea Detail. At 1320, let fires die out under boilers #1, 2, 4. At 1330, disconnected boilers #1, 2, 3, 4 from the main steam line. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. At 1339, pilot O. H. OTTERSEN left the ship. At 1425, commenced receiving fresh water from the Dock. At 1425, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, USS SUMNER, LOVE, S.F., Sealc, USN, 346 78 77, reported aboard for duty. Pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, Receiving Station, Pearl Harbor, T.H., SMITH, 376 35 42, Sealc, USN, reported aboard for duty. Records and accounts of above men received on board.	W. C. BOLES, Lieut. (jg), D-V(G), USNR.				
16-20	Moored as before. At 1630, commenced receiving telephone service from the Yard. At 1722, hoisted out plane #1178, pilot: Ens. R.V. FLECK, A-V(N), USNR, passenger: SLATON, E.J., Plc, USN. At 1725, hoisted out plane #1108, pilot: Ens. H.F. SAUNDERS, A-V(N), USNR, passenger: Ens. C.B. HANEY, A-V(N), USNR. At 1845, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, Ref: ComCrBatFor serial 3175 of 13 November 1941, WOODARD, F., 274 29 60, OB1c, USN, was transferred to the Receiving Barracks, Pearl Harbor, T.H., for further transfer to Palmyra Island with baggage and transfer papers.	S. I. HALL, Jr., Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.				
Approved: <i>R. H. English</i> R. H. ENGLISH, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.		Examined: <i>E. L. Fryberger</i> E. L. FRYBERGER, Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator				
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3576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. Ship (No. 1000)
 Page 1112

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA (Name) CL50 (Classification Number)

At Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Tuesday 2 December 1941
 (Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 104 R. H. ENGLISH Capt. J. D. King, Commanding

Line	Lat	Long	WIND				BAROMETRIC				TEMPERATURE				WIND AT 1000	CLOUDS				SEA			
			Direction	Force	Speed	Direction	Force	Speed	Force	Speed	Force	Speed	Force	Speed		Force	Speed	Force	Speed	Force	Speed		
1			040	9	30.09		68	62		BO	STCU	035	4	30									
2			040	9	30.08		68	62		BO	STCU	035	4	30									
3			040	9	30.08		68	62		BO	STCU	035	4	30									
4			040	8	30.09		70	62		BO	STCU	035	4	30									
5			030	10	30.09		70	60		BO	STCU	030	4	30									
6			030	12	30.09		70	60		BO	STCU	030	4	30									
7			050	10	30.12		70	62		OP	STCU	030	5	30									
8			050	12	30.14		70	62		OP	STCU	030	8	30									
9			050	15	30.15		69	63		OP	STCU	030	8	30									
10			050	17	30.15		71	67		C	STCU	030	7	30									
11			050	17	30.15		73	69		C	STCU	030	8	30									
12			050	17	30.13		73	66		C	STCU	030	8	30									

Received None

Expended 4671

On hand 618347

Distilled 114563

Received 19500

Expended 10875

On hand 83708

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Drill	Morning	Afternoon
1		
2	Set Condition	
3	III Watch II	
4	In the AA Batteries.	
5		
6	5" Loading Drill	
7	Condition III	
8	Drums.	
9		
10		

Barometric Reading

Draft in'd

Draft aft

ASTER ENGINE PORT

Draft in'd

Draft aft

MACHINE TAMPERS (JEN):

Maximum 84

Minimum 68

Inspected smokeless powder samples.

Conditions normal.

Line	Lat	Long	WIND	BAROMETRIC	TEMPERATURE	WIND AT 1000	CLOUDS	SEA
13			040	15	30.11	73	69	BO STCU 030 6 35
14			030	15	30.09	73	69	BO STCU 030 6 35
15			030	15	30.09	72	67	BO STCU 030 6 35
16			100	13	30.09	71	65	C STCU 100 6 35
17			030	15	30.10	71	64	C STCU 100 6 30
18			040	15	30.10	71	62	C STCU 100 6 30
19			040	15	30.12	71	63	C STCU 100 6 30
20			040	16	30.18	73	65	C STCU 060 7 30
21			040	16	30.16	73	67	C STCU 060 7 30
22			040	12	30.17	73	65	C STCU 060 7 30
23			040	12	30.17	72	65	OP CUNE 050 8 20
24			045	14	30.17	71	65	OP CUNE 050 9 20

REMARKS AND DATA—CONTINUED

Time	Lat	Long	WIND	BAROMETRIC	TEMPERATURE	WIND AT 1000	CLOUDS	SEA
Time of Day								
Time of Day								
Time of Day								

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

P. S. S. HELENA Date 2 December 1941

08-12 CONT

MILLER, J. 283 34 08 GM3c, USN 070004 of Nov. 7, 1941.
 BENNETT, A.J. 346 76 79 GM3c, USN
 LOWRY, R.O. 265 99 95 Sealo, USN

At 1030, Secured from Condition III in AA Batteries. Made monthly inspection tests of smokeless powder samples. Test satisfactory. At 1055, completed hoisting in two planes. At 1105, the Summary Court Martial, of which Lieut. Comdr., R.D. SMITH, USN, is senior member, met to try the case of COZAKOS, A.G., Sea2c, USN. At 1130, the Summary Court Martial of which Lieut. Comdr., R.D. SMITH, is senior member adjourned to await further orders of the Commanding Officer. At 1140, completed hoisting in two planes.

E. A. Luehman
 E. A. LUEHMAN,
 Ensign, U.S. Navy.

12-16 Moored as before. At 1300, received the following stores for use in the general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ch. Pay Clk, T.M. WELCH, USN, and as to quality by WILLINGHAM, G.B., PhM2c, USN, 48 jars green olives from American Packers, Ltd. At 1300, mustered crew at quarters. At 1415, pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer, the following men were transferred to the Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T.H., for treatment: BURROWS, R. Jr., 261 89 59, WT2c, USN, Diag: Calculus, left (urter). WELCH, D.H., 300 13 93, Sea2c, USN, Diag: Deafness due to heavy firing. At 1445, received the following stores for the general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ch. Pay Clk, T.M. WELCH, USN, and as to quality by WILLINGHAM, G.B., PhM2c, USN; from Tai Hing Co., 90 tins of pickles. At 1515, cut off boiler #6, to be used for auxiliary purposes.

W. R. Mizelle
 W. R. MIZELLE
 Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

16-20 Moored as before. At 1600, let fires die out under boiler #3. At 1620, cut off boiler #3, from auxiliary steam line.

L. J. Baird
 L. J. BAIRD,
 Lieut. (jg), U.S. Navy.

20-24 Moored as before.

R. E. Kising
 R. E. KISING,
 Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

H. E. English
 H. E. ENGLISH,
 Captain, U.S. Navy,
 Commanding.

E. L. Frymeyer
 E. L. FRYMEYER,
 Lieut. Comdr., U.S. Navy.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

APPENDIX 2: 2007 DATA—SURVIVORS

Page 1190

UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA Wednesday 3 December 1941

SOME DESCRIPTION Plus 104 REMARKS

00-04 Moored port side to berth No. 3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 1 5/8" wire bow and stern lines, 8" manila forward and after bow and quarter spring lines, 8" manila bow and quarter breast lines. Boiler #6 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone services from the Navy Yard. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. SOPA, Combat for in the USS CALIFORNIA. At 0020, the USS HENDERSON got underway and stood out.

W. W. Jones
W. W. JONES,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

04-08 Moored as before.

P. O. Anderson
P. O. ANDERSON,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

08-12 Moored as before. At 0800, held quarters for muster and physical drill. Absentees: SZYMANSKI, F., F3c, USN, absent over leave since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 0812, exercised crew at Emergency Drills. At 0828, secured from Emergency Drills. At 0905, hoisted out two (2) planes for instrument flight. Plane #1109: Pilot Lt-(jg), C.R. DOERFLINGER, USN, passenger: Ens. H.F. SAUNDERS, A-V(N), USNR. Plane #1178: Pilot Ens. P. GOLDBECK, A-V(N), USNR, passenger: Ens. C.B. HANEY, A-V(N), USNR. At 1040, received the following stores for use in the general mess, inspected as to quality by WILLINGHAM, C.B., Pm2c, USN, as to quantity by Ens. C.W. BROWN, D-V(G), USNR, from Provisioning Co. Ltd., 900 bars ice cream. At 1100, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, REINHARDT, D.F., 250 22 28, Em1c, USN, left the ship to report to the Senior Patrol Officer, Honolulu, T.H., for duty with Permanent Patrol. To resume regular duties upon completion of this duty. At 1100, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, HALL, R.W., 325 00 91, Wtlc, USN, left the ship for permanent duty with Beach Guard, to return to regular duties upon completion of this duty. At 1100, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, the following named men left the ship for temporary duty with Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H.: SHEETS, R.D., #258 21 85, Em1c, USN; MAYO, M.W., #360 02 06, VC2c, USN; STANKAVICH, E.R., #250 50 42, OM2c, USN. At 1115, the Camp Andrews Recreation Party of (16) men JONES, C.E., #272 06 17, SFlc, USN, returned on board. At 1103, hoisted plane #1109 aboard. At 1105, hoisted plane #1178 aboard.

C.W. Brown
C.W. BROWN,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

12-16 Moored as before. At 1300, mustered crew at quarters. Absentees: SZYMANSKI, F., F3c, AOL since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 1505, USS OOLALA got underway to shift berths. At 1512, USS OOLALA moored port side to our starboard side. At 1525, USS DOLPHIN and USS HARKWAL stood in and moored.

N. K. Faerber
N. K. FAERBER,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

16-20 Moored as before. At 1823, USS WARD got underway. At 1916, USS HILBERT stood in to harbor.

A. V. Sims
A. V. SIMS,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

20-24 Moored as before.

V. C. Langan
V. C. LANGAN,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

Approved: R. M. MULLICH, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: E. L. FRIEDMAN, Lieut. Comdr., U.S. Navy.

(Original without copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP															HELENA		CL50							
By Pearl Harbor, T.H.															TO		Thursday 1 December 10 41							
Plus 10															R. H. ENGLISH		Capt. G. S. May, Commanding							
TIME DESCRIPTION															WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE		CLOUDS		SEA	
															Direction		Pressure		Air Sea Air Wet Bulb		Forecast		Height	
															Force		State		At Sea		At Anchor		At Anchor	
															Direction		Pressure		Air Sea Air Wet Bulb		Forecast		Height	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20					
060	8	30.09	72	68	C	STCU	040	7	30															
060	10	30.07	72	69	C	STCU	040	7	30															
060	10	30.07	72	69	OE	STCU	040	9	30															
060	10	30.08	72	68	OE	STCU	040	8	30															
060	10	30.08	73	67	C	STCU	040	8	30															
060	10	30.08	73	67	C	STCU	040	9	30															
060	10	30.07	74	68	C	STCU	040	2	30															
070	12	30.08	74	68	BC	STCU	050	1	35															
070	11	30.10	75	68	BC	STCU	070	4	35															
070	12	30.12	76	68	BC	STCU	070	4	35															
070	12	30.12	77	68	BC	STCU	070	5	35															
070	12	30.12	77	69	BC	STCU	070	3	35															

Latitude		Longitude		Time		Drift		Current		Direction		Force		Temperature		Pressure		Wind	
Observed		Computed		Observed		Computed		Observed		Computed		Observed		Computed		Observed		Computed	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	
23° 37' N		157° 12' W		10 41															

UNITED STATES SHIP		HELENA	Thursday	4 December	1941
ZONE DESCRIPTION <u>Flux 101</u>		REMARKS			
00-04 Moored port side to berth #3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 1 5/8" wire bow and stern lines. 8" manila forward and after bow and quarter spring lines, 8" manila bow and quarter breast lines. USS OOLAH moored alongside to starboard. Boiler #5 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone services from the Yard. Ships present: Various units of the Pacific Fleet. SOFA (ComBatFor) in the USS CALIFORNIA. At 0140, the following named men returned from a tour of temporary duty with the Shore Patrol, Honolulu, T.H.: SHEETS, H.D., 258 21 85, EMIC, USN, MAYO, M.W., 360 02 06, PC2c, USN, STANKAVICH, E.R., 250 50 42, GM2c, USN. B.T. Kelly B. T. KELLY, 2nd Lieut. USMC.					
04-08 Moored as before. M. A. TENG, Lieut. (jg), U.S. Navy.					
08-12 Moored as before. At 0800, mustered crew at quarters. Absentees: SZYMARSKI, P., F3c, USN, AOL since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 1030, published the findings and sentence in the case of CISCO, L.E., Sea2c, USN, tried by Summary Court-Martial for being absent over leave from 0100, 1 November 1941 to 1700, 1 November 1941. As a result, he missed the ship which sailed at 0634, 1 November 1941. CISCO, surrendered aboard the USS SAN FRANCISCO, Finding: Guilty. Sentence: To be confined for a period of one (1) month and to lose fifteen (\$15) dollars per month of his pay for a period of four (4) months; total loss of pay amounting to sixty (\$60) dollars. Approved by Convening Authority on 2 December 1941. M. CROSS, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.					
12-16 Moored as before. At 1245, commenced making preparations for changing berths. At 1255, the following men left the ship on a tour as temporary Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H. WOODFIN, G.W., #261 80 22, EMIC, USN; MILLER, C.D., #375 62 20, EMIC, USN; ANDERSON, J.P., #243 63 86, EM2c, USN. At 1315, pilot R. L. GREEN came aboard. At 1325, Y.T. #152 made fast to starboard bow. At 1330, Y.T. #142 made fast to starboard quarter. At 1358, completed shifting berths. Moored in berth #1 and #2 Pearl Harbor, T.H. At 1420, Y.T. #152 cast off starboard bow. At 1421, Y.T. #142 cast off starboard quarter. At 1535, commenced receiving fresh water from the dock. D. L. G. KING, Ensign, U.S. Navy.					
16-20 Moored as before. At 1600, received the following stores for the general mess, from Chun Chong Co. Ltd., 450 lbs mainland fresh grapes, 1200 lbs iceburg U.S. #1 lettuce. Inspected as to quality by COOK, L.L., PM3c, USN and as to quantity by Ens. D.L.G. KING, USN. At 1635, received the following stores for the general mess, from Puget Sound Egg Packers, Inc., 392 lbs graham flour, inspected as to quality by COOK, L.L., PM3c, USN, and as to quantity by Ens. E.S. WASHBURN, Jr., D-V(G), USNR, O.C.D. At 1800, received on board 100 charges of 5" 38 cal. 8FD ammunition and 20 projectiles 5" 38 cal. B.I AP. E. S. WASHBURN, Jr., Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.					
20-24 Moored as before. At 2015, secured from Condition III in the AA Battery. J. H. BASHBACKE, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.					
Approved		P. H. ENGLISH, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.			
E. L. FISHBURN, Lieut. Comdr.,		E. L. FISHBURN, Lieut. Comdr.,			

[illegible]

U.S.S. HELENA Date 5 December 1941

ADDITIONAL SHEET

16-20 Moored as before. At 1600, received the following stores for the general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ens. R. J. KIRKLAND, Jr., D-V(G), USNR, and as to quality by BERGFELD, P.C., Phm2c, USN, from American Factors Lt., 60 cases of mustard. At 1715, pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer, USS SOLAGE, BUTLER, J.T., Sea2c, USN, #234 25 96, reported on board for duty. Records and accounts delivered in person. At 1800, pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer Lieut.(jg), M.T. TYNG, USN, left the ship in charge of five (5) petty officers to report to Fleet Morale Officer for Shore Patrol duty at Bloch Recreation Center Arena.

R.J. Kirkland Jr.
R. J. KIRKLAND, Jr.,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

20-24 Moored as before. At 2115, set Condition III, Watch II in the 5" Battery and searchlights. At 2215, hoisted out two aircraft for Night Flying, plane #1108, Ens. F. GOLDBECK, A-V(N), USNR, pilot, RULEGOSKY, K.J., RM3c, USN, passenger; plane #1178, Ens. C.B. HANEY, A-V(N), USNR, pilot, SLATON, R.J., RM3c, USN, passenger. At 2315, Lieut.(jg), M.T. TYNG, USN and five (5) petty officers returned to the ship, having completed Shore Patrol duty at Bloch Recreation Center Arena. At 2320, secured from Condition III, Watch II in the 5" Battery and searchlights.

W. R. Mickle
W. R. MICKLE,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

Approved: *E. M. Conklin*
E. M. CONKLIN
Captain, U.S. Navy
Commanding

Witnessed: *E. H. Shickler*
E. H. SHICKLER
Lieut. Grade 1, U.S. Navy

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Investigation, together with log sheets)

UNITED STATES SHIP

HELENA

Friday

5

December

1941

SHIP DESCRIPTION: File 104

REMARKS

00-01 Moored port side to berths #1 & 2, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 1 5/8 wire bow and stern lines, 3" manila forward and after bow and quarter spring lines, 2" manila bow and quarter breast lines. Boiler #6 in operation for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone services from the Dock. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. SOPA in the USS CALIFORNIA (CombatFor). At 0130, the railroading named men returned aboard having completed a tour as temporary Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H.: WOODFIN, G.W., BMC, #261 80 22, USN; MILLER, C.D., #175 62 20, EMIC, USN; ANDERSON, I.D., #243 63 86, EMIC, USN. At 0315, MAWHEATHERS, E., Mat#22, was delivered on board by the Shore Patrol, having been AOL since 0100, December 5, 1941, and was made a prisoner at large by order of the Commanding Officer.

L. D. Stiles
L. D. STILES,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

04-08 Moored as before.

H. F. Saunders
H. F. SAUNDERS,
Ensign, A-V(H), USNR.

06-12 Moored as before. At 0200, held quarters, for muster. Absentees: SZTANMAN, F., F3c, USN, AOL since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 0845, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, ref: BuNav despatch, 242118 of November 1941, Ens. S.C. BROWNING, D-V(G), USNR, was detached this date and ordered to report to ComNavFor for temporary duty under instruction, and then to duty with ComNavFor armed guard center Treasure Island, California. At 0900, hoisted out plane #1176, Pilot: Ens. H.F. SAUNDERS, A-V(H), USNR, passenger: Ens. G.R. HANST, A-V(H), USNR. At 0930, received the following stores for the general mess: Woon Love's Biscuit Co., 500 lbs soda crackers; From Tai Hing Co., 504 lbs. candy, inspected as to quantity by Lt-Comdr., F.M. HOCK, (SC), USN, and as to quality KOLODZIER, J.C., PHM2c, USN. At 0945, received the following ammunition from West Dock AMM Depot, Pearl Harbor, T.H., 80-54/38 cal. projectiles - 20 live catapult charges. At 1000, published the findings and sentence in the case of PRONKILLA, A.F., F3c, USN tried by S.C.M. for absence over leave. Findings: Guilty. Sentence: Loss of pay of \$18 per month for two (2) months, total loss of pay amounting to \$36. Bad Conduct Discharge remitted on probationary period of six (6) months. Approved: By the Convening Authority on 1 December 1941, and by 1810 (ComNavFor) on 4 December 1941. At 1030, received the following stores for use in general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ens. H. BOWMAN, D-V(G), USNR, inspected as to quality by KOLODZIER, J.C., PHM2c, USN; from Chun Heon Ltd., Honolulu, T.H., 600 pounds fresh tomatoes, 800 pounds fresh lemons.

H. A. Bowman
H. A. BOWMAN,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

12-16 Moored as before. At 1245, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T.H., NORMER, C.S., Seals, V-6, USNR reported aboard for duty. Records and accounts to be forwarded by registered mail. At 1240, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, NEWMAN, D.F., G3c, USN, left the ship for temporary duty with Beach Guard. At 1300, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, the following men left the ship for temporary duty with Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H.: KATO, K.W., #160 02 06, F3c, USN; SHRETS, H.D., #258 421 85, EMIC, USN; SPANGLER, E.W., #250 50 42, G4c, USN. At 1430, lighted fires under #3 boiler. At 1510, lifted safety valves on boiler #1 by hand. At 1515, cut in boiler #3 on auxiliary steam line. At 1525, secured fires under boiler #6. At 1540, secured auxiliary steam stops on boiler #6.

E. S. Smith
E. S. SMITH,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

Approved:

E. H. English
E. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

E. L. Friedman
E. L. FRIEDMAN,
Lieut. Comdr.,
U.S.N.

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA CL-50

At Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Saturday 6 December 1941

NAME Plus 104 R. H. ENGLISH CAPT. F. E. King, Commanding

Date	Lat. North	Long. East	BY ARRIV.	BY LOG	Current (T)	WIND	BAROMETER				TEMPERATURE				WIND DIR.	WIND SP.	CLOUDS				SEA
							At Sea	On Deck	At Base	At Top	Air	Surf	At Base	At Top			Base	Surf	Base	Surf	
1	060	12	30.04	73	67	OP	CUMB	090	6	25											
2	060	12	30.04	73	67	OP	CUMB	090	5	25											
3	060	10	30.03	73	67	OP	CUMB	090	5	25											
4	060	10	30.01	73	67	OP	CUMB	090	5	25											
5	070	10	30.02	72	66	OP	CUMB	080	6	25											
6	070	10	30.03	72	66	OP	CUMB	080	6	25											
7	080	10	30.06	72	65	OP	CUMB	080	6	25											
8	080	10	30.07	74	66	OP	STCU	080	6	25											
9	080	6	30.08	75	68	OP	STCU	050	4	25											
10	040	7	30.06	77	72	OP	CU	030	2	30											
11	040	8	30.04	77	71	OP	STCU	010	4	30											
12	040	8	30.02	77	69	OP	STCU	010	3	30											

a) Latitude		Received		None	
b) Longitude	Expend	3495			
	On hand	604948			

c) Latitude		Received		None	
d) Longitude	Expend	21500			
	On hand	76357			

Current		Revised LEADING POINT	
Lat	Drift	Drift for'd	Drift aft

GENCOINFORM IN USE		After Revising Point	
Time	Drift for'd	Drift aft	

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS		Magnetic Temperature	
Compass No.	Error	Maximum	Minimum
S. H.	Variation	70	
Deviation	Inspected smokeless powder samples.		Conditions normal.

DRILLS AND EXERCISES	
Morning	Afternoon

REMARKS FOR DATA - SUMMARY	
Exp. No. (Serial)	
Time to submerge	
Greatest depth	

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 1

UNITED STATES SHIP	HELENA	Saturday	6 December	1941
(Day) (Date) (Month)				
SHIP DESCRIPTION <u>Plus 104</u>		REMARKS		
00-0. Moored port side to Berths 1 & 2, Ten Ten Dock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 8" manila bow line, 1 5/8" wire stern line, 8" manila forward and after bow and quarter spring lines, 8" manila bow and quarter breast lines. USS OGLALA moored along starboard side, port side to. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone service from the dock. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Yard, and Marine Craft. BOPA is co-located in USS CALIFORNIA. At 0000 energized general fueling system. At 0130, MAYO, W.M., JG2d, USN, SHEERS, H.D., EAGLE, USN, STANAVICH, E.R., CM2c, USN, returned aboard having completed their temporary tour of duty as Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H. <i>W. L. Bailey, Jr.</i> W. L. BAILEY, JR., Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.				
01-02 Moored as before. <i>E. L. Buchanan</i> E. L. BUCHANAN, Ensign, U.S. Navy.				
02-12 Moored as before. At 0210, received the following stores for use in the general mess: Dispersed as to quantity by T-1, L.S. MCGURICK, D-V(G), USNR, and as to quality by THOMPSON, W.S., PO2c, USN, from the Provision Co. Lt., available. 900 pieces of the crew. At 0410, Messes #1108 and #1178 returned from San Juan Island and were hoisted aboard. At 0810, T-1, W.J. HANSEN, D-V(G), USNR, left the ship in charge of 12 men for Camp Andrews Party. At 0915, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer the following named men left the ship for temporary duty as Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H.: MILNER, D.D., JG1c, USN; GOOD-SON, G.W., JG1d, USN; ANDERSON, S.T., SM2c, USN. At 0950, held Quarters for senior and captain's inspection. Absentees: KRAMER, T., T-1c, USN, absent over leave since 0100, 1 December 1941, pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer. At 1010, T-1, GAGE, USN, left the ship for temporary duty as Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H. <i>L. V. McGurick</i> L. V. MCGURICK, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.				
12-12 Moored as before. At 1210, Camp Andrews Recreation Party of 12 men, T-1, S., EP2c, USN, in charge, returned to the ship. <i>H. E. Heisang</i> H. E. HEISANG, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.				
13-20 Moored as before. <i>R. W. Fides</i> R. W. FIDES, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.				
21 Moored as before. <i>S. O. Anderson</i> S. O. ANDERSON, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.				
22-23 Moored as before. <i>S. B. Fowler</i> S. B. FOWLER, Ensign, U.S. Navy, Commanding.				

W. 2000, 60

(Mar. 1920)

Page 1117

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP <i>ANNIE STAPPA</i>																																																																					
By <i>Pearl Harbor, T.H.</i> TO <i>Alaska</i> Sunday 7 December 1911																																																																					
ZONE DESCRIPTION <i>Plus 104</i> R. H. ENGLISH CAPT. U. S. Navy, Commanding																																																																					
Time	Lat	Long	Wind	Kts	Barometer	Temperature	Humidity	Clouds				Sea		Wind	Direction	Force																																																					
								Base	Height	Layer	Direction	Force	Direction				Force																																																				
1			050	6	30.02	72.65	80	STCU	040	4	30																																																										
2			050	6	30.01	72.63	80	STCU	040	2	30																																																										
3			050	6	29.99	73.67	80	STCU	040	4	30																																																										
4			030	5	29.98	73.67	80	STCU	020	1	30																																																										
5			030	8	30.01	73.67	80	STCU	020	3	30																																																										
6			030	8	30.03	73.67	80	STCU	020	3	30																																																										
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U. S. Navy
1941

Page 2 of 2

UNITED STATES SHIP

TELENA

Sunday

7 December

1941

LINE DESCRIPTION Plus 104

REMARKS

00-04. Moored port side to Berths #1 & #2, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 8" manila bow line, 1 5/8" wire stern line, 8" manila forward and after bow and quarter spring lines, 8" manila bow and quarter breast lines. USS OGLALA moored port to starboard side. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone services from the dock. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. SOPA in the USS CALIFORNIA (ComBatPor). At 0130, the following named men returned to the ship having completed temporary tour of duty as Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H.: WOODFIN, G. W., #261 60 22 EM1c, USN; ANDERSON, J.P., #243 63 86 EM2c, USN; MILLER, O.D., #175 62 20 EM1c, USN; JACOBY, E.F., #243 63 91 EM2c, USN.

C. W. Brown
C. W. BROWN,
Ensign, D-V(3), USNR.

04-08 Moored as before. At about 0757, airplanes recognized as Japanese made a surprise dive bombing attack on Ford Island. Rounded General quarters. At about 0757, a series of three heavy explosions felt nearby. At about 0758, ship rocked by violent explosion on starboard side. This explosion caused by torpedo from a torpedo plane coming over channel south of Ford Island. Hit occurred approximately between frames 71 to 79.

W. W. Jones
W. W. JONES,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

08-12 Moored as before. At about 0801, opened fire with 5" AA batteries at Japanese planes. Followed immediately thereafter by 1.1 and 50 cal. Heavy planes strafed boats and ships in harbor. One fighter type plane believed to have been hit falling toward Navy Yard in flames. The first attack appeared to consist of a strafing attack in coordination with a torpedo attack launched against this and other vessels in the harbor. At 0803, USS OGLALA, alongside, listing to port. At 0810, forward boiler operating station flooded, No. 1 engineer room flooded. Steam power out from ship. Fire reported in compartment B-203-31, and compartment closed off because of no water pressure. It was later determined that this was not an actual fire but smoke from torpedo explosion. At 0810, GREEN, J.J., Y1c, USN, confined in the brig awaiting trial by CGM was released from the brig. At about 0820, first attack ended. TELENA laying heavy fire with 5", 1.1, and 50 cal. throughout the first attack. At 0830, signal hoisted to ships present to get underway. At 0840, signal hoisted to ships present to sortie in accordance with plan. At 0840, report received that after boiler operating station was flooding. At about 0840, Japanese submarine reported to be in North Channel. At about 0847, USS OGLALA taken in tow by tugs was hauled astern to berth Baker 3. At 0855, plane attack coming in to starboard from South West. At about 0900, WATSON, A.R., CM3c, USN, and RIVERT, R.E., CM3c, USN, attached to USS ST LOUIS, reported on board. At 0900, report received Japanese submarine sunk in Middle Loch. At 0900, Japanese planes attacked, approaching from Southeast and South, over Navy Yard, taking advantage of covering offered by Navy Yard buildings. Attack consisted of a series of dive bombing attacks with glide bombing attack. Several bombs exploded alongside, several near misses, no direct hits. Fire from ship with all anti-aircraft guns in action, was heavy and appeared to cause planes to veer off. One dive bomber which veered off was raked by 1.1 and 50 cal. and was seen to fall in flames near Hospital Point. At 0908, Ensign, W.J. HANSEN, D-1(0), USNR, reported on board from temporary duty at Camp Andrews. At 0907, HANSEN, W.J., EM1c, USN, reported on board with the following named men from a flight to Camp Andrews, Oahu, T.H.: LAMBLEY, W.L., 22c, USN; DEAR, W.W., 22c, USN; GALT, J.P., 22c, USN; MITCHELL, H.J., 22c, USN; GLOVER, R.M., 22c, USN; KATZMAN, R.M., 22c, USN; PETER, H.B., 22c, USN; TUDEN, O.E., 22c, USN; WOLTERHUIS, K.E., 22c, USN; GARDNER, R.M., 22c, USN; MILLER, L.C., 22c, USN; DAVID, M.L., 22c, USN; HARRIS, E.T., 22c, USN; HARRIS, J.R., 22c, USN; BULAN, D.F., 22c, USN. At 0907, bombs exploded alongside. Near misses. At 0910, plane dropped objects in channel which exploded. Drydock believed at first to be torpedoes and later thought to be bombs. At 0912, Japanese submarine reported sunk in entrance of Middle Loch.

C. W. Brown
C. W. BROWN,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

W. W. Jones
W. W. JONES,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

W. W. Jones

Page 1200

ADDITIONAL SHEET

C. R. S. HELENA

Date 7 December 1941

08-12 CONTD. About 0920, bombing attack aimed at HELENA and NEVADA. At 0930, lit off boiler #6. At about 0940, second attack ended. At 0945, informed ComDesBatFor would be able to get underway by 1015, speed restricted to 15 knots. At 0955, No. 3 fireroom was reported flooding. As soon as steam was obtained, pumps were put on and flooding controlled. At 1000, lighted off boilers #5, 7, 8. At 1000, informed ComDesBatFor of damage to forward boiler and enginerooms. At 1015, USS OGLA offered assistance to our repair parties. At 1025, P.T. boats commenced moving out of harbor. At 1025, draft of ship about 26 1/2 feet amidships, ship on even keel. At 1030, received orders from ComDesBatFor to remain at berth until further orders. At 1030, condition of guns: All after turrets at local control but no material damage; after main director and after sky control station were out of electric control and were shifted to manual control. Forward turrets no casualties. All mounts firing without air for gas ejection. Fuel oil fire on water reaching Ford Island. At 1030, received word to be prepared to receive PENNSYLVANIA alongside. At 1035, Ammunition expended: 400 rounds 5"/38 cal. 3500 rounds 1.1/75 cal. and 8500 rounds of 50 cal. All batteries in good condition. At 1035, the following named men were DEAD and were transferred to the Morgue at the Pearl Harbor Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T.H.:

PENNYL, J.C.	GM2c	USN
RAFF, H.K.	Sea2c	USN
GREENWALD, R.D.	Sea1c	USN
DICKENS, E.G.	F2c	USN
HINES, A.C.	Sea2c	USN
ALBANESE, S.	F2c	USN
GARDNER, A.J.	WT2c	USN
CARTER, W.J.	Sea2c	USN

At 1038, received report that there was no enemy CV in vicinity. At 1040, tested main engines. After diesel reported in good order. After port shaft alley was being pumped. At 1100, engineroom reported 2 boilers and one steam generator in use. At 1101, USS TENNESSEE opened fire. Received report that 4 of our fuel tanks were flooded. At 1105, patrol bomber #14 reported sank enemy submarine off of Pearl Harbor, T.H. Also reports received that enemy planes were approaching from south. At 1115, shifted to #4 generator, #1 generator being out of commission. Received reports from Observation Post No. 10 that planes were attacking from 148° T. At 1115, observed planes flying over at high level in general northerly direction. Believed to be enemy planes observing or high bombing. No bombs observed. Opened fire on this formation with 5" battery. At 1130, received report that a unidentified ship was 10 miles off KAENA POINT, Oahu, T.H. At 1135, planes reported attacking HICKAM FIELD. At 1145, reports received enemy parachute troops were landing on the North Shore of Oahu.

J. J. Armstrong
J. J. ARMSTRONG,
Ensign, D-7(S), USNR.

1200-1730 Moored as before. At 1200, received orders from CINCPAC all ships get underway and report to ComDesBatFor. ComDesBatFor assumed command of TASK FORCE I. At 1215, received report enemy transport four (4) miles off BARBER'S POINT. Own planes were ordered to attack transport. At 1215, yard began transporting 1" anti-aircraft guns on railroad cars. At 1215, received report enemy ship fifteen (15) miles south of Pearl Harbor. At 1220, WIALOFF was reported attacked. At 1235, received reports enemy planes approaching Pearl Harbor from Diamond Head. At 1245, enemy flight reported southeast of Diamond Head headed for Pearl Harbor. At 1245, received report eight (8) men-of-war in latitude 21°-10' N; longitude 159°-16' W; course 090° T. At 1245, set Condition II port watch in anti-aircraft battery. Left all batteries fully manned. At 1250, received report that smoke screen airplanes were carried away. Both smoke screen generators put out of commission. At 1250, received power on battle of roud. At 1255, began receiving fresh water from Navy Yard. At 1315, enemy landing party reported landed on WAIKIKI. At 1315, enemy and friendly aircraft reported engaged in dog fight over Diamond Head. At 1315, the First Lieutenant reported damage as follows: Forward fireroom flooded; forward boiler control flooded; forward engineroom flooded.

H. H. English
H. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

E. J. Anderson
E. J. ANDERSON,
Lieut. Comdr.,
p.s. 1000

This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets

3592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Page 1201

port shaft alley flooded. At 1318, enemy reported landing off MANAKULI. Own planes firing on them. At 1322, enemy naval attack reported approaching nine (9) miles southeast of BARRER'S POINT. At 1335, electrical power out in galley, but sandwiches being served to crew from galley. At 1350, reports received that six (6) enemy ships approaching WAILALE shore, to aid landing party at MANAKULI. At 1400, received report an unidentified destroyer approaching WAILALE. At 1445, transferred planes and all aviators to Ford Island. At 1600, mustered crew on stations. The following casualties reported: DEAD Sent to Morgue, NH, PH., T.H.

ALBOWESE, S.	F2c	USN	GARDNER, A.J.	WT2c	USN
CARTER, W.J.	Sea2c	USN	HARRIS, A.C.	Sea2c	USN
DICKENS, P.P.	F2c	USN	PENNYL, J.C.	EM2c	USN
NAMP, M.M.	Sea2c	USN	GREENGLAD, R.D.	Sea1c	USN

The following men were INJURED and transferred to U.S. Naval Hospital, P.H., T.H.

ANDERSON, W.D.	Sea1c	HUTTS, W.J.	Sea1c
ARMSTRONG, R.A.	F1c	JONESON, D.W.	Sea2c
BASHER, J.B.	Sea1c	KLEE, A.R.	F2c
BARTWELL, D.V.	EM2c	KULKE, E.C.	Sea1c
BIRNBERG, D.W.	Sea2c	LAMBERT, R.C.	EM1c
BLAKE, B.F.	Sea1c	LOVE, C.P.	Sea2c
BODENBERG, R.	F1c	MAY, M.W.	FC3c
BONISH, F.A.	Sea1c	McFILLAND, J.A.	FC3c
BRENDLE, L.J.	WT2c	McKINNON, A.M.	Sea1c
CISCO, L.E.	Sea2c	MORRIS, J.A.	EM2c
DANIELS, E.C.	Sea1c	MINIX, C.R.	Sea1c
DAVIS, A.A.	F3c	MUGGERLEY, R.L.	Sea1c
EDLING, R.N.	EM3c	POWERS, J.O.	SK3c
ESCOBAR, C.	OFFIC1c	SHAW, J.O.	F1c
FILL, J.	Sea1c	SMITH, J.L.	CH1(AA)
FISCHER, H.O.	Sea1c	TEASDALE, R.W.	PLSgt. USED
FLANNERY, R.J.	FC3c	THOMPSON, R.W.	F3c
FUELI, E.D.	FC3c	THOMAS, R.C.	SK2c
GILMAN, R.L.	F1c	VELLA, S.A.	Sea2c
GOLDMAN, P.J.	WT2c	WATERS, C.M.	Sea1c
GREEN, J.C.	Sea1c	WHITMAN, E.M.	Sea2c
HANSEN, I.	Sea1c	WILSON, C.E.	Sea1c
HEICK, A.J.	F1c	WISMAN, H.A.	GM1c
HENDERSON, W.V.	F2c	WYLL, C.C.	Sea2c
HUBBARD, P.F.	F1c	YAROVICH, M.C.	EM2c

INJURED and retained on board:

THOMPSON, H.V.	Ensign, U.S.N.	KERSHNER, A.V.	Ch. Elec. U.S.N.
HALLOIS, F.V.	Sea1c	RUB, M.R.	Sea1c
STERN, I.M.	EM2c	WILLIAMS, I.M.	PLA3c

MISSING:

URBAN, J.J.	EM2c	MORICELLI, E.	WM2c
WILLIS, G.S.	Sea2c	McGILLAND, G.W.	Sea1c
DOBBS, R.H.	EM2c	WATLAND, J.W.	EM1c
BEARDSLEY, L.M.	EM3c	ALDRIDGE, T.E.	Sea2c

At 1732, sunset, darkened ship, set Condition BAKER and II in AA Battery. At 1735, Draft of ship forward 29' 6", Aft 25' 2".

M. CROSS,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

1730-2100 Moored as before. At 2106, a flight of planes flew across from east, Ford Island and other shore batteries opened fire followed by ships in harbor. One plane brought down to westward of Pearl Harbor. Information learned later that these were friendly planes.

A. W. SILE,
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

Approved: *[Signature]*
R. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Witnessed: *[Signature]*
E. L. HARRISON,
Lieut. Comdr.,
O. S. W. Knappe

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)

EXHIBIT NO. 164

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

1 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON

At the hearing on January 25, 1946, Congressman Murphy asked to see the reports of the attack on Cahu which were sent to Washington by General Short and his subordinates. (Tr. 8342, 8346). The originals of those reports were shown to Congressman Murphy the same day, and copies are enclosed herewith.

*Carl R. Nelson*CARL R. NELSON
Captain, AUS

P 1 W
955A
URGENT

RADIOGRAM

0-14-c

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 7, 1941

URGENT

334P M.

From FT SHAFTER TH

To THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

SECRET

Copies furnished as noted:

NO 1057 DECEMBER SEVENTH

JAPANESE ENEMY DIVE BOMBERS ESTIMATED NUMBER SIXTY
ATTACKED HICKAM FIELD WHEELER FIELD PEARL HARBOR AT
EIGHT AM STOP EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO AT LEAST THREE HANGARS
WHEELER FIELD THREE HANGARS HICKAM FIELD AND TO PLANES
CAUGHT ON GROUND STOP DETAILS NOT YET KNOWN STOP FIGHT
LASTED OVER ONE HOUR STOP UNCONFIRMED THAT THAT SHIPS
IN PEARL HARBOR BADLY DAMAGED STOP MARINE AIRFIELD EWA
ALSO BADLY DAMAGED STOP MORE DETAILS LATER END

SHORT

ACTION COPY NO. 1 to JED.

INF. COPY NO. 2 to Chief of Army Air Forces.

INF. COPY NO. 3 to Secretary of General Staff.

INF. COPY NO. 4 to A.C. of S. G-1

INF. COPY NO. 5 to A.C. of S. G-2

INF. COPY NO. 6 to A.C. of S. G-3

INF. COPY NO. 7 to A.C. of S. G-4

Action Copy

The text of an exact copy of this message is
furnished. On such message as are absolutely
necessary will be made and mark of "SECRET". This
copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be
returned to The Adjutant General without delay.

RECEIVED-1941-12-07 10:00 AM

7 50TS
1111A/7

RADIOGRAM

0-60

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 7, 1941

447 P. M.

From HRAA II

To AGC

Copy furnished as noted:

No. 1060, 7th

BATTLE CASUALTIES REPORTED TEN TWENTY AT SEVEN DECEMBER NINETEEN
FORTY ONE KNOWN DEAD THIRTY EIGHT WOUNDED THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
SIX OF WHICH TWENTY TO FIFTY LAY BURNED ONE EIGHT SEVENTEEN
PLANE FROM MAINLAND WAS INTO ATTACK THREE INJURED AND

SHORT

AG

BHB/bjs-1712.

War Department, A.G.O., December 7, 1941. - To: A.C. of S., G-1.
(Exact Copy)

Exact Action Copy To: A. C. of S., G-1, Copy No. 1

Exact Information Copy To: A.C. of S., G-2, Copy No. 2.

A.C. of S., G-3, Copy No. 3.

A.C. of S., G-4, Copy No. 4.

Secretary of the General Staff, Copy No. 5.

Chief, Army Air Forces., Copy No. 6.

WPD Copy No. 7

Action Copy

110-1000-1010 - OFFICIALS ONLY DO NOT REPLY TO THIS OFFICIALS ONLY

3596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

P7 WTJ
1204P

URGENT

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 7, 1941

536P M.

From HAWAII

To ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished as noted:
DEC - 7 1941

No. 1066, 7th

FOR G TWO ENEMY AIR ATTACK RESUMED ELEVEN AM MUCH LESS
INTENSE THAN FORMER ATTACKS PERIOD MANILA REPORTS NO OVERT
ACTS HAVE YET OCCURRED THERE SIGNED FIELDER.

SHORT

The making of an exact copy of this message is
forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely
necessary will be made and marked "SECRET". This
copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be
returned to The Adjutant General without delay.

Exact Action Copy To: G-2, Copy No. 1

Exact Information Copy To: G-1, Copy No. 2.
G-3, Copy No. 3.,
G-4, Copy No. 4.,
Secretary, General Staff, Copy No. 5.
G-6, Copy No. 6.

AG EHB/bjs-1712.

War Department, A.G.O., December 7, 1941. - To: G-2.
(Exact Copy)

Action Copy

REL 12-7-41

LW

25WTJ 5P

RADIOGRAM

G-4-C

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 9, 1941.

1:02A M.

From FT SHAFTER,

To CHIEF OF STAFF.

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1077. DECEMBER 8TH.

REURAD FIVE FOUR NAUGHT DASH EIGHT DECEMBER
EIGHTH YESTERDAYS OPERATIONS CONSISTED OF HEAVY AIR
ATTACKS PRINCIPALLY AGAINST PEARL HARBOR, HICKAM, WHEELER
AND BELLWIS FIELDS SCATTERING BOMBS AT FORT SHAFTER,
CAPITOL BUILDING AND GOVERNORS HOME. OUR LOSSES SEVERE
IN AIRCRAFT. ENEMY LOSSES BELIEVED SMALL. ELEVEN PLANES
BROUGHT DOWN BY ARMY. GROUND FORCES UNIMPAIRED. MORALE
EXCELLENT. ALL TROOPS ON BATTLE POSITIONS WITH TWO DAYS
OF FIRE AT POSITIONS. TOTAL LOSSES TWO HUNDRED KILLED
THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FIVE WOUNDED VERY LARGELY AT
HICKAM FIELD. STATUS OF AIRCRAFT AS FOLLOWS: PLANES
AVAILABLE B EIGHTEEN NINE; B SEVENTEEN, NINE; A TWENTY,
EIGHT; PURSUIT, FORTY ONE TOTAL SIXTY SEVEN. PLANES
THAT CAN BE REPAIRED LOCALLY: B EIGHTEEN FOUR; B SEVENTEEN
TWO; A TWENTY TWO; PURSUIT NINE TO SIXTEEN. PRIORITY
FOR DESIRED ASSISTANCE: SIXTY HEAVY BOMBERS; TEN MILLION
ROUNDS POINT FIFTY CALIBER AMMUNITION WITH LINKS REPEAT
LINKS; TWO HUNDRED PURSUIT PLANES; THIRTY SIX DIVE
BOMBERS. BOMBS AS FOLLOWS: TWO THOUSAND POUND BOMBS
SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY; ELEVEN HUNDRED POUND BOMBS THREE

Action Copy

REPRODUCED FROM THE RECORDS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

SECRET

M.

From _____

To _____

SHEET #2 OF HONOLULU NO. 1077-8TH.

Copies furnished as noted:

THOUSAND; SIX HUNDRED POUND BOMBS SIX THOUSAND; THREE HUNDRED POUND BOMBS TEN THOUSAND. SPECIAL ATTENTION TO INVERTERS AND SPARE TANKS FOR B SEVENTEENS. AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE FURNISHED WITH COMPLETE COMBAT CREWS AND WITH FULL COMBAT NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT. REQUIREMENTS FOR MACHINE TOOLS AND SHOP EQUIPMENT NOT YET DESIRED. PRELIMINARY SALVAGE REPORTS ARE FAVORABLE AS CONSIDERABLE QUANTITY OF NEW TOOLS HAD NOT YET BEEN INSTALLED IN HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT AND WERE NOT DAMAGED. SUBPARAGRAPH ONE HUNDRED FIFTEEN DASH THIRTY SEVEN MILLIMETER GUNS TO COMPLETE QUOTA. REPLACE ALL THREE INCH ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS WITH FIVE INCH TOTAL OF EIGHTY SIX. THREE INCH GUNS TO BE USED FOR OUTLYING ISLANDS. TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN POINT FIFTY CALIBER GUNS TO COMPLETE QUOTA. FORTY EIGHT DASH ONE NAUGHT FIVE M. OR SEVENTY FIVE M TWO GUNS TO COMPLETE ORGANIC EQUIPMENT AND PERMIT USE OF OLD BRITISH SEVENTY FIVES AS HEACH GUNS TO REPLACE THOSE SHIPPED TO PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. ONE BATTALION TANKS PREFERABLY MEDIUM. ONE SIGNAL BATTALION. THIRTY THREE HUNDRED HARBOR DEFENSE TROOPS TO FILL TABLE OF ORGANIZATION. FIFTEEN HUNDRED FIELD ARTILLERY TO FILL DIVISIONAL

Action Copy

REPRODUCED BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

To

SHEET #3 OF HONOLULU NO. 1077-8TH.

Copies furnished as noted:

ARTILLERY. AUTHORITY TO EVACUATE ALL DEPENDENTS AT
GOVERNMENT EXPENSE AND TO CRATE AND SHIP FURNITURE. WAR
DEPARTMENT TO PUSH FOOD STORAGE FOR CIVILIAN POPULATION;
INVENTORY IS BEING MADE RESULT COMMUNICATED AS SOON AS
KNOWN. RATIONING OF GASOLINE HAS BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT
TODAY. TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY JAPANESE AGENTS ARE UNDER
ARREST, FIFTY ADDITIONAL TO BE APPREHENDED. ONE HUNDRED
AND THIRTY TWO GERMANS AND ITALIANS ARE BEING ARRESTED.
ONE J. PANESSE NAVAL OFFICER PRISONER OF WAR. THIRTY
JAPANESE AMATEUR RADIO STATIONS HAVE BEEN CLOSED.

SHORT.

THIS MESSAGE IS AN EXTRACT FROM THE MESSAGE
RECEIVED. ONLY SUCH EXTRACTS AS ARE ABSOLUTELY
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RECEIVED-1918-12-10 10:10 AM 1077-8TH. HONOLULU, T. H.

3600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

P 46 WTJ 223P/9		RADIOGRAM		G-4-C	
Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.					
PRIORITY		DEC. 10, 1941			
From HAWAII		629 A M.			
To AGO					
Copies furnished as noted: DEC 10 1941 		NO. 1098, 9TH AGE SEVEN DECEMBER FOLLOWING SUMMARY BATTLE CASUALTIES ENLISTED MEN FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION COLON DEAD IDENTIFIED ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX NOT IDENTIFIED SEVENTY FOUR MISSING TWENTY WOUNDED ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FOUR. 46 A G O DEC 10 1941 Received 725 SHORT EXACT ACTION COPY TO: A.C. of S., G-2, Copy No. 1.* EXACT INFORMATION COPY TO: Sec. Genl. Staff, Copy No. 2. A.C. of S., WPD, Copy No. 3. A.C. of S., G-1, Copy No. 4.* Chief, Army Air Forces, Copy No. 5. PREP INF CY TO: Chief of Staff, GHQ. <i>with destroyed by burning</i> <i>LP-1701</i> <i>@wp destroyed by burning</i> <i>cho</i> FILE DEC 21 1941			
The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked "SECRET". This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be returned to The Adjutant General without delay.		Action Copy			

1 RADIOGRAM 1

P14 WTJ
103 PM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 1441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

0-4-0
DECEMBER 10 1941

PRIORITY

816 P M.

From FT SHAFTER TH

To THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished as noted:
DEC 10 1941



1106 DECEMBER TENTH

FOR GENERAL ARNOLD STOP PURSUIT PLANES WERE DISPERSED TO
VARIOUS FIELDS ON OAHU STOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
INDICATED THAT SABOTAGE WAS MORE PROBABLE THAN ATTACK
AND TO FACILITATE ANTI SABOTAGE MEASURES PLANES WERE NOT DIS-
PERSED AROUND PURSUIT FIELDS STOP LAST FEBRUARY FUNDS WERE
REQUESTED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF BUNKERS AND NECESSARY
TAXIWAYS TO PERMIT DISPERSAL OF PLANES AT HICKAM FIELD
STOP FUNDS HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED AT TIME OF ATTACK STOP
WE ARE NOW RUSHING CONSTRUCTION OF THESE DISPERSAL
FACILITIES AT HICKAM FIELD ALSO AT MAUI AIRPORT AND AT
OTHER FIELDS.

SHORT

47 AGO
DEC 10 1941

EXACT ACTION COPY TO: Chief, Army Air Forces, Copy No. 1
EXACT INFO COPY TO: A. C. of S., S-2, Copy No. 2
A. C. of S., WPD, Copy No. 3
Secretary, General Staff, Copy No. 4

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1-2-41

01-211158 PM 40

**HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.**

SECRET

In reply refer to:

12 December 1941

SUBJECT: Report of Battle of Oahu.

TO: The Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

1. On November 27, 1941, at 3:15 P.M., due to the seriousness of the situation reported by the Chief of Staff from Washington to the Department Commander, Alert #1 was directed. This Alert as set forth in the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department requires all vital installations to be protected against sabotage throughout Oahu. Within an hour and a half the entire command was in position and bridges, light plants, water works, radio stations, and many other installations considered vital were being protected for 24 hours a day. This protection, however, required only a small percentage of the troops, the remainder continuing the normal training. This Alert did not require the dispersion of our airplanes on the fields due to the fact that damage from saboteurs would be more simple if the planes were dispersed than they were all assembled on the mats and in the hangars.

2. Alert #1, as above, was in effect at 7:55 A.M. on December 7, 1941, when the attack by an estimated one hundred and fifty Japanese planes struck the Army and Navy installations on this island.

3. The installations of the Aircraft Warning Company, a total of six permanent stations and six mobile, had not been completed on December 7, 1941, although every effort was being made to install these warning stations. The complete interceptor service, including all mobile stations, was operating from 4:00 A. M. to 7:00 A.M., which was the normal practice during Alert #1. The interceptor service closed down at 7:00 A.M. as nothing unusual had been reported. The Opana mobile station, however, continued in operation of its own accord for further training. The noncommissioned officer of the Opana station called the telephone operator at the Aircraft Warning Information Center at 7:00 A.M. and informed him that there was a large number of planes approaching Oahu from the direction North 3 points East at a distance of 100 miles away. At this time there was only one officer at the Information Center. This officer called the WFO of the Opana station regarding the situation. As no Naval officer was available or present for the purpose of checking whether this flight was from one of the carriers which was operating in the North, or one of the Army flights approaching from the West Coast, he assumed this to be a friendly flight, and therefore did not alert the military command. Affidavits of the operator and the lieutenant in charge attached. Also station charts are enclosed herewith.

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4. When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire was opened, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few moments the real situation was not grasped. Perhaps three or four minutes had elapsed after the start of the attack until my Chief of Staff ran into my quarters and announced that an attack was in progress. I could scarcely believe it for I was about to turn out all troops under Alert #3. This Alert required all troops to occupy their battle positions in the shortest possible time and defend Oahu in their mission. This message was carried out as rapidly as possible under the circumstances and troops from all echelons moved promptly to their battle positions. The Advance CP of the Department was operating in the Aliamahu Grater by 8:45 A.M. with limited personnel, and the Advance CP of the 25th Division, of the Hawaiian Air Force, and complete personnel of Advance CP of Department Headquarters by 11:00 A.M. Rear echelons remained at their normal locations.

5. Three distinct attacks were made during the morning, the first one coming at 7:55 A.M., the second about 9:00 A.M., and the third about 11:00 A.M., each lasting approximately fifteen minutes. From a military standpoint the attack had been thoroughly planned and was almost faultlessly executed. Military objectives were successfully attacked with sufficient strength to bring about maximum destruction. In the Army, the airfields, the planes on the ground and the installations at the fields were the first objective. There were a few scattering bombs dropped at Fort Shafter and Fort Armstrong, these being sufficient to indicate that these two posts were also included as military objectives.

6. The largest number of planes concentrated on Pearl Harbor, and there each battleship, cruiser, and group of destroyers was given particular attention by a definite group of planes. Throughout there was every indication that the entire attack had been most carefully planned and every pilot knew exactly the part his plane was to play. There was very little evidence of any hit or miss bombing. From maps recovered from crashed planes, it was indicated that the pilots bombing Pearl Harbor knew the location of practically every ship, including exactly what type the ship was and where it was berthed. There was inclosure No. 1 attached sets forth the type of planes identified and their general characteristics. It is believed that all planes came from carriers. The most serious damage to battleships was caused by torpedo planes.

7. The damage, as far as the Army was concerned, was chiefly at Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Bellows Field; Hickam Field suffering the greatest number of casualties and material losses. At Hickam Field the Hawaiian Air Depot was completely destroyed. Many of the bombers were wrecked on the ground and three hangars were burned. The mess hall and barracks were severely damaged, and the Post Exchange building was wrecked.

8. Wheeler Field suffered the second greatest amount of damage in hangars and personnel, and in actual numbers the greater loss in planes.

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9. Balloons Field suffered the least. However, two pilots were killed here and one squadron of P-40s lost all but two planes. At Shafter and Armstrong there were no casualties nor any material damaged.

10. By noon on Sunday the situation was becoming somewhat normal. However, the civilian population was just realizing what had happened and roads were becoming jammed with traffic going in every direction. The Honolulu Rapid Transit Company, which operates a large number of buses and has by far the largest franchise in the City of Honolulu, under the direction of Mr. Kirk and his Civilian Relief Committee immediately moved into Hickam Field, Fort Kamehameha, and started evacuating families from these areas. All during Sunday afternoon the following day this evacuation of families continued, the bulk of the families being quartered in schools and homes throughout the City. At Fort Shafter, where the headquarters of the Interceptor Command is being constructed in a spur of the Koolau Mountains, the women and children of Fort Shafter and a few from Schofield Barracks were accommodated. Some confusion resulted in this initial evacuation. However, within 48 hours most of the difficulties were eliminated and the system was functioning in an efficient, highly satisfactory manner. Slit trenches were being dug by the Station Complement at all the posts in the immediate vicinity of quarters so that when the families returned to their quarters they would have some protection in case of actual raid by jumping into these trenches. Slit trenches are also being constructed in all parks, school grounds, and open places accessible to civil communities.

11. Prior to this time all Japanese Agents, as well as Italian and German, had been listed by the Army G-2, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Naval Intelligence. Hence it was but a matter of a few hours until the Japanese Agents were being apprehended and assembled in the Immigration Station, which had been selected as a site heretofore. At present they are all assembled in the Quarantine Station on Sand Island, the total being as follows:

Japanese	-	370
German	-	98
Italian	-	14
Total	-	482

There has been no difficulty, either at the time of apprehension or later during the period of confinement of these enemy agents. In the beginning the Department Military Police and Civilian Police constituted the guard. Later a rifle company of the 25th Division was employed. A special detachment is now being organized under the Provost Marshal for the guarding of the entire group. Under the Standing Operating Procedure the Commanding General, 25th Division, is made responsible for guarding of vital installations within the South Sector. However, within the next week the entire Police District #1, which includes the City of Honolulu, will be taken over by the Hawaiian Territorial Guard, under the direction of the Department Provost Marshal. This will relieve approximately six companies of Infantry for combat duty.

- 3 -

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12. The casualty report of 10 December 1941, is attached as Enclosure No. 2. The 24 hours following the submission of this report has changed the figures in but one respect, adding four to the total known dead and subtracting four from the seriously wounded.

13. Since 11:00 A.M. on 7 December 1941, there have been no attacks. A landing was not attempted, either from small boats, by air borne troops or by parachute troops, although during Monday and Tuesday there was much information and many erroneous reports received at the Department OP. We have been unable to determine whether these reports were submitted by additional enemy agents or by imaginative individuals. The Army has one prisoner of war, a Naval Lieutenant, who came ashore from a two-man submarine, which became stranded on a reef near Kaeohe Bay. A submarine of this same type was sunk by the Navy at about 7:15 Sunday morning within Pearl Harbor, after it was believed it had attacked the Raleigh. Very little information was obtained by G-2 from this prisoner. He apologized for his ignorance in navigating and stated that he expected and wanted to be shot as a result of his failure. This submarine was towed ashore and is now being examined by both the Army and the Navy. Some equipment was found intact in the planes that were shot down. In most cases this equipment, as well as the planes, engines, etc., appeared to be excellent for the purpose for which it was intended. Occupants of all planes were dead when found. The Army shot down a total of eleven planes by pursuit planes and by anti-aircraft.

14. Martial Law was declared on December 8th and all functions of the Military Government were initiated, with the Department Commander as Military Governor and the Department Judge Advocate General in actual charge as Executive. The cooperation of the civilian population, in view of this great change in their Government, has generally been excellent. Whether difficulties will arise in the future remains to be seen. However, all indications point to a general acceptance of this situation by the civilian population.

15. Approximately three weeks prior to the outbreak of hostilities, detachments from the 804th Engineers, reinforced by large groups of civilian engineers, departed from Honolulu on specially chartered vessels for Christmas and Canton Islands for the purpose of constructing airfields on these islands by January 15th. Additional fields were being constructed or already established fields were being expanded in the Fiji Islands, New Caledonia and at Townsville, Australia. All of this work was directly under the Department Commander, with the District Engineer acting as his immediate representative. According to local agreement the Army was responsible for the defense of Christmas Island and the Navy assumed the responsibility for Canton Island. This was later changed on account of instructions from the War Department before the Navy had placed any of their defense forces on Canton Island. Defense forces were to have been dispatched to Canton Island December 8th but were intercepted by the state of war. To date there has been no delay in this construction and the supplying of these outlying projects are being expedited. It is felt, however, that certain modifications must be made

- 4 -
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for the sake of safety. The Ludington on December 8th was en route from Christmas to Canton carrying 1500 tons of equipment for Canton, including a large still to guarantee a water supply. On orders from Washington the Navy, for purposes of safety, diverted the Ludington from Canton to Samoa. Canton is very close to points where the Japanese are operating and the Navy feels that it will be impossible to protect it at this time.

Also, the water situation in a short time would be serious if the 300 civilians now there remain. The decision was made yesterday to send the Haleakala from here to Canton to take all civilians to Christmas to be employed upon the works there. The dredge and tugs were started yesterday from Canton to Christmas as the position was too exposed to leave these boats there. Two 75mm guns, 6 Browning automatic rifles, and 6 water-cooled machine guns, all with antiaircraft mounts, are being sent on the Haleakala to reinforce the garrison at Canton, consisting of 45 Engineers, Medical and Signal Detachments. A detachment of ten Field Artillery is being sent to operate the 75mm guns. If approved by the Chief of Staff, this garrison will remain on the Island. There is available food for a period of six months. There are a good many thousands of gallons of water in storage and two stills in operation capable of producing 1,000 gallons of water per day. There is no harbor at Canton and it is impossible for anything but small boats or lighters drawing about eight feet to enter the harbor. By providing proper under-ground facilities it is believed that this garrison can remain at Canton and defend itself indefinitely. All engineer equipment, gasoline, oil, explosives, etc. are being left at Canton and work will proceed with a limited number of men available. With the increase in the number of civilians at Christmas work should go along much faster there. If Christmas and the field at Nandi, near Suva in the Fiji Islands, are completed by January 15th it will be possible to use this route without either Canton or Samoa. The advisability of moving the civilians from Canton to Samoa was considered but the Navy did not want them at Samoa. The machinery on the Ludington now at Samoa can be used to very great advantage at Nandi and the War Department is being requested to authorize the Ludington to unload this at Suva when the first convoy proceeds to the Philippine Islands. The work at Christmas, Nandi, and Townsville will be pushed to the maximum as the necessity for this additional air route to the Orient is more apparent now than ever before, particularly since Midway and Wake are being attacked and Guam is reported to be in the hands of the Japanese.

16. Today nine B-17s have arrived safely from the mainland, making a total of 23 now available in the Department with the possibility of repairing two more. There are 11 B-18s and 9 A-20s left, with 52 P-40s. ^{Pursuit} More P-40s and heavy bombers will be required before a sense of security is possible. This is particularly true in view of the severe losses which have been suffered by the Navy.

17. The ground troops in the Department have suffered no losses. Morale is high and a state of training throughout is perhaps the highest it has been for many years. Reinforcements, however, are highly essential, in air force, fillers for harbor defense units, field artillery, as well as the infantry regiments in both divisions. Antiaircraft artillery which is due to arrive in January and March should be sent at once. A battalion of tanks and a signal

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21. Affidavit covering the details of the action of the Aircraft Warning personnel and the Control Officer at Wheeler Field is enclosed. Also graph of the flight of enemy planes as plotted by the O'Connor Aircraft Warning Service Stations.

Incls:

1. Enemy Aircraft Believed Used in Air Raid 7 Dec 41.
2. Report of Casualties.
3. Graphs.
4. Affidavit.

Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

- 7 -

SECRET

SECRET

Enemy Aircraft believed used in air raid 7 December 1941.

1. Fighter 97 Nakajima.
 - a. Nonretractible landing gear.
 - b. Low wing, blunt nose.
 - c. Single seat.
 - d. Three machine guns, two in wings, 500 rounds per gun.
 - e. Sea level speed 240 miles per hour, maximum.
2. Fighter Mitsubishi.
 - a. Two 20mm cannon fires from wings; two machine guns fire through propeller.
 - b. 550 pound bomb load.
 - c. Speed 275 miles per hour, minimum.
 - d. Maximum range (?)
- * 3. Bomber Kamikaze Type Observation and Light Bomber Type 97 - (One also Diesel motor - (One shot down with Diesel motor near Mahiwa.)
 - a. Dihedral (slight positive).
 - b. Low wing monoplane.
 - c. Three machine guns - bomb load 661.3 pounds - 300 km.
 - d. Speed 217.4 miles per hour, maximum.
4. Dive bomber 97 (referred to sometimes as Deck Type Reconnaissance).
 - a. Low wing monoplane.
 - b. Retractable landing gear.
 - c. Single strut.
 - d. Three in crew (Pilot, 2d Pilot and radioman).
 - e. Speed sea level 300 miles per hour, maximum.
5. Torpedo Plane.
 - a. No description in F.M. Appeared larger than other enemy aircraft; low wing, carried one torpedo directly under fuselage.
- * 6. Type O-1 Fighter (Mitsubishi).
 - a. Ship board fighter.
 - b. All metal low wing, internally braced.
 - c. Fully retractible landing gear.
 - d. Flush rivetting.
 - e. Two 20mm cannons; each wing; two 7.7 machine guns in fuselage. No armor.
 - f. Floating gear and arresting gear. (This ship at SAG).
7. Aichi Clock Type.
 - a. Ship board bomber.
 - b. Two seater.
 - c. Internally braced.
 - d. Wings from oval plan.
 - e. All metal except wing tip which is wood.
 - f. Semi-retractible gear.
 - g. Kinsei engine, model 44, twin row radial air cooled.

Page 1, Incl. #1.

3610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

- h. Weight empty 2388.
- i. Useful load 1272.
- j. Loaded 3660 (over all).
- k. Believe bomb at 550 pounds.
- l. No armor apparently.
- m. Two fixed guns fuselage.
- n. Flexible gun rear cockpit caliber 7.7.
(In possession Navy).

*Indicates type of ship according to F.M., July 1941, one of each was shot down and is in possession of Army or Navy.

Report of Casualties.

1. The following data reference battle casualties from midnight 6 December 1941 to midnight 9 December 1941 is hereby submitted.

	<u>T. G. H.</u>	<u>SCAG</u>	<u>Hickam</u>	<u>Total</u>
(a) Number of patients in hospital prior to midnight 6 December 1941.	456	531	29	1016
(b) Admissions:				
1. Battle casualties (seriously and slightly wounded).	318	118	26	472
2. Other than battle casualties	10	44	2	56
3. Number dead upon arrival at Hospital	133	27	0	159
4. Number died after admission.	(10)	(11)	(0)	(21)
(c) Dispositions:				
1. Battle casualties to duty.	0	44	12	56
2. All others.	127	248	73	498
(d) Total number of beds vacant.	614	548	34	1200
(e) Total known dead.	142	38	0	224x
(f) Total seriously wounded.	75	38	1	114
(g) Total slightly wounded	253	60	25	358
(h) Total Battle Casualties - - - - -				696

x This includes 44 dead bodies taken direct to the morgue.

Encl #2

Fort Shafter, T. H.)

Territory of Hawaii)

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned,
as authority for administering oaths of this nature, one
Grover C. White, Jr. 0-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal
Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii who
after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer
the AHS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two
hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required opera-
tion of all stations from 4 A.M. to 6 P.M. This schedule was modified to
the hours of 4 A.M. to 4 P.M. A temporary schedule was next devised which
required all stations to operate from 4 A.M. to 11 A.M. and to have
"staggered" operation, i.e., 3 stations from 11 A.M. to 1 P.M., the remain-
ing 3 stations from 1 P.M. to 4 P.M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I con-
tacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations oper-
ate from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed
to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Nicholas, SCANN, acting RDP Officer, re-
ports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the in-
formation received by the AHS Information Center from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M.
Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Hermit A. Tyler, Air
Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A.M. to
7 A.M.

3. At approximately 7:30 A.M. a report was received from a Detector
station at Opans that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a
course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This
information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc.
Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opans about the flight. The
statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCANN, the switchboard operator is
attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center
was not named when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A.M.
This position was named shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Morie E.
Stebuffer, SCANN, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30
P.M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.

Further the Depoent sayeth not.

GROVER C. WHITE, JR.,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,

Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

I Doel:

Statement by Pfc. Joseph McDonald

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec A.D. 1941

at Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADAM R. HUGGINS
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

Fort Shafter, T. H.)
Territory of Hawaii)

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13004145, Pvt 1st, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the ANS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opama at 7:20 A.M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockard at the Opama Station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 125 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opama Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

P. J. C. Joseph P. McDonald

Joseph P. McDonald,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of December A.D. 1941
at Fort Shafter, T. H.

Adam R. Huggins
ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

PB WTJ

416 P TIME FILED

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

RADIO GRAM

O-4-3

DEC 19 1941

320 A. M.

From: FT SHAFTER, HAWAII

To: THE ADJT GENL

Copies furnished as noted:

ONE TWO THREE FIVE EIGHTEENTH (1941)
 FOR G TWO REUAD SIQV NINTN ONE SEVENTEENTH NO SINGLE
 EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT EITHER COMPREHENSIVE OR RELIABLE
 PERIOD STEPS WERE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO ASSEMBLE AVAIL-
 ABLE INFORMATION AND AS RECEIVED WAS SENT YOU WITH
 TECHNICAL DATA TO ARMY AIR FORCE PERIOD PARA TACTICS
 USED COLON ALL TARGETS STRUCK TACTICALLY SIMULTANEOUSLY
 PERIOD PRIMARY OBJECTIVE PEARL HARBOR AND HICKMAN FIELD
 COMMA REGARDED AS SINGLE OBJECTIVE PERIOD SECONDARY
 OBJECTIVE WHEELER FIELD AND OTHER AIR FIELDS PERIOD DIVE
 BOMBERS ATTACKED TARGETS FROM ALL DIRECTIONS SIMULTANE-
 OUSLY COMMA INITIATING DIVE OF FORTY FIVE TO FIFTY DE-
 GREES FROM ALTITUDE OF THREE TO FIVE THOUSAND FEET AND
 CONTINUED DIVE ALMOST TO TARGETS PERIOD HIGH ALTITUDE
 BOMBERS FLEW IN VEE FORMATION INDIVIDUAL PLANES IN FOR-
 MATION SEPARATED BY ABOUT TWO PLANE WIDTHS COMMA
 TWELVE TO FIFTEEN PLANES IN FORMATION AND RELEASED
 BOMBS IN FORMATION FROM ALTITUDES ESTIMATED AT FROM
 EIGHT TO TWELVE THOUSAND FEET PERIOD DIVE BOMBING AND
 HIGH ALTITUDE ATTACKS CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY PERIOD
 DIVE BOMBERS GIVEN CLOSE SUPPORT BY PURSUIT PERIOD NO
 REPORT OF CLOSE SUPPORT BY PURSUIT FOR HIGH ALTITUDE

Action Copy

RECEIVED-1941-12-19 10:15 AM 1941-12-19 10:15 AM 1941-12-19 10:15 AM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 341, Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

ONE TWO THREE FIVE DECEMBER 18 PAGE TWO
BOMBERS PERIOD APPEARS NOW HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBERS EMPLOYED
ONLY AGAINST PEARL HARBOR DASH HICKAM AREA PERIOD HAVING
RELEASED BOMBS DIVE BOMBERS EMPLOYED MACHINE GUNS AGAINST
AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AND AGAINST PERSONNEL PERIOD ACQ-
WHEELER FIELD IT APPEARS ENEMY RELIED PRINCIPALLY UPON
CONFIRE FOR DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT COMMA BOMBS BEING
EMPLOYED AGAINST BUILDINGS PARA UNABLE AT THIS TIME TO
ESTIMATE TOTAL NUMBER PLANES EMPLOYED NOR TO STATE NUMBER
OF CARRIERS UTILIZED COMMA ALTHOUGH APPEARS ALMOST CERTAIN
AT LEAST THREE CARRIERS WERE USED PERIOD NO NOVELTIES
EITHER IN EQUIPMENT OR TACTICS INTRODUCED PERIOD SUCCESS
OF ATTACK DUE TO CAREFUL PLANNING AND PREPARATION COMMA
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTIVE COMMA SURPRISE COMMA AND
DETERMINATION WITH WHICH

THIS PART BEING SERVICED.

TORPEDO BOMBERS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED PERIOD TYPE ZERO
PURSUIT HAD TWO TWENTY MILIMETER CANNON IN WINGS AND TWO
SEVEN POINT SEVEN MACHINE GUNS FIRING THROUGH PROPELLER
PERIOD DIVE BOMBER HAD TWO SEVEN POINT SEVEN MACHINE GUNS
FIRING THROUGH PROPELLER AND ONE SEVEN POINT SEVEN

Action Copy

RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER

11

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

DEC 19 1941



RECEIVED DEC 19 1941
U. S. DEPT. OF WAR

ONE TWO THREE FIVE DECEMBER 18 PAGE THREE

FLEXIBLE GUN IN REAR COCKPIT PERIOD FRAGMENTATION AND
DEMOLITION BOMBS WERE EMPLOYED BY DIVE BOMBERS PRESENT
INFORMATION INDICATING NO BOMBS LARGER THAN ABOUT FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY POUNDS USED BY THIS TYPE PERIOD HIGH ALTI-
TUD BOMBERS REPORTED TO HAVE UTILIZED CONVERTED FIFTEEN
INCH SHELL COMMA EVIDENT PURPOSE TO SECURE PENETRATION
PERIOD CHARACTERISTICS OF TORPEDOES NOT KNOWN AT THIS
TIME PERIOD REPORTS THAT TWO MOTOR PLANERS USED NOT
POSITIVELY CONFIRMED SIGNED FIELDER

46 A G O

100 10 10

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10 10

EXACT ACTION COPY NO. 1, C. of S., D.D., Copy No. 1, 2

EXACT INFORMATION COPY NO. 1, C. of S., D.D., Copy No. 2

EXACT INFORMATION COPY NO. 1, C. of S., D.D., Copy No. 3

EXACT INFORMATION COPY NO. 1, C. of S., D.D., Copy No. 4

EXACT INFORMATION COPY NO. 1, C. of S., D.D., Copy No. 5

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EXACT INFORMATION COPY NO. 1, C. of S., D.D., Copy No. 22

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3440 Montana Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 15, 1961

824 A. M. ...

FROM FT SHAFTER, HAWAII

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

REC 15 1341



PART FIVE 1233--DECEMBER 13

ARMY EQUIPMENT COLON TWO TYPED AIRCRAFT POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED DOWN TYPE ZERO SINGLE SEAT PURSUIT PAPER
PREVIOUS STATEMENT TO ARMY AIR FORCES RELATIVE TYPE ZERO
ONE PURSUIT IN ENRON PAPER AND TYPE NINETY NINE DIVE
BOMBER PERIOD DIVE BOMBER NO CONVENTIONAL TWO ENGINE
SINGLE ENGINE TWO SEATED MONOPLANE WITH FIXED LANDING
GEAR AND DIVING BRAKES PERIOD BOTH TYPES EQUIPPED WITH
A TESTING HOOKS FOR CARRIER OPERATION PERIOD NEITHER HIGH
ALTITUDE BOMBERS PRESENT NOR ARE

PLEASE RETURN COPY TO: Mr. J. C. B. 022. Cy. No. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

Q. 1007, Federal Staff, Co. No. 3

U.S. Army Air Force, No. 4

DEL 10 1944

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3618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PSG WTJ
21/224P TIME FILED
PRIORITY

P. D. DORAN

Q-4-C

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 22, 1941

7:58 P. M.

From HAWAII

To THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1302--DECEMBER 21

NINETEENTH DECEMBER RE UNSIGNED RADIO NUMBER SEVEN ONE TWO COLON EXCEPT UNVERIFIED REPORT THAT ONE TORPEDO USED AGAINST CONSOLIDATED BARRACKS HICKAM FIELD COMMA AERIAL X TORPEDO'S EMPLOYED AGAINST PEARL HARBOR ONLY STOP ENEMY MAIN EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST NAVAL VESSELS AND NAVAL INSTALLATIONS STOP INFORMATION NECESSARY TO RECONSTRUCT ENTIRE ENEMY OPERATION AGAINST OAHU NOT AT PRESENT IN POSSESSION OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES HERE STOP SUGGEST INFORMATION RELATIVE ENEMY ACTION AGAINST NAVAL OBJECTIVES BE OBTAINED FROM NAVY DEPARTMENT STOP AS TO ATTACKS AGAINST ARMY ESTABLISHMENTS COMMA DIVE BOMBING COMMA IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOW FLYING PURSUIT ATTACKS COMMA GREATLY PREDOMINATED OVER HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBING ATTACKS STOP ENEMY DIVE BOMBERS AND ENEMY PURSUIT SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE AND RATIO OF THESE TWO TYPES EMPLOYED NOT REPEAT NOT KNOWN STOP PRESENT INFORMATION INDICATES HICKAM ONLY ARMY OBJECTIVE ATTACKED BY HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBERS STOP HICKAM BOMBED FROM SIX THOUSAND FEET OR HIGHER BY TWO FORMATIONS HORIZONTAL BOMBERS COMMA FIRST FORMATION PROBABLY FIVE OR SIX PLANES COMMA SECOND FORMATION SEVEN TO NINE PLANES STOP TYPES

Action Copy

RECEIVED 12-22-41 11:58 AM 12-22-41 11:58 AM 12-22-41 11:58 AM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From _____

To _____

Copy furnished on _____

DEC 22 1941



RECEIVED MSG. DIV. 155
U. S. AIR FORCE

NO. 1302 FROM HAWAII PAGE TWO

OF HIGH ALTITUDE HORIZONTAL BOMBERS NOT DEFINITELY
DETERMINED STOP ALL AVAILABLE BOMB SIGHT INFORMATION HAS
BEEN RADIOED TO CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES STOP PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE IS THAT ONLY SINGLE ENGINE PLANE WERE
EMPLOYED BY ENEMY STOP NUMBERS OF PRESENCE OF ENEMY TWIN
ENGINE PLANE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT SURVIVED INVESTIGATION
STONED TINKER END

EMIONS

SECRET. The making of an exact copy of this message is
forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely
necessary will be made and marked "SECRET". This
copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be
returned to The Adjutant General without delay.

EXACT ACTION COPY FOR Chief, Army Air Forces, Cy No. 1.

EXACT ACTION COPY FOR A. C. of S., G-2, Copy No. 2.

EXACT ACTION COPY FOR A. C. of S., GPO, Copy No. 3.

EXACT ACTION COPY FOR Secretary of Staff, Copy No. 4.

Action Copy

SECRET**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

AUTH: C. O. HAW. DEPT.

INITIALS *W M W*
DATE 21 DEC 1941

In reply refer to:

AG 370.2/35

21 December 1941.

Subject: Report of attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference your radio 682-16th of 17 December 1941, the report of air tactics was included in our radio 1302 this date.

2. The reports of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of the Interceptor Command and of the Operations Officer, Hickam Field are attached hereto as inclosures 1, 2, 3 & 4.

3. For the report of the then Commanding General, attention is invited to the "Report of the Battle of Oahu" dated 12 December 1941, signed by General Shorn and which has previously gone forward to you.

For the Commanding General:

46 A G O

DEC 26 1941

Received

W. M. W.
Major, A. C. D.
Assistant Adjutant General.

4 Incls

1 - Report of AG/S, G-2. (dup)

2 - Report of AG/S, G-3. (dup)

3 - Report of Interceptor Command. (dup)

4 - Report of Operations Officer, Hickam Field. (dup)

SUBJECT: Report of attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941.

AG 381(12-21-41)MSC

1st Ind.

RPM/TM-3705

War Department, A.G.O., December 29, 1941. TO: Chief of Army Air Station.

4 Incls. n/c

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

In Reply refer to:

20 December 1941

SUBJECT: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941.
TO: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. The following facts have been gleaned from numerous reports of eye-witnesses and supplement or correct reports sent you by radio.

2. The enemy effort will be covered under three general headings: Hickam Field area; Wheeler Field Area; Solloway Field area.

a. HICKAM FIELD AREA: At 7:55 A.M., December 7, 1941, the first indication of an attack was 9 enemy single engine, low wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, which were observed southeast of Hickam Field hanger line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet, and toward Pearl Harbor. They were in two echelons, 5 planes in the first and 4 in the second. This flight did not attack Hickam Field. At almost the same time, however, 9 dive bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hanger line from the South, and 3 additional planes attacked the same objectives from the Northwest. Several minutes later 9 additional dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hanger line from the Southeast. Immediately thereafter 7 additional dive bombers attacked the Hickam Field hanger line from the East. All planes dived at approximately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 3000 to 5000 feet. Bombs were released at about 1000 feet with the planes pulling out of dives from 800 feet to approximately 300 feet.

Machine-gunfire was employed before and after bomb release. This attack lasted about 10 minutes. This attack and subsequent ones were supported by fighter planes.

The second attack occurred at about 8:25 A.M., when between 6 and 9 planes approached from the south and attacked No. 1 Agua System, technical buildings immediately behind hanger lines and consolidated barracks. These planes when first observed were flying level and released bombs from level flight at altitude of about 150 feet. During and immediately after this bombing attack our planes on parking apron were attacked with gun fire. About one minute later (8:26) a formation of probably 5 or 6 planes bombed the base-ball diamond from a high altitude, evidently believing gasoline storage system to be in that area. The second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes.

SECRET

Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont'd
 To: A. C. of S., 4-4, War Dept., Washington

The third attack occurred about 8:00 A.M., when 5 to 8 planes (presumably those that had previously bombed from level flight at 150 feet at 6:25) attacked the technical buildings behind hangar lines and our dispersed planes with machine gun fire. These attacks came from four directions almost simultaneously. At the same time a formation of from 7 to 9 planes, flying in "V" formation at an altitude estimated at 8,000 feet approached from the south, releasing bombs which struck consolidated barracks, parade ground and Post Exchange. The third attack lasted about 3 minutes. Our 3-17's were arriving from the Mainland during this attack. All enemy planes observed at low altitudes were single engine, low wing, monoplanes. Type of high altitude bombers not definitely established. Largest bombs used believed not to exceed 500 pounds. Our ammunition used identified as 7.7 and 20 mm.

b. WHEELER FIELD AREA: At 8:00 A.M., Sunday, 7 December 1941, approximately 25 planes approached Wheeler Field, generally from the southeast, at about 5,000 feet altitude. They passed well to east of Wheeler Field, circled counter-clockwise, losing altitude and approached for attack from north at about 3,000 feet, generally perpendicular to the hangar line. The formation of the entire group was roughly a closed "V" - with 5 sections of 4 planes each forming the "V" formation, with a 5th plane extending the right leg of the "V". A single odd plane flew slightly to the rear of the formation. The attack struck hangar line and vicinity over a length of about 500 yards, starting from the engineering hangar, which is at the extreme southeast of the hangar line. Bombs and machine gun fire were employed during dive bombing attack. Practically all bombs struck the hangar line and points in rear of the line and were released at altitudes of 200 and 250 feet. After releasing bombs the planes continued to dive for a short distance and pulled out at about same angle as start of dive. No evidence at Wheeler of bombs larger than 500 pounds.

After the first dive bombing the formation broke, apparently in all directions, with individual planes continuing gun fire, and without regard to possibility of collision. This phase of the attack was carried on from altitudes of approximately 300 feet and the only semblance of order appeared to be that planes circled counter-clockwise. Principal targets for this gun fire were our planes on hangar line and buildings and personnel in immediate vicinity. All planes in first attacking formation appeared similar externally and were single engine, low wing, monoplanes. While not positively established, it is presumed from evidence of 20 mm fire that this attack included fighters in support of dive bombers. The entire attack lasted approximately 15 minutes.

SECRET

Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont'd
To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington.

Another attack struck Wheeler Field a few minutes after 9:00 A.M., same day. This attack consisted of 7 enemy planes which approached from the south, flying roughly in line at an altitude of about 500 feet. They fired machine guns at planes being taxied onto the air-drome but it is believed that no plane fired more than 25 to 50 rounds. All seven planes were single engine, low wing, monoplanes, two-seaters. They withdrew to the north. The whole second attack less than 5 minutes. This could very reasonably have been a group of planes expending the remainder of their ammunition.

c. **BELLOWS FIELD AREA:** The attack on Bellows Field was initiated by a single Japanese fighter plane at approximately 8:30 A.M., December 7th. He came directly from the sea (East) and employed machine-gun fire on the tent area apparently expending all his ammunition in this one attack.

At about 9:00 A.M., nine fighters attacked from the north in 3 groups of 3 planes each in "V" formation. This attack lasted about 15 minutes and consisted of gun fire only. It was initiated with a diving attack of all 9 planes, after which the 3 formations of 3 each peeled off and attacked from various directions.

After the single plane, tent-area attack, a B-17 which had arrived from the mainland and which had been unable to land at Hickam Field attempted to land at Bellows Field but rolled off the run-way. This plane was repeatedly machine-gunned by the 9 plane attack.

The attack at Bellows Field appeared well planned, rehearsed and well executed. One plane was reported shot down by Infantry troops defending the area but no part of it was recovered from the sea for identification purposes.

3. **GENERAL OBSERVATIONS & REMARKS:** Strafing planes came down to a very low altitude in practically all cases. Some 30 to 50 feet from the ground. Strafers used 50 caliber, 7.7 cal. and 20 mm. The torpedo planes which were employed only against Pearl Harbor came in to sight flying very low and did not change altitude until torpedoes were dropped.

Rigid flight discipline was demonstrated by the enemy and accurate bombing was evidenced. Such an attack could not have been performed without numerous and detailed rehearsals. Every movement seemed to have been rehearsed and was exceptionally well executed.

Liaison with battle force intelligence has been maintained but the general tactics of the enemy attack has not definitely been reconstructed.

A few bombs were dropped in Honolulu proper, but in all probability this resulted from individual planes clearing bomb racks before departing. A few bursts of machine gun fire were likewise delivered at targets other than military objectives.

SECRET

Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont'd
 To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington.

4. CONCLUSION: It is impossible at this time to state how many planes or how many carriers were employed, but it is still believed that at least three carriers were involved. Likewise, it is impossible to definitely establish whether or not any planes returned to a carrier, re-loaded and participated in subsequent attacks. It is the opinion of this office that no planes did so. It is more probable that planes were launched from different carriers at different times or that different groups of planes were launched at staggered intervals. It has not been established from what direction or distance the carriers were when the planes were launched, although the Navy believes that at least one carrier operated from 150 miles north of Oahu. It is established that no land based planes were employed in the attack, and while many reports come in relative to enemy planes with more than one motor no positive identification of such planes has been established. It is believed that multi-motor planes reported were our own B-17's, a flight of which arrived from the Mainland during the attacks.

Kendall J. Felder
 KENDALL J. FELDER,
 Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.,
 A. C. of S., G-2.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

In reply refer to:

20 December 1941

G-2 SECTION CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT

7 Dec '41

At 0755, 7 December 1941, the Japanese Imperial Navy sent its airplanes over Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, Bellows Field, Wheeler Field, Schofield Barracks, Fort Kamehameha, other Army and Navy Installations and the City of Honolulu as well, in the opening blow in the present war between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, arrived in the G-2 Office in the headquarters building at Fort Shafter at 0803 and was followed at short intervals by other members of the section who came from all parts of the city. The section was in operation by 0830 although it handled a volume of messages prior to that time.

By 0830 the following subsections of the department G-2 were in full operation: Combat Intelligence, Public Relations, Administration, Army Contact Office (counter-subversive and counter-espionage).

Contact with the intelligence sections of the various posts in the Department was established by telephone beginning at 0815.

Immediate use of the radio stations in Honolulu, KGU and KGMB, was made by the section.

The first message put on the air by the section was that "Oahu has been subjected to a sporadic air raid. Do not drive on the streets or highways. Keep off the streets."

The radios then warned people to get vehicles off streets, to remain calm, to keep off the telephones, to keep their radios on, and that there would be announcements in Japanese and Filipino and that they should not be alarmed if they heard a foreign language on the air.

All military and naval personnel were warned to return to their posts immediately.

Civilian and all other emergency workers who had been organized for disaster relief were ordered to their predesignated posts.

About 0830 it was announced to the press that the planes had been definitely identified as Japanese.

The War Department was advised by this section of preliminary details of the attack about 0850.

The Contact Office which had been operating on a 24 hour basis was instructed to take particular precautions to watch sabotage and internal disorders. All agents of the Contact Office were functioning at this time.

Liaison between the section and the office of the Director of Civilian Defense was established about this time.

Shortly thereafter Governor Poindexter declared the Territory in a state of emergency thereby placing the Territory's "M-Day" law into effect at 1000.

As various intelligence sections of the different posts in the department were contacted, they were instructed to report all enemy planes down, all enemy prisoners captured, all enemy activity in their respective sectors although these orders already were included in the Standing Operating Procedure for the Department.

SECRET

- 1 -

G-2 SECTION OPERATIONAL REPORT - Cont'd.

Efforts were begun at about 1000 to obtain all still and motion pictures, both Army and commercial and amateur, for forwarding to the G-2 of the Army.

Liaison was established with the Navy public relations section about 1030 when it was announced that a cable censorship would be placed in effect immediately. This censorship went into effect about 1130. A hand-censorship on the local press and radio also was invoked about this time.

This section advised the War Department of subsequent developments in the radi throughout the morning and early afternoon.

Steps were taken by the section to apprehend all enemy agents and suspicious characters.

Steps were taken to assemble captured maps, papers and equipment for translation, decoding and evaluation.

The two Honolulu radio stations, KGU and KMS, were cut off the air shortly after 1110 to prevent enemy planes from coming in on the beam. Station KEBQ and KOTB in Hilo, Hawaii and Lihue, Kauai, were cut off the air shortly afterwards. Thereafter all radio stations went on the air only for short intervals to broadcast announcements approved by this section dealing with military and civilian defense.

About 1400 the combat intelligence subsection began moving into the forward echelon position in the Alifan Crater. The rear echelon handled combat intelligence from the Headquarters Building, Fort Shafter, then relayed information to the Forward Echelon as they completed their movement into the combat position.

Martial law was announced by General Short at 1545 after a conference between Governor Poindexter, General Short, and the G-2, Colonel Fielder.

General Short announced the blackout at this time, and blackout warnings were broadcast from radio stations at intermittent intervals between this hour and sundown.

A statement was issued at 1600 concerning martial law and the blackout to all press and radio agencies at this time.

Complete blackout of the entire Territory went into effect at sundown, 1800 after warnings by press and radio throughout the Islands.

Throughout the night the entire section functioned from the forward echelon, the rear echelon and the Honolulu Contact Office.

During the second air raid the rear echelon was subjected to falling shell fragments and machine gun fire from American guns shooting at the Japanese planes.

Many messages were handled during the night relative to parachute troops, enemy landings, and sabotage, all were found to be false.

GENERAL REMARKS

Throughout December 7 and 8, known enemy agents and suspect Japanese, German and Italian aliens were apprehended and detained. The Japanese Consul was held incommunicado in his Consulate. The G-2 section coordinated arrangements for internment and examination of those apprehended.

- 3 -
SECRET

G-2 SECTION CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT - Cont'd.
General Remarks - Cont'd.

Efforts were started shortly after the attack on December 7 to reconstruct the enemy tactics of the attack. This involved interrogating dozens of eye witnesses, most of whom told widely differing stories, and the translation and decoding of many maps and papers. These efforts are still in progress and a full report will be made as a separate communication.

Attached hereto is a Work Sheet of Journal in Combat Intelligence Section.

Kendall J. Stender
KENDALL J. STENDER,
Lieutenant Colonel, C. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

1 Incl: (In dup)
Work Sheet - Journal
7 December 1941 -
(7 sheets)

- 3 -
SECRET

PEARL HARBOR MESSAGE SHEETS

Fort Shafter, T. H.

A. O. of S. 9-2 - PEARL HARBOR

7 DECEMBER 1941

A. O. of S.

NEW YORK

(These work sheets include the period during which operations were maintained at Fort Shafter, as well as a certain number of messages received by the rear echelon after the forward echelon had set up an advanced C. F.)

MESSAGE NO.	TIME	TEXT
F	0900	LT. E. E. SWELSON, HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE, reported as liaison officer.
F	1002	Road to PEARL HARBOR jammed. Civilian police cannot. Military Police notified at 1005.
	1025	Parachute troops landing near BARRERS POINT - at JERKEY & CANNEL ROAD.
M	1030	LT. E. D. CHAPMAN, C. W., Co. A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, Schofield Barracks, reported as liaison officer.
I	1032	Troops reporting in direction of Harbor from Schofield. Commence firing.
X	1040	Parachute troops reported at BARRERS POINT. Unverified.
T	1132	Parachute troops have landed on North Shore and have been identified as wearing blue coveralls with red disc on left shoulder. BURGIN. Unverified.
	1135	Parachute troops at MAHAPOU HEAD.
	1145	Both radio stations were ordered to get off the air, because enemy aircraft were using the beams to come in by. GENERAL MARTIN approved the action.
U	1210	Parachute troops landing at BARRERS POINT. Unverified.
V	1210	Message from manager of KAHUKO PLANTATION: "No Parachute troops have been sighted all morning. Verified by 24 Division G-3."
W	1245	Two local prisoners under guard at FT ARMYTHAM unit. Further orders. Also suspicious person reported by civilian.
	1245	Provost Marshal General & Colonel Fielder. GENERAL GULLION told PM General to advise - the President has signed Proclamation and directed that we initiate our Apprehension and Detention Plan.
E	1300	The Governor will declare Martial law if the General so desires.
FF	1305	No change in situation for 24th Division. Parachute troops in North Sector are not confirmed.
II	1319	Submarine reported. Not confirmed.

LAND

- 1 -

7 DECEMBER 1941

SECRET

LAND

HEADQUARTERS MARITIME DEPARTMENT
 Fort Shafter, T. H.
 A.C. of C., 8-2 - FORWARD ECHELON
 7 SEPTEMBER 1941

WORK SHEET

(These worksheets include the period during which operations were maintained at Fort Shafter, as well as a certain number of messages received by the rear echelon after the forward echelon had set up an advanced C. P.)

<u>MESSAGE NO.</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>TEXT</u>
GG	1320	Many reports parachute troops being landed near KANOE, wearing blue coveralls with a red shield. Not verified.
BB	1320	Question re orders to shoot on sight wearers of blue denim. Is being checked. Chief of Staff orders no soldier to wear blue denim.
AB	1330	Landing party reported between BARBERS POINT and MANAKULI, being fired on by our 2-40's.
DD	1335	One Bagan about to land in front of LUALALAI.
	1409	Parachute troops reported by NP's as landing at ST. LOUIS HEIGHTS near WATER TOWER.
MM	1410	Parachute troops near WATER TOWER on ST. LOUIS HEIGHTS. Not verified.
VVV	1510	Teletype being moved from FT SHAFTER 8-2 to CRATER.
TT	1525	Quite a number of parachutists landed in FAUOA VALLEY, by TANTALUS. No verification.
No time		CAPT. CRUCKSHANK, LT. JUNKER, MR. WILSON, PVT. HOOD & PVT. RAMOND left FT SHAFTER about 1415 for ALLAMANU CRATER C.P. Arrived about 1445. One telephone, through Center switchboard, in operation. LT. COL. T. H. DAVIES arrived at Forward Echelon about 1530.
UU No time		PVT. DYKIN, 64TH C. A., definitely identified plane as GERMAN HEINKEL 113, with JAPANESE MARKING.
II	1532	COL. MENDEMAN reports all lights at PEAK HARBOR will be blacked out unless necessary for urgent naval work.
	1535	Five parachute troops landed on ST. LOUIS HEIGHTS wearing blue denim with red marks.
YY	1631	Blackout tonight. BURGIN.
MM	1825	CAPT. MCCRAW, DIST. ENGINEERS, has rounded up fishermen in KERALO BASIN and was told to report to Provost Marshall.
HZE	1830	COL. BORNHAM relieved due to mental condition.
GG No time		All saloons closed, no liquor to be sold.
KEE	1845	Blackout announced to DISTRICT COMMANDERS.
QA	1840	Blinker light on RED HILL.
B	1914	Landing of parachute troops proved false.
7	1917	Blinking light.

LAND- 2 -
SECRET

7 DECEMBER 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Fort Shafter, T. H.

A.C. of S., G-2 - FORWARD ECHELON

7 DECEMBER 1941

LANDWORK SHEET

(These worksheets include the period during which operations were maintained at Fort Shafter, as well as a certain number of messages received by the rear echelon after the forward echelon had set up an advanced C. P.)

<u>MESSAGE NO.</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
9	1925	Blinker light in West Loch.
10	2048	Blinker light near WAIKANA.
25 & 26	2109	Flares over LAHAINA BAY.
31	2131	Above flares sent up by NAVY.
35	2200	Pick-up of enemy aliens progressing satisfactorily.
47	2245	Notice of alert.
46	2250	Landing reported in MAUNA POCKET believed to be false, from G-2, 24th Division.
48	2300	COLONEL ROW just returned from HILO and reports everything OK at HILO.
50	2303	COLONEL McDONALD to G-2, FA Batteries in KANAIHOU, KEE PLAIN, MAKAKILO, KEE ADIS. Will care to register. Will be notified 2 hours previously. Phoned CAPTAIN MARSH, G-2, Rear Echelon, to insert in papers.

LAND

SECRET

7 DECEMBER 1941

HEADQUARTERS BUREAU OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Pearl Harbor, T. H.

A. M. of G., S. S. - PEARL HARBOR

7 DECEMBER 1941

NAVAL

MESSAGE NO.	TIME	TEXT
E	1000	Enemy Aircraft Carrier at 1030. PEARL HARBOR reports no enemy ships in sight. BURGIN.
L	1033	Enemy ships coming in 30 miles S.W. 031.
G	1036	Unknown boat reported at 34 N. 21.
J	1037	Three ships reported previously by radio 30 miles off 0 39 are troop ships escorted by enemy planes.
K	1040	3 Surface Vessels approaching BARRERS POINT from S.W. about 25 miles off.
Q	1115	Enemy sinker Spel south entering port from BPH.
R	1117	2 XI SS 14 550022. BURGIN.
S	1145	5 inch and U. S. Naval Shell identified by 24th Division Q-2, at Schofield Barracks.
T	1235	Four Japanese transports off BARRERS POINT. From RUP. Not verified.
XX	1310	Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor report 1 SS location 54 1800 moving west, identity unknown. Four Japanese transports off BARRERS POINT. Unverified.
PP	1430	Navy reports unidentified ships firing off LUALUALI - approaching shore. No confirmation.
QQ	1423	KANSORE reports having captured document, mark 223 degrees, 90 miles from FORD ISLAND.
KKK	1745	Enemy surface craft reported 20 degrees, 32 minutes - 158 degrees, 16 minutes, course 271 degrees. Possibly a carrier. Sending torpedo aircraft to attack. Not verified.

NAVAL

- 1 -

7 DECEMBER 1941

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
A.C. of S., G-2 - FORWARD ECHelon
7 DECEMBER 1941

A I R

MESSAGE NO.	TIME	ITEM
A	0854	Enemy planes dive bombing and machine gunning HICKAM and WHEELER FIELDS and PEARL HARBOR. WHEELER FIELD in flames. No report of enemy surface ships.
B	None	All planes coming in off GEORGE. Flying low. That is all.
D	1000	Planes coming in northwest of GEORGE. That is all.
E	1005	Hsp and Section Orders found on Jap Pilot who crashed at FT KAN. Will be translated at Contact Office and sent up here.
	1000	One Jap AIRCRAFT CARRIER reported at H3344.
		Report from DE HUSSEY Enemy ships coming in 30 miles SW -- 098.
5	1145	5" Naval Shell (dud) identified at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
	No time	Reports indicate about 40 Jap aircraft attacked Oahu early Sunday A. M., apparently from aircraft carrier at H 3344. Three planes shot down; one at Ordnance Building, FT KAN, one in WAILANA and one in PEARL HARBOR, near HICKAM FIELD.
	1040	Enemy aircraft over MAUNA POINT, flying low.
	1045	Parachute troops near JEROME & CAMEL RD.
	1055	Bombing attack at WAILANA.
	1115	Enemy planes reported heading for PEARL HARBOR from south.
	1117	Enemy planes approaching PEARL HARBOR from south.
	1122	Enemy planes approaching PEARL HARBOR from SE south.
	1123	Enemy planes flying low overhead. From HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE.
	1130	Three enemy planes shot down by four of our pursuit ships. Report by KANAHOU POLICE via FINLIER'S teletype.
	1115	Enemy Winter Spcl south entering port of NUI.
	1204	One Jap Battleship at 54 SE 88 moving west.
	1206	One sampson reporting trying to land at MAUNAIKI about 1200.
	1204	Enemy dive bomber downed at FT BARKETT by small arms fire.
	1230	One enemy dive bomber downed at FT BARKETT by small arms fire apparently. Time 1204. Signed WIND.
	1300	FT KAN captured enemy pilot who is being sent here. Interpreter sent for from Contact Office. Later found not approved.
	1310	Last flight of bombers at 1330 dropped bomb in CAPITOL GROUNDS and HICKAM RD. Bomb 2 feet by 2 feet. From COL. BOSS.

SECRET

7 DECEMBER 1941

REAR ADMIRAL BARNETT
 Post Office, N. H.
 A. S. of G., 2-2 - Forward Section
 7 DECEMBER 1941

AIRMESSAGE NO. TIME TEXT

1330 Unidentified station broadcasting on 55-60 meters: "WALLACE
 bombed, landing off BARKER POINT, Naval attacks 40 miles
 off BARKER POINT."

1340 DE KESBY reports our task force No. 1 (4 cruisers, several
 destroyers headed west off BARKER POINT), fired on by
 enemy aircraft. Report unverified.

1415 Parachute found on BELT ROAD near Japanese plane which
 crashed and burned, pilot killed. American Navy plane
 crashed in same vicinity. Pilot and enlisted man both killed.

1420 Two dead aviators - one searched - shot down in PEARL HARBOR
 YARD.

1420 Airplane approaching from north towards KAHUKU POINT,
 about 15 miles off. Not identified.

1515 Three enemy planes flying south from SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
 Signed WING. No confirmation.

1515 Small carrier based plane, 2 seater (both men dead), one
 .30 Cal. M. G., carburetor made in Japan, is down at
 PT KAM and under guard. Guard relieved by COLONEL
 FILLER'S orders.

1640 No activities off KAHUKU up to 5 miles out to sea. One
 plane over BELLOWS FIELD at 15,000 feet. Identity unknown.

1649 A large cutter (presumably JAPANESE) is reported at 55 DD 23
 by BARKETT GROUP. Small boat going back and forth from
 boat to shore. Identity unknown.

1735 BARKER POINT to KAHUKU 5 miles out, 500 feet, no activity.
 MAKAPUU to KAHUKU, same.

1745 One surface craft (Carrier?) reported at lat 20 degrees, 32
 minutes, long. 158 degrees, 16 minutes, course 271.
 Sending torpedo aircraft to attack.

1800 Strong radio interference reported by PEARL HARBOR.

1928 Enemy ship using call GEORGE MILE.

2104 HICKAM FIELD and PEARL HARBOR being bombed. Six or seven
 planes without lights; one plane was shot down.

2045 Unidentified plane flying toward PEARL HARBOR (low).

2059 Unidentified flight coming in.

2101 HICKAM being bombed.

2102 HICKAM & PEARL HARBOR being bombed.

2110 HICKAM attacked. Not confirmed.

2112 PEARL HARBOR attacked. Not confirmed.

26 & 30 2113 Above are our own planes trying to land.

SECRET

7 December, 1941

AIR

HEADQUARTERS MARITIME DEPARTMENT
 Fort Shafter, T. H.
 A.C. of S., G-2 - FORWARD ECHELON
 7 DECEMBER 1941

A I R

<u>MESSAGE NO.</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
	2150	Bridge near gun position of 8TH FA ^{marked} marked with phosphorous - which was obliterated with mud by gun crew.
	2150	64TH FA Bn reports PEARL HARBOR receiving naval bombardment.
43	2205	Seven planes reported trying to land at ALA MOANA and are being fired on.
	2300	No attack on Australian area; one Battalion of Australian Imperial Forces enroute to Haiphong.
51	2322	COLONEL DIMOREMAN (Liaison PEARL HARBOR - to LT. EBER USN, Liaison FORWARD ECHELON). - MIDWAY being attacked by ships 12 miles south and west of reef at 0940.
	2350	At MIDWAY, no actual bombing, but guns went into action - indicating planes in close. Being shelled. 24 direct hits.
	2350	Unidentified ship in area.

A I R**SECRET**

7 DECEMBER, 1941

**HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.**

Forward Echelon,
20 December 1941

Subject: Operations Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Herewith report covering conduct of operations of troops of this command during the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

a. Troops of the Hawaiian Department and outlying islands went on alert status under Alert No. 1 between 1500 and 1515 on November 27, 1941, on secret information from the War Department. Notification of enemy air attack on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field was received at about 0810. Major Echelon Commanders and District Commanders were notified of the enemy air operations and ordered to function immediately under Alert No. 3, SOP HD, 8 November 1941. Beginning at about 0900, 7 December 1941, initial defense positions were occupied. The operations section moved to the Forward Command Post at 1000.

b. HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Bellows Field were attacked by Japanese aircraft about 0755, 7 December 1941. The first attack was by dive bombers on the hangars, aircraft, barracks, Hawaiian Air Depot and Engineering Shops. The second attack at about 0850, preceded by heavy ground strafing against aircraft and antiaircraft defenses. The end of attack was at about 0930. The Hawaiian Air Force automatically turned over 18th Bombardment Wing to Naval control per Joint Army - Navy Agreement. At 0800 all Air Warning Service personnel were ordered to Air Warning Service Information Center. Serviceable pursuit aircraft were retrieved and took off at about 0850. Four A-20's and two B-17's were immediately salvaged, manned and took off at about 1140 under Navy control. Orders were issued at once to put all available aircraft in commission.

c. HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND: All troops were alerted at 0810 and took up positions under Field Order No. 1, Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, except as follows: Battery "A," 41st Coast Artillery and Battery "B," 41st Coast Artillery in position at Fort Kamehameha. Battery Hawkins, two 3-inch sea coast guns, Fort Kamehameha, manned by Headquarters Battery, 15th Coast Artillery. Interceptor Command assumed operational command of 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA). Operations during the period of the raid as follows: Enemy planes attacking over Fort Kamehameha at 0800, 1000, and 1120 taken under fire by automatic weapons of Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor and 53d Coast Artillery Brigade units at Fort Kamehameha. At least one plane was brought down. Casualties: Killed, three; wounded, fifteen. No material damaged.

d. 24th INFANTRY DIVISION: Enemy air attack came at approximately 0810, 7 December 1941. Machine gun squads, automatic rifle and riflemen from the 19th and 21st Infantry quickly returned

Fire of attacking planes. Initial 024D41 field positions occupied commencing at 0830, 7 December 1941. All units were in position and ready to operate under Alert No. 3 with initial issue of ammunition at 1700, except 240mm Howitzer batteries. 240mm batteries ready to fire at 1235, 8 December 1941. Other action during the period consisted of increasing number and strength of standing guards and patrols, already operating on anti-sabotage missions at the beginning of the period, and investigating false reports of enemy landing action in this Division's Sector. All units ordered to intensify fortification projects. Front line units were in position at 1100.

a. 25th INFANTRY DIVISION: At the time of the raid, this Division was functioning under Alert No. 1, in the patrolling of the Command and Fire Control Cable System and the guarding of vital installations in its assigned sector. At 0830 the Division Commander directed the drawing of all alert ammunition. At 0900 Alert No. 3 was placed in effect. At 0950 the Division departed for defense positions. Troops already in the field immediately increased the strength of anti-sabotage guards on the most vital installations and placed additional posts on secondary installations. 25th Infantry Division Journal records Wheeler Field bombed at 0800; at 0825 troops with small arms and antiaircraft machine guns fired on enemy aircraft; at 0830 the 25th Division Artillery was ordered to draw their initial issue of Field Artillery ammunition; at 0845 a second air raid of about forty enemy planes is reported; at 0900 orders received to occupy war positions maintaining two hundred yards between trucks.

- 1015 - 27th Infantry troops clear Schofield Barracks for John Rodgers Air Port.
- 1040 - Water tank of 25th Medical Battalion sent to Hickam Field Hospital. No water available at Hickam Field.
- 1105 - Remainder of 298th Infantry cleared Schofield Barracks for Bellows Field area (one battalion on duty that area since 27 November 1941).
- 1115 - Units of 35th Infantry in war positions, Ewa Sector.
- 1130 - 25th Infantry Bands take over guard duty at Schofield Barracks.
- 1310 - Firing Batteries of 25th Division Artillery enroute to war positions with one-half unit of fire.
- 1345 - Engineer supplies, consisting of 30,000 sand bags, barbed wire and pickets, etc., made available to each Infantry Regiment and Artillery Battalion by Division Commander.
- 1600 - 25th Division Artillery Command Post closed at Schofield Barracks and opened at Forward Command Post. All troops in war positions with at least one unit of fire all types of ammunition, except 240mm Howitzers. Ammunition supply built up during the night to two units of fire. The 25th Division cleared the Post of Schofield Barracks a half hour ahead of calculated schedule.

William B. Donegan
 WILLIAM B. DONEGAN,
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. C.,
 Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

2 Incls:

- #1 - Report Hawaiian Interceptor Commander
- #2 - Report Base Operations, Hickam Field, T. H.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND

18 December 1941.

Subject: Report of Enemy Activity over Oahu, 7 December 1941.

To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

At approximately 0802, a large formation of enemy airplanes were heard approaching Wheeler Field from the North at approximately 5000 feet. They peeled off and attacked the hangar line with Dive Bombers, releasing in all about thirty five bombs - of these, approximately four were 600 lbs; about three were 250 lbs; about eight were 100 lbs; the remainder were smaller and some appeared to be oil or other type of incendiary bombs. The airplanes appeared to release their bombs from an altitude of from 500 to 1000 feet. There were two types of bombers in the attack - one with non-retractable wheels appeared to be of the A-17 type, and the others were a little faster and had retractable wheels. Each type had a crew of two.

Bombs struck and burned Hangar No. 1 where the Base Engineering was situated and Hangar No. 3. They also burned a building used as a store house by the Post Exchange and a mobilization-type warehouse filled with cement. One bomb struck the 6th Pursuit Squadron barracks on the Southwest corner entering a window on the second floor where it exploded causing considerable damage to personnel and rendering the building unserviceable. One bomb which landed in the open made a crater approximately 15 feet in diameter and six feet deep.

After the airplanes had expended their bombs, they came to a very low altitude and machine-gunned the airplanes parked in front of the hangars. They also fired bullets through the windows of buildings, attempting to set them afire with incendiary ammunition. From belts of ammunition in one of the captured planes, it was noted that the ammunition was loaded two armor-piercing, one tracer; two armor-piercing, one tracer; two armor-piercing, one incendiary. The bullets punctured the gasoline tanks of the airplanes and set them afire with tracer and incendiary ammunition. This method of attack was very successful and destroyed fifty four airplanes by fire and twenty nine airplanes by other means. After the first raid, the personnel at the post were employed in pulling away unburned airplanes from those that were burning and removing as many as possible from the burning hangars. They were also employed in fighting the numerous fires caused by the raid and in rescuing the wounded.

Before the raid, all airplanes were tied down on the ramp in front of the hangars or were inside the hangars. None of them were loaded with ammunition. After they had been rescued from the fire and rolled away from the hangar line, the crews began arming them.

- 1 -
SECRET

3638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

P-2, Letr, Enemy Activity-Oahu, 7 Dec 41, fr OGHIC to OGHAF, 18 Dec 41

At approximately 0910, a second attack was made by seven airplanes, but little damage was done. These airplanes appeared to be expending on Wheeler Field what ammunition was left after the raid on Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor.

The following members of the 46th Pursuit Squadron took off from Wheeler Field about 0850 and were ordered by the Controller at the Information Center to proceed to the vicinity of Diamond Head at 8000 feet:

1st Lieut. L. W. SAUNDERS
2d Lieut. J. W. THACKER
2d Lieut. G. - STERLING
2d Lieut. P. - RASMUSSEN

They proceeded to the vicinity of Bellows Field and there attacked a formation of nine Japanese two-seater airplanes with retractable landing gears. Lieut. Saunders and Lieut. Rasmussen each shot down a Japanese airplane and Lieut. Sterling was shot down by the enemy. Lieut. Saunders reports that the Japanese two-seater airplanes could out-climb the P-36 airplanes used by the 46th Pursuit Squadron. By about 0920, 1st Lieut. M. A. Moore and 2d Lieut. O. Norris of the 46th Pursuit Squadron got into the air. Lt. Moore fired at a Japanese airplane without result.

The 47th Pursuit Squadron was located at Haleiwa and, between 0815 and 1000, made two flights. In the first flight were 2d Lieut. Kenneth Taylor, 2d Lieut. George Welch, 1st Lieut. John Webster, 2d Lieut. John Daines, each flying P-40's and 1st Lieut. Robert Rogers in a P-36. In the second flight were 1st Lieut. Robert Rogers, 2d Lieut. George Welch, 2d Lieut. Kenneth Taylor and 2d Lieut. Harry Brown in P-40's and 2d Lieut. John Daines in a P-36. Lieut. Welch shot down two Japanese planes in the first flight and two during the second flight. Lieut. Taylor shot down two Japanese planes during the first flight. Lieut. Brown shot down one Japanese plane during the second flight. Lieut. Dai was shot down at approximately 0915 over Schofield Barracks, probably by our anti-aircraft troops.

The 44th Pursuit Squadron was on Detached Service at Bellows Field for Gunnery Training. Upon being notified of the attack at Wheeler Field, the crews began arming the airplanes. In an effort to take off under heavy fire from the enemy, Lieut. Whiteman was shot down immediately after take-off, Lieut. Hans C. Christensen was killed while getting into a P-40 to take-off. Lieut. Samuel F. Bishop took off and was shot down into the ocean. Although wounded the leg, this pilot swam ashore.

The following casualties were incurred at Wheeler Field, excepting officers who were killed in flight:

38 Enlisted Men Killed,
59 Enlisted Men Wounded.

These casualties were suffered mostly by the men sleeping in the tents and the sleeping in the 6th Pursuit Squadron barracks that was hit by a bomb.

The Information Center for the Interceptor Command which had been set up in a temporary installation near Fort Shafter was operated as follows on 7 December 1941:

(a) 0600 - 0700

- (1) All six detector stations operating per orders C/8, HED.
- (2) 1st Lieut. KERMIT A. TYLER, AC, was Watch Officer.

- 2 -

SECRET

P-3, Ltr, Enemy Activity-Oahu, 7 Dec 41, fr CGHIC to CGHAF, 18 Dec 41 -

- (3) A plotting detail consisting of one NCO and 10 enlisted men was on duty.
- (4) The Control Center at Wheeler Field was manned by Sgt Starry.
- (b) 0700
 - (1) All detector stations closed down except one, the Opana Station at Kahuku Point, which remained in operation in order to continue training a new man operating the oscilloscope. This Station picked up plot at C702 indicating airplanes at 136 miles bearing 0° to 3° and kept tracking the target.
 - (2) Lieut. Tyler continued as Watch Officer as his schedule stipulated that he remain on duty until 0800.
- (c) 0720
 - (1) The Opana Station called to inform the Information Center switchboard operator that they were plotting a large group of airplanes. In view of contemplated arrival of B-17's from the mainland and probability of Naval aircraft operating, the Watch Officer did not consider it necessary to take any action.
- (d) 0800
 - (1) Attack underway and all AWS personnel were called to duty.
- (e) 0820
 - (1) Lieut. Grover C. White, Signal Corps, Communications Officer, and Master Sergeant Harold Taylor, Information Center Chief, arrived.
- (f) 0830
 - (1) Major Lorry N. Tindal, Air Corps, arrived and took over the duties of Controller.
- (g) 0920
 - (1) 1st Lieut. Edwin R. Granberry, CAC, arrived and manned AA position.
- (h) 0940
 - (1) 1st Lieut. A. A. Konkel, SC & Captain N. L. Tittle, SC, arrived.
- (i) 0945
 - (1) 2d Lieut. V. A. Harril, CAC, arrived at AA position.
- (j) 1015
 - (1) Major E. P. Bergquist, Air Corps, arrived.

SECRET

3640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

P-4, Ltr, Enemy Activity - Oahu, 7 Dec 41, fr CGHIC to CGHAF, 18 Dec 41 -

(k) 1030

(1) Lt Comdr F.E.G. Taylor, arrived.

(1) After 0800

Since 0800 the Station has remained in continuous operation.

The following is a recapitulation of the airplanes at Wheeler Field as of 9 December 1941:

Type	Stock Record	In Commission	Repairable Locally	Repair Upon Receipt of Major Assembly	Fire	Destroyed Other Causes
P-40B	28	25	9	5	36	13
P-40C	13	2	4	0	4	3
P-36A	39	24	2	2	5	6
F-26A	8	2	0	0	4	2
P-26B	6	3	1	0	2	0
C-47B	1	1	0	0	0	0
A-12A	4	1	0	0	0	3
B-12A	3	2	1	0	0	0
B-18	1	1	0	0	0	0
OA-8	1	0	1	0	0	0
OA-9	3	1	0	0	2	0
AT-6	4	0	1	0	1	2

H. C. Davidson
H. C. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier General, Air Corps,
Commanding.

- 4 -
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HICKAM FIELD
Office of the Post Operations Officer
Hickam Field, T.H.

C-115

19 December 1941

SUBJECT: Report on Tactics Used in Bombing Attack of 7 December 1941.

TO : Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Forward Echelon, T.H.

1. The following observations are reported in connection with the Japanese bombing attack on 7 December 1941.

a. I was in the Post Operations Office at Hickam Field waiting for the arrival of twelve (12) incoming B-17s. Shortly before the attack, I noticed the time to be 0745. I would estimate the attack occurred within ten (10) minutes.

b. The Hawaiian Air Depot repair hangar was dive bombed first, and the hangars on the roadside immediately thereafter. These attacks were pressed home to a very low altitude.

c. The airplanes parked on the mat were strafed after the dive bombing of the hangars. Several planes were set afire. I noted a bright red flame on the ground under an airplane parked next to Hangar 8. I am unable to state whether this was an incendiary bomb or an airplane flare. The planes were the same type in some cases. I would say that the dive bombers were also used for strafing.

d. The hangars and planes were also strafed by planes flying perpendicular to the hangar line. This action followed the strafing attack in c, which was parallel to the line.

e. All strafing attacks came very close to the ground and ceased only when almost on top of the objectives.

f. There was a short lull (about thirty (30) minutes) between the first and second attacks. During the second attack, my attention was concentrated on a high altitude attack by a formation of about twelve (12) planes which flew in from the south in a very tight formation. From the approach, which was directly along the hangars on the mat side, I would say that this attack was intended for the hangar line, although it hit the area just west of the hangar line (barracks, parade ground, etc.,). I believe this group of bombs was over and to the left of the intended targets.

g. The second attack was accompanied by strafing, although it seemed less severe than during the first attack.

-1-

SECRET

POO to CG, HAF, 12-13-41.
Report on Bombing Attack. Cont'd

h. Immediately after the high altitude attack, I observed a heavy dive bombing attack on the Pearl Harbor area. This was pressed home against an intense anti-aircraft fire, although I saw no planes shot down. The bombers in this attack did not come as low as those which conducted the attack in b above.

i. I observed only single engine planes.

j. I saw no enemy planes actually fall, although I observed two (2) which were smoking and appeared to be in trouble.

k. The attacks were finished about 0915 - 0930.

Gordon A. Blake
 GORDON A. BLAKE,
 Major, Air Corps,
 Post Operations Officer.

SECRET

EXHIBIT NO. 165

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

4D757

The Pentagon

10 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON:

In response to Congressman Murphy's inquiry at page 4532 of the Committee transcript, there is enclosed a copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a 23 February 1941 conference between German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima. The partial translation was obtained from the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality.

*Carl R. Nelson*CARL R. NELSON
Capt., AUS

Incl - 1



3644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834-PS

Foreign Office
Ram No. 56/R

BERLIN, 2 March 1941.

Strictly Secret

Personal

In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. These statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.

Signed: RIBBENTROP.

To: The German Embassy in

Ankara
Madrid
Moscow
Rome (Quir.)
Rome (Vat.)

The German Legation in

Athens
Belgrade
Bern
Budapest
Bukarest
Helsinki
Lisbon
Pressburg (Bratislava)
Sofia
Stockholm
one each

65215

Enclosure
To RAM No. 56/R

Strictly Secret

**EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER
WITH AMBASSADOR OSHIMA IN FUSCHL ON 13 FEBRUARY 1941**

After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these policies had been [2] fully vindicated. He (the RAM,) regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now.

Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction. A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable. Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a *treaty with Russia*—a necessity for avoiding a two-front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the German-Japanese relationship. Now the *German-Japanese alliance* has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from

the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?

* * * * *

As for the war against *England*, we had poor weather for our bombers during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing measure so that we hope to destroy very much more than America was able to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. The time when we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further developments.

At sea the commitment of U-boat weapon had thus far been comparatively slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air Force-U-Boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a matter of reducing imports by sinkings to a definite level below the absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.

[3] Concerning *America*, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all. The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. In East Asia, America would hardly dare to send its fleet beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is impossible, and Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the fleet and land troops are lacking. This points to the creation of American air bases in England for practical purposes. But in an air war we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion in its attacks on Europe and must thereby split up its forces. In an air duel—Europe vs. England—Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers.

The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. By order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns.

Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the co-operation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:

1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.) The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.

- [4] 2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war, America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less

so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interest there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.

3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also, to secure for herself already during the war the position she would hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.

The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that America had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, by no means be decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the coalition of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America's entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan's entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy to the Far East, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the big chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would be able to do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he did not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his in Japanese waters.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia. The press, radio, etc. of these countries were already so synchronized with each other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of contact must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.

Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however, that, impressed by German victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.

[5] Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the influence of the events, the hard feelings against America had risen considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U. S. A., concerning Japan's attitude in case of American entry into the war, and mentioned that he considered it appropriate to talk in plain language with the U. S. A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire to get America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if the U. S. realizes that they were confronting firm determination, would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war. American people felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason, by Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics toward the U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In the end they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard feelings for American people, but that should the U. S. A. have any aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined people, a front, at that, which included practically the whole world. One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as speeches and addresses of a principal nature are concerned it would be necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy propaganda.

The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan's friendliness which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded.

On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). England too was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.

[6] Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be formed on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asia sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.

The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U. S. A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U. S. A. to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.

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EXHIBIT NO. 166

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Department of State **Secret**
Washington

December 5, 1941.
6 pm

No distribution
Rush

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

With reference to your 5876, please read the following cable to Eden personally but leave no text of the message:

One. As proof of American policy of aid to Russia, this Government recently sent representatives to the Soviet Union in order to discuss the furnishing of supplies to the Soviet Union to assist it in its struggle against the Nazi invasion. These representatives entered into an agreement with the Soviet Government as to supplies; an agreement which was coordinated with a similar effort by the British Government.

Two. It is our conviction that the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union is the measure to which we fulfill the commitments our representatives made.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

This code was sent in the Arden Code.
It should be sent in the Arden Code before
being communicated to anyone. *SC*

740 0011 EUROPEAN 1941 17085

Confidential File

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER Collect ☐ Full rate ☐ Day letter ☐ Night letter Charge Department ☐ ☐ Full rate ☐ Day letter ☐ Night letter Charge to ☐ \$ ☐		TELEGRAM SENT Department of State <i>Washington.</i>	TO BE TRANSMITTED CONFIDENTIAL CODE NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE PARTIAL PLAIN
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-2-

in Moscow. We are exerting every effort to carry out these obligations and will continue to do so until the final victory.

Three. In so far as our post war policies are concerned, it is our belief that these have been delineated in the Atlantic Charter which today represents the attitude not only of the United States but also of Great Britain and of the Soviet Union.

Four. In view of this fact in our considered opinion it would be unfortunate were any of the three governments, now on common ground in the Atlantic Charter to express any willingness to enter into commitments regarding specific terms of the post war settlement. Discussions between the several governments looking toward fullest possible agreement on basic policies and toward later arrangements at the proper time and with full public knowledge will of course be expected to continue. Upon the conclusion of hostilities those nations contributing to the defeat of the Hitler forces will join in an effort to restore peace and order.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19____

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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PLAIN

-3-

The participation at that time of the Soviet Government will be no less than that of Great Britain and our own. In order not to jeopardize the aims we shall all share in common looking to an enduring peace it is evident that no commitments as to individual countries should be entered into at this time. It would be unfortunate if we should approach the peace conference thus hampered. Above all there must be no secret accords.

Five. Our basic policy of aid to England is no less strong than that of aid to Russia and we are confident that there is no doubt in the British mind as to our good faith in carrying out our policy. It was in this spirit the Atlantic Charter was conceived, to which the Soviet Government has now given its adherence. Given the limitations of this Government, it would be difficult if not impossible for us to implement this common understanding by agreements of a more detailed nature at this time. Furthermore, the constitutional limitation to which this Government is bound must be kept in mind.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ P. _____

PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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We have very frankly indicated our position in order that in view of the short time before Mr. Eden's departure he may have no misunderstanding as to the general lines of our position.

As to numbered paragraph seven of your telegram we abstain from comment because of uncertainty as to its meaning. In the event that further discussions on this are contemplated we would like to have fuller information.

Hull
(RA)

This letter has been
approved by Mr. Hull

AK
JHR

En: RA:RIC

Enclosed by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

9

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXHIBIT NO. 167

Copy of document handed
to the Secretary of State
by the Japanese Ambassador
on November 26, 1941.

ORAL

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

November 26, 1941

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which

-2-

which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese
Ambassador

-3-

Japanese or on November 23 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

In this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 23 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan

contains

-4-

contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

Copy of document handed by the
Secretary of State to the
Japanese Ambassador on
November 26, 1941.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
TENTATIVE AND WITHOUT
COMMITMENT

November 26, 1941.

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Section I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

711.74 / 2504
The Government of the United States and the Govern-
ment of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the
Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed
toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific
area, that they have no territorial designs in that area,
that they have no intention of threatening other coun-
tries or of using military force aggressively against any
neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their na-
tional policies they will actively support and give
practical application to the following fundamental
principles upon which their relations with each other
and with all other governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial
integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries.

(3)

-2-

- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
- (4) The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- (3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- (4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
- (5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finances as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

-3-

Section II

Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina
and

-4-

and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support -- militarily, politically, economically -- any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the
Government

-5-

Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

ORAL STATEMENT BY STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TO THE PRESS, NOVEMBER 28, 1941

The Japanese representatives were handed for their consideration a document that is the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said so often in the past that it rests on certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.

For the Press.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
December 7, 1941.
No. 585.

The text of the document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 28, 1941, which consists of two parts, one an oral statement and one an outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan, reads as follows:

"ORAL

"Strictly confidential.

"NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

"The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application

3662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited."

"Strictly confidential,
tentative and without commitment.

"NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

"OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

"SECTION I. DRAFT MUTUAL DECLARATIONS OF POLICY

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

"(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

"(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

"(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

"(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

"(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

"(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

"SECTION II. STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence

to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

"4. The government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.


"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

December 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM

At the President's press conference this afternoon, the President announced that he had received a letter from the Emergency Railway Board concerning the settlement of the Railway demands. He read a part of the letter and said that the rest of it would be given to correspondents by Mr. Early.

The President commented that he trusted that that is the end of their trouble and that tomorrow he would be given the formal report and a transcript of the proceedings.

The President was asked if the Japanese marched into Thailand what would the United States Government do? The President evaded the question. Another correspondent asked if the President could give any indication of the nature of the information requested from the Japanese Representatives this morning. The President said let us put it this way, and this answers again many questions at the same time. Since last April we have been discussing with the Japanese some method to arrive at an objective that is permanent peace in the whole area in the Pacific and at times it seemed that progress was being made. During the whole period up to the end of June we assumed that as both nations were negotiating toward that objective - there would be no act contrary to the desired end of peace. We were therefore somewhat surprised when the Japanese Government sent troops to a specific over-all total into Indo-China after very brief negotiations with the Vichy Government at the conclusion of which the Vichy Government let it be understood clearly that they had agreed to this number of troops principally because

711.942594-2/8

Confidential

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because they were powerless to do anything else.

Sometime later conversations were resumed with the United States and again we made it perfectly clear that the objective we were seeking meant the taking of no additional territory by anyone in the Pacific area. We received word the other day that there were large additional bodies of Japanese forces of various kinds, including troops, planes, war vessels, etc., in Indo-China and that other forces were on the way. Before these forces had arrived the number of forces already there had greatly exceeded the original amount agreed to by the French and the number on the way were much greater, and the question asked this morning very politely, at my request, was as to what the purpose and intention of the Japanese Government was as to the future, eliminating the necessity of policing Indo-China which is a very peaceful spot and we hope to receive a reply in the near future.

In reply to a question as to whether any time for a reply had been set, the President said that there had naturally been no time limit set.

EXHIBIT NO. 168

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Letter dated November 18, 1941, from Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, transmitting a memorandum dated November 17, 1941, which had also been sent to the President, entitled "An Approach to the Problem of Eliminating Tension with Japan and Insuring Defeat of Germany."
2. Memorandum dated November 18, 1941, of conversation between Secretary of State Hull and the British Minister concerning "Conversations Between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassadors."
3. Memorandum dated November 19, 1941, of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Netherlands Minister.
4. Memorandum dated November 19, 1941, of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Australian Minister.
5. Memorandum dated November 26, 1941, of conversation between Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Canadian Minister Counselor.
6. Memorandum dated November 29, 1941, of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Australian Minister.
7. Memorandum dated November 30, 1941, of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Australian Minister concerning "Conversation Between Australian Minister and Ambassador Kurusu."
8. Dispatch #280 dated December 1, 1941, from the State Department to the American Embassy, Chungking, concerning the Chinese opposition to the proposed *modus vivendi* and the U. S. negotiations with Japan.



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
November 18, 1941



Dear Cordell:

I am enclosing copy of a
letter and memorandum which I
am sending to the President.

Sincerely,

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State.

Enclosures

*Enclosed
of*

711.94/2540-16/55

Confidential file

November 17, 1941

**AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ELIMINATING TENSION
WITH JAPAN AND INSURING DEFEAT OF GERMANY**

I. Introduction

It is becoming increasingly evident that "all out" diplomatic preparedness is as important an instrument of defense as is adequate military preparedness. Military activity may win battles, diplomatic activity can make the fighting of these battles unnecessary; military victories can gain raw material and equipment and can weaken the enemy, diplomatic victories can achieve similar gains. Without major diplomatic victories Germany could not have attained her spectacular success. Had they not suffered major diplomatic defeats neither England nor France would be in their present predicaments.

An "all out" effort involves in diplomacy as in military strategy the fullest use of every economic and political advantage. Just as our military forces in preparation for an "all out" defense or in actual warfare must make intelligent use of our geographical position, our rich resources, our vast labor power, technical equipment and democratic traditions, so must diplomacy utilize these advantages to the full if it is to have any chance of success.

We are rich — we should use more of our wealth in the interests of peace and victory. We are powerful — we should be willing to use our power before our backs are to the wall. We need no nation's lands — we should make full use of that fact. We keep our national pledges — now is the time that record of integrity should stand us in good

-2-

stead. We are protected by two oceans -- let us exploit that protection while distance is still a potent barrier. We are a democracy -- let us take full advantage of the strength of our covenants openly arrived at.

If ever there was a time when diplomacy could secure its most brilliant victories for the United States, now is that time! The longer we wait the less chance will we have to use diplomacy as an aid to our defense. The terms of relationship will become irrevocable; opportunities lost are gone forever. Having committed irrevocably to a course of action, we lose the power to exercise choice, to accept offers and make positions.

If the President were to propose something like the a pending agreement and the Japanese accept, the whole world would be electrified by the successful transformation of a threatening and belligerent powerful enemy into a peaceful and prosperous neighbor. The prestige and the leadership of the President both at home and abroad would skyrocket by so brilliant and momentous a diplomatic victory -- a victory that requires no vanquished, a victory that immediately would bring peace, happiness and prosperity to hundreds of millions of eastern peoples, and secure the subsequent defeat of Germany!

The proposal is workable and could be spectacularly successful, if Japan could be induced to accept the arrangement, and the great advantages it offers to Japan, and the fact that the likely alternative is war might induce Japan to accept the arrangement.

-3-

The proposal is given below only in bare outline and in only enough detail to indicate the essential points. What is most needed at this moment is not a carefully worked out program, but rather a decision to employ an all-out diplomatic approach in the current discussions with the Japanese.

-4-

**II. Self-Evident Propositions Concerning
United States and Japan**

1. War between the United States and Japan would cost thousands of lives, billions of dollars; would leave the vanquished country bitter and desirous of revenge; would foster social disruption, and would not insure peace during our children's lives, nor permanently solve troublesome problems now standing between the two countries.
2. The United States prefers a just and peaceful settlement to war as a means of settling international difficulties, and is willing to go more than half way to settle peaceably the issues that stand in the way of more friendly intercourse between the two countries.
3. The United States recognizes that Japan, because of the special nature of its economy, is greatly in need of opportunities for increased foreign trade, and in need of capital to repair the ravages of four years of warfare, and in need of secured sources of basic raw materials.
4. The United States recognizes that our immigration laws have in fact unjustly discriminated against the Japanese people.
5. The United States believes that in the long run the interests of both the Japanese people and the American people can best be served by establishing fair and peaceful conditions under which Japan and her neighbors can prosper.

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... it is noted that a full year there is no basic obstacle to the development and more friendly relations between the United States and Japan. We believe that the Japanese will welcome an opportunity to restore peace, to strengthen Japan's industry and trade, and to promote friendly relations with her neighbors on a basis of equality. To Japan's needs and the needs of her neighbors.

The United States wishes to help Japan maintain her independence and to attain peace and stability in the Far East in order to promote her political and economic development, so that she may be able to help herself and her neighbors.

... it is noted that a full year there is no basic obstacle --

... it is noted that a full year there is no basic obstacle as long as the United States remains a force in the Pacific area to be feared by no one and to be respected by all. A potential enemy is not a friend, and a friend is not a potential enemy.

- 7 -

III. Proposed Agreement

Because of the foregoing facts, the United States proposes to enter into an Agreement with Japan at once under which the United States and Japan will agree to certain things, as follows:

On her part, the United States Government proposes to do the following:

1. To withdraw the bulk of the American Naval force from the Pacific.
2. To sign a 20-year non-aggression pact with Japan.
3. To promote a final settlement of the Manchurian question.
4. To actively advocate the placing of Indo-China under the Government of a Joint British, French, Japanese, Chinese and American Commission, which will insure most-favored-nation treatment for those five countries until European War is ended, and which will govern the country primarily in the interests of the Indo-Chinese people.
5. To give up all extra-territorial rights in China and to obtain England's agreement to give up her extra-territorial rights in China, and give Hong Kong back to China.
6. To present to Congress and push for enactment a bill to repeal the Immigration Act of 1917 which prohibits immigration into the United States of Japanese, and place the Japanese and the Chinese on the same basis as other peoples.
7. To negotiate a trade agreement with Japan, giving her (a) most-favored-nation treatment and (b) such concessions

on imports as can be mutually satisfactorily arranged, including an agreement to end raw silk exports from Japan for 20 years.

8. To extend a 2 billion 10-year credit at 2 per cent interest, to be drawn upon at the rate not to exceed \$200 million a year except with approval of the President of the United States.

9. To set up a \$500 million stabilization fund, half supplied by Japan and half by the United States, to be used for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.

10. To remove the restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.

11. To use its influence to the full to attempt to eliminate sources of potential friction between Japan and her neighbors, and to assure Japan access to the raw materials of the world on the same basis as now enjoyed by United States and Great Britain.

3. On its part, the Japanese Government proposes to do the following:

1. Withdraw all military, naval, air police forces from China (boundaries as of 1931) from Indo-China and from Thailand.

2. Withdraw all support -- military, political, or economic -- from any government in China other than that of the national government.

3. Replace with yen currency at a rate agreed upon among the Treasuries of China, Japan, England and United States all military scrip, yen and puppet notes circulating in China.

- 1 -

4. Give up all extra-territorial rights in China.

5. Extend to China a billion yen loan at 2 per cent to aid in reconstructing China (at rate of 100 million yen a year).

6. Withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided U.S.S.R. withdraws all her troops from the Far Eastern front except for an equivalent remainder.

7. Sell to the United States up to three-fourths of her current output of war material -- including, naval, air, ordnance and commercial ships on a cost-plus 10 per cent basis as the United States may select.

8. Expel all German technical men, military officials and propagandists.

9. Accord the United States and China most-favored-nation treatment in the whole Japanese Empire.

10. Negotiate a 10-year non-aggression pact with United States, China, British Empire, Dutch Indies (and Philippines).

11. Inasmuch as the United States cannot permit the present uncertain status between the United States and Japan to continue in view of world developments, and feels that decisive action is called for now, the United States should extend the above offer of a generous and peaceful solution of the difficulties between the two countries for only a limited time. If the Japanese Government does not indicate its acceptance in principle at least of the proffered terms

- 10 -

before the expiration of that time, it can mean only that the present Japanese Government prefers other and less peaceful ways of solving these difficulties, and is awaiting the propitious moment to attempt to carry out further a plan of conquest.

- 11 -

IV.

Advantages to Japan and United States of Such an Agreement

The advantages accruing to each government are listed below:

A. To the United States

1. In the event that Japan elected to reject the offer of peaceful solution under terms herein indicated, the United States would have a clearer idea of what to expect and would therefore know better how to shape her own policy.
2. Our naval power will be greatly increased at once by the freeing of our Pacific fleet for duty elsewhere.
3. We would be able to send more of our equipment to England and Russia without increasing our vulnerability to an attack from the East.
4. We will have stopped the war in China and have regained for her her freedom.
5. We will have paved the way for a substantial increase in post-war trade.
6. We would greatly strengthen the Allied position vis-a-vis Germany.
7. We will have saved ourselves from a war with Japan.
8. The money it would cost us would be a very small part of what we would save by not having to fight Japan, or by not having to be prepared for a two-ocean war.
9. A prosperous Japan and China can greatly help to restore our normal trade, and thus make easier our own transition to a peace time economy.

- 12 -

10. Insure for ourselves an increased supply of tin, antimony and wood oil and rubber from the Far East.

11. Handicap Germany in its present military campaign and at the same time give great moral encouragement to the British and Russian people.

12. Finally, military and naval experts who now fear a "two front" naval threat will be more enthusiastic about all out help to England and Russia. There will be much less cause to oppose the administration's foreign policy.

B. To Japan

1. Instead of being confronted with prospect of a more serious war and certain defeat in the end, she can have peace at once.

2. She can proceed at once to shift from a war economy to peace economy and at the same time experience prosperity rather than a serious depression.

3. She can withdraw from the China incident without loss of "face".

4. She can strengthen her currency and reduce her public debt.

5. Her foreign trade will greatly increase.

6. She can devote her energies and capital to reconstructing Japan, building up Manchuria, and developing new trade possibilities at a time when other countries are engaged in war or preparation for war.

7. She will at one stroke have solved some of her thorniest problems in her international relations.

8. She will avoid the social disruption that is bound to take place in Japan after an expanded and prolonged war effort.

- 13 -

The one danger inherent in the proposed concessions is that if accepted by Japan it would provide her with a breathing space during which she could greatly strengthen her military and economic potential. She might then be a greater threat to us a year or two hence than she is now.

Against that possibility are the following factors:

1. Owing to the scarcity of many raw materials she will not be able to expand her navy and air force during the next year nearly as much as we can -- particularly in view of the provision in the agreement that we can buy 80 percent of her current output of armaments.
2. The next two years are crucial for us. If we can obtain the release of the Russian, British and American forces now being tied up in the Far East by Japan's threatening, we will have done more to strengthen United Kingdom and Russia vis-a-vis Germany than we could with a whole year's output of planes and tanks and ships.
3. The Japanese people would be so relieved by the settlement of the China "incident", and the end of the threat of war with major powers, and would be so happy at the cessation of economic strangulation and the emergence of real prosperity, that it is hardly likely that any military clique could stir up significant trouble for years to come.

Altogether, the likelihood of Japan's strengthening her position and re-entering the world scene as a belligerent aggressor in the next few years seems very slim -- provided Germany is defeated.

- 14 -

It would, of course, be necessary to obtain Congressional approval before making definite offers, but through preliminary confidential conferences with leaders of both parties and with appropriate committees, the ground could be quickly prepared so that negotiations could go forward.

A completed document could in a week or two be offered to the Japanese Government. The world, including the Japanese people, would know the motives and the contents of our offer. If the Japanese Government would not accept, it would have at least the great advantages of (1) clarifying our own policy and rallying support behind the President, (2) create serious division in Japan.

If the Japanese Government were to indicate its tentative acceptance in principle, the President could at once call a conference in Washington to be attended by Chinese, British, Russian, and possibly Dutch East Indian and Philippines representatives. Inasmuch as all the important concessions are to be made by United States and Japan, the participation of other governments in the conference need not complicate negotiations.

The above proposed program of mutual concessions can be successful only if certain vital concessions are not left out. If adopted with those concessions peace in the Pacific would be gained, whereas if adopted without them "appeasement" would be the result, the threat of war would not be averted, and an exceptional opportunity to settle the issue on terms favorable to defeat of Germany would be lost.

- 15 -

Minimum concessions to be obtained from Japan should be withdrawal of troops from the mainland of Asia and to us of the bulk of her current production of armaments. If we do not achieve this, we shall not obtain any significant relief to allied military forces in the east whom we would be making it possible for Japan to strengthen herself for possible later aggression when the situation is more propitious for aggressive acts on her part. The minimum objectives must be to free the American, British and Russian forces from the Pacific.

HDW:dln
11/17/41.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 18, 1941

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND THE
JAPANESE AMBASSADORS, ADMIRAL KICHISABURO NOMURA
AND MR. SABURO KURUSU

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH MINISTER,
SIR R. I. CAMPBELL

COPIES TO:

The British Minister called at my request. I said that I had engaged in a lengthy conference with the two ranking Japanese representatives, including Mr. Kurusu, who is here for the purpose of carrying on conversations with this Government. I added that the conversation related to the question of a proposed peaceful settlement for the Pacific area. I stated that nothing was agreed upon at this meeting and that the discussion included the subject of two opposing policies - of conquest by force on the one hand and a policy of peace, law and order on the other. I went on to say that the three main points on which we have encountered serious difficulties in former conversations with Ambassador Nomura, namely,

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-2-

namely, the bringing of Japanese troops out of China, the Tripartite Pact and certain phases of commercial policy, were discussed at length; but that the Japanese made no concessions on the troop matter or on the matter of the Tripartite Pact. I told the Minister that the Japanese finally inquired whether a brief temporary partial arrangement could not be worked out that would enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along the lines of peace rather than of military action. This would also include the idea of Japan's coming out of China. They said while the United States and maybe Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should be so disposed on consultation, would to a partial extent relax embargoes on exports to Japan, Japan on its part would correspondingly take steps in the direction of a peaceful policy and in organizing and educating its public opinion in support of such a policy during the next few months. The Japanese suggested further that the whole question of a general peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be gradually developed and public opinion in Japan would enable them to meet us more satisfactorily themselves, and presumably satisfactorily to us

on

-3-

on the more difficult questions such as removing their troops from China and the Tripartite Pact. They did not, however, make any definite commitments as to just how far they could comply with our position with respect to these two points.

I said to the British Minister that I had made it clear to the Japanese that if their Government cared to present something on this point, I would give it consideration in the event it appeared to be feasible of consideration, but that I could make no promise, and that if it should be deemed feasible, I would confer with the British, the Dutch, the Chinese and the Australians about any phase of the matter in which they would be interested to which they would give consideration. I also said to the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan decides on a peaceful policy rather than a policy of force and conquest, we could not get far in any kind of discussion but that I could understand why they might need a little time to educate public opinion, as stated.

C.H.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 1

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL
AND THE TWO JAPANESE AMBASSADORS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE MINISTER OF
THE NETHERLANDS, DR. A. LOUDON

COPIES TO:

The Minister of the Netherlands called at my request and I repeated to him the substance of what I stated to the British Minister on yesterday in regard to my conversation with the two Japanese Ambassadors. He was very appreciative of this information, and especially of the disposition of this Government to cooperate wholeheartedly as heretofore with his Government.

D.H.

S C : A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 19, 1941

SUBJECT:

CONVERSATION OF SECRETARY HULL WITH THE BRITISH MINISTER
REGARDING UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

PARTICIPANTS:

SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA,
THE RIGHT HONORABLE RICHARD G. CASEY. ✓

COPIES TO:

The Minister of Australia called at my request
and I gave him the substance of my statement to the
British Minister yesterday afternoon.

C.H.

S:CH:DFB

711.94/2468

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 10-1-78

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: The following Ministers of Justice
were involved in the process:

COPIES TO:

The Canadian Minister/Representative in a question with Article VI of the Statute of the ILO and Article IV of the Convention in the matter of ensuring that the Canadian Government be satisfied as to those to be conscripted.

PA/H:SK:FIB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 29, 1941

SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN OFFER TO ACT AS MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONORABLE RICHARD G. CASEY

COPIES TO:

The Australian Minister called at his request and made some reference to the possibility that he might cause Kurusu to call on him, at which time he would discuss the pros and cons of the present relations existing between all of the governments interested in the Pacific and wind up by suggesting that Australia would be glad to act as mediator or something of the sort. I really gave the matter no serious attention except to tell him that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of a move of that kind. I interrupted him to make this conclusive comment before the Minister could make a detailed statement of the matter on the assumption that he would develop a set of facts along lines that he began to intimate.

C.R.

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recent weeks by the British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, and twice by the Netherlands Minister.

C.H.

S:CR:MA:AR

TELETYPE OFFICE WILL FORWARD MESSAGE (Full rate) Cable (Day letter) Cable (Night letter) Charge Department Full rate Day letter Night letter Charge to	TELEGRAM SENT Department of State Washington, November 1, 1941 NO DISTRIBUTION	RECEIVED TELETYPE OFFICE NOV 1 1941
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AMEMBASSY,
 CHUNGKING (CHINA).
 N/E 7 2 P 0

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY.
 Reference your 483, November 28, 10 a.m., and the
 Department's 277, November 28, 7 p.m.

The Department notes from your telegram under refer-
 ence that the Chinese Foreign Minister informed you that
 on November 26 the Chinese Ambassador at Washington had
 informed the Department that the attitude of China toward
 the temporary arrangement with Japan under tentative con-
 sideration at that time was QUOTE negative UNQUOTE. You
 will have observed from the Department's telegram under
 reference reporting *inter alia* the Chinese Ambassador's
 conversation with the Secretary on November 25 that
 China's attitude was made known to this Government and to
 various circles in Washington through various channels
 and through telegrams to several individuals.

The Secretary of State, whenever he has discussed
 with the Chinese Ambassador the matter of the current
 conversations with the Japanese, has made it plain that

Enciphered by _____
 Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

711.54/2487
 PS/WHA
 Confidential File

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

-2-

Washington

we have made no sacrifice of principles; that we expect to make none; that we have aided China; that we expect to continue to do so to the best of our ability; and that, should matters which concern China come up for discussion, we expect to consult with the Chinese Government at some appropriate stage.

As reported in your telegram under reference the Chinese Foreign Minister described frankly and with force the psychological effects on the Chinese public and the Chinese will to continue resistance which might be expected should there be adopted an arrangement such as the modus vivendi we had under consideration at that time. It will be recalled that the Generalissimo in his recent message to the President and the Prime Minister of England also spoke frankly and forcefully of the psychological effects of a successful Japanese invasion of Yunnan Province. As you were informed in the Department's telegram under reference the Secretary of State in speaking to the Chinese Ambassador on November 25 pointed out that one of the prime points of the draft temporary modus vivendi which this Government was then tentatively considering was to protect Yunnan Province and the Burma

Enclosed by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ P. _____

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Washington,

§ Road from the imminent danger described by the Generalissimo and in addition to ^{sustain} remove the Japanese menace, for at least three months, to the whole South Pacific area and the Philippines.

In his conversation with you the Chinese Foreign Minister described serious and difficult internal and external problems of China. This Government is not unaware of those problems and we believe that the Chinese Government is also aware of many serious and difficult problems facing us and other similarly disposed powers such as Great Britain and the Netherlands.

We have on many appropriate occasions ^{around} and we may now again assure China that in these trying and difficult days its interests have been and are being given most careful consideration in our study of our own problems and of the problems of other nations and peoples.

It may be noted that there have occurred recently several examples of ~~the~~ badly confused mechanics for the conduct of diplomatic relations between the governments resisting aggression. Those relations are so complicated

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Sent by operator _____ M. _____ P. _____

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER Collect (Full rate) (Day letter) (Night letter) Charge Department Full rate Day letter Night letter Charge is	TELEGRAM SENT Department of State -4-	TO BE TRANSMITTED CONFIDENTIAL CODE NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE PARTIAL PLAIN
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Washington,

5 that it is most difficult to carry on such relations in
 a systematic and sound manner. There have for example been
 examples of intrusion into delicate and serious situations
 on the part of individuals who are not completely or adequately
 informed of the facts. Before taking action of any sort
 it would seem to be advisable to understand completely
 each other's views. Each of the nations resisting the
 courses of aggression now rampant in the world should
 endeavor to realize that the other nations are in the
 light of all considerations ^{endeavoring to pursue} ~~the~~ the best possible
 course ^{and} and it therefore would seem to be desirable for each
 such nation to continue a resolute course in the present
 critical world situation.

You are authorized, if a favorable opportunity
 presents itself, to make ^{and} use of the foregoing ~~document~~
 or portions thereof, providing you believe that it
 might be helpful in ^{connecting on} ~~presenting~~ the points raised by the
 Foreign Minister as reported in your telegram under reference.

FRANKS:MES:MEW JMD PA/H H. L.
722 [Signature] [Signature]

Enclosed by _____
 Sent by messenger _____ M. _____ 19____

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

EXHIBIT NO. 169

SELECTION OF

STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THAILAND.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. State Department Information Bulletin No. 132 dated Aug. 6, 1941, concerning statement made by Secretary Hull that date at a press conference on subject of Thailand.
2. Dispatch dated Aug. 7, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning the Secretary's press conference of Aug. 6, 1941.
3. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 7, 1941, between the Thai Minister and M. M. Hamilton concerning "American press reports in regard to Government's attitude toward developments relating to Thailand."
4. Dispatch dated Aug. 8, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning item No. 3 above.
5. Dispatch dated Aug. 8, 1941, from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department concerning reaction in Thailand official quarters to statement by Secretary Hull on Aug. 6, 1941.
6. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 12, 1941, between the Thai Minister and M. M. Hamilton concerning "Thai Government's desire to obtain expression of the attitude of the American Government toward Thailand."
7. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 14, 1941, between the Thai Minister and Mr. Peck concerning "Request of Thailand for permission to purchase arms in the United States."
8. Dispatch dated Aug. 15, 1941, from U. S. Minister Foote, Batavia, to State Department concerning British reports of position of U. S. and British relation to Netherlands East Indies and Thailand.
9. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 18, 1941, between Secretary of State and the Thai Minister concerning "Attitude of U. S. Government toward Thailand in event of Japanese attack".
10. Dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning aid to Thailand.
11. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 4, 1941, between British Minister Sir Ronald Campbell and Under Secretary Sumner Welles concerning "Situation in Thailand."
12. Dispatch dated Nov. 6, 1941, from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department, concerning aid for Thailand.
13. Memorandum by S. K. Hornbeck concerning Aide Memoire handed to British Minister Sir Ronald Campbell on Nov. 6, 1941, and the attached Aide Memoire concerning material aid for Thailand.
14. Dispatch dated Nov. 11, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, requesting inquiry on Thailand's petroleum requirements.
15. Dispatch dated Nov. 18, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning military aid to Thailand.
16. Dispatch dated Nov. 22, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning policy of this Government toward assistance to Thailand in the event she should be invaded.
17. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 22, 1941, between First Secretary of British Embassy and Mr. Smyth concerning "Reported request of Japanese for use of Thai airdromes for 'survey flights'".
18. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 25, 1941, between the British Ambassador and Under Secretary Sumner Welles concerning "Aid to Thailand by Thailand."
19. State Department Radio Bulletin No. 280 dated Nov. 26, 1941, concerning press conference of Secretary Hull that date and information furnished to press concerning the delivery of the so-called "Ten point note" to Japanese Ambassadors.
20. Dispatch dated Nov. 27, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning the withdrawal of nationals from Pacific area.
21. Memorandum dated Nov. 27, 1941, of conversation between the Thai Minister and Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams, concerning the Minister's inquiry into press reports of the note handed the Japanese Ambassadors on Nov. 26, 1941 by Secretary Hull.

22. State Department Radio Bulletin No. 282 dated Nov. 28, 1941, which relates briefly the President's Press Conference of that date at which he mentioned the U. S.-Japanese negotiations.
23. Memorandum of Conversation dated November 28, 1941, between the Thai Minister and Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Smyth concerning "Aid to Thailand."
24. Dispatch dated Nov. 28, 1941, from U. S. Minister, Bangkok to State Department concerning radio speech by Thai Prime Minister on Nov. 27, 1941.
25. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 29, 1941, between the Thai Minister and Mr. Smyth concerning "Thailand's treaties with Great Britain and Japan."
26. Memorandum of Conversation dated Dec. 1, 1941 between the Thai Minister, the Thai Military Attache and Mr. Adams and Mr. Smyth concerning "Aid to Thailand."
27. Dispatch dated Dec. 2, 1941 from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning talks with Japanese.
28. Dispatch dated Dec. 2, 1941 from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok and attached dispatch of same date to American Consul, Singapore, concerning contemplated aid to Thailand in concurrence with British in form of aviation petroleum products.
29. Dispatch dated Dec. 3, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok to State Department reporting conference he had with Thai Foreign Minister concerning recent Japanese attitude toward Thailand and assistance offered by British and U. S.
30. Dispatch dated Dec. 4, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department concerning his conversation that morning with Thai Foreign Minister who said the Thai Government hoped the American and British Governments would issue public statements that Japanese invasion of Thailand would incur armed resistance of those two countries in addition to Thailand's.
31. Dispatch dated Dec. 5, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department relating conversation between Thai Foreign Minister and Japanese Ambassador concerning Japanese forces in Indochina.
32. Dispatch dated Dec. 6, 1941 from Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, to State Department reporting rumor regarding proposed occupation of Thailand by British.
33. Dispatch dated Dec. 6, 1941 from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok concerning credit extension to Thailand.
34. Memorandum of Conversation dated Dec. 7, 1941 between First Secretary, British Embassy and Mr. George Atcheson concerning "Reported desire of the Thai Government that British forces not move into Thailand."
35. Dispatch dated Dec. 7, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department reporting Japanese attack on Thailand.
36. Dispatch dated Dec. 8, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department reporting the agreement of Thai Government to allow Japanese passage through Thailand for their troops in order to attack Burma and Malaya, and related matters.

(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
Division of Current Information No. 132

COUNTRY JAPAN

DATE Aug. 6, 1941

Subject: Increasing indications that Japan is making demands on Thailand; statement in House of Commons by Mr. Eden that anything that threatens Thailand was of immediate interest to Great Britain

At the press conference today Secretary Hull said:

THAILAND

A correspondent remarked that there are increasing indications that Japan is making demands on Thailand. He said that Mr. Eden stated today in the House of Commons that anything that threatens the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Great Britain, and he inquired if the Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy. The Secretary replied that he believed we have many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain countries and that this has included the Pacific area. He said that we have made very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He stated that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion to give the press a statement on that general question as it relates to the Pacific area and that he might refer to the fact that prior to giving out that statement Mr. Welles read to the press his own (the Secretary's) statement of the issues that were presented when he himself appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the Lease Lend Bill last January and that he need not repeat those things here. Asked if the Secretary could say whether this Government had had occasion to express any views to the Government of Thailand concerning the present crisis there, Mr. Hull replied that he could not go into details now because it is not at a stage where he could be very definite on account of the many angles to the matter. A correspondent

remarked that certain steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he asked if it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it is fair to have increasing concern about any movement which would include the step to which the correspondent refers. A correspondent asked if the press could infer that this Government has increasing concern over events out there. Mr. Hull replied that this is what he was trying to say and that anything that Mr. Welles said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would have a special application to Thailand in the present situation. A correspondent inquired if there have been some indications that Thailand has been offered what amounted to a protectorate over Malaya as well as Indochina so that the Japanese would have a protectorate similar to that of the British Commonwealth of Nations over Canada. Mr. Hull replied that we had not been advised on that subject. He said, of course, as the press knew, there had been a multiplicity of rumors and reports coming out of that area lately and that there are many angles to different and important phases of the situation, all of which we are observing as closely as possible.

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PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

Washington,

August 7, 1941

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AMLEGATION,
BANGKOK.

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There is repeated for your information an extract from the radio bulletin of August 5, 1941 in regard to my press conference of that date as follows:

QUOTE A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered whether the Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we had many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain countries, and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we had made very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He pointed out that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion to give the correspondents a statement on that

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Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

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general question as it related to the Pacific area.

Asked if he could say whether this Government had had occasion to express any views to the Government of Thailand concerning the present crisis out there, Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now because it was not at a stage where he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired whether it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it was fair to have increasing concern about a movement that would include the step to which the correspondent referred.

Asked if the correspondents could infer that this Government has increasing concern about events over there, the Secretary said that that was what he was trying to say. He added that anything that Mr. Welles had said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would have a special application to Thailand and the present situation. UNQUOTE.

Sent by operator DL Ed.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRSDATE: August 7,
1941.SUBJECT: American press reports in regard to this
Government's attitude toward developments
relating to ThailandPARTICIPANTS: The Thai Minister
and
Mr. Hamilton

COPIES TO:



The Thai Minister called this afternoon at his request. He said that he had noted reports in the press last evening and again this morning in regard to matters relating to his country; and that, in as much his Government was very busy, at times it did not take occasion to inform him of current developments. The Minister then said that he wished us to know that, if there should be any items of information which we would wish to bring to his attention, he was constantly available and would be glad to come to the Department at any time for that purpose. I inquired whether the Minister had anything particular in mind. He replied in rather general terms and said that he was not in position to make an express inquiry

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inquiry in as much as he had received no instructions from his Government. After some general remarks I mentioned that we would of course be glad to inform him at any time upon request of exactly what the Secretary may have said at a press conference. The Minister then indicated eagerness to be informed of what the Secretary had said yesterday which had formed the basis of many stories in the American press.

I told the Minister that I had anticipated that he might wish to inquire in regard to the basis for the stories in the press and that I had at hand the record of what the Secretary had said at his press conferences yesterday and today. I then gave the Minister orally the substance of an extract from the Radio Bulletin of August 8, as follows:

"A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered whether the Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we had many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain countries, and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we had made very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He pointed out that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion to give the correspondents a statement on that general question as it related to the Pacific area.

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"Asked if he could say whether this Government had had occasion to express any views to the Government of Thailand concerning the present crisis out there, Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now because it was not at a stage where he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired whether it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it was fair to have increasing concern about a movement that would include the step to which the correspondent referred.

"Asked if the correspondents could infer that this Government has increasing concern about events over there, the Secretary said that that was what he was trying to say. He added that anything that Mr. Welles had said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would have a special application to Thailand and the present situation."

I then informed the Minister that at the Secretary's press conference today the Secretary had been asked whether he had anything to say in regard to newspaper reports that the American and the British Governments had already promised Thailand aid if it should resist Japanese aggression; that the Secretary had replied that he did not have anything especially in mind on that subject; and that, when the Secretary had been pressed to confirm whether or not we had made such a communication to the Thai Government, the Secretary had replied that he did not know of any such communication.

I added that the Thai Minister of course was fully aware of the general attitude and policy of this Government in regard to countries which were resisting attack


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by forces of aggression. I mentioned that there was a country nearby to Thailand, namely, China, which was a good illustration of the attitude and policy pursued by this country in this respect.

The Minister seemed very appreciative of my having given him an account of what the Secretary had said at his press conferences yesterday and today in regard to Thailand.

W. W. H.

FE:10AR:HES



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
 OF THAILAND

RECEIVED
 AUGUST 11 1941
 1:40 P.M.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
 OF THAILAND

RECEIVED
 AUGUST 11 1941
 1:40 P.M.

400, August 8, 5 p.m.

My telegram to, 400, August 7, 2 p.m.

The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in a conversation today said that the statement of Secretary Hall in Washington regarding any Japanese move against Thailand which was received yesterday through the Thai Minister to Washington and through press releases in Bangkok was received in official circles. He indicated that both the Prime Minister and himself were much pleased. He expressed the hope that more positive action by the American Government would follow. I then reiterated my informal statement of yesterday as indicated in my telegram above to the effect that I believe the Japanese are now bluffing and that the Thai should resist the Japanese pressure by doing some bluffing on their own. He again received the suggestion most cordially and requested me to say this to the Prime Minister who has (*) no to see him tomorrow.

GRANT

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 (*) Apparent omission.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

DATE: August 29, 1941 *FE*

SUBJECT: Thai Government's desire to obtain an expression of the attitude of the American Government toward Thailand

PARTICIPANTS: *yes*
 Nong Rajawongse Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister
 Mr. Hamilton

COPIES TO:

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 FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS
 AUG 31 1941
 Department of State

The Thai Minister called this afternoon at his request. He said that he came on an important matter and under instruction from his Government. He stated that his Government had directed him to approach the Department with a view to obtaining an indication of this Government's attitude toward Thailand in the present international situation. He said that the Thai Government had, during the past few weeks when attention was centered on his country, made clear through a statement by the Thai Publicity Bureau -- which statement his Government had instructed him to confirm to us -- that the Thai Government desired to remain on friendly terms with all countries but that the Thai Government would, if Thailand should be attacked

by seas

by some other country, defend itself against such attack. The Minister said that his Government was gratefully appreciative of the statements made by Mr. Hall in reference to Thailand during his recent press conference.

The Minister said that if I felt that it would be preferable that he call on the Secretary in regard to this matter, he would of course be glad to do so. I commented that that was my initial reaction. I said that I would like, however, to discuss the matter with higher officers of the Department, after which I would expect to get in touch with him.

I then continued that of course the Minister was fully familiar with the attitude of this country toward Thailand. I referred to the fact that the Thai Government had been the first Far Eastern Government with which the American Government had entered into treaty relations many decades ago. I stated also that since that time there had been a long record of friendship between our two peoples and our two Governments; that some months ago when we thought that the Thai Government was following a dangerous course we had frankly told the Thai Government that we thought it was "playing with fire"; and that, as I had stated to the Minister only a few days ago, the attitude and policy of this Government toward ceasing material assistance to countries which were resisting aggression

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were well known. I reminded the Minister that at that time I had said that a country nearby to Thailand, namely, China, furnished a good illustration of the way in which there was applied this country's policy of extending aid to countries resisting aggression.

The Minister said that he interpreted the instruction from his Government, although the instruction did not expressly so state, to mean that the Thai Government desired to ascertain whether, in the event that Thailand should be attacked and should resist that attack, the Government of the United States would extend material assistance to Thailand.

I said again that I would take this matter up with higher officers of the Department and would then expect to communicate further with the Minister.

McMillan:GMP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DATE: August 14, 1941


SUBJECT: Request of Thailand for permission to purchase arms in the United States

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. Rajawongse Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister
 Mr. Peck

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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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1941 AUG 19 PM 1 07



The Thai Minister called to see Mr. Hamilton, but since the latter was engaged, he asked to see Mr. Peck. The Minister recalled, for the information of Mr. Peck, that he had called on August 12 to inform Mr. Hamilton that he had just received a telegram from his Government which pointed out that the Thai Government had formally announced its intention of resisting with force any armed aggression that might be attempted against Thailand. On the basis of this declaration, the Thai Government inquired what the attitude of the American Government would be toward Thailand if such armed aggression should, in fact, take place; particularly, would the American Government render any assistance to the Thai Government in this emergency?

The

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The Minister said that Mr. Hamilton had outlined to him the American Government's attitude and policy toward rendering assistance to countries which were resisting aggression, and Mr. Hamilton had instanced the aid that the United States is giving to China. The Minister said further that Mr. Hamilton had indicated, before an authoritative reply could be given to the Thai Government's inquiry, he would wish to lay the matter before higher authorities of the Government.

The Minister said that today he had received another telegram from his Government which, in the gravity of its tone, indicated that a critical state had been reached in respect of the threat of invasion. His Government urged him to spare no effort to obtain an expression of the views of the American Government in this situation.

Reverting to his conversation two days ago with Mr. Hamilton, the Minister said that from the circumstance that Mr. Hamilton referred to American assistance to China, he inferred that Mr. Hamilton had in mind assistance of the Lend-Lease variety. Assuming this to be the case, the Minister wished to say that the Thai Government was not asking for armament on credit, but was prepared to make purchases on a commercial basis. The early acquisition of
the arms

-3-

the arms it sought was of the utmost importance to the Thai Government, which, at present, is poorly supplied with equipment. Consequently, the Thai Government would be very grateful to learn how soon, if the American Government could make arms available for purchase, shipments could be arranged and could begin.

The Minister said that, speaking as man to man, the Thais were traditionally suspicious of Japan; he personally felt that in the recent contact with Japan his country had "played with fire", but he trusted that Mr. Peck understood the background of the matter.

The Minister observed, as his own personal reaction to recent news, that the large number of troops dispatched by Japan into Indochina was an ominous sign. The Japanese must have been aware that they would meet with no resistance in Indochina, which was under the control of Vichy and hence of Germany, and these forces must be intended for use elsewhere. Mr. Peck remarked that the newspapers suggested they might be intended for use against Malaya. The Minister replied that the Japanese, in his opinion, would never dare to make an attack on Malaya without previously occupying Thailand, because to do so would be to leave their flank open to attack from Burma. He deduced that these forces were intended for the occupation of Thailand and that the danger to Thailand was accordingly imminent and serious.

The fact

-4-

The fact of the matter now is that Thailand is determined to maintain its independence, if it can possibly find the means of doing so. In this emergency the Thai Government is anxiously waiting to learn the nature of the reply that the American Government will give to the inquiry transmitted on August 12.

Mr. Peck said that he would report to Mr. Hamilton at once the observations made by the Thai Minister.

MHP
FE:Peck:MHP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Netherlands

Dated August 12, 1941

U. S. EMBASSY OFFICE

DEC 22 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
AUG 13 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State

Washington

111, August 12, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

One. In a telegram dated August 6 addressed to the
Governor General of the Netherlands Indies Mr. Welter,
Minister of Colonies, said that the British Foreign
Minister had made the following statement to the
Netherlands Minister at London:

"We have assumed the duties of safeguarding and
restoring the possessions and rights of the Netherlands
Government to the best of our ability during the war
and after peace. It follows therefore that an attack
upon the Netherlands Indies would lead us to do the
utmost in our power. We must, however, remain sole
judge of what actions or military measures are practi-
cable and likely to achieve our common purpose. Should
the United States of America be disposed to take
supporting action many things would become possible
which we cannot undertake now."

Two.

AUG 28 1941

FILED

PS/H

720.001 P.W./444

RECEIVED
U. S. EMBASSY OFFICE
AUG 13 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

-2- 111, August 18, noon, from Batavia.

Two. Mr. Custer then addressed the following message to the Governor General:

On a question in relation to this statement Eden confirmed that in the event of an attack by Japan the British Empire will back us up completely. The Declaration of the British Government can be considered satisfactory politically but it is disappointing from a strategical point of view. On the eighth instant a conference will be held with Eden to discuss the possibility of drawing up another formula in which the proposed staff discussions come automatically into action, since it has become clear now that the United States and England will not resist Japanese occupation of Thailand with force of arms. It is also brought to your attention that any guarantee or certainty of United States participation by force of arms is absolutely excluded."

Three. While the general public has no knowledge of the above quoted telegram it has been circulated rather freely among high officials where it has aroused varying degrees of gloom, pessimism, and some bitter feeling against the United States.

FOOTE.

NPL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: AUGUST 18, 1961.

SUBJECT: **ATTITUDE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT TOWARD THAILAND IN EVENT OF JAPANESE ATTACK.**

**PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE MINISTER OF THAILAND,
MON RAJANONGSE SINT PRAMOJ.**

COPIES TO:

SEP 17 1941

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

23-194

A circular ink stamp from the Department of State, Office of Political Relations. The text "OFFICE OF POLITICAL RELATIONS" is curved along the top inner edge, and "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is curved along the bottom inner edge. In the center, the date "AUG 18 1941" is stamped. A handwritten checkmark is visible above the date, and the number "24" is handwritten to the right of the date.

The Minister of Thailand called by mutual agreement. He had previously had a conference with Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division, in which he discussed the purpose of his call to see me. (Reference is made to the record of Mr. Hamilton's conversation of August 12, 1941.)

The Minister said that pressure had been brought to bear on his Government in connection with rubber and perhaps one or two other commodities; that the troops of Japan have been moved up to a point on the new border between Thailand and Indochina just opposite and overlooking Bangkok. He was of the opinion that their first objective is to go south and attack Singapore. He said that the largest military forces are opposite Bangkok

2004

and that the Navy and all of their military craft with few exceptions are stationed at Saigon. He believes that the Japanese will probably first move south and later against Hanoi in order to destroy the French East Colonial.

The Minister indicated that pressure on his Government was more and more threatening and that no one could tell what day or what hour Japanese troops and other forces might move into his country. He said that his Government had announced that it was neutral and friendly towards every country, but that if it should be attacked it would defend itself as best as it possibly could. He then stated that his real interest in calling on me was to ascertain what the attitude of this Government would be towards his country in case it should be attacked and endeavor in good faith to defend itself. I repeated to him what Mr. Hamilton had said concerning the long friendship existing between our two countries and about the probability of Japanese intervention by force at any time despite agreements and understandings to the contrary. I stated that we have ascertained this by experience with them in the Chinese invasion and in other instances; and that they are unquestionably out on a rampage of invasion by force, the seizure of any and all weaker countries, and the placing of them under a military

-3-

military despotism, which would dominate their political, economic, commercial and other affairs and interests and which would channel straight to Tokyo the cream of all benefits, advantages and gains.

I reminded the Minister that we have been aiding China against the aggression of Japan--aiding her in many ways--and that we would place Thailand in the same category; that I have already more than once expressed the serious concern of this country with reference to threatened Japanese intervention. I then added that in aiding all countries subjected to aggression and intervention by force, especially by countries like Germany and Japan, we do the very best possible to distribute such aid where it will be most effective. I said that we are increasing our production fairly rapidly and that the State Department will be glad to contact the officials in charge of the defense program and inform them of the needs and desires of Thailand. I finally said that I would be glad to have the Minister call at any time for the purpose of exchanging information about the situation. He remarked that Thailand had the money to pay for the material that they would like to purchase in the United States.

S:CHAMMAN

G.N.

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER Collect: ☐ Full rate ☐ Day letter ☐ Night letter Charge Department: ☐ Full rate ☐ Day letter ☐ Night letter Charge to: \$ _____	TELEGRAM SENT Department of State Washington, November 3, 1941	TO BE TRANSMITTED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE H. C. H. PARTIAL PLAIN
--	---	--

ACCESSION,

BANGKOK (THAILAND).

Your 495, October 29, 10 a.m.

The Department is particularly interested in the statement made to you by the British Minister that planes could be sent to Thailand from Singapore. The Department was on the point of informing the British Embassy, in reply to an inquiry, that it favored the sending of planes from Singapore, but ^{that} ^{on our part} ~~the~~ reply has been held up pending consideration of ~~other matters~~ ^{matters.} related to the ~~question of assistance to Thailand~~.

H. C. H.

RLS
FE:RLS:LJH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

WA
FE

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NOV 3 PM 5 28

RECEIVED STATE

1-1000 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 4, 1941

SUBJECT: Situation in Thailand.

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Ronald Campbell, British Minister;
Mr. Welles, Under Secretary.

COPIES TO: S, A-B, PA/H, FE, Bu



892.24

Sir Ronald Campbell called to see me this morning at his request.

He inquired whether this Government could as yet give the British Government a reply to the communication he had left with me a few days ago regarding the situation in Thailand.

I told the Minister that I had assumed that a reply had already been made to him by Dr. Hornbeck in as much as I had approved a draft reply some days ago and that it was my understanding that the Secretary of State had likewise approved this draft. I then called Dr. Hornbeck on the telephone who told me that the delivery of the reply had been held up owing to the information which had reached us last Saturday from Chungking relating to

FM 892.24/83 1/2

PS/AML

NOV 12 1941

-2-

anticipated attack by the Japanese by way of Indochina on Yunnan.

I consequently told Sir Ronald that certain questions of an urgent character involving China as well as Thailand had arisen just as Dr. Hornbeck was about to give the reply of this Government to the British Embassy, and that for the time being, therefore, our reply would have to be postponed.

Sir Ronald said he fully understood the circumstances.

LS

U:SW:IJ

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TK Bangkok
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (C). FROM Rec'd 9:10 p.m.

Dated November 5, 1941.

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT.

504, November 6, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

Department's 137, November 3, 10 p.m.

One. Both the British Minister and I, in
 suggesting that 24 fighter planes be transferred
 to Thailand from Singapore, had in mind their
 replacement from the United States. I have asked
 the Naval Attaché now in Singapore to report
 whether surplus planes exist there.

Two. I venture to suggest below factors
 relevant to a consideration of American policy
 with respect to Thailand. Whatever may have
 been the Thai feeling toward Japan during the
 Indochina incident, the Government and people
 now undoubtedly dread and desire to escape
 Japanese domination in any form. Following the
 Japanese move into Southern Indochina in July,
 a policy of reticence was adopted and the Govern-
 ment was (4) in this by press reports of August 6
 and 7, quoting the Secretary of State's declaration



892.24/03

PS/AD

APR 27 1942

FILED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MA

Bangkok

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

November 6, 1941

Rec'd 9:56 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

504, November 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Siam has been of considerable advantage to the United States and Great Britain because if Japan had acquired a dominant position in this country it would have had a favorable position from which to negotiate for seaports and airfields and to obstruct American and British access to the tin and rubber resources here. If Thailand had in any important particular during recent months sided with Japan as the self styled champion of Asia against American and British Imperialism the benefit to Japan's program would have been immense. As things stand Great Britain has been left undisturbed in control of three fourths of the tin output and our joint rubber purchases begun ^{October} ~~September~~ 18 are proceeding at the rate of over 3,000 tons monthly. Our extensive missionary enterprises are continuing without the molestation they have encountered in Japanese controlled areas. The military implications

PECK

BTM

TO
This telegram is to be
closely guarded and not
for release or distribution
to anyone. (C)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

November 4, 1941
10:00 P.M.

FROM
Secretary of State,
Washington.

SUBJECT

5:4, November 4, 8 P.M. (SECTION FOUR)
of a possible Japanese domination of this country
whether acquired by intimidation or invasion seem
to concern us in a general way because of the possible
advantage to Japanese strategy and in particular as
threatening American aid to Thailand through Burma
but on the whole military considerations concern Great
Britain more than the United States. The United States
during the progress of hostilities is under no specific
obligation to assist Thailand to maintain its independ-
ence whatever may be our future obligations under general
pronouncements once victory over aggression is achieved.
Three. I have been informed of the purport of
reply from the British Government to the inquiry of
the Thai Prime Minister concerning British intended
action in the event of a Japanese invasion. Apparently
this draft can be reduced to an undertaking to give
Thailand aviation gasoline and lubricating oil for military
purposes at once, the . .

HTM

PECK

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Bangkok

Dated November 6, 1941

Rec'd 10:04 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT

504, November 6, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

36 pieces of artillery over a period of about nine months and a promise to occupy Southern Thailand with armed forces when the invasion takes place in the north. Disregarding other considerations this seems a small return to make for the practical advantages we are receiving and for the risk Thailand is incurring through repudiation of Japanese overtures. If it could be done it would certainly be preferable to preserve this country as a political and military entity rather than to envisage partition of the country as a temporary expedient. Moreover, it happens that the British owned tin mines and all the rubber plantations are in the south and if they were saved and the bulk of the country abandoned to Japan a hostile propaganda would allege this to be proof of our merely selfish aims in the Orient.

Four. Indochina and Thailand will be dry and

PECK

HTM

MA
This telegram MUST BE FROM
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

URGENT

Suitable for military activities from January to April inclusive. Presumably bombing and parachute attacks could take place at any time. In the meantime those leaders who support a policy of independence in this country must fight the councils of dependency and of expediency. In China Japan has overwhelmed areas and armies many times greater than those of Thailand. No amount of supplies given country or courage on its own part could guarantee successful resistance to a determined Japanese assault. But the public and private utterances of officials here incline us strongly to believe that if we assist the Government to acquire the aviation gasoline, lubricating oil, and fighter planes for which it is pressing there will be no surrender until forcible resistance has been tried and has

PECK

STIM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HA Bangkok
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased by FROM Dated November 3, 1941
 from being communicated
 to anyone. (C) Rec'd 8:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

304, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN).

Failed. This will give us valuable receipts
 to prepare for further developments. If the Japanese
 were to be convinced not only that invasion would be
 opposed by Thailand with force but would meet with
 serious retaliation from the United States and Great
 Britain there is strong probability that the studied
 invasion would be abandoned altogether. I venture
 the further suggestion that if our attempt to pre-
 vent Japan's southward expansion were inspired by
 the aim of preserving the independence of Thailand
 as well as saving our own possessions the cause of
 democracy would derive greater advantage from the
 effort than otherwise since this dual purpose would
 convince the people of Asiatic countries that we are
 champions of their liberty.

(END OF MESSAGE).

PECK

RTM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY
LIAISON OFFICE

November 18, 1941.

✓ FE - Mr. Hamilton:

This subject was discussed at the
Liaison Meeting held on November 12.

The consensus of opinion was that if any
action concerning these planes should be
taken, the initiative should come from
the British without any urging from the
United States.




U-L:OWilson:WLB


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

November 8, 1941

U-L
Mr. Wilson: ✓

Please put this on
the agenda for the next
meeting of the Liaison
Committee.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 7,
1941.

U
Mr. Welles:

It seems to me that the question of planes for Thailand has reached a point where the only way to get forward with the matter is to have it considered by high officers of the War and Navy Departments along with officers of this Department. I therefore suggest that you may care to discuss this with General Marshall and with Admiral Stark.

U - LIAISON OFFICE
NOV 8 - 1941
892.24/38 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FE:MMH:HES

NOV 7 1941

MR. WELLES

STATE DEPARTMENT
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Reference is made to the meeting at which the British, the
 American and the Japanese representatives met on November 10,
 and especially to the discussion of the question of the
 supply of oil to Japan.

In passing to the question of the supply of oil to
 Japan, I stated that the supply of oil contained in
 the British Government's interest was not an end in
 itself, but a means to an end, and that the British
 Government, and Sir Ronald Campbell's Department,
 of the question of the supply of oil to Japan. I stated that it seemed
 to me that as a matter of practical procedure and of political
 practicability, it would be more feasible for the British
 than for us to put planes into Thailand. I stated also
 that in either case the planes would be American planes.
 The British would get them from Thailand more quickly
 and with less publicity than would we.

In the light of developments in Indochina and of the
 approach made to us by Chiang Kai-shek, the pressure both
 upon this country and upon the British of supplying aid
 to China is increased. It seems to me that at this moment
 it is highly desirable that we and the British make a
 special and extra effort to remember the morale and the
 capacity to resist of both the Chinese and the Thai. In
 both cases the maximum of advantage would flow from direct
 supplying

supplying of planes to the British, with the indirect supplying of us. This might be effected by a conclusion of an arrangement whereby we might undertake that for every plane which the British supply from Singapore or Burma or India we will send to the British one or more planes by way of replacement.

It is of course a fact that for each plane that we send to the Far Eastern and Indian Ocean theaters, we send one less plane to the European and Mediterranean theaters. However, the number called for in order to produce certain psychological and military effects in the Far Eastern situation is small and the potential advantages of such investments in that area are large.

There would be warrant for urging upon the British a release of some planes from Singapore even if it could not be arranged that replacement would be made immediately from this country. We have been placing substantial air forces at Manila, and every plane that we send there contributes substantially toward increasing the security of Singapore. In the light of the combined British, Dutch and American preparations of the past few months in the general area under consideration, the likelihood of a Japanese attack upon Singapore or the Malay Peninsula has been greatly diminished. At this point the British might well move
planes

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
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planes

-3-

planes from Singapore into China and into Thailand, with some arrangement for a recall in certain eventualities, without great risk so far as Singapore is concerned (but, of course, with substantial risk so far as Hong Kong is concerned).

PA/HISKE:FLD





~~PA/H~~ ~~Dr. Hornbeck~~

FE - Mr. Hamilton:

I concur entirely in the views set forth in the suggested memorandum to the British Embassy. I suggest that this be given to the Secretary to read and if he concurs, that Dr. Hornbeck ask Sir Ronald Campbell to come in, and hand him the reply as drafted.



U:SW:IJ

REMARKS OF SENATOR

REMARKS

Reference is made to the conference, April 24-25, 1941, held with the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Keenan, on October 27, by the British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, in regard to the situation of Thailand and to the question of making available war materials to the Government of Thailand.

For some weeks it has been the policy of the Government of the United States to give sympathetic consideration to priority and export applications filed on behalf of the Thai Government and, whenever practicable in the face of the very great and urgent demands from other areas upon this country's production, to take favorable action upon such applications.

On August 15 the Secretary of State, in reply to the Thai Minister's oral inquiry as to the attitude of this Government toward Thailand in case Thailand should

602.33 / 81

PS/DG

in personnel and materiel in great haste to defend itself, mentioning that the United States has been aiding China in such ways against the aggression of Japan and that in the contingency mentioned this Government would place Thailand in the same category as China.

With regard to the proposal of the British Government to offer to release to the Thai Government certain weapons and field guns with accompanying ammunition conditional on the acceptance by the Thai Government of a number of military instructors, question is raised whether a stipulation that the Thai Government accept military instructors might not be interpreted by the Japanese Government as contrary to the political accord between the Japanese Government and the Thai Government arrived at in connection with the Japanese Government's mediation of the Thai-French Indochinese border controversy, and thus serve as a pretext to the Japanese Government for the exertion of additional pressure upon Thailand.

With regard to the question of aircraft, information has been received that the American Naval and

Military

-3-

Military Attaches at Bangkok are under the impression that there may be certain airplanes at Singapore in excess of the number which can, with the trained pilots available there, be used to advantage. The suggestion is offered that the British may wish to consider the release to Thailand of a number of these planes. Should that be not practicable, there is offered the further suggestion that, if the British Government, after weighing its own needs and the needs of Thailand and taking into account all political and military factors, should decide to make available to Thailand from planes being supplied to it from this country a certain number of planes, this Government would be agreeable to such an arrangement.

With regard to the question of aviation gasoline and lubricating oil for the Thai air force, this matter is being looked into and we shall expect to make reply on this point in the near future.

Department of State,

Washington,

FE:VIA/JOH:HEE
10-28

FE
7/14/47

PA/H

3742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NOVEMBER 11, 1941.
1 p. m.

Amlegation
Bangkok (Thailand).
145

Confidential

Department's 137, November 3, 10 p. m. and 141, November 6, 1941, 6 p. m. to you.

In connection with consideration which the Department is giving to the question of making available to Thailand certain supplies, the Department requests that you endeavor discreetly to obtain information in regard to specifications and quantities of aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil that might reasonably be made available to the Thai air force under present circumstances. In sending to the Department your report and any recommendation which you may feel in a position to make, you should bear in mind the circumstance that, because of great and increasing demands upon this country's production of high octane gasoline, careful disposition of available supplies is imperative.

(SKH)

HULL.

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER		TO BE TRANSMITTED XCONFIDENTIAL CODE X NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE	
Full rate Collect Day letter Night letter	TELEGRAM SENT		PARTIAL PLAIN
Charge Department: Full rate Day letter Night letter	Department of State		"Brown"
Charge to \$	Washington,		November 18, 1941
ALLEGATION,		4 P. M.	
BANGKOK.		154	
Your 508, November 8, 1 p.m.		Bn	
The Department has given this matter the most serious consideration and has explored every possibility of making available to the Thai Ministry of Defense the desired anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and ammunition. It is very much regretted, however, that it has been found impossible to spare any of these guns or ammunition, ^{at this moment} in view of the tremendous needs of our own defense program as well as the very urgent needs for such materials in other areas.			
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Hull 82			
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RLS PE:RLS:MBW			
Enclosed by			
Sent by operator M. B.			
10-200 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE			

NOV 24 1941

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N

NOVEMBER 22, 1941.

3 p. m.

Amlegation
Bangkok
153.

Your 520, November 15, 2 p. m. and previous messages in regard to assistance for Thailand.

One. The Department has on several occasions informed the Thai Minister in regard to the policy of the United States of extending assistance to countries resisting aggression and has stated to him that in the event that Thailand should be invaded and should endeavor in good faith to defend itself, the United States Government would place Thailand in the same category as China.

The question of supplying planes to Thailand has been under active consideration by this Government and by the British Government. An officer of the British Embassy informed the Department November 18 that in view of the serious demands on British resources, the British Government was unable to supply any planes at the present time and that it was doubted whether bombing or fighting planes would be supplied from other sources, although inquiries were being made. The United States Government has also explored every possibility of supplying planes to Thailand, but it has been found impossible to spare any planes for Thailand at this moment in view of the tremendous demands of our own defense program as well as the urgent needs for planes by countries now actively resisting aggression.

The question of supplying aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil to Thailand (your telegram no. 518, November 14, 7 p. m.) has also been under active consideration by the United States and British Governments. In a recent instruction to the British Minister at Bangkok, the British Foreign Office stated that the British Government was prepared at once to furnish limited amounts of aviation gasoline sufficient for the current requirements of the Thai air force. The appropriate authorities of the United States Government are now endeavoring to arrange for the supply of aviation lubricating oil to Thailand, and the Department expects to telegraph you further in this regard to the near future.

Two. It may be stated for your information that the British Government has recently authorized the British Minister at Bangkok to offer to Thailand twelve field guns and twenty-four howitzers; if this offer is accepted, twelve howitzers would be released at once from Malaya. The British Minister has also been authorized to assure the Thai Prime Minister that in respect to general defense, the British Government is ready to furnish QUOTE unobtrusive advice UNQUOTE; for this purpose the British Minister has been authorized in his discretion to obtain the agreement of the Thai Government to the appointment of three additional assistant British military attachés to Thailand.

HULL.

(DA)

FE:RLS:MBW FE PA/H DE EA/T A-A.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 22, 1941.

SUBJECT: Reported request of Japanese for use of Thai airdromes for "survey flights".

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. W. G. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy,
Mr. Smyth.

COPIES TO:



7519.94

Mr. Hayter of the British Embassy informed Mr. Smyth during a call on November 22, 1941 that according to a recent telegram from the British Minister at Bangkok, Japanese members of the Thai-Indochina Boundary Commission are asking for the use of some Thai airdromes for "survey flights" and also for aviation gasoline from Thailand, presumably to be used in these flights. Mr. Hayter added that this information had been given to the British at Bangkok by the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs.


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FILED
NOV 24 1941

7519.94/401

PS/414

Fulda



and had no appreciable beneficial effect. He stated that the Thai Government was urgently desirous of obtaining airplanes. I replied that if that was the case it would seem to me that the British might use some of the planes allocated by the United States to Great Britain which are now in Singapore and make these available to the Thai Government without publicity by flying them in at night. The Ambassador said that the trouble was that the British Government urgently needed all the airplanes they could get from us for use in Singapore. I said that that was the situation with respect to the United States since, as the Ambassador knew, we were building up as rapidly as possible our air strength in the Philippines, and I had been informed by both General Marshall and Admiral Stark that the planes that we had in the Philippines are infinitely more valuable to us there than they would be in Thailand.

The Ambassador then suggested on behalf of his Government that the situation might be ameliorated by a credit of \$10,000,000 to Thailand by the United States. I said that this matter would be given immediate consideration.

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3748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION,
November 26, 1941.

Radio Bulletin No. 280

NOTE: This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion.

WHITE HOUSE

Yugoslavia.—At his press conference this morning Secretary Early informed correspondents that information had reached this Government from several of its Intelligence Services to the effect that the Germans have decided to make a final assault on Belgrade. He said that the reason behind the German plans is that the Nazi Army believes Belgrade to be the base of operations for the Chetniks. He continued that according to declarations of high German officials the bombardment to which Belgrade has been subjected will be nothing to compare to what is now in store for the city, and that the Germans have decided to raze Belgrade, which will be surrounded by troops and exposed to bombardment by artillery and from the air. He added that the sources of this Government's information are convinced that the Germans have decided to carry this attack on in the same way as they have done previously with the city of Chabatz.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Press Conference.—A correspondent said that according to reports two American military observers have been captured in Libya by the Axis forces and inquired whether we had the right under international law to demand their return or whether they were to be regarded as legitimate prisoners of war. The Secretary said that he would first have to look at the law to be certain of his answer. In reply to an inquiry as to the position that would be taken with regard to the further report that some newspaper correspondents have been captured, the Secretary said that then he would certainly have to look at the law.

Questioned whether we had received any request to intervene in or prevent the reported plans of the Germans to bombard Belgrade, Mr. Hull indicated that he had no knowledge of any request so far as concerned the bombardment itself but that if he should learn anything he would be glad to tell the correspondents.

Asked about the conversations with the Japanese envoys today, the Secretary pointed out that he did not think he would serve either the correspondents or the Government any good purpose by undertaking to go into those matters at this time. In reply to a question whether he was going to meet the envoys again today or tonight, he said that the matter was now receiving attention. A correspondent pointed out that an allegedly authoritative Tokyo despatch took a gloomy view of the discussions because of the continued conference with the so-called ABCD powers, on the ground that these discussions were regarded as a threat against Japan. Mr. Hull replied that, as he had stated, he thought that it would not be of any advantage to go into these matters at the present.

Asked for comment on the reported news item from Buenos Aires to the effect that Argentina was reluctant to accept a three-year embargo on Argentine sales of strategic materials to the Axis powers in return for our agreeing to purchase Argentine commodities, the Secretary said that all he could say offhand was that we had been having some conversations on those subjects but that he thought that, perhaps with one or two exceptions, the discussions had referred to a one-year period.

Requested to elaborate on intimations received by the press from Mexico City this morning that we may soon begin a series of general staff talks with the Mexican Army, the Secretary said that we would naturally have to look to the Army and Navy for accurate knowledge on this subject.

DEFENSE

Lend-Lease.—Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius on Monday announced that total lend-lease expenditures at the end of October were approximately 919 million dollars and that increases since then have brought the figure to more than a billion dollars. The announcement added that the steady increase in lend-lease aid is shown by the following monthly amounts in millions of dollars:

Mar.	Apr	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Total to Oct 31, 1941
18	40	60	85	134	150	207	225	919

Actual contracts have been let for more than 75 percent of the first seven billion dollar Lend-Lease Bill and 100 percent of the funds therein have been allocated. The new six billion dollar appropriation is being allocated rapidly. Since the beginning of the war, our exports to the British, including Lend-Lease aid, have amounted to approximately five and a quarter billion dollars, most of which was financed by the British with their own dollars. In October, exports to the British were the largest of any month since the war began.

Local Defense Councils.—Director La Guardia of the OCD has announced that a total of 5,935 local defense councils have been organized throughout the United States to employ 753,407 volunteers as air raid wardens, auxiliary police, auxiliary firemen, bomb squads, rescue squads, etc., plus 196,101 persons holding Red Cross certificates issued since June 1.

He said that he was gratified at the increase in number of local defense councils but that their organization must move at an even greater rate if we are to be prepared to meet any emergency.

Defense Effort Comparison.—The OPM Bureau of Research and Statistics has issued a comparison of present industrial defense efforts with that of the U. S. during 1917 and 1918 which shows in part: (1) disbursements for industrial activity month by month are at a higher level today than in World War I; (2) due to lower price levels, the U. S. is probably getting more value for every dollar spent than in 1917 and 1918; (3) the productive capacity of each workman has greatly increased because of increased industrial efficiency through technical advances and billions of dollars of additional investment.

Maritime Commission.—In a summary of contracts and progress in their whole shipbuilding program, the Maritime Commission reported that, as of November first, there were 809 vessels for which contracts had been let. Deliveries to date have amounted to 118, keels for 261 have been laid and 146 vessels have been launched.

Light Draft Vessels.—President Roosevelt signed legislation on Monday authorizing the expenditure of \$300,000,000 for construction or conversion of 400 ships to be used as light-draft vessels by the Navy for inshore and Naval base defense work.

Ferry Command.—As the Army Air Corps Ferrying Command passes the three million mile mark in safe delivery flights, they report that their pilots pick up planes at "reception points" i. e., factories, fly them to "installation points" where flight equipment for over-water flight is installed, and deliver them to such "transfer points" as Montreal and Miami where the planes are checked over before the transoceanic flyers of the R. A. F. Ferry Command take over. The ACFC has been so organized that it will also be able to handle the President's 50,000 plane-a-year program and its operations can be changed as the theater of war changes. It is providing valuable training for pilots and crews in flying military aircraft under carefully prepared flight plans.

Ordnance.—Ordnance Department awards on Monday totalled \$94,477,819. Largest item was the contract awarded to General Motors for armor-piercing projectiles, which amounted to \$35,705,287. A total of \$11,708,300 was awarded to three firms for the manufacture of anti-aircraft guns.

The Denver Small Arms Manufacturing Ordnance Works, where production started in September will be expanded with new buildings and machinery for the manufacture of a greater quantity of small arms, the War Department announced yesterday.

Quartermaster Corps.—The Quartermaster Corps of the War Department has concentrated its purchasing this month on clothing for the Army. A total of \$76,384,471 has been spent for this equipment. Besides large orders for shoes, wool trousers, raincoats and miscellaneous items, the Quartermaster Corps has ordered 16,816,585 yards of cloth, mostly all-wool serge, to be made into clothing.

Military Attachés.—The War Department has announced the assignment of the following three officers as Assistant Military Attachés to the Legation at Cairo: Captain Paul M. Wickens, Captain William S. Moore, and Captain Guy E. Parker.

Aluminum Plants.—Federal Loan Administrator Jesse Jones has announced that upon recommendation of the OPM an aluminum plant costing \$33,000,000, including power facilities, and having an annual capacity of 128,000,000 pounds of aluminum will be constructed at Lake Catherine, Arkansas, and will be operated by the Aluminum Company of America under a five-year lease.

Concurrently he announced that an aluminum fabricating plant, costing approximately \$22,000,000 and having an annual capacity of approximately 60,000,000 pounds of fabricated aluminum, will be constructed on a 115 acre tract of land at Fairview, Oregon, and will be operated by the Aluminum Company of America.

Defense Housing Priorities.—Acting FWA Administrator Edy has announced priorities for building materials which will expedite the defense public works program now in the construction stage are being obtained for contractors from OPM. He said projects in the \$150,000,000 community facilities program will receive priority ratings generally ranging from A-2 to A-8.

USHA Administrator Straus reported the USHA is building defense homes at an average cost of \$2,789. The Lanham Act sets a \$3,500 limit on construction cost of such homes.

President Roosevelt asked Congress for \$15,000,000 in supplemental funds for defense housing. The funds would be used to build 3,000 trailers, 4,400 dormitory units and 3,550 portable houses.

Labor Supply.—The Social Security Board reports that estimates of labor needs in selected defense industries show that approximately 475,000 workers were scheduled to be hired in 9,900 establishments in 26 defense industries during the six-months period September 1941–February 1942.

Aircraft and shipbuilding industries are expected to take on nearly 250,000 workers, expanding current employment 32 and 38 percent respectively. Employers in 6,400 iron and steel and nonelectrical machinery establishments estimated they would need more than 87,000 additional workers in the next six months. The estimates forecast a layoff of 59,000 workers in the automobile and automobile equipment industry with 20,800 new hires. The tire and inner tube industry also anticipated a net reduction in employment. The number of workers engaged in manufacture of industrial rubber goods will also decline somewhat by the end of next February, the Board said.

The Board also reported labor shortages are expected to develop prior to January 1, 1942, in 179 of 306 selected defense occupations. Shortages were already occurring in 146 of these categories in mid-September. Sufficient employment service registrants are available to meet all reported demands in the remaining 127 occupations, the Board said.

Navy Enlistments.—At a Navy Department press conference this morning Admiral Nimitz, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, said that the Navy now needs 13,000 volunteers a month to keep pace with expansion under the two ocean Navy shipbuilding program, and that by next July 15,000 or more volunteers a month would probably be required.

Aircraft Merger.—The press today reported a prospective merger of Vultee Aircraft, Inc., of Downey, California, which has plants in Downey, Nashville, and Wayne, Michigan, with the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, whose principal plant is in San Diego, California. It was pointed out that such a merger, if carried out, will unite two concerns which have defense orders totaling about \$1,000,000,000 and are turning out every type of plane—from small commercial vehicles to large 4-motor, 28-ton bombers.

The press quotes Major Reuben H. Fleet, president of Consolidated, and Mr. Richard W. Millar, president of Vultee, in a joint statement issued yesterday in part as follows: "Of our own volition we have for some time been mutually exploring the business aspects of a possible future association. The facilities, products, proximity of location and experience of Consolidated and Vultee so complement each other as to make possible the more expeditious completion of their defense assignments."

MISCELLANEOUS

Crude Oil Production.—According to the press crude oil production in the United States for the week ending November 22 shot upward to 4,300,000 barrels, establishing a new all time high record by a wide margin. The crude oil output has been increasing steadily since the beginning of this year on an average of about 3,500,000 barrels daily according to statistics of the U. S. Bureau of Mines. The Office of the Federal Oil Coordinator for National Defense has estimated that the demand might reach 4,500,000 barrels daily by next year.

Life Insurance.—According to the press the Prudential Life Insurance Company of America today announced that its reserve basis would be cut from three and one-fourth to two and one-half percent and that premiums on new ordinary life insurance policies would be increased about eight percent on January 1. This

action follows the lead of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company which last week announced a reduction of its reserve basis from three to two and three-fourths percent. Both companies attribute this move to lower yields on high-grade bonds.

Cost of Living.—Labor Secretary Perkins has reported that the cost of goods purchase by wage earners and lower-salaried workers in large cities increased 1.2 percent from mid-September to mid-October. "Advances in rents and in prices of food—clothing, automobiles, and certain house furnishings, resulted in an increase of about 1.0 percent," she said, "and excise taxes levied by the Revenue Act of 1941 caused the further increase of about 0.2 percent." Miss Perkins said the cost of goods index for October 15, 1941 was 109.4 compared with 100 as the 1935-39 average.

Construction Prospects.—The OPM Bureau of Research and Statistics has issued a survey which predicts the volume of all construction next year will be higher than any year between 1930 and 1940 despite an expected 65 percent reduction in non-defense building. Total defense building, the survey stated, is expected to reach \$9,000,000,000 in January 1942; \$12,000,000,000 by July 1942; and \$15,000,000,000 during 1943.

Home Building.—The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has announced material and labor costs for a standard six-room house as of September 1941, increased 13.2 percent above costs for the same period for 1940. Building supply costs during the 12-month period rose 12.3 percent as compared with a 15.2 percent labor cost increase.

Washington Rental Rates.—Acting Commissioner Hinrichs, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, has reported that rents were raised for approximately one-seventh of homes occupied by white tenants in Washington suburban areas during the 22-months period from October, 1939 to August, 1941. Most of the increases in the suburban counties of Alexandria, Arlington, Montgomery and Prince Georges occurred after October, 1940 and were attributed to the increasing number of Government employees brought to Washington by the expanding national defense program.

Radio.—Lloyd A. Free, Director of the FCC Foreign Broadcasting Monitoring Service, has announced the establishment in London of a listening post to report on European radio propaganda. The London office, Mr. Free said, will utilize the monitoring facilities of the BBC and will have a four or five-man force. The purpose of the office will be to (1) listen to and record propaganda broadcasts made by Governments of the European continent to their own people, and (2) sift from these broadcasts any information which might be of value to the United States.

According to the press the office would be essentially a part of the Intelligence Service of the Government which at present has in operation monitoring stations in Washington, Puerto Rico and Oregon, supplying information to about 19 Government agencies.

Coal Strike.—Dr. John Steelman, appointed by the President to represent the public on the three-man board to arbitrate the captive coal mine dispute, today convened the board at the Hotel Commodore in New York City.

Stock Market.—Volume of trading on Tuesday: 840,000 shares. Dow-Jones closing stock averages: Industrials—116.96; Railroads—28.10; Utilities—15.80.

Stocks turned down today in moderate trading. Curb stocks were mixed and Chicago stocks irregularly lower. In Chicago wheat closed off one-half to seven-eighths cents and corn was off one-fourth to five-eighths cents.

Japanese Discussions.—Following a conference this evening between the Secretary and Ambassadors and Nomura and Kurusu correspondents were informed by a State Department official that the Japanese representatives were handed for their consideration a document that was the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks and that it was unnecessary to repeat what had been said so often in the past that it rests on certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State "Brown"

Washington,
November 24, 1941
11 pm

Collect (Full rate
Day letter
Night letter)
Charge Department
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to \$

AMLEGATION,
BANGKOK (THAILAND).
156
Your 528, November 22, 9 a.m.

One. The Department under date of November 22 telegraphically instructed our officers in the areas mentioned as follows:

QUOTE The Department desires that the American diplomatic and consular officers concerned call to the attention of American citizens in the Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be possible to retain in the Pacific even the present facilities. UNQUOTE.

Two. The Department believes that it would be ~~advisable~~ at this time for you to acquaint American citizens of the categories mentioned now in Thailand.

Enclosed by _____
Sent by special _____

390.115A/587

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CS/EL

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER Collect ☐ Full rate ☐ Day letter ☐ Night letter Charge Department: ☐ Full rate ☐ Day letter ☐ Night letter Charge to _____ \$ _____	TELEGRAM SENT Department of State <i>Washington,</i>	TO BE TRANSMITTED CONFIDENTIAL CODE NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE PARTIAL PLAIN
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with the nature of the renewed suggestions in regard to withdrawal as contained in the above quoted instruction.

Hue

NOV 27 1941

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Enciphered by _____

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3-1000 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 27, 1941.

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Mon Rajewongse Seni Pramoj, the Thai Minister
Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams

COPIES TO:

Copy sent to Bangkok
 BS eh
 THE EASTERN AFFAIRS
 Department of State
 WMS

The Thai Minister called upon his own initiative.

He said that some time ago Mr. Hamilton had told him that when he had any question to ask in regard to matters affecting Thailand he should not hesitate to call ~~Mr. Hamilton~~ and ask questions which he had in mind. He said that he was taking advantage of Mr. Hamilton's kindness this morning.

Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams told the Thai Minister that Mr. Hamilton was in conference and regretted that he himself could not talk with the Thai Minister.

The Thai Minister asked whether the following short two-sentence paragraph appearing in The New York Times was accurate:

711.94/2577

PS/WH

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accurate:

"The State Department said:

' The Japanese representatives were handed for their consideration a document that is the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said so often in the past that it rests on certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.' "

Mr. Adams replied that he understood that the statement was substantially accurate. The Thai Minister asked whether the last sentence might be interpreted to mean that the United States insisted that the Japanese evacuate both French Indochina and China.

Mr. Adams replied that he had no information or authority which would enable him to be specific in his reply to the Thai Minister's question. Mr. Adams said, however, that the President and the Secretary of State had on many occasions outlined the attitude of this Government toward acquisitions of territory by force. Mr. Adams said that there had been no change in this Government's attitude in that respect.

The Thai Minister thanked Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams for the information which they had given him. He added that naturally his Government was vitally interested in the subject matter of the statement and he wished to keep his

Government

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Government informed.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION,
November 28, 1941.

Radio Bulletin No. 282

NOTE: This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion.

WHITE HOUSE

Merchant Ship Arming.—The White House today made the following announcement:

"American merchant vessels sailing on routes between the United States ports and ports of Spain, Portugal and their adjacent island possessions will not be armed.

"American merchant vessels sailing in the inter-American trade between ports of the United States and ports in Central and South America will not be armed.

"American merchant vessels sailing on routes in the Pacific Ocean will not be armed under existing circumstances.

"Public announcement will be made of any change of policy affecting any of these routes."

Press Conference.—The President informed correspondents that he planned to depart from Washington at 3:00 p. m. today for Warm Springs, Georgia, on a vacation that had twice been postponed, and that while he did not know when he would return, he hoped that it need not be before December 2, adding that he might have to return because of existing conditions in the Pacific. Asked how long he expected these conditions to exist, the President referred the correspondent to Tokyo and not Washington. A correspondent inquired whether the President could comment on further developments concerning the Japanese situation and the President indicated that while not able to do so, no reply had been received to Secretary Hull's note (see Radio Bulletin No. 279 of November 26), but that talks had not broken down. He added that the American policy continued to be one of infinite patience.

A correspondent asked what the Administration's policy was with regard to legal and lobbying activities on the part of former public officials, particularly in the matter of construction projects in connection with the defense program. The President said that he had discussed this with the Attorney General and that they were in favor of legislation which would prevent such activities on the part of persons having previously held responsible Government positions. He pointed out that in the past certain Government departments had prohibited such activities within a two-year period of holding public office.

A correspondent mentioned a report that the people of Puerto Rico were apprehensive over the outcome of an economic survey to take place regarding countries in the Caribbean area because the so-called "plan" would prejudicially affect their country. The President replied that there was nothing in that story as presented by the correspondent. He said that a study was under consideration in which Puerto Rico would take part as well as other places in that area. He added that he did not see how the Puerto Ricans could worry about a study that has not yet begun and in which they would participate. Asked whether there was any possibility of joint Anglo-American consideration of certain problems involved, the President said that that might be possible.

The President was asked if he had any information concerning the attitude of the independent steel companies with regard to the three-man arbitration board appointed by the President in the captive mine dispute and he replied that he knew nothing other than what had appeared in the press on the subject.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Finland. In response to inquiries as to developments in the Finnish situation, the Secretary of State today stated that the Finnish note had been given careful consideration but that it had thrown no light upon the question uppermost in the mind of this Government, that is, how far and to what extent the Finnish military policy is one of combined operations of the Germans and Finns vitally to injure Great Britain and her associates and to threaten the northern supply lines over which Russia is now receiving supplies and assistance from Great Britain and the United States to aid Russia in resisting the Hitler forces of invasion and conquest, and to what extent that Finnish policy is a menace to all America's aims for self-defense. The recent journey of the Finnish Foreign Minister to Berlin to join with Hitler's puppet governments over Europe in sign-

ing the "anti-Comintern Pact" used by Hitler solely as an instrument to wage a war of conquest and domination against free peoples, is highly significant and cannot be camouflaged or explained away by propaganda attacks on nations engaged in defending themselves.

The Secretary went on to say that the Department was giving careful attention to all the reports and information which might furnish a definite answer to this question. The concern of this Government, which has been emphasized by the studies made by the War Department and the statement of the Secretary of War on November 25, as to Finnish policy in this regard, has been made abundantly clear to the Finnish Government, the Secretary said.

The Secretary concluded by saying that every act of the Finnish Government since the delivery of its note has confirmed our apprehensions that it is fully cooperating with the Hitler forces.

CONGRESS

Anti-strike Legislation.—As movements continued within the House Rules, Labor and Naval Affairs Committees for various types of legislation designed to curb strikes in defense industries, the Senate Judiciary Committee today approved the bill sponsored by Senator Connally, the principal feature of which would permit seizure and operation of strike-bound defense plants (see Radio Bulletin No. 277 of November 22).

Concurrently the House Labor Committee today voted favorably on the Ramspeck bill which is described by the press as foremost among the various House proposals which have received the backing of Administration leaders and is regarded as a compromise of various proposals. According to the press, the bill at present embodies the substance of various proposals made including a strengthening by statute of the powers of the National Defense Mediation Board; a "cooling off" period before strikes could become operative; compulsory arbitration under Presidential discretion; and, as a last resort, Government seizure and operation of strike-bound plants. The press says that proponents of the bill regard it as a "reasonable measure" and thus likely to receive Presidential support, notwithstanding the anticipated opposition of the AFL as well as the CIO. President Green of the former yesterday was reported to have stated that no need existed for any such legislation in so far as concerns the AFL as it has allegedly supported no strikes of serious magnitude in defense industries. The CIO is said to oppose all anti-strike measures generally as of a "repressive" nature.

According to the press, representatives of management for the most part are in support of legislation of the type under consideration, with the exception of compulsory arbitration, which was yesterday denounced by the National Association of Manufacturers.

DEFENSE

Explosives.—The War Department today announced that production of Tri-Nitro-Toluene (TNT), the Army's most important high explosive, has increased 111 percent in the first three weeks of November at the two Government-owned plants now in operation. TNT is used alone or mixed with ammonium nitrate as a bursting charge for high explosive shells and bombs.

Army Construction.—Brig. Gen. Somervell, former Chief of Army Construction Division, now Assistant Chief of Staff, speaking at the annual meeting of the Washington Society of Civil Engineers, said "a blitzkrieg of building" during the first 15 months of the \$3,500,000,000 emergency building program has put the program "on schedule and we intend to keep it there". To date, he said, "prompt and superior" shelters and training quarters have been provided for 1,500,000 troops and "two-score" munitions plants have been erected "from the ground up," many of them months ahead of schedule. The construction effort, "the greatest ever undertaken in this Nation," is not "puncture-proof or perfect". Mistakes have been made "but they have been frankly admitted and promptly rectified," Gen. Somervell said.

Stimson.—War Secretary Stimson said at his press conference yesterday that optimistic press reports on performance of American equipment used by the British in Egypt and Libya had been borne out by meagre despatches from our military observers, but that "The whole campaign is still in a state of flux, and it will be some time before we have the whole story. So far as it has gone, our equipment has been satisfactory, and the press has not overemphasized our tanks." He said that the Army "has shown really wonderful progress, and I

think along the right lines," in the current maneuvers in Carolina, and that the Army's goal is to develop hard-hitting combat units, whether armored or infantry, adding that this meant an "application all along the line of that principle which the Germans showed only in their panzer divisions." He pointed out that for the past year the Army has been concentrating on developing new self-propelled guns and other anti-tank weapons as the answer to the armored division and that progress is being made.

Tanks.—Following the reported wide interest shown in the performance of U. S.-built tanks in Libya, the War Department has announced that plans for the construction of new facilities or the expansion of existing facilities for the production of rivetless armor casting for tanks have resulted in commitments through the Defense Plant Corp. of sums totalling \$53,500,000. Major General Wesson, Chief of Ordnance, yesterday said that production plans have for some time contemplated the complete elimination of the riveted type of construction on all combat vehicles. Cast steel hulls are now being made in considerable quantities for the medium tank and a minimum of 30 percent of future production will have the cast steel hull. The balance will be of welded construction. He went on to say that no reports from Libya criticizing the M-3 tanks, which are riveted, had been received and no orders have been issued cancelling the production of these tanks. However, the development of the cast armor plate and the use of welding puts the American tank far in advance of any known tanks. Such tanks are already in production and when the new facilities are completed, the entire output will be rivetless.

Flight Strips.—The Army Air Force has announced that it will cooperate with the Bureau of Public Roads in expediting the projected \$10,000,000 chain of "flight strips" along public highways for landing fields in connection with the defense program. The Department said the strips are urgently needed in the Northeast, the Appalachian mountains, and Northwestern regions of the United States.

Glider School.—The War Department has announced that a new glider training school for officers of the Army Air Forces will open at 29-Palms, Calif., about January 1. The school will have an initial class of 12 students, the Department said, but will ultimately train 24 pilots every four weeks until a total of 128 students have been trained. The 29-Palms school is the third Army gliding school, the others being located at Lockport, Ill., and Elmira, N. Y.

Merchant Ship Arming.—Secretary Knox stated in a press conference on Wednesday that the Bureau of Navigation has been training gun crews since April 15, 1941, but that the program was not designed originally for providing armed guards on merchant vessels. Beginning October 15, he said, special schools were established and training was designed specifically for duty on armed merchantmen. He continued: "The results of the training program are highly satisfactory and trained crews are now available in any size to fit the armament of merchant ships as fast as they are armed." For administrative purposes, he said, two armed guard centers have been established, one each on the East and West coasts, which will serve as pools to receive the output of the training schools and will continue to train men, assign them to vessels and handle replacements.

Defense Plant Corporation.—The largest Defense Plant Corporation agreement made to date has just been signed with the Columbia Steel Corporation, to construct facilities for the production of pig iron, steel, and steel plates, near Provo, Utah. The cost is estimated at \$91,000,000 and brings to \$250,000,000 the amounts obtained by U. S. Steel for its affiliates in the 10,000,000-ton steel expansion program. Altogether, Defense Plant Corporation has invested \$391,039,000 in the expansion of the steel industry.

MISCELLANEOUS

Treasury Bonds.—Treasury Secretary Morgenthau yesterday announced that the Treasury expects to borrow \$1,000,000,000 or more in another "major financial operation" next week, and "barring unforeseen developments in the international situation," the Treasury would issue new bonds, but that no refunding would be included in next week's operation.

The Treasury also announced it will issue refunding bonds in January to retire more than \$700,000,000 of Government obligations maturing early in 1942. In addition, the Treasury said, \$339,000,000 in Farm Mortgage Corporation bonds will be refunded if the Corporation's Board approves.

Taxation.—Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Sullivan yesterday told a press conference that the Treasury does not plan to ask for any further increased taxes

on incomes earned during 1941 and that it does not intend to suggest to Congress any increases in the capital gain and loss tax that would apply to financial transactions made in 1941. The Treasury, however, is continuing work on new levies that would apply to 1942 earnings, he said.

Chairman Eccles of the Federal Reserve Board, speaking in New York City, said, "By the middle of next year defense expenditures will probably be running at an annual rate of somewhat more than 15 billion dollars above the middle of the current year. The conclusion is inescapable . . . that additional taxation must be imposed and further restraints applied . . ." He said he hoped "further taxation . . . will first tap the corporate excess profits and the middle and upper individual income brackets and close numerous conspicuous loopholes in the corporation, individual income, inheritance and gift tax structures . . ."

Public Works.—Acting FWA Administrator Edy has announced that prospectuses from which will be built the national shelf of post-defense public works and service projects are being received in the Public Work Reserve Washington office. The prospectuses list and describe public works and services proposed by State, municipal and other Governmental subdivisions for inclusion in the Reserve on which preliminary studies indicate that between 25 and 30 billion dollars may be expended over a six-year period.

Football Standings.—In what the press referred to as an up-set, the University of Texas football team yesterday defeated Texas A. and M. by a score of 23-0. Both teams were included in a sports writers' poll held on November 25 listing the country's ten leading teams in the following order: Minnesota, Texas A. and M., Duke, Notre Dame, Duquesne, Michigan, Missouri, Fordham, Northwestern, Texas. The same poll listed the second ten teams: Navy, Vanderbilt, Penn, Mississippi, Ohio State, Clemson, Oregon State, Alabama, Harvard, Georgia.

Army-Navy Game.—The Army-Navy game to be played tomorrow at Philadelphia at 1:15 p. m., E. S. T. will be broadcast by short-wave for foreign reception over the following stations to Europe and Latin America: WNBI, New York, 15,150 kilocycles or 19.8 meters; WRCA, New York, 17,780 kilocycles or 16.8 meters; WBOS, Boston, 11,870 kilocycles or 25.28 meters; WGEA, Schenectady, 15,330 kilocycles or 19.56 meters. To Orient: KGEI, San Francisco, 9,670 kilocycles or 31.02 meters.

Stock Market.—Volume of trading on Thursday: 810,000 shares. Dow-Jones closing stock averages: Industrials—115.64; Railroads—27.33; Utilities—15.69.

Stocks today reached new lows since June 1940 in moderate trading. Curb stocks were irregularly lower and Chicago stocks lower. In Chicago wheat closed approximately unchanged and corn was up one-fourth to one-half a cent.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Date: November 28, 1941.

Subject: Aid to Thailand.

Participants: Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister,
Mr. Hamilton,
Mr. Smyth.

Copies to:

The Thai Minister called on his own initiative on Mr. Hamilton on November 28. He referred to recent newspaper reports in regard to increased Japanese troop movements to Indochina and stated that he was apprehensive that a Japanese attack on Thailand was imminent. He expressed the opinion that of the several possible areas in which the Japanese might attack, Thailand appeared to be the most logical; he commented that a Japanese attack on Siberia would bring Soviet air attacks on Japan, an attack from Indochina against the Burma Road would have to go through very difficult terrain, while an attack on Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies would be met by strong opposing forces. He said that the situation of Thailand was very different from that of China where the great extent of the country had permitted the Chinese to withdraw far into the interior in the face of Japanese attack. Thailand, however, was a very small country and retreat into the interior was not possible.

He continued in substance as follows: A Japanese attack on Thailand would probably be carried out by a drive of land forces through Cambodia, and by a simultaneous Japanese naval attack in the Gulf of Siam which would meet with

only feeble resistance from the few small gunboats constituting the Thai navy. The Cambodian area is chiefly jungle, but one good paved road cuts through it; Japanese mechanized forces could proceed along that road. Conscription for military service exists in Thailand, but while the army includes some 200,000 men, only about 40,000 are properly trained and equipped. A part of the Thai army, including most of the small mechanized force, is now stationed in the area ceded to Thailand by Indochina in May, 1941. During the dry season, mechanized forces can operate without difficulty through the plains of Thailand where Bangkok is located; Bangkok is the nerve center of Thailand and its occupation by an invader would practically put a stop to resistance. Thailand has only one first-class airport (at Bangkok) where heavy bombers can operate; there are two or three other small air fields in Thailand but these can accommodate only small planes, such as fighters. The capture of the Bangkok area would cut off the transportation route for relief supplies coming by railroad over the narrow peninsula from Malaya and there would remain only a few rough roads over the mountains into Burma which could not be used except in the dry season:

The Minister stated that in the event of a Japanese attack, Thailand would resist with all its forces. He expressed the hope that the United States could now supply a number of airplanes to Thailand, as this would have a very important effect on Thai morale and would "raise their spirits" immensely. Referring to statements made to him by the Department that, in case of attack on Thailand by an aggressor, the United States would place Thailand in the same category as China and would offer assistance, he suggested that immediate consideration be given to the problem of making such supplies available in Thailand, and suggested in particular that the question of transportation of supplies to the Thai military forces be carefully studied and plans made so that supplies could go forward without delay in the event that hostilities occur. Mr. Hamilton informed the Minister that this matter would promptly be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

In discussing the general situation, the Minister remarked that Thailand has a non-aggression pact with Great Britain in which Great Britain promises to respect the territorial integrity of Thailand, but that this is not the case in Thailand's treaty with Japan; Japan merely promises to promote cordial relations, exchange information, and cooperate in economic matters. This fact, he commented, increased his apprehension in regard to a Japanese attack on Thailand.

FE: Smyth: NHS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

FROM: CHAI
Bangkok

Dated: November 28, 1941
Rec'd: 5:42 p.m.

DEC 1 1941

COPIES SENT TO:
O.N.I. AND R.I.D.

Division of
Foreign Affairs
NOV 28 1941
Bangkok

659, November 28, 11 p.m.

In a radio broadcast November 27, 9 p.m.,
the Prime Minister urged the people to be neutral
but to prepare to fight if war becomes inevitable.
He stated that Great Britain and the United States
had promised not to attack Thailand and that the
Japanese Ambassador had guaranteed that Japanese
troops in Indochina are not intended for an attack
on this country in any circumstance.

PECK

LRS

70-001 PACIFIC WAR/553
PS/MC/M
DEC 2 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DATE: November 29, 1941.

SUBJECT: **Thailand's treaties with Great Britain and Japan.**

PARTICIPANTS: The Thai Minister and Mr. Smyth

COPIES TO: **UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE**
DEC 4 1941
MR. WELLES

741.9211/20

The Thai Minister telephoned Mr. Smyth on November 29, 1941, and, referring to his conversation with Mr. Hamilton on November 28, said that he would like to make clear a point wherein Thailand's treaty with Great Britain differs from her treaty with Japan.

He stated that Article I of the Anglo-Thai Pact of Non-aggression of June 12, 1940, reads as follows:

"Each high contracting party undertakes not to resort in any case either to war or to any act of violence or of aggression against the other, either alone or in concert with one or more than one third power and to respect the territorial integrity of the other high contracting party."

He then said that Article I of the "Treaty between Thailand and Japan concerning the Continuance of Friendly

741.9211/20
PS/GB

-2-

Friendly Relations and Mutual Respect of Each Other's
Territorial Integrity" of June 12, 1940, reads as
follows:

"The high contracting parties shall mutually
respect each other's territorial integrity and
hereby reaffirm the constant peace and perpetual
friendship existing between them."

The Minister pointed out that a non-aggression
clause is found in the British treaty but not in the
Japanese treaty.

RS
FE:Sayth:HES

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DATE: DECEMBER 1, 1941.

Subject: Aid to Thailand.

Participants: Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister,
Lieutenant Colonel Mon Luang Kharb Kunjara, Thai Military and
Air Attaché,
Mr. Adams,
Mr. Smyth.

Copies to:

The Thai Minister called on his own initiative, accompanied by his Military Attaché, Colonel Kunjara, on Mr. Adams and Mr. Smyth December 1, 1941. The Minister said that he had brought Colonel Kunjara along in order to explain the general military situation.

Colonel Kunjara said that according to his latest information the Japanese have approximately 150,000 troops in Indochina, about equally divided between northern and southern Indochina. He expressed the conviction that the real objective of any Japanese attack from Indochina would be the Burma Road, and he felt that it would be far easier for the Japanese to reach the Burma Road by going through Thailand than by attacking from northern Indochina through the difficult mountain country of Yunnan. He said that the Japanese could attack from southern Indochina into Thailand, using mechanized equipment, and then proceed north along the railroad from Bangkok; just south of Chlengmai a paved motor road branches off from the railroad and the Japanese could go north along this road to the Thai-Burma border and/or the Thai Indochina border. He believed that the Japanese would then probably cut through a corner of Burma toward the Burma Road. He pointed out that the pass through the mountains of northern Thailand would be far less difficult to cross from a military viewpoint than would be the passes which would have to be crossed by an army attacking from northern Indochina. For this reason he was extremely apprehensive that the Japanese intended shortly to launch an attack against Thailand from southern Indochina.

Colonel Kunjara gave the following information in regard to the Thai military and naval forces; the total strength of the Thai army is about 200,000 but only 40,000 are well-equipped and trained. The Thai air force possesses about 200 combat planes, of which 108 are pursuit planes (slower than current Japanese pursuits), 30 bombing planes and the balance observation and general service planes. There are about three pilots for every plane. The Thai artillery includes 15 regiments of field artillery (12 guns to a regiment) and one regiment of medium artillery. The mechanized equipment includes 80 tanks (all eight tons or under), several hundred trucks, and one platoon of armored cars. The Thai navy is composed of the following vessels: two heavy gunboats (2400 tons), two light gunboats (1200 tons), two sloops, nine first-class torpedo boats, five submarines, five smaller torpedo boats, twelve mosquito boats, and 38 naval planes. The naval personnel amounts to about 6,000 men.

Colonel Kunjara expressed the belief that a Japanese attack against Thailand would be carried out by a land attack through Cambodia and by a simultaneous naval attack; he believed that one Japanese naval force would attack along the coast in the region of Bangkok, while a second force would attempt to land men along the Kra peninsula in order to cut railroad communications with Malaya.

Colonel Kunjara said that the military equipment now most urgently needed by Thailand was heavy artillery, bombing planes and pursuit planes. The Minister expressed the hope that means could be found to make this equipment available immediately in order that Thailand might be better able to resist aggression by Japan.

Mr. Adams informed the Minister that the information given by Colonel Kunjara and the request of the Minister would promptly be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

3766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect ☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter

Charge Departments

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

December 2, 1941

AMLEGATION,

BANGKOK,

Reference your 536, November 27, 1 p.m., paragraph three.

As you know the Department has been carrying on for some months with the Japanese Ambassador here informal and exploratory conversations in an effort to determine whether there may be found a sound basis for the undertaking of negotiations looking to a comprehensive and ^{peaceful} ~~general~~ settlement ~~covering~~ covering the entire Pacific area. Those conversations are still continuing.

In Radio Bulletin no. 280, November 26, 1941, it was reported that the Secretary gave the Japanese representatives for their consideration a document based upon certain fundamental principles which are well-known as the principles upon which the American people and Government believe relations between nations should be based. In Radio Bulletin no. 282, November 28, it is reported that the President at his press conference on that date informed the correspondents that the talks with the Japanese had not ^{in fact not} broken down and that the American policy remained one of great patience.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

74C.0011 PACIFIC WAR/859B

PS/LH

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

3767

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect (Full rate
Day letter
Night letter)
Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

-2-

Washington.

Bearing in mind your requests for information regarding the talks with the Japanese which might have possible effect upon the situation in Thailand, the Department would expect to inform you promptly of any information in this regard which might be of especial interest to you.

H. H. H.

12/ *37* *921-74*

RECEIVED

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M. 19.

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect (Full rate)
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington

December 2, 1941

892.6363

AMLEGATION,
BANGKOK.
160

The following telegram sent to the American Consulate
at Singapore is repeated for your information:

(Telegraph Section: Here insert text of attached-
telegram to Singapore.)

You are authorized in your discretion to inform the
appropriate Thai authorities of the foregoing.

Hull
C.H.

DEC 2 1941

RS
FE:RLS:MJP

Enclosed to

Sent by operator

892.6363/167

PS/MJB

TELETYPE UNIT
Department of State

AMERICAN CONSUL,
SINGAPORE.

In concurrence with the British Government we wish to facilitate the supply to Thailand under adequate control of certain quantities to be agreed upon of aviation grade gasoline and aviation grades of lubricating oils. A complete description of the arrangements tentatively agreed upon between this Government and representatives here of the British and Netherlands Governments will be cabled to you shortly. Completion of these plans may require several days, and meanwhile we wish to facilitate the immediate delivery of small quantities of appropriate grades of aviation lubricating oils to Thailand. We understand from the Standard Vacuum Oil Company in New York that it will be possible for them to ship by first boat approximately 15 tons of aviation grade lubricating oils from their own stocks at Singapore. While they will make their own arrangements with the Thai Government for the purchase of this material, we request that you communicate with the local representative of this oil company and render all assistance possible to expedite this delivery. It is requested

Enclaved by _____

Not by operator _____ M. _____ B. _____

FORM 1-1-36 (REVISED) 1-1-36

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
 Received at Bangkok 3, 1941
 Time being communicated
 to agent. (C)

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



6:17, December 3, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Qut. In a conversation I have had with the
 Minister for Foreign Affairs he referred to the
 strikingly mild attitude of the Japanese toward
 the Thai Government lately but said that the
 Thai Government thoroughly understood what Japan
 was plotting against this country and definitely
 would resist Japan. I said I would be glad to
 telegraph this to my government. He referred
 appreciatively to the information received through
 the Minister in Washington that the United States
 would place Thailand in the same category as China
 in case of resistance to invasion.

Two. The Prime Minister was very disappointed
 at the meagreness of the assistance promised by the
 British Government in reply to his inquiry made
 about October 15. It is my opinion that the gov-
 ernment, however, as a whole and the Thai people
 are confidentially expecting that if the nation
 resists Japanese invasion it will receive immediate
 (a) from Great Britain and the United States.

OSB

PROK

(a) Apparent Omission

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/671

PS/RK

FILED
 DEC 10 1941

HMS

TO Bangkok
 This telegram was
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (C)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
 Dated December 3, 1941
 Rec'd. 4 p. m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

547, December 3, 5 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

The Thais are well aware that these two nations
 are opposing Japanese aggression even at the risk of
 war and naturally infer that their own efforts will
 receive British and American support. See the
 Legation's telegram 534, November 26, 11 p. m.
 paragraph no. 3, quoting two popular radio commentators
 as saying that Thailand will have friends to come to
 her assistance.

Third. If Japan invades this country and no aid
 as described is provided there is bound to be popular
 resentment against our two nations and possibly our
 citizens. This will be fomented by the Japanese and
 some Thais. I earnestly suggest that the British
 and American Governments as soon as possible inform
 the Thai Government what immediate and long term
 assistance it can expect against invasion.

PECK

COA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased ~~FROM~~
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Bangkok
Dated December 3, 1941
Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

547, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

This will enable the government to plan for the future intelligently either for resistance to the last extremity in the hope of ultimate victory through supporting British and American action or for a truce while awaiting a later settlement. Preliminary advice will also do much to avert a revulsion of feeling if American and British aid is not speedily forthcoming. The Thai have confidence in Britain and the United States in spite of refusal to supply them with military equipment and I feel that it would be fair to inform them of our intentions with reference to their situation as soon as those intentions can be communicated.

My British colleague is telegraphing along the same general line.

(END OF MESSAGE).

HPD

PECK

Pa/tek

2-10-60, December 4, 5 pm, from Bangkok.

He said when Great Britain encouraged to resist war
invasion and was conquered by Germany. He insisted
that the Thai Government will resist invasion even
without exterior aid but that it needs and earnestly
looks for the assistance it would derive from the
suggested American and British statements.

PEOK

FDMS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From: Bangkok
 To: Washington
 Subject: Thailand
 Date: November 3, 1941

Re: Bangkok
 Date: November 3, 1941
 Time: 10:00 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Re: Bangkok, November 3, 1941



The Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning again asked me to convey to the Department the word of the Thai Government that the American and British Governments will issue public statements to the effect that Japan by invading Thailand would incur the enmity and armed resistance of those two countries in addition to Thailand's. He recalled American and British statements of last August which I referred to in paragraph two of the Legation's 502, November 3, 3 p.m. and said the Thai Government believed a new and even stronger statement would accomplish two results--it would deter the Japanese from the invasion on which they are now determined and would strengthen the will to resist of a Thai faction which is wavering because of disbelief that our two nations will actually come to the aid of Thailand when it is called on to resist aggression. He said this faction has considerable political influence and that it is impressed by the Japanese argument that all the small nations whom

PS/RK

AY 2230, December 11, 3 p.m., from Bangkok.

Mr. King whom Great Britain encouraged to resist with
abandonment and was concurred by Germany. He insisted
that the Thai Government will resist invasion even
without exterior aid but that it needs and earnestly
looks for the assistance it would derive from the
suggested American and British statements.

PECK

LME

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

Bangkok

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Dated December 5, 1941

FROM
Rec'd. 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 12 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 12 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

551, December 5, 3 p.m.

During a call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in reference to gasoline supplies he informed me that the Japanese Ambassador had just called and informed him that the Japanese forces in Indochina definitely would not be used to invade Thai and that they were concentrated for use against the Burma Road. Consequently Thailand need feel no anxiety. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that his Government, in spite of Japanese assurances, is nevertheless greatly worried because it has received additional evidence that an attack by land and air is imminent. He was unwilling to tell the nature of the evidence but said he had asked the British Minister to call in order to back up on the report. My British colleagues have received no (except no) evidence of this sort recently so far as I am aware. The

Foreign

740.001 P.W.

MMS

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/681

DEC 16 1941

FILED

PS/RK

-2- #551, December 5, 3 p.m. from Bangkok.

Foreign Minister inquired anxiously whether I had reported to the American Government the hope of the Thai Government that public statements would be issued by Great Britain and the United States promising to stand by Thailand if invaded by Japan (see Legation's 550, December 4, 3 p.m.).

PECK

HTM

1673

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

Bangkok

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Dated December 8, 1941

FROM

Rec'd. 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

551, December 8, 3 p.m.

During a call on the Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs this morning in reference to gasoline sup-
plies he informed me that the Japanese Ambassador
had just called and informed him that the Japanese
forces in Indochina definitely would not be used
to invade Thai and that they were concentrated for
use against the Burma Road. Consequently Thailand
need feel no anxiety. The Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs informed me that his Government, in spite
of Japanese assurances, is nevertheless greatly
worried because it has received additional evidence
that an attack by land and air is imminent. He
was unwilling to tell the nature of the evidence
but said he had asked the British Minister to call
in order to make up on the report. My British
colleague has received no (recent) evidence of
this sort recently so far as I am aware. The

Foreign

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 12 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 11 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/681

FILED

PS/RK

DEC 16 1941

740.0011 P.W.

HMS

-2- #551, December 3, 3 p.m. from Bangkok.

Foreign Minister inquired anxiously whether I had reported to the American Government the hope of the Thai Government that public statements would be issued by Great Britain and the United States promising to stand by Thailand if invaded by Japan (see Legation's 550, December 4, 3 p.m.).

PECK

HTM

1693

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

Chungking via N. R.

FROM Dated December 6, 1941

Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State, DEC 15 1941
Washington.

477, December 6, noon.

The Chief of the Information Department of the Foreign Office informed a member of my staff yesterday that the British "wanted to move into Thailand but hesitated to do so in the absence of a clear indication of the American attitude. He said that this report came from a very reliable source in the United States. I attach no significance to the report except as indicative of an interesting and somewhat prevalent tendency to play up the situation.

GAUSS

PEG

DEC 17 1941

FILED

FS/ATB

740.6011 PACIFIC WAR/712

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Full rate
Collect Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

3

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

December 6, 1941

6 P.M.

AMERICAN LEGATION,

BANGKOK, (THAILAND).

Rush 549 168
Your ~~2~~, December 4, 1 p.m.

You may assure Thai authorities that extension of a credit to Thailand for current needs is fully agreed to in principle, and that Department expects no delay in working out details with the appropriate lending agency of this Government.

892.51/238

Stull
JK

892.51/238

FD:FL:ME

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., 19 _____

PS/E

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
RECEIVED

DEC 12

SUBJECT: Reported dispatches from the Thai Government that British forces not move into Thailand

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. W. G. Hayter,
First Secretary,
British Embassy,
and
Mr. Atcheson

COMES TO:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 12
Department of State

OFFICE SECRETARY OF STATE
DEC 11 1941
MR. WELLES

During a call on Mr. Atcheson this morning Mr. Hayter, in response to an inquiry whether there was any news, stated, after some hesitation, that the British Minister in Thailand had sent a message to the Foreign Office which began "For God's sake" and which was endorsed by the Thai Foreign Minister requesting that British armed forces not move into Thailand.

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/1061

FILED
DEC 12 1941

FE:Atcheson:HES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM GRAY
BANGKOK



Dated December 7, 1941


Rec'd 4 a.m., 8th

File to Chicago
289 Dec. 8 5 p.m.
res

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

SSS, December 7, 8 a.m.



NPW
248
242-94

The correspondents have been officially informed that the Japanese attacked Thailand at various places on the land and sea frontiers at 2 a.m., December 8, and that Thai forces resisted. The Government ordered cease firing 7:30 a.m., and negotiations are taking place. Bangkok is quiet. American citizens will concentrate in the Legation in case of disorders.

PECK

HM

DEC 12 1941

FILED

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/70B

PS/ATB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



NHN

FROM Bangkok

This telegram must be
properly paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Dated December 8, 1941

Rec'd. 2:59 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

LNA

File
DEC 16 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TRIPLE PRIORITY

567, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned me
and other diplomatic representatives in succession
this afternoon. His remarks to me were the same as
made to the British Minister. The gist follows:

Two. He informed me with I believe sincere
grief that his Government had yielded to overwhelming
Japanese force and at D'Annunzio today had signed an
agreement permitting passage of Japanese troops
through Thailand by way of Bangkok in order to attack
Burma and Malaya. In return Japan guaranteed the
sovereignty independence and honor of the country
and gave an assurance that the country would not be
disarmed. The Japanese offered to include restoration
of all lost territory but the Thai Government refused
because it wished the world to know that it only
yielded to force and not for gain. I inquired how
this arrangement

PECK

HPW
792.94

HNS

740.0011 P.M./831

FILE

PS/RK 31

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NNN

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Bangkok
FROM

Dated December 8, 1941

Rec'd. 2:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

857, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

affected the status of the American Legation and American citizens and the Foreign Minister replied that these points were not discussed and that since Thailand remained independent he believed that American status was not involved. He volunteered that in reply to a question from the British Minister he had assured the latter that if British forces as well entered this country to oppose Japan they would not be opposed.

(The Prime Minister confirmed this over the telephone to the British Minister)

Three. Events leading up to this agreement were as follows: At 11 o'clock night of December 7 the Japanese Ambassador and staff called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs but the latter was absent near the frontier at Aranya. The Japanese were finally received by the

-8- 557, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Bangkok.

by the Foreign Minister and the latter was told that Japan was fighting for its life with Great Britain and the United States and intended to make wide spread attacks on their territory at 1 o'clock in the morning of December 8,

PECK

JHL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Bangkok
Dated December 8, 1941
Rec'd 2:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

557, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

part of these attacks would be made through Thailand and Japan demanded that passage of troops be allowed. Japan offered this country certain choices (one) to join Japan in the war against the United States and Great Britain in return for which Japan would not only guarantee the sovereignty, independence and honor of the country but would restore all territories lost previously to foreign powers; (two) Thailand could join the three power pact and permit passage of troops in which modified proposal there would be no promise of restoration of territory. The Thais refused to join the pact and the final agreement has been described. The Thai representatives said that in the absence of the Prime Minister who is Commander-in-Chief no (repeat no) reply could be given and no orders could be

-2-#557, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Bangkok.

could be given and no orders could be issued to the

PECK

JRL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Bangkok

Dated December 8, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 6:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

557, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Thai troops; they asked therefore that the
forcible attempt to enter Thailand at one
o'clock should be at least deferred. The
Japanese replied that no change would be made
in the planned attack.

Fighting occurred during the night and
this morning at Singora, Pattani and Prachuab
on the southern coast and at Watana and Aranya
on the Eastern frontier. The Thais lost
possibly a battalion of troops at Pattani.

The Foreign Minister was deeply moved;
he recalled the efforts made by his (*) to
(*) arms (?) and he expressed gratitude for
the friendliness shown by the United States.
He said that the hearts of the Thai were with
the United States and Great Britain and I

PECK

LMS

(*) apparent omission

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PH
This telegram must be FROM
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Bangkok
Dated December 8, 1941
Rec'd 4:52 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

557, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

could not but admit the sincerity of this country's effort to resist Japan and the overwhelming force to which it finally yielded.

It is the intention of the British Minister and myself to continue our duties normally as far as we can. It is almost impossible for our nationals under existing circumstances to leave and they have been offered quarters in the Legation if they wish them.

The Legation telegraphed American citizens in northern Thailand advising them to consider leaving for Burma. The city seems as peaceful as usual.

(END OF MESSAGE)

PECK

LM3

EXHIBIT NO. 170

(NOTE.—Documents contained in this Exhibit were obtained from files regarding Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short in the War Dept. and are supplemental to those documents appearing in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 140)

TABLE OF CONTENTS**SECTION A. DOCUMENTS RE RELIEF OF GEN. SHORT FROM COMMAND AND HIS SUBSEQUENT RETIREMENT (PAGE 3794)**

Dec. 18, 1941	Message to War Dept. reflecting the relief of Gen. Short by Gen. Emmons as commander of Hawaiian Dept.
Jan. 12, 1942	Message reporting departure of Gen. Short and others from Hawaii for mainland.
Jan. 12, 1942	Message reporting arrival of Gen. Short and others at San Francisco.
Jan. 13, 1942	Telegraphic orders to Gen. Short to proceed to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for temporary duty.
	Handwritten memo by H. L. S. (Sec'y Stimson) re Gen. Short case.
	Handwritten note (Gen. Marshall) on wording of the acceptance of Gen. Short's retirement.
Feb. 17, 1942	Memo by Gen. Hilldring for TAG re action in detail required re Gen. Short's retirement.
Feb. 17, 1942	Memo for file by Col. Ostrander re actions taken with reference to handling Gen. Short's retirement.
Feb. 17, 1942	Acceptance of Gen. Short's retirement by ar Dept.
Feb. 17, 1942	Letter to Gen. Short accepting his retirement effective 2-28-42.
Feb. 18, 1942	Receipt from Gen. Short of retirement papers.
Feb. 19, 1942	Notes from Col. Ostrander and others re handling of press release on Gen. Short's retirement.
Feb. 14, 1942	Copy of letter from Sec'y Stimson to Sec'y Knox suggesting wording of saving clause in acceptance of retirement of Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel.
Feb. 25, 1942	Blind memo stating President intends to ask for a courts-martial of Gen. Short and Admiral Kimmel on question of dereliction of duty.
	Article of War 97.
Feb. 26, 1942	Memo for Chiefs of Staff from JAG division re proposed courts-martial of Gen. Short.
Feb. 26, 1942	Final draft of press release on Gen. Short's retirement, as approved by President.
Feb. 27, 1942	Memo from Gen. Marshall for Sec'y of War relating that approved news release was read to Gen. Short over the phone before release.
Feb. 28, 1942	Press release on Gen. Short's retirement.
Feb. 28, 1942	Wire service bulletin on announcement of retirement of Gen. Short and Admiral Kimmel.
Feb. 28, 1942	Navy Dept. Communique #47 announcing retirement of Admiral Kimmel.
Mar. 9, 1941	Letter from Gen. Short to TAG asking retirement be changed to read "for physical disability in line of duty."
Mar. 17, 1942	Letter from TAG to Gen. Short stating his request of Mar. 9, 1941 for change in retirement was not possible.

SECTION B. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO WAIVER OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PAGE 3818)

Sept. 10, 1943	Handwritten memo of H. L. S. (Sec'y Stimson) suggesting War Dept. get waiver from Gen. Short.
Sept. 10, 1943	Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War re obtaining waiver as had been done by Navy Dept. with Adm. Kimmel.
	Memo from Lt. Col. Wm. J. Hughes, Jr. to JAG re validity of agreement in advance to waiver statute of limitations.

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Sept. 7, 1943	Letter from Adm. Kimmel to Sec'y of Navy and waiver of statute of limitations. Draft of letter from Sec'y of War to Gen. Short asking for waiver and proposed waiver.
Sept. 25, 1943	Memo from Gen. Green to JAG transmitting attached waiver dates Sept. 20, 1943 from Gen. Short.
Sept. 22, 1943	Telegram from Gen. Green to JAG re completion of his mission.
Sept. 28, 1943	Memo from Gen. Green for JAG re trip to see Gen. Short and obtain waiver.
Sept. 27, 1943	Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War suggesting a public announcement of the waiver.

SECTION C. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE ROBERTS COMMISSION RECORDS (PAGE 3830)

Mar. 2, 1942	Memo from Gen. Hildring to JAG transmitting Roberts Commission entire file to JAG for use in connection with preparation of charges against Gen. Short.
Mar. 4, 1942	Memo from Lt. Col. J. L. Harbough, Jr. to Col. F. Granville Munson for use in preparing charges against Gen. Short, transmitting the entire Roberts Commission file. Memo from Col. R. N. Young to JAG asking that entire Roberts Commission file be forwarded to the Executive Officer, Operations Division, War Dept. General Staff.
Nov. 23, 1942	Memo from Col. J. M. Weir to Executive Officer, OPD, WDGS, transmitting the entire record of the Roberts Commission.
June 26, 1944	Memo from Gen. Green to Gen. Weir stating Gen. Short had requested he be furnished complete copy of Roberts Commission proceedings.
June 23, 1944	Letter from Gen. Short to TAG asking he be furnished complete copy of proceedings of Roberts Commission.
June 30, 1944	Memo from Gen. White to Chief of Staff suggesting that Gen. Short's request for a copy of Roberts Commission proceedings be put to the President for decision.
July 4, 1944	Memo from Sec'y of War for President asking for decision on furnishing Gen. Short copy of Roberts Commission proceedings bearing OK of the President.
July 25, 1944	Informal action record ordering that Gen. Short be furnished a photostatic copy of Roberts Commission proceedings.
July 29, 1944	Memo from Col. West to TAG asking that an extra photostatic copy of Roberts Commission proceedings be prepared for use by the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Aug. 9, 1944	Receipt from Gen. Short to TAG for photostatic copy of Roberts Commission, transcrip, less Exhibits.

SECTION D. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR GEN. SHORT (PAGE 3847)

Feb. 27, 1944	Message from Col. Greer to JAG re appointment as counsel for Gen. Short.
Mar. 1, 1944	Letter from Col. Greer to JAG re defense of Gen. Short.
Mar. 10, 1944	Letter from JAG to Col. Greer re taking of testimony in Gen. Short's case.
Mar. 4, 1944	Transcription of conversation between Gen. Weir and Col. Springer re counsel for Gen. Short.
Feb. 29, 1944	Letter from Gen. Short to TAG asking that Col. A. J. Greer be detailed to act as his counsel in any court-martial.
Mar. 22, 1944	Letter from Gen. Short to JAG requesting that he be allowed to enter agreement with War Dept. safeguarding his rights if he participated in a program of recording testimony of certain witnesses.
July 24, 1944	Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting that Gen. T. H. Green be detailed as his military counsel.

July 31, 1944 JAG memo to TAG approving assignment of Gen. Green as counsel to Short.
 Aug. 15, 1944 TAG memo appointing of Gen. Green as counsel for Gen. Short.

SECTION E. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD AND PRESERVATION OF TESTIMONY PRIOR TO ITS ORGANIZATION (PAGE 8858)

Feb. 25, 1944 Report of Navy Sec'y Press Conference when it was announced that Admiral T. C. Hart had been assigned to collect testimony from Navy officers concerning the Pearl Harbor attack, and that courts-martial would be postponed until after "war situation had subsided."
 Mar. 2, 1944 Extracts from Sec'y of War's Press Conference where it was stated that War Dept. was cooperating with the Navy Dept. in assembling evidence in the cases of Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel.
 July 18, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting detail of two officers as observers for him at all hearings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
 July 21, 1944 Memo from Gen. White to Gen. Grunert transmitting request of Gen. Short for officer observers at APHB hearings.
 July 26, 1944 Memo from Gen. Grunert to Ass't Chief of Staff, G-1, War Dept. recommending that Gen. Short's request for officer observers at APHB hearings be denied.
 Aug. 3, 1944 Letter from TAG to Gen. Short denying his request for appointment of two officer observers at APHB hearings.
 Aug. 2, 1944 Message from TAG to Gen. Short advising him APHB contemplates calling him as witness and asks him for suggested list witnesses which he thinks have knowledge of facts bearing upon the investigation.
 Aug. 4, 1944 Message from Gen. Short to TAG saying list of prospective witnesses will be furnished after consultation with his counsel.
 Aug. 14, 1944 Action sheet memo, 1st endorsement by Gen. Grunert referring to request of Gen. Short that he be furnished a copy of APHB testimony before board, etc. Recommends he be furnished copy of his testimony before Board, that he be denied request for copy of all other testimony taken before the Board and that he be allowed to have access to Board's Exhibits at convenience of Board, the Exhibits to remain with the Board.
 2nd endorsement to above by JAG recommended allowing copy of testimony of APHB be furnished Gen. Short, less Exhibits.
 Aug. 20, 1944 Memo for record, Ass't Chief of Staff, G-1, approves request of Gen. Short for copy of APHB proceedings as set forth in 2nd endorsement above.
 Aug. 11, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting he be furnished a copy of transcript of testimony before APHB and access to its Exhibits, and TAG's approval as attached.
 Aug. 31, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting he be furnished copies of synopses of testimony before APHB.
 Sept. 20, 1944 Memo by Gen. Grunert recommending disapproval of Gen. Short's request for synopses of testimony taken before APHB.
 Sept. 28, 1944 Memo from Col. R. E. Kunkel to TAG recommending disapproval of Gen. Short's request for synopses of testimony taken before APHB.
 Oct. 1, 1944 Memo of approval by Ass't Chief of Staff, G-1, of the recommendation of TAG above denying Gen. Short's request for synopses of testimony taken before APHB, and attached TAG letter to Gen. Short so advising him.
 Oct. 3, 1944 Memo from Gen. McNarney to Gen. Grunert transmitting letter from Gen. Short to Sec'y of War and reply thereto by the Sec'y re testimony before APHB.

3792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Sept. 29, 1944	Letter from Gen. Short to Sec'y of War referring to fact that APHB has apparently not been furnished full details re intercepted Jap messages, and asks that all such information be made available to the Board.
Oct. 2, 1944	Reply to Gen. Short's letter of Sept. 29, 1944 by Sec'y of War assuring him the APHB was exploring all sources of evidence bearing on the Pearl Harbor attack.
Aug. 24, 1944	Memo by Col. West for Staff and members of APHB re handling of Board's transcript of testimony.
Sept. 2, 1944	Letter from Col. Wm. J. Hughes, Jr. to Col. Chas. W. West, Recorder, APHB re copy of Major Clausen's memo of July 10, 1944 to Mr. Amberg, which he did not think should be furnished to Gen. Bragdon, as counsel for Col. Wyman.
Sept. 2, 1944	Memo from Col. Hughes to Maj. B. R. Powell re order creating APHB and referring matter of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., to Board, with attached copy of order of Sec'y of War dated July 8, 1944 creating the APHB, and memo of acting Sec'y of War dated July 12, 1944 referring Wyman matter to Board.
Sept. 4, 1944	List of personnel of APHB making trip to Hawaii in connection with its investigation.
Sept. 13, 1944	Letter from Col. West to Col. Hughes re APHB transcripts.
Sept. 21, 1944	Memo from JAG to Gen. Weir stating that on recommendation of Gen. McNarney, the APHB be advised that Col. Hughes of the JAG office be allowed to familiarize himself with APHB proceedings to facilitate review of APHB Report by the JAG when report submitted to him for opinion.
Oct. 23, 1944	War Dept. Press Release reporting APHB report had been received by the Sec'y of War, who had referred it to the JAG for consideration.
Oct. 26, 1944	Excerpt of Press Conference of Sec'y of War in which the Sec'y stated the situation had not changed re APHB and refused any comment on the report.
Nov. 30, 1944	Semi final draft of statement for Sec'y of War on APHB report indicating partial approval and disapproval of criticism by Board, and that further investigation would be conducted under his direction. Handwritten JAG note concludes "errors of judgment only". . . . "Reason: forestall demand for Ct. M."
Aug. 12, 1944	Message from TAG to CG, 9th Service Command requesting he facilitate work of APHB which would hold hearings at San Francisco.
Aug. 29, 1944	Message from Gen. Somervell to Gen. Richardson re trip of Gen. Bragdon to Honolulu as counsel for Col. Wyman, and preparation of records for his examination.
Dec. 6, 1944	Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War re effect of inactivation or discharge of APHB military personnel upon amenability to prosecution for unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
-----	Memo from Harvey H. Bundy to Col. Hughes re combination of safe containing documents to be examined by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen.

F. CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH WAR DEPT. AND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LEGISLATION EXTENDING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PAGE 3903)

Feb. 14, 1942	Letter from Sen. Hayden transmitting copy of letter of constituent and War Dept. reply of Feb. 19, 1942.
Sept. 11, 1943	Letter from Sen. Brooks and War Dept. replies of Sept. 16, 1943 and Oct. 8, 1943, and JAG memo of Oct. 4, 1943 saying delay in answering letter, and proposed draft of letter to Sen. Brooks.
Nov. 22, 1943	Letter from Sen. E. C. Johnson to JAG re Gen. Short's case and reply dated Nov. 25, 1943 stating waiver of statute of limitations had been obtained.

May 18, 1944' Reply of Sec'y of War to letter from Congressman Mansfield dated May 10, 1944 stating he does not consider a trial of Gen. Short must be held during war time and waiver obtained would permit trial later.

May 25, 1944 Memo from JAG for Legislative and Liaison Division and draft of letter to Congressman Celler in reply to his letter of May 18, 1944 re H. J. Res. 283 to extend statute of limitations.

June 3, 1944 Letter from Sen. Ferguson to JAG re question of "manifest impediment" stated in Article of War 39, and reply dated June 1, 1944 enclosing memo re "meaning of 'Manifest Impediment' in Article of War 39" prepared by Col. Hughes.

June 1, 1944 Letter from JAG of Army to JAG of Navy transmitting copy of his letter to Sen. Ferguson of same date and copy of memo re "Manifest Impediment."

Dec. 9, 1943 Letter from Attorney General to Director of Budget Bureau re H. J. Res. 199 stating he had no objection to it.

Dec. 13, 1943 Letter from Attorney General to Director of Budget Bureau re H. J. Res. 199 stating that he does not think the resolution will accomplish the purpose its sponsors have in mind, but he has no objection to it.

June 9, 1944 Letter from Attorney General to Director of Budget Bureau re S. J. Res. 133 stating he has no objection to it.

June 6, 1945 Letter from Sec'y of War to Director of Budget Bureau re S. J. Res. 66 stating the Department regarded the legislation would be ineffective to extend the statute of limitations.

June 8, 1945 Transcript of conversation between JAG and Ass't Solicitor General Hugh Cox re meaning of legislation directing Sec'y of War and Sec'y of Navy to commence investigations of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

June 15, 1944 Transcript of Conversation between JAG and Gen. McNarney re legislation directing Sec'y of War to investigate attack on Pearl Harbor and for similar action by Navy.

June 15, 1944 Memo from J.A.G. of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re legislation directing investigation of Pearl Harbor attack.

June 15, 1944 Memo from JAG of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re legislation relating to Pearl Harbor Prosecutions.

June 15, 1944 Draft of statement for Sec'y of Navy re Joint Resolution regarding Pearl Harbor catastrophe.

June 15, 1944 Memo from C. H. Bull, Navy, to Gen. Weir re Kimmel-Short courts-martial suggesting it be decided by the President.

June 17, 1944 Memo from JAG of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re S. J. Res. 133 recommending a Navy Court of Inquiry.

June 24, 1944 Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War re Public Law 339, 78th Cong. directing investigation of Pearl Harbor attack by Secretaries of War and Navy, recommending a board of officers be appointed to conduct the investigation for the Sec'y of War.

June 30, 1944 Memo from Adm. Gatch to Gen. Cramer re copies of Roberts Commission testimony.

Dec. 30, 1943 Memo from JAG of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re H. J. Res. 189 saying it could be ignored.

Memo from Lt. Col. Hughes for Gen. Cramer re legal aspects of extending statute of limitations for courts-martial proceedings.

3794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Section A

S. C. Form No. 11

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at War Department Message Center,
Room 3441, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

A. G. O.
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED

1941 DEC 18 AM 2:57

PTW:HTON TH 114 DEC 18 1941

WASHINGTON TO

REURD 080 SEVENTEEN DECEMBER LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER S. GORTZ JR.
ARMY REL INQUIRY AND COMMAND AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL POLUE D. EVANS
HONORARY HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT SEVENTEEN DECEMBER

DEC 18 1941

Executive Officer & Col. Whipple
To note - then to
Rec Sec - note - Index & file

noted
Wagland

FD

12/18/41

Reimbursing
1509

RECEIVED
OFFICERS' DIVISION
A. G. O.

645/20241-295

CE
P2WTJ
130P/JAN 12

RADIOGRAM

AC-5

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

JANUARY 12

9:10P M.

From FT SHAFTER

To ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1649--JANUARY 12

MAJOR GENERALS WALTER C SHORT COMMA ACCOMPANIED
BY AIDE CAPTAIN LOUIS W TRUMAN INF COMMA AND
FREDRICK L MARTIN LEFT ON CLIPPER ELEVENTH
JANUARY FOR MAINLAND ASSIGNMENT STOP CAPT
TRUMAN IS PROCEEDING BY AIR ON TEMPORARY DUTY
WITH ROBERTS COMMISSION SEMICOLON UPON COM-
PLETION THIS DUTY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED REPORT
YOUR OFFICE FOR TRAVEL TO STATION OF GENERAL
SHORT

47 A G O

JAN 12 1942

Received

10:40pm

13

830 2/23/42

Index & File

RECEIVED-ADJ-ADJUTANT GENERAL JAN 12 1942

90

S. C. Form No. 11

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at War Department Message Center,
Room 3441, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

229 WVY. GL 27 PTY WD

J.T.H.
9:42

HQ WDC AND 4TH ARMY PRES SANFRAN 121P JAN 12

AG
WNDC

MAJOR GENERALS WALTER C SHORT O DASH 1621 AND FREDERICK L MARTIN O DASH 2507 REPORTED THIS HQ FOR DUTY JAN TWELFTH COMPLIANCE WAR DEPT ORDERS.

DEWITT CG WDC AND FOURTH ARMY

853P

noted by Rogers 1/17/42 Jan 16/42

noted by Gen Adams 1/13/42

Col Whipple Sm

To note when noted by Rec Sec. Under File

Round Section

noted 1/15/42

Venue 1/16/42

Pennington 1/15/42

RECEIVED
SIGNAL DIVISION
JAN 13 1942

RECEIVED - 1217 - FIRST-CLASS DELIVERED TO THE ADDRESSEE BY AIR MAIL

JAN 12 1915.

TELEGRAM

SPECIAL BUSINESS- GOVERNMENT RATES

WAR DEPARTMENT

A. G. S.
NO 23 32 (1-12-42) 2

JANUARY 12, 1915.

COMMUNICATING GENERAL

GENERAL ADVISORY BOARD AND BOARD OF WAR

PRELIMINARY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

ATTENTION AGAIN GENERAL BOARD OF WAR (1-12-15) RE ADVISORY BOARD OF WAR
DIRECTOR HAS REQUESTED TO ADVISORY BOARD OF WAR (1-12-15) RE ADVISORY BOARD
INSTRUCTIONS BY SECRETARY OF WAR AND BOARD OF WAR (1-12-15) RE ADVISORY BOARD
OFFICE SHOULD TO BOARD OF WAR AND BOARD TO THE ADVISORY BOARD (1-12-15)
REMARKS (1-12-15) RE ADVISORY BOARD (1-12-15) RE ADVISORY BOARD (1-12-15)

ADVIS

OFFICIAL:

ADVISORY GENERAL.

DIRECTOR:

OSWALD, THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

MISS PHIBBS, THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

MR. JORDAN, THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

**WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM**

Schon

This is to be held for
a few days to await
the cooling down of the
situation

H. S.

128

is accepted, ~~as to be~~ effective —
to ~~be~~ taken in
national production, ~~the~~ interests of the
Government.

3800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION 8-1
WASHINGTON

21/12/42

February 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Subject: A. In connection with the return of
General William H. Short, United States
Army.

The Secretary of the War Department:

1. The Adjutant General is requested to prepare a general
order for General Short, United States Army, the following order will be
issued:

A. The Adjutant General is requested to prepare the order of The
Adjutant General, United States Army, Short, United States Army, to effect
the return of General Short, United States Army, for over 10 years, which
will be effective from June 1, 1942, until the expiration
of 10 years, or until the expiration of the 10-year period.

B. The Adjutant General is requested to prepare the order of The
Adjutant General, United States Army, Short, United States Army, to effect
the return of General Short, United States Army, for over 10 years, which
will be effective from June 1, 1942, until the expiration
of 10 years, or until the expiration of the 10-year period.

C. The Adjutant General is requested to prepare the order of The
Adjutant General, United States Army, Short, United States Army, to effect
the return of General Short, United States Army, for over 10 years, which
will be effective from June 1, 1942, until the expiration
of 10 years, or until the expiration of the 10-year period.

D. The Adjutant General is requested to prepare the order of The
Adjutant General, United States Army, Short, United States Army, to effect
the return of General Short, United States Army, for over 10 years, which
will be effective from June 1, 1942, until the expiration
of 10 years, or until the expiration of the 10-year period.

E. The Adjutant General is requested to prepare the order of The
Adjutant General, United States Army, Short, United States Army, to effect
the return of General Short, United States Army, for over 10 years, which
will be effective from June 1, 1942, until the expiration
of 10 years, or until the expiration of the 10-year period.

F. The Adjutant General is requested to prepare the order of The
Adjutant General, United States Army, Short, United States Army, to effect
the return of General Short, United States Army, for over 10 years, which
will be effective from June 1, 1942, until the expiration
of 10 years, or until the expiration of the 10-year period.

132
CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

The application of Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, for retirement is approved by the President, and by his direction Major General Short is retired from active service to take effect February 28, 1942, under the provisions of Section 1243, Revised Statutes, after more than thirty-nine years' service.

February 17, 1942.

APPROVED

By order of the Secretary of War:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'E. S. Adams', with a large, sweeping initial 'E'.

E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

3804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

BSA

AG 801-Short, Walter C.
(1-21-42) CG

February 17, 1942.

Retirement.

Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army,
610 N. W. 19th Street,
Kilham City, Oklahoma.

In reference to your letter of January 29, 1942,
requesting retirement under the provisions of R. S. 1243,
10 U. S. C. 943; H. L. 1939, sec. 326, you are advised
that your application for retirement is accepted, effective
February 28, 1942, without condonation of any offense or
prejudice to any future disciplinary action.

By order of the Secretary of War:

L. S. ADAMS,

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Delivered by courier H. J. Richardson
on Feb. 18, 1942, 10:45 AM, February
18, 1942.

APR 5 42 AM

REC
F. S. G.

127
4-11-42

1917

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

IN REPLY
REFER TO

5



135

3806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SHORT

February 19, 1942..

Notes - (from Col. Ostrander)

1. At 9:45 A.M. - Feb. 19, if nothing heard from General Short - call Colonel Walsh (G-1 office) and report fact. Walsh #2606..
2. Wait for Secretary of War's release on order. (Reg. mail - return receipt demanded)

Notes by Col. Hemenway

Herewith - 1. Ret. order (original and two carbons)

2. Let of transmittal with one form.
3. Memo to AG from G-1, Feb 17th with one carbon.
4. Memo - Sequence of events (by Col. Ostrander)
5. Signed receipt from Gen. Short for letter advising re retirement.
6. Copy of letter to Gen. Short.
7. Copy of retirement order as originally drafted showing administrative correction reference P/A for shipment of H.M. goods.

and station,

9:45 A.M. - February 19th

- Called Col. Walsh for instructions.
- Reported no word from General Short.
- Walsh stated that last night General Hilling called, stating Sec. Simpson had talked to President (assumed Sec. Knox was in on this) and that any communication to press would be made by President.
No orders to issue until release obtained from Sec. War or P-1.

CHH

137

FEBRUARY 14, 1942.

DEAR FRANK: Here is my own revised suggestion as to the saving clause to be inserted in the acceptance of the retirement:

"without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any action on behalf of the Government."

Any reasons we want to give for our action can be said to the press. I am in favor of leaving the acceptance itself in this language if the Attorney General says that it is sufficient to keep open the power to court martial. I will talk with you about it on Monday if you desire.

Faithfully yours,

/S/ HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

Hon. FRANK KNOX,
The Secretary of the Navy.

HLS: ECN

FEBRUARY 25, 1942.

The President intends to ask for a court-martial on the issue of whether as stated in the report of the Roberts' Commission, there was a dereliction of duty on the part of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; the court to be held as soon as the public interest permits. It is the privilege of the officers themselves to ask for such a court-martial.

ARTICLE OF WAR 97: When and by whom ordered:

A court of inquiry to examine into the nature of any transaction of or accusation or imputation against any officer or soldier may be ordered by the President or by any commanding officer; but a court of inquiry shall not be ordered by any commanding officer except upon the request of the officer or soldier whose conduct is to be inquired into.

Charges and specifications sworn to.

Anybody subject to military law may swear to them. No officer has a right to institute a court martial against himself.

4/11
alla
4-1-12

97

February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for the Chief of Staff.

Subject: Retirement of General Walter J. Short.

1. General Short was notified that his application for retirement was accepted effective February 20, 1942, "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action". I understand that at the time this notice was delivered to General Short he was orally notified by the courier delivering the letter that if he had any objections to make they should be made within twenty-four hours, otherwise the order for his retirement would issue. Under these conditions the rights of the Government to bring him to trial before court-martial are preserved and trial may be had at any time within the period of the Statute of Limitations when it may be in the public interest to do so.
2. It would seem inadvisable at this time as a matter of policy to issue a statement that these officers will be tried by court-martial at any specified future time. Nothing would be gained by such commitment. The exigencies of the service may be such that it will be impossible at that time to try these officers. It is impossible to tell what the war conditions will be at any future time, the officers who would be required as witnesses will very probably be scattered all over the world, and it might be a physical impossibility to assemble them for such a trial. Furthermore, these officers will most likely be engaged in most important duties from which they cannot be relieved without serious damage to the war effort. The defense would certainly attempt to pass part of the blame to the War Department. Such evidence or argument, if publicly aired, would tend to discredit the War Department and cause a lack of confidence by the people in the men in charge of the war operations. This would certainly be so if the trial should result in acquittal or a mild sentence.
3. With reference to the suggestion that it is the privilege of the officers themselves to ask for such a court-martial, in so far as General Short is concerned there is no law which authorizes him to request a court-martial. He would, under the 10th Article of War, demand a court of inquiry but there would be no object in granting such a request inasmuch as the Roberts Commission has already investigated the matter and covered the same ground as would a military court of inquiry. Furthermore, when charges are preferred they must be sworn to by a person subject to military law

CONFIDENTIAL

to the effect that he personally signed the charges and specifications and that he has personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the specifications, or that he has investigated the matters set forth in the specifications, and that the same are true in fact to the best of his knowledge and belief. The theory of the Articles of War is that persons are tried by a court-martial, not upon their own request but upon charges preferred as above stated. No such charges have as yet been preferred, and it is thought inadvisable for the President to announce in advance of such preferment that the officers concerned will be tried, as his doing so would give an opportunity to the defenses to allege that the President is the accuser and to charge that the court convened by him, the sentence of which is subject to his approval, is not an impartial body.

This case was taken in person by General
Cramer to the Chief of Staff at 4:15 a.m.,
February 26, 1942.

al.

H.H.B.

Final

February 26, 1942.

The Secretary of War announced today the acceptance, effective February 28, 1942, of the application for retirement of General Walter C. Short, "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."

The Secretary of War announced at the same time that, based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts' Commission, he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court-martial of General Short, alleging dereliction of duty. The Secretary of War made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM

Papers on Gen Short's
Retirement as approved
by the Pres.

4-25

C/O

Reb 4/16/42. 131347-61B 126

DIAGRAM OF THE LAMMA

3812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Second Section File
File

G-1/14-15-16

February 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

WVS

General Hildring read the approved news release to General Short over the telephone yesterday evening at about seven o'clock. A copy of the news release was also sent by air mail, special delivery, to General Short at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, where he is visiting at present.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

APR 1 1942 AM

RECEIVED
FEB 27 1942

4/18/42

SECRET

PR 4/1

1. Clark, initiate 2. How (2-27-42)

WIRE SERVICE BULLETIN
Prepared from wire service news stories received by

INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS BRANCH
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
War Dept. Branch No. 4759

2:30 p.m., February 28

Official Use Only

**COURT-MARTIAL
FOR KIMMEL AND SHORT**

Washington--The Secretaries of War and Navy today ordered trials by court-martial for the two men blamed in the report of the Roberts Commission for the Pearl Harbor disaster--Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Maj. Gen. Walter O. Short. Secretary Stimson announced that Short would be charged with "dereliction of duty"--the same accusation made by the Roberts Commission. Secretary Knox, however, simply stated that he had ordered the "preparation of charges" for court-martial of Kimmel, the charges to embrace the findings of the Commission.

Both men had made application for retirement on February 7 and in the announcements today their requests were granted but "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action." --LWS (1:22P)

**PRESIDENT NAMES MEMBERS
OF U. S. - MEXICAN COMMISSION**

Washington--President Roosevelt today named U. S. members on a joint Mexican-U. S. Commission created "to consider broad plans for the defense of Mexico and adjacent areas of the U. S." The members named by the President are Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, U. S. Army, retired, chairman, and Vice Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, U. S. Navy, retired. --UP (11:40A)

**NAZIS SEND PLANES TO AID
16TH ARMY, MOSCOW REPORTS**

Moscow--Adolf Hitler was reported tonight to have shifted perhaps 1,800 airplanes to the blazing northwestern front in a desperate attempt to save the 16th Nazi Army at Staraya Russa from annihilation under short-range blasts of Russian artillery fire. --UP (12:49P)

**FARM LEADERS SEEK
CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT**

Washington--The Senate Agriculture Committee today named a special subcommittee to seek a conference with President Roosevelt in an effort to heal the breach between the White House and the "farm bloc" over prices of farm products. --LWS (12:27P)

**JAPS CLAIM CAPTURE
OF BRITISH CRUISER**

Berlin--A German Official News Agency dispatch from Tokyo said today that Japanese naval bombers set a British cruiser of the Exeter Class (9,350 tons, 600 officers and men) afire near Batavia yesterday. --UP (11:44A)

END

CONFIDENTIAL

Navy Department Communiqué # 47, 28 February 1942.

The Secretary of the Navy announced today the acceptance effective March 1, 1942 of the application for retirement of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, "without condemnation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action." The Secretary of the Navy announced at the same time that based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts Commission he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court martial of Rear Admiral Kimmel alleging dereliction of duty. The

Secretary of Navy made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.

CONFIDENTIAL

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3816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

OFFICERS CLUB,
Fort Sam Houston, Texas,
March 9, 1941.

Subject: Physical Condition.

To : The Adjutant General,
United States Army,
Washington, D. C.

1. On February 27, 1942, the undersigned reported to the Station Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and requested a thorough physical examination prior to contemplated retirement. This examination was completed on February 28, 1942, and the report of the same is a matter of record at the hospital named above.

2. As a result of the examination, including necessary laboratory procedure, I was advised by the examining physicians that on account of a heart and lung condition I should limit and restrict my physical activities. At the same time I was advised informally that my physical condition existing at the time of the examination and necessarily for some time prior thereto was such as would have warranted and required my retirement from active service on account of physical disability.

3. In view of the foregoing it is requested that a copy of the report of the physical examination pertaining to my case and referred to above be obtained from the Commanding Officer of the Station Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and that appropriate action, based upon the recorded physical findings, be taken by your office.

4. Although the effective date of my retirement was February 28, 1942, it is requested that, if possible, action be taken to change my status to retirement on account of physical disability incurred in line of duty and incident to the military service.

5. I am aware of the probable legal difficulties in the way of such a course of action. In the event the action requested can not be now legally accomplished, then it is requested that the report of the physical examination be filed with my retirement papers. If the report of the physical examination sufficiently establishes physical disability in line of duty and incident to the military service which, but for the accomplished fact of retirement at my own request, would have warranted or required my retirement for physical disability, then I request that a finding to that effect be entered upon the same and included with the record of my retirement.

6. I disclaim any intention to embarrass or annoy the War Department in time of war with my personal affairs. However, having now discovered for the first time my physical condition, I very naturally desire that it be made of record with my retirement file and that any corrective action deemed appropriate be taken in connection with the same.

44 A 30
MAR 15 1942
Received

Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army. *Ret.*

130

VAJ

M 1913

A. 201-Short, Walter C.
(3-9-42) OO

March 17, 1942

Change in Retirement orders.

Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, retired,
Officers Club,
Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

1. Reference is made to your letter of March 9, 1942, advising of physical examination at Station Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and requesting action be taken to change your status to retirement on account of physical disability.

2. After retirement under the provisions of Section 1243, Revised Statutes, becomes effective, there is no legal authority to change same to retirement for physical disability. However, the report of your physical examination will be obtained and filed with your record.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General

SW
Return to Chief Clerk

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Section B

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

T. J. A. G.
 - Review. of Sept 10/43
 of all the accusations. This
 presented I think you
 had better go ahead and
 try to follow the Navy's
 example. And get a
 waiver of the Statute.
 Genl Short - will not
 be harmed; on contrary
 he will probably be benefited
 by the Delay

it vs

WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON

Original

SPJGJ

10 Oct 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

Subject: Court-martial of Major General Walter C. Short.

1. The statute of limitations will bar trial of General Short and Admiral Kimmel 7 December next.
2. To meet this situation the Navy Department has obtained from Admiral Kimmel a waiver of the statute of limitations. Copy of letter of Secretary Knox to Admiral Kimmel and photostats of his reply and waiver are attached hereto.
3. In obtaining the waiver from Admiral Kimmel the Navy Department used as an intermediary Rear Admiral Harris, Retired, with whom Admiral Kimmel practices civil engineering in New York City. It is believed desirable that if a waiver is presented to General Short, he should likewise be approached by a personal friend.
4. This office has heard, though it cannot verify, that the Navy Department's action in getting the waiver was approved in advance by the President. The possibility that General Short will not execute a waiver is fully appreciated but an effort in that direction by a trusted intermediary, who can if necessary display Admiral Kimmel's waiver, seems on the whole worthwhile. The undesirable alternatives would be to request legislation extending the statute of limitations in General Short's case or to order an immediate investigation under Article of War 70 and refer the case for trial before a court composed of officers senior to General Short. Arraignment before such a court would stop the running of the statute but the court could hardly proceed with the trial due to the impracticability of obtaining witnesses who are scattered all over the world and could only adjourn indefinitely. Another possibility would be to drop the matter entirely, decision as to which, in view of his former instructions, would doubtless be a matter for the President.
5. In the event a waiver from General Short is desired, there are inclosed herewith letter to him to be signed by you, for delivery by hand, and form of waiver.

Myron C. Cramer

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.



- 3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - Copy ltr. of Sec. of Navy.
Incl. 2 - Photo. copy ltr. 7/9/43
w/1 incl.
Incl. 3 - Ltr. to Gen. Short w/1 incl.

3820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CRAMER.

Re: Validity of agreement in advance to waive statute of limitations.

Examination of the meagre applicable authorities indicates that an agreement made in advance to waive a criminal statute of limitations is of very dubious validity. While the law is that if the bar of the Statute is not asserted it is waived, the basis of the statute of limitations is the sound public policy that prosecuting officers must be diligent to prosecute while the witnesses are available and the details of the crime are fresh in their minds. It is a question whether an accused can agree to waive this public policy. But assuming he can so agree his agreement is at most a contract. If he breaches it he is merely guilty of a breach of contract. His substantive right to plead the Statute would not, in my opinion, be destroyed by an advance agreement not to plead it. He might say the agreement was without consideration or that there was no warrant of law for his agreement in advance to waive the statute of limitations. As to undisclosed offenses, charges as to which had not then been investigated and served on him within the meaning of Article of War 70 nor referred for trial and as to which a court had not even been appointed at the time of the waiver, a substantial showing might be made of his inability to waive a substantive right under these conditions.

No cases of agreements to waive a criminal statute of limitations can be found in the books, itself a strong indication that no one has ever attempted it. There is a statement in 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 228, repeated in 22 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 235, to this effect:

"An indictment, found after the expiration of the time for beginning the prosecution, is barred by the statute of limitations, and it is not saved by the fact that the prosecution was withheld on account of an agreement with accused."

The case cited, however, Com. v. Werner, 5 Pa. Superior, 249-251, shows that the agreement was not an agreement to waive the statute but an agreement to support the prosecutrix and her children.



In civil cases a specific agreement not to assert the statute of limitations is usually upheld. However, in such cases the debtor has reaped an advantage from his promise and the basis of the decision is the equitable ground of estoppel. In 130 A.L.R. 21 there is a minority view illustrated by *Shapley v. Abbott*, 42 N.Y. 443, containing the trenchant statement:

"No case has occurred to me in which a party can, in advance, make a valid promise that a statute founded in public policy shall be inoperative".


The case relied upon by the Navy, *Mullen v. U.S.*, 212 U.S. 516, is hardly conclusive. There a Naval officer was convicted by a court of inquiry as a result of which he was liable to discharge from the service. In this situation he applied to the Secretary of the Navy for a court-martial to try him on charges based on the findings of the court of inquiry. The Secretary of the Navy agreed to the trial by court-martial provided that the accused would agree that the evidence before the court of inquiry, which a statute prohibited being submitted to the court-martial, could in fact be submitted to the court-martial. The Supreme Court on the basis of *Schick v. U.S.*, 195 U.S. 65, permitting waiver of trial by jury, held that the accused could waive his right to have the witnesses appear personally at the trial and that as the Secretary was under no legal obligation to call a court-martial and did so for the benefit of the accused, he could convene the court under such conditions exacted in advance as he saw fit. The case finally turned on the fact that the accused had been deprived of no substantial right as he was allowed to call additional witnesses if he wanted to.

My conclusion therefore, from a quick search, is that a waiver in advance is, as an abstract question, of doubtful legality.

As a concrete question, if the accused executes a waiver he could only repudiate it at the trial by pleading the statute of limitations. The court would probably overrule the plea on the basis of the waiver which the prosecution would thereupon submit in evidence.

Under *Capone v. Aderhold*, 2 Fed. Supp. 280, affirmed in 65 Fed. 2d 130, error in passing upon the validity of a plea of the statute of limitations is error committed in the exercise of jurisdiction which can not be reached on habeas corpus. The only thing the accused could do, therefore, would be to sue in the court of claims for his pay which court, under *Dynes v. Hoover*, 20 Howard 65, *Swain v. U.S.*, 165 U.S. 563, undoubtedly would refuse to open the record and retry the case on this point.

My recommendation therefore is that an attempt should be made to secure a waiver from the accused and that the waiver should follow the form, in general, of that obtained by the Navy.


William J. Hughes, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel, J.A.C.D.

3822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

280 BRONXVILLE ROAD, BRONXVILLE, N. Y., *September 7, 1943.*

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., Ret., 280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville, N. Y.

To: The Honorable Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Reference (a) Letter from Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., Ret., proposing a waiver of the Statute of Limitations.

Enclosure (A) Agreement not to plead the Statute of Limitations in bar of trial by General Court Martial.

SIR: Receipt is acknowledged of your undated letter, Reference (a), delivered to me by hand August 27th, 1943, concerning a General Court Martial in my case, in which letter you state that the two-year statute of limitations controlling Naval Courts Martial will have run on my case on December 7th, 1943, and you propose that I should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial and you enclose a proposed form of waiver.

You state in Reference (a) that you think that the public interest and safety would now permit proceeding with my trial, but that you further believe that so long as the war continues it will be manifestly impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the court on account of their war duties. For this reason, among others, you feel that it would be in the best interests of all concerned if I should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial and you give me your assurance that the trial will be held at the earliest practicable date.

It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date. Delay in the matter is opposed to my personal interests, since the passage of time and the circumstances and casualties of war and of the period following may make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to assemble and produce the evidence and the witnesses required. I have at all times been anxious to subordinate my own interests to the national welfare, which appears to require that my trial be delayed. I am therefore forwarding to you herewith a waiver, Enclosure A, executed by me which I hope will be satisfactory to you.

Respectfully,

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL.

Encl. (1)

ENCLOSURE (A) TO LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 7TH, 1943, FROM REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U. S. N., RET., TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I, Husband E. Kimmel, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL.

Major General Walter C. Short,
United States Army, Retired.

My dear General Short:

In connection with your possible trial by general court-martial, the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by Article of War 39 will, unless action is taken to prevent it, bar your trial by general court-martial 7 December 1943. The tolling of the statute of limitations would be stopped by either a present waiver by you or your arraignment before a general court-martial, which, probably, would adjourn the case until later.

So long as the war continues it will be impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the court on account of their war duties. In this situation it has occurred to me that the practical thing to do is to postpone any possible trial until later and that you may desire for this purpose to execute a waiver of the statute of limitations. In the event that you see fit to do this, I give you my personal assurance that any trial determined upon will be had at the earliest practicable date.

If you should agree with the foregoing your prompt return of the inclosed form of waiver, duly executed by you, is requested.

Sincerely yours,

1 Incl.
Waiver.

Secretary of War.

Stenographic notes and rough draft in this case have been destroyed.

Disinterested officer VTC
Custodian P.T.

W.C. Short
W.C. Short, Jr., cfs

3824 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WAIVER

September , 1943.

I, WALTER C. SHORT, Major General, United States Army, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.

Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.



25 SEPTEMBER 1943.

Memorandum for: The Judge Advocate General.

There is attached hereto a waiver dated September 20, 1943, signed by Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, in which he agrees to waive the statute of limitations in bar of his trial during the present war and within six (6) months thereafter.

The above waiver was obtained pursuant to your verbal instructions.

T. H. GREEN,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Assistant Judge Advocate General.

Incl.

Waiver & pertinent papers.

WAIVER

SEPTEMBER 20, 1943.

I, Walter C. Short, Major General, United States Army, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

WESTERN UNION (15)

THE U.S. PATENT TELEPHONE CO. CABLES ARE NOT TO BE USED FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF TELEGRAMS OR TELETYPE MESSAGES. THE U.S. PATENT TELEPHONE CO. CABLES ARE NOT TO BE USED FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF TELEGRAMS OR TELETYPE MESSAGES.

A. M. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

WILLIAM C. CARLSON
CHIEF OF THE BOARD

J. D. WILLIAMS
VICE PRESIDENT

THE TIME SHOWN BY THE DIAL IS IN HOURS AND MINUTES IN STANDARD TIME AT POINT OF ORIGIN. TIME AT DESTINATION IS INDICATED BY THE DIAL.

10:21:02 9 GOVT-FTBLISS TEX 21 057P

THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

WASHDC

MISSION COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY RECOMMEND NO PUBLICITY

RETURNING VIA NEWORLEANS

GREEN

THIS COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. T. G. GREEN, Chief of Staff, General Woodruff.
SUBJECT: Final report of General Woodruff on the mission to Mexico.

Paragraph 1 of the instructions to General Woodruff, dated 10 September 1943, provided that he should report to you by radio on Wednesday, 22 September 1943, that the mission had been accomplished. I then returned to Washington, made my report to you and placed the signed waiver and the other papers in file. According to instructions, I provided General Woodruff with a copy of the instructions and gave him the authority to waive the instructions and other papers prepared by Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Hughes, Jr., of this office. General Woodruff left Dallas the same day, by plane for Mexico at 4 p.m. and returned to Dallas, 22 September 1943. Upon his return, General Woodruff informed me that he had interviewed General Walter C. Short, Jr., of the 1st Cavalry Division, at Dallas, Texas on 20 and 21 September and that General Short had signed the agreement to waive the instructions.

General Woodruff handed the signed agreement to me and I reported to you by radio on Wednesday, 22 September 1943 that the mission had been accomplished. I then returned to Washington, made my report to you and placed the signed waiver and the other papers in file.

General Woodruff had plane reservations to proceed to his home on 23 September 1943 and I presume he left on that date.



T. G. Green

CONFIDENTIAL

27 SEP 1943

MEMORANDUM for The Secretary of War.

**Subject: Court-martial of Major General Walter C. Short,
U. S. Army, Retired.**

1. Under date of 7 September 1943, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, executed an agreement to waive the statute of limitations in bar of trial by general court-martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which he may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7, 1941 should his trial be held during the present war or within six months thereafter.

2. Under date of 20 September 1943, Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, executed a similar agreement.

3. In view of the public interest in the matter as evidenced by recent newspaper articles and letters from Congressmen, it is suggested that it would be desirable that some public announcement be made by the War and Navy Departments. It is recommended that if an announcement is to be made, it be made simultaneously by both departments thus achieving solidarity.

4. The following is a suggested draft of an announcement on the subject.

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have concluded that it is undesirable in the public interest to proceed at this time with the trial of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General Walter C. Short. Accordingly, it has been decided to postpone proceedings against these officers until such time in the future as may be decided upon as being appropriate.

Both officers have voluntarily agreed to waive the statute of limitations in bar of their trials

CONFIDENTIAL

for the duration of the war and for six months thereafter.

The postponement will not affect the existing rights of the government nor those of the officers concerned.

MYRON C. CRAMER

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Incl.- Copy of waiver.

MA 22 42 25

DISPATCHED
WAR DEPARTMENT

Section C

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1

WASHINGTON

G-1/9254-59

March 2, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:

Subject: Secret Documents pertaining to the
Investigation at Pearl Harbor.

The secret documents delivered to you by Colonel Oscar B. Abbott on March 2 constitute the entire file on the above subject. These documents are delivered to you for use in connection with the charges you are preparing relative to the proposed trial of Major General Walter C. Short. They are to be considered of utmost secrecy.

J. H. WILDRING,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incls.

- 1 envelope containing:
 - 1 List showing documents furnished the J. Aer.
 - 1 List showing documents furnished the Navy.
 - 1 Minutes of Commission to ascertain & report facts relative to the attack made by Jap. armed forces upon Territory of Hawaii, 12-7-41.
- 1 package containing shorthand notes of testimony before Commission appointed by the President, 12-10-41, to investigate attack by Japanese of Dec. 7, 1941, on Hawaii.
- 1 package containing 16 volumes transcript of testimony before Commission investigating Japanese attack on Hawaii, 12-7-41, plus 1 annex of related testimony.
- 1 Package containing secret, confidential & unclassified documents as numbered and shown on included list inside package (1 copy 30).

Erhard N. Byrum
ERHARD N. BYRUM
Major, Infantry
Assistant Executive

SECRET

SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON**

March 4, 1942.

Subject: Secret documents pertaining to the investigation
at Pearl Harbor.

To: Colonel C. Granville Simpson.

1. The secret documents listed below constitute the entire file upon the above subject. These documents are for use in connection with charges you are to prepare relative to the proposed trial of Major General Walter C. Short. They are to be considered of the utmost secrecy.

- 1 envelope containing:
 - list showing documents furnished the C/Mar.
 - list showing documents furnished the C/Navy.
 - Minutes of Commission to ascertain and report facts relating to the attack made by Jap. armed forces upon Territory of Hawaii, 12-7-41.
- 1 package containing: shorthand notes of testimony before Commission appointed by the President, 12-19-41, to investigate attack by Japanese of Dec. 7, 1941, on Hawaii.
- 1 package containing 16 volumes transcript of testimony before Commission investigating Japanese attack on Hawaii, 12-7-41, plus 1 annex of assembled testimony.
- 1 package containing: secret, confidential & unclassified documents numbered 1 to 36, inclusive, as follows:
 - No.
 - 1 Memorandum of 12/23/41, Capt. J.M. Jorda, A.C., to Executive Officer, Hawaiian Interceptor Command, concerning parking areas and bunkers at Wheeler, Haleiwa, and

SECRET

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SECRET

- Bellevue fields, together with charts accompanying the memorandum (the latter being rolled together with the charts)
- 1-A Secret "OPN Yap Annex 1 to accompany PG 1 Fixed Installations", Island of Oahu
 - 2 Secret Map "Hawaiian Defense Project 1941 - Anti-Aircraft Dispositions"
 - 3 Map showing military reservations on Island of Oahu
 - 4 Special Military Map AA of Hawaiian Islands
 - 5 Map and explanatory agenda showing ground defenses at Hickam Field
 - 6 Chart of Hickam Field showing disposition of aircraft at time of attack
 - 7 Statement by Major General Walter C. Short of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, December 7, 1941
 - 8 Letter of December 23, 1941, H. L. Davidson, Brigadier General, A.S., Commanding Hawaiian Interceptor Command, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, embodying diary and other records of all units from 0001 15 November 1941 (two copies)
 - 9 Reports of E. L. Brown, 2nd Lt. A.S., and Edward J. Kent, Capt., Inf., Ground Defense Officers, showing ground defense activities at Hickam Field March 15, 1942 to December 7, 1941
 - 10 Letter, 23 Dec. 1941, Leonard M. Gooding, Lt. Col. A.S., Commanding Hickam Field, to C. G. Brown, Capt., reporting records of operations by all units from 0001, 15 Nov. '41 to 0730, 7 Dec. '41, and field orders or instructions for Alert Procedure
 - 11 Letter, 22 Dec. '41, Jay P. Thomas, 1st Lt., 26th Obs. Sq (CAB), Operations Officer, to C. G. Brown, Capt., through L. O. Bellows Field, giving records of operations of and instructions received by 26th Obs. Sq from 0001 15 Nov. '41 to 0730 7 Dec. '41
 - 12 Memo, 22 Dec. '41, C. K. Rich, 1st Col. A.S., Executive, Hickam Field, to Major Lantry, G-3, Hawaiian Air Force, re position of planes and bunkers on Hickam Field at time of attack, together with layout map or general plan of Hickam Field accompanying the memorandum
 - 13 Statement dated 22 Dec. '41, L. W. P. Ford, Capt., Inf., Ground Defense Officer, Hickam Field, concerning ground defense activities at Hickam Field, Dec. 7 '41 and thereafter

SECRET

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- 14 Letter, 22 Dec. '41, Leonard D. Westington, Lt. Col. A.C., Commanding Bellows Field, to Major Laundry, G-3, Hawn. Air Force, reporting action taken at said Field on orders given by the responsible commanders, for security since Dec. 7 '41
- 15 Memorandum, Leland C. Hurd, Lt. Col. A.C., Commanding Hickam Field, to C.G. Hawn. Air Force, under date 23 Dec. '41, containing information as to arrangements made, orders issued, and verbal action, since Dec. 7, for proper protection of Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field
- 16 Letter 22 Dec. '41, W. J. Flood, Colonel, A.C., Commanding Wheeler Field, to C.G. Hawn. Air Force, giving information concerning arrangements or instructions and orders for security of Wheeler Field since attack of Dec. 7
- 17 Letter 23 Dec. '41, J.H. Rudolph, Brig. Genl. USA, Commanding 18th Bombardment Wing, Air Corps, to C.G. Hawn. Air Force, concerning arrangements or instructions and orders for security since Dec. 7
- 18 Memorandum 22 Dec. '41, G.L. Tinker, Brig. Genl. U.S.A., Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, disclosing orders or instructions for security and employment of Hawaiian Air Force, given by him since his arrival
- 19 Letter 23 Dec. '41, H.C. Davidson, Brig. Genl. A.C., Commanding Hawaiian Interceptor Command, to C.G. Hawaiian Air Force, outlining arrangements and new instructions or orders for security after raid of 7 Dec. 1941
- 20 Letter P.L. Martin, Major General, U.S.A., Commanding Hawn. Air Force, to C.G. Hawn. Dept., dated 20 Dec. 1941, concerning Joint Army-Navy Air Force Exercise
- 21 Letter Cheney L. Bertholf, Lt. Col. AGC Asst. General, Hawn. Air Force, to C.G. 18th Bombardment Wing - subject, Attack on Navy Cruising Expedition
- 22 Letter dated Feb. 7 '41, Henry I. Atkinson, Asst. Sec. of War, to the Secretary of the Navy - subject, Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (copy)
- 23 Memorandum dated 20 Dec. '41, Robert H. Dunlop, Col. AGC, Adjutant Genl. Hawn. Dept., to Major Brooke L. Allen, Air Corps, containing tabulation showing percentage of strength of all major divisions, post and district commanders present at 24.12.7 Dec. 1941, except Kaula Dist.
- 24 Letter 12/25/41, Maxwell Murray, Major Genl. USA, to Major General Frank McCoy, supplementing General Murray's testimony before the investigating commission

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:

Subject: Report of Roberts Commission.

It is desired that you forward to the Executive Officer, Operations Division, WDGS, for file, the report of the Roberts Commission, together with all supporting papers and records in connection therewith, now in your possession.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:


R. H. YOUNG,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary, General Staff.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON

November 23, 1942.

SPJUE

MEMORANDUM to Executive Officer, Operations Division, War
Department General Staff.

Subject: Report of Roberts Commission.

1. Pursuant to undated directive of the Chief of Staff there is transmitted herewith, for file in your office, the following enumerated papers and documents constituting the Report of the Roberts Commission and supporting papers and records in connection with said Commission Report:

- 1 envelope containing:
 - List showing documents furnished the S/War) Incorporated in
 - List showing documents furnished the S/Navy) Minutes
 - Minutes of Commission to ascertain and report facts
 - relating to the attack made by Jap. armed forces upon
 - Territory of Hawaii, 12-7-41.
- 1 package containing shorthand notes of testimony before Commission appointed by the President, 12-18-41, to investigate attack by Japanese of Dec. 7, 1941, on Hawaii.
- 2 packages containing 16 volumes transcript of testimony (Vol. 1-8, in 1 before Commission investigating Japanese attack on) package.) Hawaii, 12-7-41, plus 1 annex of amended testimony. (Vol. 9-16 in other,
- 1 package containing secret, confidential and unclassified documents as numbered 1 to 36, inclusive as follows:

No.

- 1 Memorandum of 12/23/41, Capt. C.A. Kengla, A.S., to Executive Officer, Hawaiian Interceptor Command, concerning parking areas and bunkers at Wheeler, Haleiwa, and Bellows Fields, together with charts and accompanying the memorandum (the latter being rolled together with the charts)
- 1-A Secret "OFF" Map Annex 1 to accompany FO 1 fixed Installations", Island of Oahu.
- 2 Secret Map "Hawaiian Defense Project 1941 - Anti-Aircraft Dispositions"
- 3 Map showing military reservations on Island of Oahu (1 copy)
- 4 Special Military Map AA of Hawaiian Islands (1 copy)
- 5 Map and explanatory addenda showing ground defenses at Hickam Field.
- 6 Chart of Hickam Field showing disposition of aircraft at time of attack (1 copy)

**SECRET**

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SECRET

- 7 Statement by Major General Walter C. Short of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, December 7, 1941 (1 Folder memo. maps etc.)
- 8 Letter of December 23, 1941, W. J. Davidson, Brigadier General, A. C., Commanding Hawaiian Interceptor Command, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, embodying diary and other records of all units from 0001 15 November 1941 (two copies)
- 9 Reports of H. L. Duggan, 2nd Lt. A. C., and Edward F. Kent, Capt. Inf., Ground Defense Officers, showing ground defense activities at Bellows Field March 15, 1941 to December 7, 1941. (2 copies, carbon not complete).
- 10 Letter, 23 Dec. 1941, Leonard D. Weddington, Lt. Col. A. C., Commanding Bellows Field to C. G. Hawn. Dept., reporting records of operations by all units from 0001, 15 Nov. '41 to 0730, 7 Dec. '41, and Field Orders or Instructions for Alert Procedure (3 copies - all less incl. indicated).
- 11 Letter, 22 Dec. '41, Jay P. Thomas, 1st Lt. Roth Obsn. Sq. (C&S), Operations Officer, to C. G. Hawn. Dept., through C. O. Bellows Field, giving records of operations of and instructions received by Roth Obsn. Sq. from 0001 15 Nov. '41 to 0730 7 Dec. '41
- 12 Memo. 22 Dec. '41, C. K. Rich, Lt. Col. A. C., Executive, Bellows Field, to Major Landry G-3, Hawn. Air Force, re position of planes and bunkers on said Field at time of attack, together with layout map or general plan of Bellows Field accompanying the memorandum (4 copies)
- 13 Statement dated 22 Dec. '41, Edw. F. Kent, Capt. Inf., Ground Defense Officer, Bellows Field, concerning ground defense activities at said Field on Dec. 7 '41 and thereafter (2 copies)
- 14 Memo. 22 Dec. '41, Leonard D. Weddington, Lt. Col. A. C., Commanding Bellows Field, to Major Landry, G-3, Hawn. Air Force, reporting action taken at said Field on orders given by the responsible commanders, for security since Dec. 7 '41
- 15 Memorandum, Leland J. Hurd, Lt. Col. A. C., Commanding Hickam Field, to C. G. Hawn. Air Force, under date 23 Dec. '41, containing information as to arrangements made, orders issued, and verbal action, since Dec. 7, for proper protection of Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field
- 16 Letter 22 Dec. '41, Wm. J. Flood, Colonel, A. C., Commanding Wheeler Field, to C. G. Hawn. Air Force, giving information concerning arrangements or instructions and orders for security of Wheeler Field since attack of Dec. 7
- 17 Letter 23 Dec. '41, J. H. Rudolph, Brig. Genl. USA, Commanding 18th Bombardment Wing, Air Corps, to C. G. Hawn. Air Force, concerning arrangements or instructions and orders for security since Dec. 7 (less incl. indicated)

SECRET

SECRET

- 18 Memorandum 22 Dec. '41, C.L. Tinker, Brig. Genl. U.S.A., Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, disclosing orders or instructions for security and employment of Hawaiian Air Force, given by him since his arrival.
- 19 Letter 23 Dec. '41, H.C. Davidson, Brig. Genl. A.C., Commanding Hawaiian Interceptor Command, to C.G. Hawaiian Air Force, outlining arrangements and new instructions or orders for security after raid of 7 Dec. 1941
- 20 Copy of letter F.L. Martin, Major General, U.S.A. Commanding Hawn. Air Force, to C.G. Hawn. Dept. dated 20 Sept. 1941, concerning Joint Army-Navy Air Force Exercise
- 21 Copy of letter Cheney L. Bertholf, Lt. Col. AGD Adj. General Hawn. Air Force, to C.G. 18th Bombardment Wing - subject, Attack of Navy Cruising Disposition (less Incl. indicated)
- 22 Copy of letter dated Feb. 7 '41, Henry L. Stimson, Secty. of War, to the Secretary of the Navy - subject, Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
- 23 Memorandum dated 26 Dec. '41, Robert H. Dunlop, Col. AGD, Adjutant Genl. Hawn. Dept., to Major Brooke E. Allen, Air Corps, containing tabulation showing percentage of strength of all major echelons, post and district commanders present at 8 a.m. 7 Dec. 1941, except Kauai Dist.
- 24 Letter 12/25/41, Maxwell Murray, Major Genl. USA, to Major General Frank McCoy, supplementing General Murray's testimony before the investigating commission.
- 25 Memo. 26 Dec. '41, A.W. Meehan, Major A.C., A.C. of S., C-3, Hq. Hawn. Air Force, to Roberts Commission, showing numbers and types of aircraft for Hawaii, specified in Defense Plan; airplanes on hand 7 Dec. '41; airplanes ready for immediate use; planes on hand after raid and usable after raid; and airplanes that took to the air Dec. 7
- 26 Memorandum 25 Dec. '41 Robert H. Dunlop, Colonel, A.G.D., Adj. General, to "Distribution 'B' and 'F' less 5 and 6" - Subject, Priority of Construction Projects
- 27 Translation of Mori conversation
- 28 Standing Operating Procedure 25th Inf. Div. dated 12/2/41
- 29 Standing Operating Procedure 24th Inf. Div. dated 27 Nov. '41
- 30 Standing Operating Procedure 24th Inf. Div. dated 1 Dec. '41
- 31 Standing Operating Procedure Hawn. C.A. dated 26 Nov. 1941
- 32 Standing Operating Procedure Hawn. Dept. dated 5 Nov. 1941
- 33 Certain inclosures (2 in number) from General Short's report, copy of which is in War Department in Washington (33-2 33-1).
- 34 Copy of letter 11/17/41 F. L. Martin, Major General USA, Commanding Air Officer to C.G. Hawn. Dept. forwarding special reports concerning provisions for security of installations at Hickam and Wheeler Fields and Hawaiian Air Depot.

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SECRET

- 35 "A Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu", F.L. Martin, Major General USA Commanding Hawaiian Air Force; to CG Army Air Forces, through CG Hawaiian Department
- 36 Statement by General Gerow before Military Commission 12-18-41.

2. Receipt of the foregoing documents is requested by indorsement hereon.

For The Judge Advocate General:

John M. Weir
John M. Weir,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Executive.

OPD 311.5 Reg D (11-23-42)

1st Ind.

OPERATIONS DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, Washington, D. C.,
November 26, 1942. TO: Office of the Judge Advocate General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

The undersigned has received the documents and papers listed in the basic letter for file in this Division.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. W. Leamy
C. W. LEAMY,
Lt. Colonel, U.S.C.,
Custodian, Registered Documents, OPD.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

26 June 1944

Memorandum:

For General Weir.

Inclosed herewith for the office file is a copy of a letter from Major General Walter C. Short, Retired, to The Adjutant General, dated June 23, 1944, in which General Short requests to be furnished with a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission.


T. H. Green,
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army.

Incl.

To Gen Cramer

*My
+
will*

1141 Southeastern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas.

SUBJECT: Copy of the Roberts Commission Proceedings.

TO: The Adjutant General.

1. On September 20, 1943, I signed an agreement not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six months thereafter.

2. In order that I may be apprized of the possible scope of the charges which may be brought against me and in order that I may make an intelligent effort to prepare my defense against such possible charges, I request that there be furnished me at this time a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired.

5

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1
WASHINGTON

WDAGP 201 Short, Walter C.

30 June 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Request for copy of the Roberts Commission Proceedings.

I. Discussion.

1. In a letter to The Adjutant General (Tab A), Major General Walter C. Short, Retired, requests that he be furnished a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission.

2. The War Department is informed that the Secretary of the Navy (Mr. Knox) several months ago furnished Admiral Kimmel a photostatic copy of the report of the Roberts Commission. The Navy Department is unable to state whether Secretary Knox obtained informal approval from the President before this action was taken.

3. The Judge Advocate General expresses the opinion that General Short is entitled to and should be furnished a copy of the report of the Roberts Commission; that the Commission was appointed by and reported to the President of the United States; and that a copy should not be furnished General Short without prior approval by the President.

II. Action recommended.

1. That the attached memorandum for the President be signed and dispatched.

2. That when the memorandum has been dispatched this file be returned to G-1 for further action.

APPROVED

For order of the Secretary of War
JOSEPH T. McNABREY
Adj. Chief of Staff

W. C. Short

Incl. By S. E. SCHULCOW
Col. G. S. C. Asst. Sec. W. D. G. S.
Tab A

Draft of Memo to the
President for signature
of the S/W.

M. G. White
M. G. WHITE,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

JUL 4 1944

NOTED-DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Sig. Acty Secy - JWM



S. 7/2


115

JUL 24 AM 9 18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Major General Walter G. Short has requested that he be furnished a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission. A copy of General Short's letter is attached.

I am informed that the Navy Department, presumably with your approval, has furnished Admiral Hissel with a photostatic copy of the report. I believe that General Short is also entitled to a copy, in order to prepare his own defense, and request your approval of his request.

J. Edgar Hoover
Secretary of War.

Enclosure

114

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1
WASHINGTON

WDGAP 201 Short, Walter G.

30 June 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Request for copy of the Roberts
Commission Proceedings.

I. Discussion.

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II. Action recommended.

1. That the attached memorandum for the President be signed and dispatched.

2. That when the memorandum has been dispatched this file be returned to G-1 for further action.

APPROVED
By order of the Secretary of War
J. EDITH L. MONAGHAN
Deputy Chief of Staff

W. G. White

Incls. 37 R. A. MONAGHAN
Tab A Col. G. S. C. Staff Sec. W. D. G. S.

Draft of Memo to the
President for signature
of the S/W.

W. G. White
W. G. WHITE,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

JUL 4 1944

NOTED-DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Sig Acty Secy - JWM



JUL 24 AM 9-18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Major General Walter G. Short has requested that he be furnished a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission. A copy of General Short's letter is attached.

I am informed that the Navy Department, presumably with your approval, has furnished Admiral Kimmel with a photostatic copy of the report. I believe that General Short is also entitled to a copy, in order to prepare his own defense, and request your approval of his request.

OK
7/26/44

Secretary of War.

Inclosure

114

CONFIDENTIAL
 WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
 DISPOSITION FORM
 PERSONNEL DIVISION, G-1

File: HQAD 201 Short, Walter G.

Date: 25 July 1944

SUBJECT: General Officer.

TO	C/S	S/W	OSW	ASW	ASWA	CS
	Y&O	O-2	O-3	O-4	OPD	CO
	ONS	J&O	PO	IO	L&LS	CS
(Through Office Chief of Staff)						
FOR	S/W directs	Comment or concurrence	Necessary action			
	Draft of reply	Remark and recommendation	Information			
	Direct reply	Information for reply	Primary interest			
	Approved	And return to G-1	File			
	Disapproved					

That Major General Walter G. Short, USA (Ret.), 1141 Southwestern Blvd., Dallas 5, Texas, be furnished a photostatic copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission, in compliance with his request of 23 June 1944.

That the above action be expedited.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1:

G. B. Walker Jr.
 G. B. WALKER JR.
 Lt. Col., G. S. C.
 Assistant Personnel

Incls.

Memo for C/S fr.

Col. C. B. Walker

OGS Disposition also to G-1, 7/24/44, n/memo for the President, fr. Antonio G. S. & Jul 44.

REMARKS FOR RECORDS: In letter to TV, 21 June 1944, General Short requested that he be furnished a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission in order to prepare his defense. Acting S/W recommended to the President that report of General Short be approved. The President has approved the request. General Short has been advised informally.

JUL 26 1944
 NOTED-OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
W. B.

10 Aug 44
FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

11

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Munitions Building

29 July 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(Attention: Lt. Col. A. C. Kelly)Subject: Extra Photostatic Copy of Transcript of
Testimony Before Roberts Commission.

1. It is my understanding that plans have been made to make a photostatic copy of the transcript of testimony before the Roberts Commission, the same to be furnished Major General Walter C. Short, U.S. Army, Retired, in accordance with a recent directive from higher authority.

2. It would greatly facilitate the work of the Army Pearl Harbor Board if an additional copy could be made for its use, and it is accordingly requested that one be made and transmitted to be in room 4713, Munitions Building, when completed.

For the Board:

*Charles N. West*CHARLES N. WEST,
Colonel, J.A.G.C.,
Recorder.

Date August 9, 1944

Received of The Adjutant General photostated copy
of the Roberts Commission Report which investigated the
attack on the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941, consist-
ing of 16 volumes of transcribed testimony and one volume
of transcribed testimony of Rear Admiral Kimmel. (no exhibits
attached)

Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General,
U. S. Army, Retired.

Section D

DEPARTMENT SIGNAL CENTER

PHONED TO LT COL ERANA
FEB 27 1057P/SS
1964

SIGNAL CORPS UNITED STATES ARMY
SIGNAL CORPS
UNITED STATES ARMY
War Department Message Center
Room 3441, Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT SIGNAL CENTER

VA2

WMU V WARG NR 9

FROM ALLEN J GREER COLONEL RETIRED WUX BUFFALO NY 27 NPT

TO JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL US ARMY WAR DEPT WASHDC

GR NC BT

GENERAL WALTER SHORT TELEPHONED ME THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIVE WILL SEE HIM TUESDAY AND ASKED ME AS HIS COUNCIL TO SEE YOU MONDAY AM LEAVING HERE TONIGHT AND ARRIVING WASHINGTON MONDAY MORNING SHALL GO IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR OFFICE PLEASE RESERVE APPOINTMENT

02032

WAR DEPARTMENT SIGNAL CENTER

Gen. Greener
March 1, 1944
Page 2

It must now be realized that Gen. Short was not alone responsible for the disaster of Dec. 7, but that the War, the Navy, the State Department and the President himself must share responsibility. It is beyond them all the American people for not realizing the necessity for national preparedness are also responsible. The very fact that Gen. Short had such a high standard of honor made it impossible for him to suspect the treacherous attack which the Japanese made. Conditions which made such an attack possible by a friendly nation during time of peace cannot be tolerated in a civilized world and to prevent their recurrence is one of our major objectives in this war.


I offer the above to you as suggestions and hope they will not be considered presumptuous.

I would like even to present them personally to the President or to Mr. Correll Hull, a former regimental comrade of Spanish War days for whom I have the most cordial respect and personal regard.

If trial takes place it will be impossible to avoid bringing in such issues as the MacArthur incident and others which will force political and not factual matters into the case with results that cannot be other than unfortunate.

I wish to thank you for your courtesy and the cordial reception of my opinions Monday. I hope I am not unduly presuming upon your time but complex situations cannot be discussed in a few words.

Sincerely yours,



Allen J. Greer, Colonel
United States Army Retired.

AGG:ove

3850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

10 March 1944

Colonel Allen J. Greer,
Buffalo Evening News,
214-218 Main Street,
Buffalo, New York.

Dear Colonel Greer:

I have delayed replying to your letter of 1 March 1944 pending the return of General Weir from his conference with General Short. General Weir took advantage of being in Dallas to inspect several judge advocate offices in that vicinity; consequently his return was somewhat delayed.

As a general proposition, General Short appears to be agreeable to the proposed taking of testimony in the manner that you and I talked over when you were in my office. General Short made one request to the effect that nothing be started before the first of April because his wife was to undergo a minor operation and he desired to wait until she had recovered from that before anything was done. That, of course, is agreeable to the War Department.

I note the suggestions made in your letter. Of course any such suggestions will have to await further consideration of the matter.

Very sincerely yours,

Myron G. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

MGC:mb

To Col Hughes
Rms
CONFIDENTIAL

Telephone conversation between General Weir
and Colonel Springer, 4 March 1944

Weir: Now with reference to the case up there - remember? Tell General Cramer that he wants Tom as active service and as the JA counsel.

Springer: Wait just a minute - he wants Tom as - What?

Weir: Active service - on active duty. In other words he has a retired officer. He also would want a JA and someone on active duty. He would like to have Tom.

Springer: Tom, right here.

Weir: Yeah. As well as Colonel Greer, retired. Greer is about 67, 68, if I recall it. He wants officers on the court who would be senior to him as of the time in question. In other words he doesn't want any temporary lieutenant generals or someone like that who are way junior to him now - junior to him on the Regular list, on any court. He'll have civilian counsel at the time in question. He has not yet employed counsel but he intends to. He's all for this investigation of course as I told General Cramer yesterday, but he doesn't want to start on anything before the first of April. His wife is to be operated on in the hospital in Dallas sometime the forepart of this month and it will be a couple of weeks probably before he'll want to begin on that. Of course he wants the testimony preserved but as I told General Cramer these depositions, or whatever we're going to call them, should be used only if the witness is not alive or available at the time. One of his principal witnesses and probably a principal witness on both sides, is now dead, so we've lost that man's testimony - get it?

Springer: Yes, I got that all right. John, General Cramer said when I talked to you to ask you if Morse and Dainow were still to go up to the conference?

Weir: Well I had planned to have Dainow up there to the conference to edit the -

Springer: Well, that's what I figured so I told him to count on it.

Weir: It's not dreadfully important about Morse - I thought Morse would have an opportunity to see the people up there and check on their library so he wouldn't have to make those trips all over the west.

Springer: Well he's made most of his trips hasn't he?

Weir: He's made a couple but he hasn't gone very far west. You might check with him on that. I'm checking here with people as I go along. Jones will be there.

Springer: Is Jones getting his own orders?

Weir: Wait a minute - he's getting his own orders and they've been

CONFIDENTIAL

3852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

approved here so he'll be there. Now what's the dope on the
conference - everything going along all right? -

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, Feb. 29, 1944.

Subject: Detail of Colonel Allen J. Greer, U. S. Army, Retired as Counsel.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. I request that Colonel Allen J. Greer, U. S. Army, Retired be detailed to act as my counsel in any court-martial that may take place as a result of the attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, T. H.

2. I request that Colonel Greer be placed on active duty at once to represent me and to assist in the preparation of depositions to be taken in the case, accompanying the officer detailed by the War Department to prepare and take the deposition. As a preliminary to this work I request that Colonel Greer be directed to report to me and go over with me the preparation of the interrogatories of the witnesses for the defense.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, March 22, 1944.

Subject: Testimony of witnesses with knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: The Judge Advocate General, U. S. Army.

Recently I was interviewed by Brigadier General John M. Weir, J. A. G. D., at my home in Dallas, Texas. Among other things General Weir informed me that the Secretary of the Navy had appointed Admiral Hart to take testimony of witnesses who had knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor and record their testimony in order that it might be preserved against the possibility of the trial of Admiral H. E. Kimmel in the future. He stated that the Secretary of War contemplated taking similar action in my case and that the War Department desired an expression of my views on the matter. In reply I stated that I desired to cooperate with the War Department to the fullest extent consistent with the protection of my rights, and that while I concurred, in principle, with the proposal to perpetuate the testimony I believed myself entitled to such stipulations as might be necessary to safeguard my rights.

Since my interview with General Weir I have given further consideration to the matter. I am sure that there is no intention on the part of the War Department to place me in the position of being compelled to release any rights I may have in the premises.

In this connection I believe that before the commencement of any proceedings to which I am to be a party it would be only fair and just that I be apprised of the basis of the proceedings, their scope, the use to which the records may be put and such other details as will permit me to save my rights. I believe it would be a relatively simple matter to make an agreement as to those details and that such an agreement would insure that the proceedings will be disposed of in an orderly and efficient manner. It seems to me that some such agreement is so essential to the safeguarding of my rights that I would be compelled in self-defense to insist on it as a condition precedent to my participation in the proposed proceedings. If, therefore, the War Department decides to proceed with the perpetuation of the testimony in my case as contemplated, I would appreciate being informed before the commencement of the proceedings as to the views of the War Department on this point.

In a letter which I handed to General Weir I asked that in the event proceedings were begun Colonel Allen J. Greer, Retired, be made available to me as counsel. I reiterate that request. I stated informally to General Weir that I would like to have Brigadier General T. H. Green, J. A. G. D., as my counsel under the same circumstances providing he was willing to serve in that capacity. This latter request is now reduced to writing.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

WAR DEPARTMENT ARMY SERVICE FORCES		CONFIDENTIAL SHEET	
TO: The Judge Advocate General (General Orders, Regulations)		Re: Bill Questions (General)	
SUBJECT: Detail of Brigadier General L. H. Green, J.A.G.C.		Bill: Parties (General)	
FROM: Major General Walter D. Short, Walter D. (24 Jan 51) (Official Use Only)			
OFFICE: Off. No. 100		DATE: 100/5	
ACTION: Approved		REMARKS: Recommended	
For records and recommendation.			
To: The Adjutant General.			
1. General Green is the senior Assistant Judge Advocate General at this Army office and is normally in charge during my absence. In view of the importance of the case in question I am willing to make him available as counsel for General Short provided it will not unduly interfere with the performance of his present duties. 2. I recommend that the basic request be approved and that it be stated that the detail of General Green be in addition to his other duties.			
Walter D. Short Major General The Judge Advocate General			

TO: *8/11/44*
 FROM: *W.D.*
 SUBJECT: *11/11/44*
 RE: *11/11/44*

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W. D. A. O. Form No. 0106
 March 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ADPOL-M 201 Short, Walter C.
(24 Jul 44)

1st Ind.

ADK/ab/2448

WD, AGO, Washington 25, D. C., 9 August 1944.

TO: Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, 3141 Southwestern
Boulevard, Dallas 5, Texas.

Approved provided it will not unduly interfere with Brigadier General
Green's present duties. This approval is given with the express understanding
that the detail will be in addition to his other duties.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Encl. 1
CONFIDENTIAL

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Section E

REPORT OF NAVY PRESS CONFERENCE
TUESDAY, 25 FEBRUARY 1944

REC'D NEWS DIV
JAN 26 1944

FEB 26 1944

PLEASE PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO OFF THE RECORD STATEMENTS

Secretary Knox announced that the United States Task Force which struck Saipan and Iianian Islands had destroyed 135 enemy planes in the air and on the ground with the loss of but six of our planes. In addition two ships were sunk and nine others damaged.

Although the United States force was detected by the enemy while approaching the islands on February 21 and attacked by enemy land-based planes for nearly two days, not one of our ships was sunk or even damaged. Enemy installations were bombed and strafed by planes from our carriers. On February 23, Liberators of the 7th Army Air Forces took part in the bombing of Kusaie, and on the same day other planes participated with Navy planes in bombing four enemy-held atolls in the Marshalls.

In commenting upon the report from the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Secretary Knox said that the amazing thing was the heavy damage our pilots had inflicted on enemy aircraft with such small loss to themselves. Further, he said, despite the two-day attack by enemy torpedo planes and bombers on our forces, apparently not a single ship had been hit.

In response to a question, he said that reports he had received indicated that the Japanese have improved their planes, but the quality of their pilots is deteriorating.

The Secretary announced that Admiral T. C. Hart had been assigned to collect testimony from Navy officers concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor for use at the court martial of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. He said that this was being done because many of the officers were scattered throughout the world and many were engaged in hazardous duties. He said that it was "an attempt to be absolutely square with Admiral Kimmel" and that the testimony should be taken by a high ranking officer in whom both the accused and the Navy Department had confidence. He explained there was no change in the decision to postpone the court martial until after the "war situation" had subsided and the trial can be held safely.

When asked whether this action was being taken in conjunction with similar action by the War Department, he replied that it was not and that he did not know whether the Army would take like steps or not.

Vice Admiral Ben Moreel, Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks, attended the conference and reported briefly on the work of the Seabees in the Pacific area which he had toured recently with Under Secretary Forrestal. He said there were about 100,000 men in the Pacific construction battalions and they were doing excellent work in repairing damage to captured installations as well as building new bases. One of the mistakes the Japs have made, he said, was to under-estimate the speed with which Americans could restore bases and repair damage. Not only were the Seabees far superior to the Japanese in skill but also in the supply of construction equipment. He said the Seabee Special, or the stavedore detachments, were doing an outstanding job.

END

ALZ/jws
Press Branch
Bureau of Public Relations

37

Extract from Transcript of Press Conference of Secretary of War
Held at 10:30 A.M., Thursday, March 2, 1944.

PRESS:

Is the War Department planning to record the testimony of officers who may be later unavailable who have knowledge of events for use in the case of Major General Walter C. Short, as announced by the Navy?

SECRETARY:

The War Department is working in full cooperation with the Navy Department in assembling such testimony.

PRESS:

~~Is it true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are studying a plan for the formation of a Department of National Defense, and if so, will that be put into effect before the close of the present war?~~

SECRETARY:

~~I am told there was an interesting story in the newspapers on that subject, but I have no comment to make on it.~~

PRESS:

Does your reply to the previous question mean that you are taking testimony?

SECRETARY:

Yes, I understand so. We are taking steps to preserve that evidence, which means that we must be taking testimony.

GENERAL SURLES:

Yes, we are working with the Navy Department.

PRESS:

Could you say who is taking that testimony?

SECRETARY:

I think that is a matter which is usually not discussed in public—a lawyer perhaps.

3860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PRESS:

I think the reason the question was asked is because the Navy Department announced that Admiral Hart would be the officer in charge of assembling the testimony in the Navy. We wondered if you had designated a specific officer for that.

SECRETARY:

I can't answer that. I didn't know that Admiral Hart had been appointed. My information was just as I put it, that we are acting with the Navy to preserve that testimony.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

3861

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, July 18, 1944.

Subject: Detail of officers as observers with the board of officers investigating
the Japanese Attack of December 7, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army.

1. At the request of the War Department, on September 20, 1943, I signed an agreement not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7, 1941, should the trial be held during the present war or within six months thereafter. I understand that in accordance with a recent act of Congress, the War Department has under consideration the appointment of a board of officers for the purpose of investigating and reporting the facts concerning the attack by the Japanese upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

2. I am now and always have been willing to face a court-martial or a court of inquiry at the earliest possible moment to answer for any deficiencies implied or alleged against me for which apparently I was summarily relieved from command. It is my assumption that the proposed board is being convened for the purpose of determining any and all alleged improper acts or omissions on my part on or before December 7, 1941. In order to expedite any future trial, I herewith request that I be permitted to have sit with the Board at the examination of all witnesses two officers of my selection, to represent me at such hearings as well as to cross-examine all witnesses appearing before the Board. I desire to point out that in the event of my being required to meet any future resultant charges this privilege will greatly abridge the time necessary adequately to prepare my defense. I desire to point out also that such representation will assist in bringing to light more clearly my position and the situation prior to and on December 7, 1941, and thus present a more complete picture to the Board and the Secretary of War. It is urged that this request be granted in fairness to the undersigned as well as to the United States, as in the end it should result in the saving of time for all concerned.

3. If the above-mentioned request is granted I shall be glad to submit the names of the officers whom I desire to represent me.

Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1
WASHINGTON

WDGAP 201 Short, Walter C.

21 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GEN. GEORGE GRUNERT, USA,
President, Pearl Harbor Investigation Board, directed by
Public Law 339, 78th Congress.

The request of Major General Walter C. Short,
USA Retired, contained in the attached memorandum for The
Adjutant General, dated 18 July 1944, is referred to your
board for remark and recommendation in consultation with
the Office of The Judge Advocate General.


H. G. WHITE,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Encl.

Memo to TAG (18 Jul 44)
fr Gen Short.

118

1st Memo. Ind.

201-SHORT, Walter C.
Headquarters Army Pearl Harbor Board, Munitions Building, Washington, D.C.,
26 July 1944.

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department.

1. Following consultation with the Office of The Judge Advocate General the Board has considered the various factors involved and concluded that the request of Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, that he be permitted to have sit with the Board at the examination of all witnesses two officers of his selection, to represent him at such hearings as well as to cross-examine all witnesses appearing before the Board, should be denied.

2. Although it is recognized that certain advantages might be gained were the request granted, it is believed that such a course of action would also entail numerous undesirable consequences, a consideration of which suggests the advisability of not permitting the requested procedure.

3. In this connection it is pertinent to note that the Board is merely a fact finding agency of the War Department, and not initially charged with an investigation of any specific alleged acts of commission or omission on the part of Major General Short or any other individual in the military service. However, should substantial evidence of such acts be adduced, the Board contemplates affording an early opportunity to the individual or individuals concerned to appear before it, with or without counsel, and to testify, call witnesses, and offer anything that may be desired in his or their behalf. The Board also contemplates permitting such person or persons again to appear after all other evidence has been adduced, to offer anything further that may be desired in his or their behalf.

4. It appears proper to point out that in the event formal charges should result from the Board's investigation, any accused person must also under Article of War 70, be afforded further opportunity fully to present his case prior to any subsequent trial on such charges.

5. It is recommended that Major General Short be advised accordingly.

For the Board:


GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lt. General, U.S. Army,
President.

Incl.

Cpy of Memo fm
Gen. Short w/d

117

ACE/ab/2446

ASFO-M-F 201 Short, Walter C.
(18 Jul 44)

3 August 1944.

Detail of Officers as Observers with the Board of Officers Investigating the Japanese Attack of December 7, 1941

THRU : Commanding General,

Eighth Service Command.

TO : Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired,
3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas.

1. Your letter of 18 July 1944, Subject: "Detail of officers as observers with the board of officers investigating the Japanese Attack of December 7, 1941," is acknowledged. Although it is recognized that certain advantages might be gained were the request granted, it is believed that such a course of action would also entail numerous undesirable consequences, a consideration of which suggests the advisability of not permitting the requested procedure.

2. In this connection it is pertinent to note that the Board is merely a fact finding agency of the War Department, and not initially charged with an investigation of any specific alleged acts of commission or omission on the part of any individual in the military service. However, should substantial evidence of such acts be adduced, the Board contemplates affording an early opportunity to the individual or individuals concerned to appear before it, with or without counsel, and to testify, call witnesses, and offer anything that may be desired in his or their behalf. The Board also contemplates permitting such person or persons again to appear after all other evidence has been adduced, to offer anything further that may be desired in his or their behalf.

3. It appears proper to point out that in the event formal charges should result from the Board's investigation, any accused person must also under Article of War 70, be afforded further opportunity fully to present his case prior to any subsequent trial on such charges. Consequently, your request that you be permitted to designate two officers of your selection to represent you at hearings before the Board of Officers appointed under the Provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, is denied.

By order of the Secretary of War:

FILE

1-705
To 28425 The Pentagon

Taylor 2446

2446
3 Aug 44
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

116

(S: 8 Aug 44)

N.Y. 10/24/46

WAR DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSINESS

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin Mil Pers Officers' Miscellaneous SPFO-M Date 2 August 1944
(Division, branch, section, and symbol)
AGPO-M 202 Short, Walter G. (2 Aug 44) Telephone 78872
(Originating office)
 Classification Confidential Precedence Routine
(Restricted—Confidential—Secret) (Deferred—Routine—Priority—Urgent)

To: COMMANDING GENERAL EIGHTH SERVICE COMMAND

TRANSMIT FOLLOWING TO MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C SHORT US ARMY RETIRED QUOTE
 ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD CONTEMPLATES CALLING YOU AS A WITNESS IN WASHINGTON
 DC COMMENCING THURSDAY AUGUST TENTH STOP THE BOARD INVITES YOU TO FURNISH
 IT BY AIR MAIL AT ONCE ROOM FOUR SEVEN FOUR THREE MUNITIONS BUILDING A
 SUGGESTED LIST OF WITNESSES WHICH IN YOUR OPINION HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS
 BEARING UPON THE INVESTIGATION STOP YOUR REQUEST FOR COPY ROBERTS COMMISSION
 RE NOT APPROVED STOP ANTICIPATED PHOTOSTATIC COPY SAME WILL BE COMPLETED
 AND AVAILABLE UPON YOUR ARRIVAL WASHINGTON STOP OTHER REQUESTS REGARDING
 COUNSEL BEING CONSIDERED REQUEST YOU ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS RADIOGRAM
 SPFO DASH M AND INFORM THIS OFFICE WHEN LIST OF WITNESSES MAY BE EMPLOYED
 UNQUOTE

ULIO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Distribution:
 Classified Message Center.
 Secretary, General Staff.
 Operations Div, WDOR.
 Army Pearl Harbor Board, Rm 4743 Munitions.

OFFICIAL
 Content and classification
 authenticated by

ADJUTANT GENERAL

W. R. A. G. O. Form No. 600
 September 4, 1943

10-5070-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

180

☐ For Action
☐ For Information

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
 OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

File No. 100-1-101-101-101, Entry 2.
 (11 Aug 44)

URGENT

16 AUGUST 1944

INFORMAL ACTION SHEET

Subject: Request for Copy of Testimony Taken Before the Board of Inquiry.
 From: General Short, 4743 (Head Number) 2nd Lt. (Rank) 1st Lt. (Rank)
 To: The Adjutant General, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 4743 (Head Number) 1st Lt. (Rank) 1st Lt. (Rank)

Remarks to Indispensable:

For remark:

1 Inc.

At: 11 Aug 44.

DANA H. SMITH
 Major A.D.
 The Adjutant General, Pearl Harbor Board.
 Chief, Officers' Branch.

1st Ind.

Headquarters Army Pearl Harbor Board, Bn 4743, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.
 16 August 1944.

TO: The Adjutant General.

As to General Short's requests, the following is recommended:

a. That his request to be furnished with a copy of his testimony before the Board be granted.

b. That his request that he immediately be furnished a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken, be denied.

The Board does not believe it wise to grant these requests because of the danger of publicity, the granting to one witness what is denied to others, and the possible jumping to conclusions as to the Board's report before all evidence has been received, sifted and conclusions thereon reached. However, the Board has no objection to having General Short or his advisor, General Green, at the Board's headquarters peruse and study the record of testimony taken now and when the Board returns to Washington prior to a rehearing of General Short.

(Over)

CONFIDENTIAL

3868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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Form No. 1 (Rev. 1-15-44)

CONFIDENTIAL

1. The both sides (bottom turned up).
2. Except for initial action, each comment dated and numbered consecutively, with telephone and room number after the signature.
3. A line drawn across the sheet under each action.
4. Carbon record copy made of all initial action.

W. M. A. G. O. Form No. 1-15-44

INSTRUCTIONS

2. That the request that General Short or his advisor, General Green, have access to all of the exhibits from time to time be granted. However, this access must be at the Board's Headquarters and said exhibits must remain with the Board.

For the Board:

George Brumby
GEORGE BRUMBY,
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army,
President.

1 Incl.
n/c (1 cc w/d)

(S: 19 Aug 44)
ACM/ab/2446

From: Officers Branch AGO Rm 2441 Munitions 78978

TO : The Judge Advocate General Rm 2713 Munitions

For remark.

1 Incl. n/c.

E. B. Bunch
E. B. BUNCH, COL, AGO,
Chief, Officers Branch.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SPSOS 1944/8838
 HQ. ASST. J.A.S.O.,

Ref Ind.

WFO, Jr. 77838

To: The Adjutant General, Attention: Officers Branch, Room 2442,
 Munitions Building, Washington 25, D. C.

I cannot see where any harm will be done by giving General Short a copy of the testimony already taken, less exhibits, and, from now on, the day to day stenographic transcript. As to the danger of publicity, after all, he has already been furnished a copy of the full Robert's Report containing the stenographic transcript, etc. Also, giving General Short the day to day transcript will serve to keep him currently advised of the testimony, which will enable him to prepare in advance his own testimony in answer thereto if he wishes to offer such testimony. This will avoid the delay which would be caused at the end of the case by being compelled to allow General Short additional time to read over the voluminous record preparatory to his possible reappearance before the Board and the possible production of witnesses on his behalf. The closing of the entire case and the filing of the Board's report at the earliest possible moment is, of course, of the utmost importance.

MYRON G. CRAMER

Myron G. Cramer,
 Major General,
 The Judge Advocate General.

WJ Jr.

Rugos, WJ, Jr., -rm/vmf

All notes and rough drafts have been
 destroyed.

DCustodian WJ Jr.
 Disinterested officer _____

3870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF DISPOSITION FORM PERSONNEL DIVISION, G-1

Date: 20 August 1944.

File: WDGP 201 Short, Walter C.

SUBJECT: General Officer.

TO	C/S	S/W	USW	ASW	ASWA	CG
	TAG	G-2	G-3	G-4	OPD	CG
	QMG	JAG	SG	IG	L&LD	CG
Through Office Chief of Staff)						
FOR	S/W directs	Comment or Concurrence				Necessary action
	Draft of reply	Remark and recommendation				Information
	Direct reply	Information for reply				Primary interest
	Approved	And return to G-1				File
	Disapproved					

I. That the request of Major General Walter C. Short is approved, as concurred in by the TJAG, in the second indorsement.

II. That all concerned be advised accordingly.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1:

3 AGO
22 AUG 1944

Received

PO-9

G. B. WALKER JR.
L. C. G. S. C.
Assistant Executive

Incls.

Informal action sheet
fr AGO to G-1, 18 Aug 44,
w/incls.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: In the attached letter, General Short requests to be furnished with a copy of his testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board; a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board; and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken. He also requests access to all the exhibits from time to time. The President of the Board recommends that General Short's request to be furnished with a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken, be denied. TJAG concurs in General Short's request.

AUG 22 1944

NOTED-DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL

104

WAR DEPARTMENT
Room 1244, Munitions Building,
Washington

11 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Request for Copy of Testimony Given Before the Board of Officers.

TO: The Adjutant General of the Army.

1. On appearing this morning before the special Board of Officers holding a hearing in connection with the investigation of the facts surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, I requested to be furnished with a copy of my testimony before the Board as soon as practicable and likewise requested that I be provided with a copy of all of the testimony taken by the Board before the Board proceedings are concluded. I made these requests for the purpose of examining and reviewing the same so that if any supplementary or explanatory statements were desirable I might have the further opportunity of presenting them in order that the said Board might have the full advantage of my intimate knowledge of the facts as they existed at that time. The Chairman of the Board stated that my requests were of such a nature that they should be decided by the War Department and suggested that I make direct application concerning the same.
2. Accordingly, I request that as soon as practicable I be furnished with a copy of my testimony before the Board. I request also that immediately I be furnished a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board and that hereafter I be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken. I also request access to all of the exhibits from time to time. The Board appears to have three reporters for the purpose of expediting the transcribing of the testimony and I believe approval of my requests would present no administrative difficulty.
3. In order to expedite matters, I request that these copies be given to Brigadier General T. H. Green, 2026 Munitions Building, who will forward same to me wherever I happen to be.

/s/ Walter C. Short
/s/ WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army.

CONFIDENTIAL

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3872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

44/8535-1

1

MEMO FOR MR. Short, Walter C.
(11 Aug 44)

1st Ind.

ADJ/AD/7446

MR. ADJ, Washington 25, D. C., 24 August 1944.

FROM: Brigadier General T. H. Green, Jr. 2534, Munitions Bldg, Washington 25, D. C.

TO : Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired.

The request of Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, to be furnished with a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, less exhibits, and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken, is approved.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. U. 110
J. A. U. 110,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copy for, TIAO, re 2nd Ind, SPJW 1944/8535
17 Aug 44. stating that no harm can be seen in furnishing
Maj Gen Short a copy of the testimony already taken, and
day to day stenographic transcript.

WJH, Jr. 77535

QUT

84 K

CONFIDENTIAL

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas.

August 31, 1944

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Testimony taken before the Army
Pearl Harbor Board.

TO: The Adjutant General of the Army.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, W.D., A.G.O., Washington 25, D.C., to Major General Walter C. Short, U.S. Army, Retired (A.G.O.-M-F 201 Short, Walter C. (11 Aug 44), dated 24 August 1944, in which I was informed of the approval of my request to be furnished a copy of testimony taken before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

2. It would greatly facilitate matters if I was furnished with copies of the synopsis of testimony being prepared by the Army Pearl Harbor Board for its use. I therefore request that in addition to full transcript of the testimony there be furnished me at this time a copy of the synopsis of testimony already prepared for use by the Board and that I be furnished with copies of the future synopsis as and when they are prepared.

3. As there will be a large amount of testimony for me to examine and as time is of the essence I request that action on this request be expedited as much as practicable.

4. In order to expedite matters I request that the copies of synopsis be delivered to my counsel, Brigadier General F. H. Green, 2056 Munitions Building, who will forward them to me.

Walter C. Short,
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired.



CONFIDENTIAL

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IMMEDIATE ACTION

AGPO-M 201 Short, Walter C.
(31 Aug 44)

1st Ind.

ACK/ab/2446
(S: 21 Sep 44)

WD, AGO, Washington 25, D. C., 1 September 1944.

TO: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Bldg 36, Presidio of San Francisco, San Francisco, Calif.

For remark.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. ULID
J. A. ULID,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

AGPO-M 201 Short, Walter C. 2nd Ind.
Army Pearl Harbor Board, 20 September 1944.

GG/wh

To: The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

1. The analyses referred to are not as yet the official record of the Board and will not be until verified and accepted in whole or in part. At present they merely are work sheets being compiled by officers loaned to assist the Board.

2. Further, there is but one complete copy of the analysis sheets referred to and the Board will need this copy for study until it completes its report, whereupon that copy may or may not become a permanent part of the record. Nor can that copy, of which there are between four and five hundred sheets, be spared by the Board to have copies thereof made.

3. Hence disapproval of General Short's request now, or in the future, is recommended.

For the Board:

George Gruent
GEORGE GRUENT,
Lt. Gen., U. S. A.
President.

ASAGO
SEP 28 1944
Rec'd Back
PO
10:55
10:55 am

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRETARY OFFICE AND BOARD

98

(5: 44)

KBB/ACK/ab 25 September 1944

The Judge Advocate General

25 Sep 44

Synopsis of Testimony taken before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board.

AGPO-M 201 Short, Walter C.

(31 Aug 44)

Officers Br. AGO

Rm 2441

Munitions

78978

For review and recommendation. The original correspondence with
two indorsements has not as yet reached this office.

1 Incl.

Cy. ltr. 31 Aug 44, w/2 Inds.

K. B. HUSH, COL, AGO,
Chief, Officers Branch.

SPJGJ 1944/8838

To: The Adjutant General. Attention: Officer's Branch, Room 1080,
Munitions Building.

As it appears from second indorsement from the Pearl Harbor Board to
The Adjutant General, dated 20 September 1944, that the synopsis of
testimony requested by General Short in the basic communication are not
yet completed and at the present time are merely work sheets which do not
in any way constitute the official action of the Board and as, in any
event, the Board states it can not at the present time spare those
papers, it is recommended that General Short be advised that the
requested synopsis can not under the circumstances be furnished him.

For The Judge Advocate General:

R. E. Kunkel

R. E. Kunkel,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Chief, Military Justice Division.

1 Incl.
n/c

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3876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
DISPOSITION FORM
PERSONNEL DIVISION, G-1

File: WDGAP 201 Short, Walter G.

Date: 1 October 1944.

SUBJECT: General Officer.

TO	C/S	S/W	USW	ASW	ASWA	CG
	☒ TAG	G-2	G-3	G-4	OPD	CG
	QMG	JAG	SG	IG	L&L	CG
(Thru OGS)						
FOR	☒ S/W directs	Comment or Concurrence				Necessary action
	Draft of reply	Remark and recommendation				Information
	Direct reply	Information for reply				Primary interest
	Approved	And return to G-1				File
	Disapproved					

That the attached correspondence be returned by indorsement in accordance with the recommendation of The Judge Advocate General, as contained in the attached Transmittal Sheet SPJGJ 1944/8535, 28 September 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

G. B. Walker Jr.
G B WALKER JR.
Lt Col, G S C
Assistant Executive

Incls.
Trans. Sheet 19 Sep. 44
from TAG to G-1 w/incls.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: In basic communication Major General Walter G. Short requests that in addition to full transcript of testimony there be furnished him a copy of the synopses of testimony already prepared for use by the Board, and that he be furnished with a copy of the future synopses as and when they are prepared. Lieutenant General George Gruent, President of the Board, recommends disapproval in 2nd indorsement. The JAG recommends that General Short be advised that the requested synopses can not under the circumstances be furnished.

1012 1944
NOTED-OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL

10-52754-20

97

CONFIDENTIAL

AGPO-M 201 Short, Walter C.
(21 Sep 44)

1st Ind.

ACK/cb/2446

HQ, AGO, Washington 25, D. C., 4 October 1944.

FROM: Brigadier General T. H. Green, U. S. Army, Bn 2035, Munitions
Building, Washington 25, D. C.

TO : Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired.

The synopsis of testimony requested in the basic communication are not yet completed and are merely worksheets which do not in any way constitute the official action of the Board and as the Board can not at the present time spare these papers, the requested synopsis can not under the circumstances be furnished.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. ULLS

J. A. ULLS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.Off. Br. *ACK* - 78978

DISTRIBUTION:

G-1 AGO, Bn 28925

The Judge Advocate General, re
Transmittal Sheet, 26 Sep 44, SPJGJ 1944/9535.Pres. Army Fear Harbor Board, Bldg 36, Presidio
San Francisco, San Francisco, Calif. re 2nd Ind.
20 Sep 44, AGPO-M 201 Short, Walter C., GG.Brigadier General T. H. Green U. S. Army, Bn 2035
Munitions Bldg, Washington 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OCS
FVOC
J542
vho

WDOSA 201 Short, W.C.
(2 Oct 44)

October 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ORDENT:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated September 29, 1944, signed by Major General Walter C. Short, Retired, along with a reply to General Short which has been signed by the Secretary of War.

The Secretary of War directs that these be forwarded for appropriate action by your Board.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff

*Oct 10 1944 J.S.P.
pc-9
Enc.*



DISPATCHED
OCT 10 1944
BY 10-10-44

COPY FOR
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

*Directly - J542
6/10/44
(Place Card Here)
10*

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas,

September 29, 1944.

Honorable Henry L. Stinson,
Secretary of War,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The testimony which was taken before the so-called Roberts Commission and that currently being taken in the hearing now pending before the Army Pearl Harbor Board was recently made available to me. Upon examining these records, to which none of the exhibits have been attached, I fail to find a disclosure of certain vital information which high Washington officials appear to have had prior to December 7, 1941, of the imminence of an attack by the Japanese. Such information was not made available to me in the exercise of my command in the Hawaiian Islands. As I understand that the Army Pearl Harbor Board is now about to complete its hearings and since this important factual data is not included in the testimony of the Board thus far furnished to me, I feel compelled to call this matter to your attention.

From statements in the records of these two hearings, it is to be noted that a knowledge of pertinent facts which are not later disclosed in the record is inferred. This important factual information is essential to a full appraisal of the situation. I specifically refer to the following instances: On pages 318 and 319 of the testimony taken before the Roberts Commission the questions asked by Justice Roberts indicate that as chairman of the commission he was in possession of facts of the utmost importance to this case which pointed to a definite warning of an attack against Pearl Harbor which apparently was known to officials in Washington from certain intercepted Japanese code messages. So far as I have been able to learn these facts are not a part of the record of these hearings.

Again in the testimony of Admiral Kimmel before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. XVI, page 1811) it is clearly indicated that certain vital information was in the hands of the War and Navy Departments regarding the imminence of an attack, which information was certainly not transmitted to me. The information upon which he based this statement is likewise not a part of the record of the hearings. Without a doubt he would not have made such a statement if he did not have evidence to support it.

It is also respectfully pointed out that General Marshall had some important information on which he relied at the time he

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General

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CONFIDENTIAL

sent me the coded telegram (referred to at Vol. IV, page 309, of Pearl Harbor Board testimony) under date of December 7, 1941, which unfortunately did not reach me until seven hours after the attack. The information upon which General Marshall must have relied in sending this message likewise does not appear in the record before the Board thus far furnished me.

* The facts upon which these actions and statements were based clearly go to the very essence of the present inquiry. I believe, therefore, you will readily agree that a full and complete disclosure of all the information which was in the hands of Washington officials prior to December 7, 1941, with regard to the imminence of an attack, should be obtained and made a matter of record in the proceedings of the current investigation as they are of the utmost importance in appraising this entire situation.

As the perfecting of the record in this investigation is of course of great importance to me personally, I urge that no steps be left unturned to make a complete investigation of the same, so that all of the evidence concerning this matter is in the record of the hearings of the Board. It is therefore urgently requested that the Board delay the completion of its proceedings until such time as this can be accomplished. In this connection I request also that my counsel be given access to all War Department records which would be pertinent to this matter.

Furthermore, if a thorough investigation of the War Department records by the Board and by my counsel do not disclose the facts and evidence upon which the statements and actions above referred to were made, I request that an appropriate call be made upon any other source which might have such pertinent information, particularly the Navy Department, and that they be required to furnish and make all such evidence available to the Board and to my counsel.

The War Department has denied my request to have a representative at the Board proceedings and to cross-examine witnesses and therefore unless my request herein is granted there is no means available to me by which I may be assured that all the pertinent evidence will be made available to the Board and to me.

Sincerely,

Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired.

Classification changed by authority
of Walter C. Short General (Date)
CONFIDENTIAL 103

October 2, 1944.

Major General Walter C. Short, USA Retired,
1141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas.

Dear General Short:

Your letter of 29 September 1944 is being placed in the hands of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

This Board was appointed by my order to ascertain and report to me the facts relating to the attack made upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper. You may therefore rest assured that the Board is exploring all sources of evidence bearing upon the subject.

I am directing General Grunert to permit your Military Counsel to examine its exhibits in the presence of a member of the Board. No copies of these exhibits, however, may be made.

I am also directing that appropriate warnings relating to military security be given to your counsel for the information and guidance of all concerned.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Secretary of War.

ONLY FOR
THE ACCOUNT GENERAL
CONFIDENTIAL

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Rec'd 17 11 26

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Munitions Building

24 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Grunert
General Russell
General Frank
General Green
Colonel Toulain
Colonel West
Colonel Hughes
Major Gleason
Captain Burkart
Lieutenant Murphy
Mr. Perkins
Sergeant Montgomery
Miss Brennan

1. The copies of our Transcript to date of departure marked "Copy for General Grunert" and original of all exhibits will be taken with us. The other four (4) copies will be left behind. This includes Volumes 1-16, inclusive.

2. While absent from Washington, two copies of our daily transcript, i.e., those marked for General Grunert and General Russell, will be retained with the Board. As soon as corrections are completed, the other three (3) copies will be mailed to the Board Headquarters in Washington, to be numbered and utilized by digesting staff. This includes Volume 16 (testimony of 28 Aug. 1944) and subsequent volumes of testimony taken outside of Washington.

3. The copies of Transcript marked "For the Recorder" will be turned over to General Short (through his counsel, General Green) as soon as corrections and numbering are completed. The mentioned counsel will also be permitted to examine copies of all exhibits to the proceedings but will not be furnished copies.

CHARLES W. WHIST,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Recorder.

cmw/dw

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Room 4741, Munitions Building
2 September 1944

Colonel Charles F. West, Recorder
Army Pearl Harbor Board
Building 36, Presidio of San Francisco
San Francisco, California

Dear Colonel:

I enclose herewith copy of memorandum I have today sent to Major B. R. Powell, G.S.C., who is acting on behalf of Brigadier General J. S. Bragdon, counsel for Colonel Wyman.

I wrote this letter after considerable thought and consultation with General Kramer, as there would be a distinct embarrassment involved in giving General Bragdon a copy of Major Clausen's memorandum of 10 July 1944 to Mr. Amberg. This memorandum is referred to, as you will note, in the memorandum of the Acting Secretary of War to the Judge Advocate General dated 17 July 1944. In spite of this fact, it was felt that General Bragdon, as counsel, has a right to the order referring the Wyman case to the Board. In the event General Bragdon follows up the present request by requesting Major Clausen's memorandum, I shall, unless instructed to the contrary by the Board, decline to give it to him on the ground that it contains confidential information to which he is not entitled.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR.
Colonel, J.A.G.D.

Incl-Copy of memo to
Maj Powell with incs

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Room 4741, Munitions Building

2 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR : JUDGE W. F. POWELL, C. J.

Subject: Order Creating Pearl Harbor Board and
Referring Matter of Colonel Theodore
Syman, Jr., to Board

1. Pursuant to your oral request for transmission to Brigadier General J. L. Bragdon, who you state has been appointed counsel for the above-named officer, there is attached hereto copy of confidential order by the Secretary of War dated 8 July 1944 creating the Pearl Harbor Board, copy of Supplement 1 order of the Secretary of War dated 1 July 1944, and copy of confidential memorandum of the Acting Secretary of War dated 11 July 1944 referring the matter of the investigation of Colonel Theodore Syman, Jr. and any others who might be involved in Hawaiian defense projects to the Pearl Harbor Board.

WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR.
Colonel, J.A.G.C.
Officer in Charge

- 3 Incl
Incl 1: Confidential memo /r
dated 8 Jul 44
Incl 2: Supplement 1 order of S/W
dated 1 July 44
Incl 3: Confidential memo of Acting S/W
dated 12 Jul 44

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1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

Subtotal Orders

Zachariah Smith

[illegible]

Exercises

Mr. George Grunert, 01534, UO6
President.

Ref. Geo. Henry D. Russell, CR12742, USA
Member.

Ref. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 02071, USA
Member.

Col. Charles V. West, D13774, JAGM.
Recorder, without vote.

1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 26

80. 2d Service Command,
Governors Island, New York.

FD Mayweather Board, T Section,
Columbus, Ohio.

4001st AAF Base Unit,
Patterson Field, Ohio

GDMA, West Point, N. Y.

2. Such military and civilian personnel may be assigned to assist the Board as the Board shall request.

3. The Board will convene at Washington, D. C., at the call of the senior member and will hold sessions at such times and places as it may deem advisable. The Board will observe its own procedure and is authorized to report.

4. The members of the Board allocated to command positions will retain command while performing duties with the Board.

during the period of operations as the Board, approximately sixty full-time members are authorized to perform such travel, including overseas travel, under the authorization of the State as may be directed by the President of the Board. The Board will also have authority to select the location of the Special Committee and to direct the Special Committee to conduct such studies as may be required.

~~RESTRICTED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CONFIDENTIAL

6. Military and civil personnel will render the Board all necessary information and assistance.

7. Travel directed is necessary in the military service, 691-1, 43-02, 03, 212/5-425. The provisions of War Department Circular No. 20, 43, and War Department Circular No. 26-3, 43, apply.

By order of the Secretary of War



[Handwritten signature]
 Major General
 The Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.In Reply
Please Refer to: AGO-A-A 210 511 (10 Jul 44)

20 July 1944

Subject: Supplemental Orders.

To: Each Officer Mentioned.

1. The Board appointed by letter orders, this office, AGO-A-A 210 511 (26 Jun 44), 9 July 1944, subject: "Orders", as amended by letter orders, this office, AGO-A-A 210 511 (10 Jul 44), 11 July 1944, subject: "Amendment of Orders", pertaining to each of the following-named officers, will consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the Human Military Affairs Committee, as directed by the Acting Secretary of War in his memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944:

Lt. Gen. George Grenart, 01534, USA.
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 021769, USA.
Maj. Gen. Walter G. Frank, 02671, USA.
Col. Charles M. West, 012774, JAGD.

2. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0207615, JAGD, is appointed as Assistant Recorder without vote on the above referred to Board.

By order of the Secretary of War:



W. M. McMillan
Adjutant General.

1 Incl.

Memo 12 July 44

Distribution:

AG of S, G-1, Col. Goodwin, R 20921, The Pentagon.
C Statistics Br, OS, Rm 3D685, The Pentagon.
Off Sr Rec Sec, Rm 1006, Munitions Bldg. w/d
Col. Burger, Rm 1052, Munitions Bldg. w/d
1-Each officer's ROL file.
AG of S, CPD, YDGS, Rm 3B680, The Pentagon.
CG, Army Air Forces, Rm 6D1082, The Pentagon.
The Judge Advocate General, Rm 2751, Munitions Bldg.

CONFIDENTIAL

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6. Military and civil personnel will render the Board all necessary information and assistance.

7. Travel directed to proceed is in the military service, 602-1, 43-02, 03, 213, 54-25. The provisions of War Department Circular No. 20, 43, and War Department Circular No. 204, 43, apply.

By order of the Secretary of War



[Signature]
J. A. H. 10, 43
Major General
The Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D.C.

Reference: AGPO-A-210,211 (10 Jul 44)

Subject: Supplemental Orders.

21 July 1944

To: Staff Officer Noted.

1. The Board appointed by letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-210,211 (10 Jul 44), 2 July 1944, subject: "Orders", as amended by letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-210,211 (10 Jul 44), 11 July 1944, subject: "Amendment of Orders", pertaining to each of the following named officers, will consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as directed by the Acting Secretary of War in his memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944:

- Lt. Gen. George Grunert, 01534, USA.
- Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 0212769, USA.
- Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 02871, USA.
- Col. Charles M. West, 012774, JAGD.

2. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0207612, JAGD, is appointed as assistant Recorder without vote on the above referred to Board.

By order of the Secretary of War:



W. M. McPherson
Adjutant General.

1 Encl.
Memo 12 July

- Distribution:
- AG of S, G-1, Col. Goodwin, R 20931, The Pentagon.
 - G Statistics Br, OS, R 32885, The Pentagon.
 - Off Br Sec Sec, R 1006, Munitions Bldg. w/d
 - Col. Burger, R 1052, Munitions Bldg. w/d
 - Each officer's 201 file.
 - AG of S, OPD, WDGS, R 33860, The Pentagon.
 - OS, Army Air Forces, R 011082, The Pentagon.
 - The Judge Advocate General, R 2701, Munitions Bldg.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

July 12, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Hyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects.

1. The recommendations contained in paragraph 2 of the memorandum dated July 10, 1944, of Major Henry C. Clauson, J.I.S.D., to Mr. Arberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, on the above subject, are approved.

2. Immediately upon the appointment of a board of officers pursuant to Public Law 589, 78th Congress, to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, the phases of the present matter relating thereto will be referred to such board for investigation and such other action as may be proper under the directive appointing such board. As it is understood Major Clauson will be detailed as assistant recorder of this board, he will continue in that capacity to coordinate the activities referred to paragraph 1 hereof with the activities of the Pearl Harbor board in the present case.

(Signed) ROBERT F. PATTERSON

ROBERT F. PATTERSON
Acting Secretary of War.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Room 4741, Munitions Building

4 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL J. A. SEITZ, G.S.C., OPD, Room 4C830, Pentagon
Subject: List of Personnel Accompanying and Accompanying the Army Pearl Harbor Board to Hawaii.

Pursuant to your request by telephone on 2 September 1944 that you be furnished with a complete list of all the personnel including and accompanying the Army Pearl Harbor Board on its trip to Hawaii, the names of such personnel are as follows:

Lt. Gen. George Gruenert, 01534, USA
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 0012769, USA
Maj. Gen. Walter M. Frank, 02871, USA
Col. Charles S. West, 012774, JAGD
Col. Harry A. Toulmin, 0205520, AC
Lt. Colonel Charles K. Nelson, Jr., 0357164, AC
Maj. Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD
Maj. Robert G. Hurt, 01000134, AGD
1st Lt. James L. Murphy, Jr., 0583430, AC
Capt. Stephen M. Montgomery, 33846271
Mr. Lloyd L. Perkins
Mr. Earl H. Penell
Mr. M. E. O'Connor
Mr. Stephen S. Maxson
Mr. Leon M. Golding
Mr. Verle C. Brown

WJH
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR.
Colonel J.A.C.D.
Officer in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

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3890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WAR DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

13 September 1944

Colonel William J. Hughes, JAGC
Room 4741, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.


Dear Colonel Hughes:

Three copies of all volumes of the transcript covering our San Francisco hearings to include number 23, which was the last testimony taken there, were duly transmitted to you by registered mail prior to our departure from that place. This was in accordance with a memorandum dated 24 August 1944, a copy of which was furnished you and Major Purkhart.

Our schedule of operations here has been a rather intensive one and it has been somewhat difficult for the board members to keep the record "read". However, they do not want the rear echelon there to run out of copy. Therefore, it has been decided not to wait until the record is read and corrections are made on all copies (as per plan set forth in previous memorandum) but to send you two copies of each volume as soon as available and before corrections are made. These two will be those marked Secretary of War and Recorder. If you are still transmitting the latter to General Orin on behalf of General Short, it should be explained to him that slight minor corrections may later have to be made. So far as Purkhart's crew is concerned, I may say that usually the corrections to be made are of an obvious or minor nature. They will be called pick up any glaring error which may creep in.

In accordance with the foregoing remarks there is being transmitted to you via earliest available transportation two copies each of volumes 24 - 27 inclusive, and subsequent ~~volumes~~ will be forwarded as soon as completed.

Trusting that everything is moving on as all right and looking forward to seeing you soon, I am, with kindest regards,

Very truly yours,

Colonel, JAGC
Headquarters, Army Pearl Harbor Board

SECRET

SPJW

21 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL JOHN H. WHIR.

Subject: Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.

1. I discussed the Pearl Harbor matter with General McMurtry this morning and he told me that when the Board had made its report it would very probably be referred to me in the usual course for opinion. In that event I pointed out that the time element was such that either I or someone in my office ought to begin to familiarize himself with the testimony in order that no undue delay should occur at this end. General McMurtry stated he wished this procedure to be followed and to advise the Pearl Harbor Board accordingly.

2. I would like you, therefore, to inform the Board of the above and to have Colonel Hughes familiarize himself with the testimony so as to be able to assist me when the time comes.

Myron C. Ormer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

Hughes, M. J. Jr. -rm

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Public Relations
P3383 GRAFON
Tel. - RM 6700
Evs. 3525 and 4540

October 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS:

The report of the Army Board which was appointed to assist the Secretary of War in investigating the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe has now been received by the Secretary.

The Secretary has referred this report, which is based on testimony taken during the last three months and recorded in nearly 8,000 pages, to the Judge Advocate General for consideration. The Secretary will also personally review this report and such part of the record as may be advisable.

The report has been classified by the Army Board partly as SECRET and partly as TOP SECRET, and this classification will be reviewed for security by appropriate military authorities.

END

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Public Relations
PRESS BRANCH
Tel. - RE 6700
Br. 3425 and 4860

October 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS:

The following is the text of a question and the reply made by the Secretary of War at his press conference on October 26, 1944:

PRESS:

Can you disclose whatever you can about the nature of the Army's Pearl Harbor report? Does it recommend court-martial action against General Short or any other Army officers? Does it alter in any way the Army's expressed plan to hold a trial after the war is over of General Short? Is there any chance any part of the report or a summary thereof will reach the public prior to election day, or prior to the end of the war, or ever? When will it be made available to Congress?

SECRETARY:

Have you ever read the statute under which my duties are combined?

PRESS:

I read that and couldn't find it called for a report to Congress on that thing.

SECRETARY:

Then, why do you ask the question? I am going to follow this statute:

"The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in Section I above and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify."

That is the duty of the law under which I am acting. I do not care to comment on any future action on the Pearl Harbor report of the board which was appointed to assist me, except to say that I shall give this report the consideration necessary in order to carry out the serious duty by which I was charged by this act of Congress. The present status of the report is as given in the press release last Monday immediately after the report was handed to me.

END

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Memorandum:

I am of opinion
errors of judgment -
only & that these
of such a nature
Reason: faultless
demand for G. M.

23

11/30/44.

See

By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."

This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and examined such parts of the evidence taken as I deemed necessary. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they may be made public, consistent with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

SECRET

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I SECRET I

-3-

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

As far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and commendations as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged

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in combat is active Theater of Operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public at the present time the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based.

Furthermore, to publish merely portions of the Board's report or record would necessarily distort the facts and the conclusions, which would likewise be against the public interest.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

OPD 381 Hav (29 Aug 44)
Subj: Visit of Gen. Bragdon
to PCA
OPD, Pacific Theater Sec.
6454

29 August 1944

Commanding General
USAF in Pacific Ocean Areas
Port Shafter, T. H.

Number WAR 88692

To Richardson from Somervell signed Marshall.

Orders are being requested for Brigadier General J. S. Bragdon to proceed to Hawaii in connection with the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings there. General Bragdon will act as counsel for Colonel Wyman who will appear before board. It is desired that these officers reach Hawaii on or about 12 September. It is requested that you have the department engineer have the records pertaining to the construction of aircraft warning stations, the war reserve gasoline project and all work pertaining to both, also the records pertaining to the Rohl Connolly contract and any other contracts for work or materials relating to the above projects, reviewed and a chronological analysis made thereof so that it will be available for the officers above. It is particularly desirable that there be a chronological record of the actual work done and of all delays in connection therewith, with reasons therefor. Also that local priorities and changes therein be listed according to their occurrence. It is further suggested that the analysis be developed under the three general headings of: (A) The project for the aircraft warning stations; (B) The war reserve

CM-OUT-88692 (30 Aug 44)

SECRET

COPY NO. 18

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

CONFIDENTIAL

SP333

S - 221 244

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

Subject: Effect of investigation or discharge of Army Branch Member
 based military personnel upon availability to prosecution
 for unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

1. It is my opinion that court-martial jurisdiction for unauthorized disclosure of classified information in connection with an investigation conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board terminates on the day of its military personnel upon their discharge or relief from active duty, if other than a member of the Regular Army. Members of the Officers' Reserve Corps, Selected Reserve Corps, Organized Reserves, officers appointed and non-commissioned in the Army of the United States, Selectees or Inductees, members of the Women's Army Corps, and enlisted and enlisted men of the National Guard of the United States generally are subject to military law only when on active duty, and, except as to offenses involving violation of Articles of War 94, court-martial jurisdiction over them ceases upon their relief from active duty, or discharge. In a general sense, jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a period of service which has then been terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service. Under Articles of War 9, retired officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army remain subject to military law.

2. Any person who willfully communicates or transmits, or attempts to communicate or transmit, any document, writing or note relating to the national defense to any person not entitled to receive it is subject to prosecution under the provisions of the Espionage Act (sec. 1, Title I, act of 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 217); sec. 1, act of 26 Mar. 1950 (54 Stat. 79); 50 U.S.C. 31). The Department of Justice has informally expressed some doubt as to whether the unauthorized disclosure of classified information would constitute a violation of the mentioned statute, but would be willing to prosecute such case if necessary.

MYRON C. CRANDER

Myron C. Crander,
 Major General,
 The Judge Advocate General.

Info copy to Deputy Chief of Staff

Lasarus, H.B. 2000

CONFIDENTIAL

3902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR., J.A.G.D., Room 2714
Munitions Building, Extension 77535

The Secretary of War directs that the combination of the outer safe in Room 4D-834, be given to Colonel Edward P. Meohling, Executive Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, upon the following understanding:


- a. The inner safe will remain where it is, without access
- b. The combination to the outer safe will be disclosed to no more than two officers.
- c. The door to the outer safe will not be allowed to remain open unless an officer is in attendance.
- d. The occupants of the room, entrance to which is obtained through the outer safe, will vacate the room for such period of time as Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, may require to enable him to complete the present work assigned to him by the Secretary of War.
- e. Colonel Meohling will acknowledge the above by appropriate indorsement hereon.

Harvey H. Bundy

HARVEY H. BUNDY
Special Assistant to the Secretary of War

SECRET

Section F



DO NOT DETACH THIS SLIP

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

Date

2/12, 1942

To

Adj. General.	Panama Canal.
Under Sec. of War.	Dir. Personnel.
Asst. Sec. of War.	Chief, Air Corps.
Asst. Sec. of War (Air).	Chief of Finance.
Asst. Chief Clerk.	Q. M. General.
C. & R. Div.	Judge Advocate Gen.
Chief of Staff.	Public Relations.
Chief of Engrs.	Chief Signal Corps.
Chief of Ord.	Proc. & Accts. Div.
Surg. General.	

For -

Necessary action.

Direct reply.

Necessary action and preparation of reply for signature of Secretary of War.

Necessary action and preparation of reply for signature of Administrative Assistant.

Remarks and recommendation.

Memorandum for Sec. of War or Administrative Asst. Investigation and report.

Notation and filing.

Noted by Sec. of War or Administrative Asst. and returned for filing.

Previous papers.

Mark "Personal attention of Administrative Asst."

Correction.

Remarks:

By direction of the Secretary of War:

JOHN W. MARTYN,
Administrative Assistant.

Form No. 2

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~~11~~

ENK/rmm 1512

WD 201 Short, Walter C.
(2-14-42)

FFB 1-8-42

Honorable Carl Hayden,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Hayden:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 14, 1942, requesting information as to the present retirement status of General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and enclosing copy of a letter from one of your constituents, Mrs. F. H. Guild of Tucson, Arizona, in which she protests the retirement of these two officers.

The conditions surrounding the case of Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, are of very confidential nature; and, in view of the report of Justice Roberts concerning this matter, I feel confident that you will appreciate the necessity for such procedure. As soon as a decision has been reached by the Department, full publicity of the action to be taken will be made.

Since the case of Admiral Kimmel comes under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department, it is suggested that you address the Secretary of the Navy concerning that officer.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE L. KILPATRICK

Secretary of War, ENK

DISPATCHED

FEB 19 1942

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DISTRIBUTION:
Secretary of War.

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3908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

JAH/haw/240

AG 232 Short, Walter G.
(11 Sep 43)P-H

16 September 1943.

Honorable C. Wayland Brooks,
United States Senate.

My dear Senator Brooks:

Your letter of 11 September 1943 concerning Major General Walter G. Short, O-3622, United States Army, Retired, to the Secretary of War, has been referred to us for appropriate reply.

Before appropriate action can be taken, it is necessary that I secure certain information in this matter. I feel certain, therefore, that you will appreciate the necessity for a slight delay before a final reply will be possible.

Very respectfully,

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

RJG2

OCT 8-1943

Honorable C. Wayland Brooks,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Brooks:

In further reply to your letter of 11 September 1943 inquiring whether the statute of limitations will bar the trial of Major General Walter C. Short (Retired) for alleged offenses committed on or about 7 December 1941, you are advised that the two-year period of the statute of limitations embodied in Article of War 39 will expire 7 December 1943, but that in the meantime General Short has executed a waiver of the statute of limitations. General Short's action in executing a waiver is similar to that of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel who executed a waiver covering the Naval statute of limitations. Public announcement to this effect was made in the press on 3 October 1943.

In answer to your second inquiry as to whether General Short was placed on the retired list following the attack on Pearl Harbor, you are advised that General Short, upon his own application, was retired from active service 28 February 1942, "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action".

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

OCT 8-1943



RECEIVED BY STAFF

ORIGINAL DISPATCHED FROM
OFFICE OF STAFF

Copy for The Adjutant General

123

3910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

3910E

1st Incl.

6

War Department, AGO, J. 100. 4 October 1943.

To: The Adjutant General (The Personnel Division, G-1, War Department General Staff).

1. Inclosed is draft of reply for the signature of the Secretary of War, to letter of Senator C. Wayland Brooks.

2. The return of this file was delayed because of the anticipated public announcement of the signing of a waiver of the statute of limitations by General Short. This announcement appeared in the newspapers of 3 October 1943.

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

2 Incls.

Incl. 1 - AGO Transm. Sheet

9-20-43 w/4 incls.

Incl. 2 - Orig. ltr. Sen. Brooks.

Honorable C. Wayland Brooks,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Brooks:

In further reply to your letter of 11 September 1943 inquiring whether the statute of limitations will bar the trial of Major General Walter C. Short (Retired) for alleged offenses committed on or about 7 December 1941, you are advised that the two-year period of the statute of limitations embodied in Article of War 39 will expire 7 December 1943, but that in the meantime General Short has executed a waiver of the statute of limitations. General Short's action in executing a waiver is similar to that of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel who executed a waiver covering the naval statute of limitations. Public announcement to this effect was made in the press on 3 October 1943.

In answer to your second inquiry as to whether General Short was placed on the retired list following the attack on Pearl Harbor, you are advised that General Short, upon his own application, was retired from active service 28 February 1942, "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action".

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of War.

41

ROBERT B. BETHUNE JR. MC CORMACK
 ELBERT D. THOMAS, UTAH
 ROBERT J. HENNING, COLO
 ROBERT HALL, ALA
 BERNARDINE HENRIETTE CALIF
 ROBERT D. THOMAS JR. ST.
 T. D. THOMAS, MD
 WALLACE P. WALKER
 ROBERT M. HARRIS JR. WY
 JAMES D. HARRIS JR. MONT
 JOSEPH L. G. HARRIS, WY

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

Major General M. C. Cramer
The Judge Advocate General
United States Army
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Cramer:

I am in receipt of a letter from Fred W. Simpson of Colorado Springs, Colorado, as follows:

"The writer begs to again rise to a point of order and ask why Kimmel and Short cannot be courtmartialled before the statute of limitations bars such a trial, which should be as we understand it before December 7, 1945. The permission given both of these men to retire instead of being tried at once seems to me to be letting them off very easy, to say the least."

It will be appreciated if you will favor me with a reply in duplicate which I may transmit to Mr. Simpson.

Many thanks for your cooperation and courtesy.

Sincerely,

ECJ: ES

014.4 Statute of Limitations
 4
 18
 25 November 1943

SPJUS

Honorable Edwin C. Johnson,

United States Senate.

Dear Senator Johnson:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 22 November 1943 in which you quote from a letter received by you from Fred W. Simpson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, relative to the statute of limitations barring possible future courts-martial of General Short and Admiral Kimmel.

In a press announcement, 3 October 1943, the Secretary of War stated that General Short had executed an instrument waiving as a defense the statute of limitations should he be tried by court-martial subsequent to 7 December 1943. A similar announcement with reference to Admiral Kimmel was made by the Secretary of the Navy.

Very sincerely yours,

Myron C. Cramer

Myron C. Cramer,
 Major General,
 The Judge Advocate General.

J. R. H.

Quimond, J. A.

RECEIVED ON
 26 NOV 1943



NOV 52 83 48

Statute of Limitations—25 November 1943

38

3914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

May 18, 1944

Honorable Mike Mansfield,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Mansfield:

I have your letter of May 10, 1944, requesting to be advised as to the War Department policy with reference to the trial of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short for alleged offenses growing out of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. You point out that the statute of limitations, as extended by Congress, will expire June 7, 1944.

The War Department does not take the view that General Short must be tried before June 7 next. Some time ago General Short executed a waiver of the statute of limitations which operates to extend it until the end of the war and six months thereafter and thus permits his trial irrespective of the date set by the act of Congress referred to by you (Act of December 20, 1943, Public Law 206, 78th Congress). I understand a similar waiver was executed by Admiral Kimmel. Under these circumstances, I do not feel that the trial of this case in time of war is necessary. Such a trial would of necessity be very lengthy, would give publicity to highly confidential matters and would require the attendance of many important Army and Navy officers who at present are engaged in active operations against the enemy all over the world. For these reasons, I feel that it would not only be against the public interest but it would also be highly detrimental to the successful conduct of the war to bring this case to trial during the period of active operations.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMAN

Secretary of War.

C O P Y

95 M

S270J

MEMORANDUM FOR LEGISLATIVE AND LIAISON DIVISION, OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
ROOM 3D-514, THE PENTAGON.

Subject: H. J. Res. 283 "To extend the time limit for immunity".

1. Transmitted herewith is draft of a letter prepared for the signature of the Under Secretary of War, in reply to a letter dated 18 May 1944 from Honorable Emanuel Celler, in regard to House Joint Resolution 283, purporting to extend the statute of limitations in the Kissel-Ghent cases and requiring prosecution of those officers within a three months' period.

2. Attention is invited to the possibility that unless Representative Celler's letter to the Under Secretary of War is deemed personal, or quasi-official in character, the present matter should, under existing practice, be coordinated with the Bureau of the Budget if the Under Secretary's reply is to be deemed the official expression of the War Department.

Myron C. Connor,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

2 Encls.
Encl. 1 - Working copy, 19 May 44, w/2 Encls.
Encl. 2 - Draft of reply to Representative Celler.

19 May 44

3916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SPJ

Honorable Emanuel Celler,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Celler:

In reply to your letter of May 18, 1944, requesting my views as to H. J. Res 288, a Joint Resolution to extend the time limit for immunity from prosecution of persons involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, I inclose herewith copy of a letter dated May 18, 1944, from the Secretary of War to Honorable Mike Mansfield which expresses my views on this general subject matter.

Sincerely yours,

Under Secretary of War.

1 Incl.
Copy ltr to Hon. Mike
Mansfield fr S/W,
18 May 1944.

W. J. ...
W. J. ...
W. J. ...

FERGUSON
MICHIGAN

THE SENATE
DOUGLAS & MORGAN

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 2, 1944.

Major General Myron C. Cramer,
The Judge Advocate General,
Headquarters Army Service Forces,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Cramer:

I am in receipt of your letter of June 1 with reference to the meaning of "manifest impediment" in Article of War 39 prescribing a statute of limitations of two years unless some manifest impediment to trial exists.

I note you now think it is possible that this could be interpreted to mean that one of the impediments would be if the Government could not produce witnesses. I am of the opinion that Congress and the people of the United States could not take a chance on such interpretation. I think the original opinion of the Attorney General and the authorities holding that it is an impediment which a man himself creates are the ones we would have to rely upon and that, therefore, an extension of the statute is essential if we are going to see that justice is really done. The thing which has troubled me considerably is that the Army has not seen fit to take a waiver from anyone other than General Short. They have assumed on their part, at least up to two days ago, to hold to the theory that there could be only one person guilty for what happened at Pearl Harbor. I think this is a wrong presumption. It is for this reason that I hope an investigation will be made so those who are guilty will be brought to trial at the earliest possible date consistent with our security. Surely trials could be conducted with reference to some of the acts committed at Pearl Harbor which would not interfere with our war effort.

As a matter of law I am wondering whether the Army assumes that they cannot investigate any agency of the Government other than the Army. If this is true, then I think Congress itself should endeavor to investigate any phase which the Army feels it should not investigate because of the law. It would appear to me that the Army would have the right to go into other agencies to ascertain whether or not what was done by such agencies was the cause of the trouble rather than those acts committed by Army officers. I would appreciate your opinion on this important matter.

With best personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

MF/F

153

SPJW

- 1 JUN 1944

Honorable Homer Ferguson,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Ferguson:

I inclose herewith copy of memorandum prepared in this office as to the meaning of "manifest impediment" in Article of War 39 prescribing a statute of limitations of two years unless some manifest impediment to trial exists.

I feel, as suggested in the memorandum, that a court might readily hold that the existence of a state of war constituted a "manifest impediment" to trial of an alleged offender where his trial in time of war would either be impossible due to the absence of military witnesses engaged in the war effort or would be detrimental to the public interest because of the likelihood of giving information to the enemy. However, I do not care to take a positive position on the matter due to my belief that the situation is already taken care of by General Short's agreement not to plead the statute which I have every reason to believe he will adhere to. In the event that the unusual should occur and General Short should violate his solemn agreement, it is difficult for me to believe that a court-martial confronted with a fraud of this character would sustain his plea of the statute of limitations. Moreover, as I suggested to you yesterday, such action by General Short would subject him to trial for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman under Article of War 25.

Very sincerely yours,

Myron C. Oranger

Myron C. Oranger,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Incl.
Copy of memorandum.

RECEIVED
JUN 1 1944



Hughes, Wm. J. Jr., -cfr/vmr

JUN 1 1944

18

MEMORANDUM RE MEANING OF "MANIFEST IMPEDIMENT" IN ARTICLE OF WAR 39.

Article of War 39 provides a two-year statute of limitations but also provides:

"That the period of any absence of the accused from the jurisdiction of the United States, and also any period during which by reason of some manifest impediment the accused shall not have been amenable to military justice, shall be excluded in computing the aforesaid periods of limitation."

It is well settled that the above statute of limitations does not destroy the jurisdiction of the court but is a mere defense which must be pleaded. In re: Townsend, 133 Fed. 74; In re: Ellis, 17 Fed. 723; Johnson v. U.S., 13 Fed. Cases 227, No. 5413; paragraph 67, page 32, paragraph 70a, page 63, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1925. Before, therefore, any question can arise as to whether the statute of limitations has run or not, the accused must plead it. At that point the court will determine whether a "manifest impediment" existed during any particular part of the period. As to the meaning of "manifest impediment", the preceding reference to absence led the Attorney General in 14 Op. Att. Gen. 266 to hold that it meant an "impediment" similar in kind to absence which rendered the trial impossible. In In re: Davison, 4 Fed. 207, 210, the court held that:

"'Manifest impediment' as used in the 39th article, does not mean merely want of evidence, or ignorance as to the offender or offense by the military authorities, but it means something akin to absence--want of power, or a physical inability to bring the party charged to trial."

In the case of Harria, 14 Op. Att. Gen. 266, 267, the Attorney General held "manifest impediment" did not refer to concealment of the offense by the accused, but that it meant something "akin to absence--want of power or a physical inability to bring the party charged to trial".

There are, however, intimations that "manifest impediment" may include something more than mere physical absence or some other

impediment purely personal to the accused. Thus, in 9 Op. Atty. Gen., 181, 183, the question was presented whether an officer who was dismissed the service but later restored to duty, could be tried on charges pending at the time of his dismissal. The argument apparently being that the period he was out of the Army, and hence not amenable to trial, constituted a "manifest impediment". The Attorney General said:

- "The circumstances which may cause delay in bringing an officer to trial can be arranged in three classes: 1st. Those that are created or interposed by the act of the party; 2d. Circumstances arising independently either of his action or that of the Government; and 3d. Such as are controlled by the Government itself.

"Causes of delay arising from the conduct of the party accused are manifest impediments within the meaning of the 89th article. It is a broad principle of law and of natural justice that no man can take advantage of his own wrong; accordingly, wherever we find statutes of limitations in favor of offenders, they are coupled with an exception against persons beyond the jurisdiction of the proper court, and fugitives from justice. Hough, in a note on the words 'manifest impediment' in the English statute, says it is 'preventing witnesses appearing against him, or the like.' In Colonel Johnson's case, cited by that author, the charge was mutiny in arresting the captain general of New South Wales, who was the principal witness for the crown, but who did not arrive in England, where the court martial was held, for more than two years after the mutiny had been committed.

"This was held to justify a delay beyond the period of three years in bringing the offender to trial".

It is evident from the above that the present case comes within the second subdivision involving as it does "Circumstances arising independently either of his action or that of the Government;". Thus was the situation in Colonel Johnson's case, cited with approval by the Attorney General, wherein it was the absence of a prosecuting witness which was held to be a "manifest impediment" (see Hough's Military Law Authorities, page 13; see also Hough, Treatise in American Martial, pages 466-473).

One of the reasons for not bringing the accused to trial at the present time is, as is well known, the absence and dispersal all over the world of important Government witnesses. If the absence of witnesses, which merely renders a trial more difficult, constitutes a "manifest impediment", the fact of actual war which renders it detrimental to American interests to try the offenders in time of war, would likewise constitute a "manifest impediment". It cannot be supposed that Congress,

when it was applied to the statute a period of time when a "manifest impediment" existed, intended to provide for "manifest impediments" merely when in character, such as absence, but intended to end: the most important of all impediments, namely, a condition of war which would render a trial impossible without great harm to the war effort. The Articles of War were intended by Congress as a code not merely for peace but for war, and an construction should be read into them which keeps their application to wartime situations. It is informally understood that the Judge Advocate General of the Army has rendered an opinion to the effect that where a state of war exists, rendering it against the public interest to try the accused in time of war, the fact of war constitutes a "manifest impediment" within the meaning of the applicable statute of limitations.

It seems, therefore, entirely possible that a court might construe the existence of a state of war as a "manifest impediment" on the theory that trial of the offender at such a time would defeat its own purpose. In support of this, are the cases already cited which up to now, at least, limit the meaning of "manifest impediment" to something physical in character and not including a situation where it is merely disadvantageous to the Government to try the offender at the particular time. Thus, on this aspect, Whitney's Military Law and Procedure, page 339, states:

"It need hardly be added that a delay so early as to prosecute beyond the period of the limitation, caused by the fact that it was not convenient or deemed advantageous for the Government to prosecute before, can clearly not be treated as an 'impediment.'"

The matter being doubtful, it is felt on the whole that too great reliance should not be placed upon the possibility that a state of war constitutes a "manifest impediment" within the meaning of Article of War 33.

W. J. P.

1944/6292

-1 JUN 1944

Rear Admiral Thomas L. Gatch,
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy,
Room 2307, Navy Building,
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Admiral Gatch:

I inclose herewith copy of a letter, dated today,
which I have sent to Senator Ferguson, inclosing a copy of
a memorandum prepared in this office on the meaning of
"manifest impediment" contained in Article of War 39.

Very sincerely yours,

Myron C. Cramer

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Incl.
Ltr to Sen. Ferguson w/incl.

W. J. Hughes

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JUN 1 1944
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Hughes, Wm. J., Jr., cfs

AH:cjs
DECEMBER 9, 1943.

Honorable HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SMITH: In compliance with your request of December 8, I have examined the resolution (H. J. Res. 199) which is before you in enrolled form, to extend the time limit for immunity.

The Joint Resolution would extend the statute of limitations affecting the possible prosecution of any person connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, for the period of six months.

The debates in the Senate and House of Representatives on this resolution indicate that it was the view of the sponsors of the legislation in Congress that as a matter of precaution in order to avoid any question as to the binding effect of any waivers of the statute of limitations that have been obtained so far, and in order to extend the right of the Government to prosecute any persons who have not waived the statute of limitations' it was desirable that that statute of limitations in respect to such cases be extended by congressional action.

I found no objection to the approval of the Joint Resolution.

Sincerely yours,

[S] F. BIDDLE,
Attorney General.

Delivered by Asst. Sol. Gen's Office 12-10-43.

AH:NAT:mer
DECEMBER 13, 1943.

Honorable HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SMITH: In compliance with your request of December 8, I have examined the resolution (H. J. Res. 199), which is before you in enrolled form, to extend the time limit for immunity.

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The debates in the Senate and House of Representatives on this resolution indicate that it was the view of the sponsors of the legislation in Congress that as a matter of precaution in order to avoid any question as to the binding effect of any waivers of the statute of limitations that have been obtained so far, and in order to extend the right of the Government to prosecute any persons who have not waived the statute of limitations, it was desirable that the statute of limitations in respect to such cases be extended by congressional action.

I am inclined to the view that the resolution is not likely to have the effect its sponsors apparently have in mind. If present waivers of the statute of limitations are binding, the legislation would be superfluous. If the waivers are not effective, the statute of limitations expired on the day on which the bill was finally passed by the Congress and the resolution cannot now revive the right of the Government to institute prosecutions.

In view of the fact, however, that the resolution is at best innocuous, I find no objection to its approval.

Sincerely yours,

_____, _____,
Attorney General.

HBC:gm
JUNE 9, 1944.

Honorable HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SMITH: In compliance with your request of June 8, 1944, I have examined Senate Joint Resolution 133, to extend the statute of limitations in certain cases.

3924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The Joint Resolution extends any statute of limitations that operates to prevent the court martial and prosecution of any person involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, crime or offense against the United States, for a further period of six months. As you know, Public Law 208, Seventy Eighth Congress (Act of December 20, 1942; 57 Stat. 605), extended these statutes for a period of six months from December 7, 1943.

Section 2 of the bill directs the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

I call your attention to my letter dated December 13, 1943, commenting on House Joint Resolution 199, Seventy Eighth Congress, which became the Act of December 20, 1943.

I find no objection to the approval of the present resolution.

Sincerely yours,

_____, _____,
Attorney General.

Delivered by messenger 6-9-44.

44/8535
 Honorable Harold E. Smith,
 Director, Bureau of the Budget,
 Washington, D. C.

JUN 6 - 1945

Dear Mr. Smith:

The War Department offers no objection to the approval of the enrolled enactment, S. J. Res. 66, "To extend the statute of limitations in certain cases".

The purpose of the enactment is to extend for a further period ending six months after the date of the termination of hostilities in the present war with Japan as proclaimed by the President or as specified in a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, whichever is the earlier, in addition to the extensions provided for in Public Laws 208, 339, and 489, 78th Congress, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941 that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial, or punishment of any such persons.

In the War Department's letter to you, dated December 10, 1943, commenting upon the enrolled enactment, H. J. Res. 199, which became Public Law 208, 78th Congress, it was pointed out that, in the opinion of this Department, that enactment, if approved by the President, would be ineffective to extend the period of limitations prescribed by Article of War 39 in regard to any offenses denounced by the Articles of War, which may have been committed in connection "with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty" by military personnel who have continued amenable to prosecution. That conclusion was based upon the premise that the two year period of limitation prescribed by Article of War 39 expired in respect to any such persons or offenses at midnight, December 7, 1943, and that any subsequent extension thereof by the approval of that resolution would be ex post facto and, therefore, void. In the War Department's letter to you dated December 3, 1944, commenting upon the enrolled enactment, S. J. Res. 156, which became Public Law 489, 78th Congress, it was stated that the foregoing considerations applied to the enactment, S. J. Res. 156. The same considerations also apply to the enactment, S. J. Res. 66, 79th Congress.

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3926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The War Department is unable to estimate the fiscal effect
of the enactment, if approved.

Sincerely yours,

MANNY L. STIMMON

Secretary of War.

JUN 6 45 AM



DISPATCHED
OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF STAFF

61

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL CRAMER AND HUGH COX, ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL, 8 JUNE 1944

Cox: * * * to proceed forthwith with an investigation—is cast in such a form that it does give the services some leeway as to the nature of the investigation, etc., and that although the words in the concluding clause doesn't have the language about discretion in it, it probably doesn't require any—the institution of proceedings any particular time, and for that reason the Attorney General told Judge Rosenman that considering the possibility of criticism that the President might be subjected to if he did veto it, it was his personal view that the President ought to think pretty carefully before he did decide to veto it. Now we are not going to put all that in a report. I think we'll just send to the Budget probably a noncommittal report stating that we don't have any objection or we don't take any position one way or another on the thing. But I thought you ought to be in; formed as to what the Attorney General had said to Judge Rosenman.

Cramer: Yes, I'm certainly very glad to know that. Well now, he doesn't think that the bill in its present form—if the President approves it, will that put us up against the proposition that we have to go ahead?

Cox: Oh I think you would be under a duty probably to have some kind of an investigation.

Cramer: We're going to have an investigation anyway, there's no question about that.

Cox: I don't think that otherwise, and I agree with the Attorney General about that, it imposes any immediate duty on you at all. If you ever finish the investigation and got full possession of all the facts, then the question would arise as to when you had to commence proceedings and I think you could construe that section so that the word "forthwith" doesn't apply to commence such proceedings, so you would have some latitude there anyway.

Cramer: Well that's just the question—I don't know—

Cox: The legislative history I think creates some doubt about it because they did take out the words "in their discretion".

Cramer: Yes, well the investigation as far as that's concerned, we'll start that any time, just as soon as we find out what's going to happen to this bill and where we are at. We didn't take it because at first there was going to be a two-party investigation and then General Short's wife was sick (I guess you heard me tell that), so that's the reason we haven't taken any.

Cox: Well that seemed—we look at section 2, that's the only immediate obligation that's imposed on you. Now I think that's improper, that is I don't think Congress has got the right to tell you to go ahead forthwith with an investigation but they've done it and it's a question I suppose for the President of weighing an impropriety against the criticism that might come from vetoing the thing.

Cramer: You see they say after investigating the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify. But doesn't that imply that they mean to do it within the six months period since they've extended the statute?

Cox: I wouldn't construe it that way I think, General. I think—suppose your investigation for one reason or another isn't finished within the six months—the section shows you're not supposed to start proceedings until you've got all the facts. You may not be able to get the facts in six months; these people are scattered all over the world I suppose.

Cramer: Yes, they are everywhere; there's a question whether we can get them in that length of time. But I do feel this to a certain extent, if the President approves the bill, he does or at least implies that he is concurring with Congress in that directive, that binds the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy to go ahead, don't you think there's the possibility of that?

Cox: Well again I think it's—I draw a distinction between the investigation and the proceedings. I think he certainly binds himself and them to go ahead with the investigation, which you are going to do anyway. Now on the proceedings I think there—I don't think he binds himself to starting proceedings within the six months period. I think it depends on what happens in your investigation—how the thing goes and what the situation is when the investigation is completed. I think it's pretty clear from the record of the history of the debates that I'm looking at that you can make a strong argument that Congress didn't intend you to start proceedings at any time if it was the judgment of the services that those proceedings would interfere with the war.

Cramer: Well that's probably true when you go through the records of the debates—I had those in front of me yesterday.

3928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Cox: The Senate Debate and the House Debate both have got a lot of statements of that kind. It's not free from doubt but I think it's tenable, strong position.

Cramer: Well many people—the last I haven't talked to since I talked to you, but they were very keen about a veto on it. I doubt myself whether the President would veto it.

Cox: Well I got the impression from what the Attorney General said—heard—Judge Rosenman say—that the Judge would be very reluctant to have him veto it.

Cramer: Yes. So maybe we can get him to put in something in the message explaining the situation that by that he is not binding himself—

Cox: To start any proceedings if the proceedings are going to interfere with the war. I think it's quite possible that the people at the White House might approve that.

Cramer: Well all right. That's a good suggestion, I'll see what I can do about it. And thank you very much. Goodbye.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL McNARNEY AND GENERAL CRAMER. 15 JUNE 1944

Cramer: Good morning, General. I wanted to talk with you a bit about this Short-Kimmel business. I suppose you saw where the President signed the bill yesterday and made a statement to—in a general way about he understood that it was not to interfere with the war effort, which approves our going ahead with some sort of an investigation. Now I'm just wondering what the best procedure is. I've been talking with Admiral Gatch about it and we're both of about the idea that it ought to go up at least to the level of the two Secretaries to agree to do something in concurrence with each other and probably it would be a wise idea to put it up to the President and have sort of a joint commission of some kind—what do you think of that?

McNarney: Well I think that whatever we do should be joint—certainly if we are going to have an investigation it should be a joint investigation with both the Army and Navy on—now if the President would like to add some civilian I would have no objection to that.

Cramer: Well of course—

McNarney: We've already had one commission but I'm sure you and Gatch ought to get together and submit a recommendation to the two Secretaries as to what you think the—what type of a thing it should be.

Cramer: I see. Now so far as having a joint investigation is concerned that would have to be directed by the President I suppose anyway even if it were only Army and Navy.

McNarney: Oh no, it wouldn't have to be directed by the President because we have a directive to go ahead and do it haven't we?

Cramer: We have a directive to go ahead and do it, yes.

McNarney: The Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy could agree to that if its restricted to Army and Navy people.

Cramer: But of course the—it says severally—I don't know what they mean by that act severally but the Act of Congress says that the Secretary of War and Navy shall severally be directed to proceed, which means separately I presume.

McNarney: Well I think we'd still have to do it separately.

Cramer: The only question about it would be this—if we agreed on a joint commission some way as to what authority it would have to subpoena witnesses and all that sort of thing. I mean if we just voluntarily agreed to appoint a joint committee.

McNarney: Well you'll have to give them enough authority to call witnesses before them and swear them I suppose.

Cramer: Well my offhand thought on that is that they'd have to have a special act of Congress authorizing like you people did on the Roberts Commission.

McNarney: They would, huh? I'm not enough of a lawyer to know all those things but I think the best thing to do is for you and Gatch to get together and make us a recommendation as to what we ought to do.

Cramer: All right, fine.

McNarney: I'm not enough of a lawyer to be able to determine it but I do think that whatever we do should be joint.

Cramer: Yes, well I think that's true. And they are sort of holding off—I told them we'd hold off so they wouldn't give any more public statements over there unless we made them together.

McNarney: Yes. Well I'll tell you I'll call Horn and tell him that I think that it should be joint and that I've asked you to get in touch with Gatch to submit some sort of a recommendation.

Cramer: All right, that will be fine. Goodbye.

McNarney: Goodbye.

JAG :rld

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington 25, D. C., 15 June 1944.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

At 10:45 this morning I had a talk with General Cramer and General Weir in General Cramer's office on the Joint Resolution extending the Statute of Limitations as approved by the President on June 13. I pointed out that this Joint Resolution directs the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War *severally* hold an investigation into the Pearl Harbor catastrophe and expressed the opinion that this requires us to proceed separately. General Weir opined that if the Secretaries acted severally upon a report it would satisfy the law in this respect. Both General Cramer and General Weir thought strongly that it would be preferable for the President to appoint a Joint Commission to handle the whole matter at once. I also agree that this would be preferable procedure providing that it complies to the Statute.

I told General Cramer that I contemplated recommending to the Secretary of the Navy that he immediately convene a Court of Inquiry which would be given the Roberts Commission Report and Admiral Hart's Report and would be authorized to summons any witnesses in the Naval service on shore duty within the United States; that in my opinion summoning witnesses outside of the United States would interfere with the prosecution of the war and would be counter to the President's expressed understanding in the statement he made of his reason of approving the Joint Resolution. General Cramer and General Weir thought it would be preferable to leave such a matter up to the discretion of the Board and tell them not to summons any witness which would interfere with our war effort.

If a Commission is appointed by the President we all agreed that there should be a General and an Admiral on it to deal with the strategic considerations. We thought that Mr. Hackworth of the State Department, or at least someone high up in the State Department should be on the Commission to cover the diplomatic phases and that there should be two other members so that the Commission would be predominately civilian. It occurs to me that perhaps a retired Judge and a Senator would be advisable.

We agreed that we should present our views to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and that they probably would wish to take this up with the President.

T. L. GATCH,
Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

3930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



JUN 15 1944

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: New legislation relating to Pearl Harbor
Prosecutions.
Reference: Letter ltr 25 March 1944, (NS)416-2/1944.

1. Under date of 17 March 1944 the attention of the Secretary was called to the fact that it was necessary that this office ascertain the availability of certain officers in the event that a court martial should be convened to try persons involved in the disaster at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In the same communication instructions were requested.

2. Referring to a list of officers submitted to him by the Secretary, Admiral King stated that the detachment of these officers from duty at sea to participate in a court martial would seriously interfere with the war effort. This office was thereupon instructed to hold this entire matter in abeyance and in compliance with that order no further action was taken.

3. Under date of June 13, 1944 the President approved a Joint Resolution of the Congress which, in addition to extending the statute of limitations to December 7, 1944, provided as follows:

"The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophes described in section 1, above, and to commence proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify".

4. It is respectfully requested that appropriate instructions be issued in order that the provisions of the Joint Resolution may be complied with.

W. L. GARDNER
Judge Advocate General

IN REPLY ADDRESS
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY
AND REFER TO NO.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY RELATING TO THE
JOINT RESOLUTION REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR
CATASTROPHE.

In accordance with the mandate of Congress expressed in the recently approved Joint Resolution relating to the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, I shall at once order a formal Court of Inquiry to investigate all facts relating to this disaster.

Congress directed as follows:

"The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1, above, and to commence proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify."

When Congress passed this legislation, it knew that Admiral Hart had been engaged for some time in examining many witnesses with a view toward perpetuating their testimony. Nevertheless, Congress directed that I proceed with an investigation of the facts.

Inasmuch as Congress is not satisfied with the procedure taken by Admiral Hart and wishes further investigation by me, it is my duty to order a formal Court of Inquiry.

When this Court of Inquiry has completed its work and reported its findings to me, and should the facts so justify, those considered derelict in their duty at Pearl Harbor or connected with that catastrophe, will be proceeded against as directed by Congress.

*This was handed to Sec/Nav but
no action has been taken as yet.*

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Sample
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE JUN 15 1944

TO : General John Weir USA

FROM : Cornelius H. Bull
Office JAG, USN

SUBJECT: Kimmel-Short court martial.

1. In my humble judgment - the sooner this matter gets over on the doorstep of No. 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue the better. After all, Mr. K is the only man who can decide whether these two officers should be court martialled - or if they should. Neither your secretary nor mine can decide this matter.

If Admiral Gatch recommends a court for Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy he will have to lay this matter before the President for a decision. We both know that the President would, in all probability, just put the matter in his files ("under consideration") certainly until after the elections.

Should the President decide that more investigation be needed, he could set up a composite Board or Court of Inquiry as he saw fit.

When Mr. Forrestal has instructed us how to proceed and what to do I'll sound off.

Regards,



Special Assistant
to the Assistant General

JAG:EA:NEW:122

17 JUN 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

1. With further reference to the action to be taken by the Navy Department pursuant to Section 2 of S. J. Res. 133, commonly known as the Short Resolution, in which the Secretaries of War and Navy are "severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe," (the attack on Pearl Harbor of 7 December 1941), I have informally sounded out several members of Congress, including two members of the Conference Committee, with respect to their interpretation of the directive of S. J. Res. 133.
2. All of the Congressmen approached were substantially in agreement on the points discussed. I feel that their opinions present a fair consensus of the majority of the members of Congress. The reactions of the members with whom this matter was discussed may be summarized as follows:
 - (1) The Resolution contemplates separate investigations by the Army and Navy, as indicated by the use of the word "severally". The suggestion of a joint Army and Navy investigating commission, with civilian members, convened by order of the President, did not meet with approval. It was felt that such a commission would be a duplication of the Roberts Commission, and therefore largely wasted effort. Apparently there has been wide-spread dissatisfaction with the report of the Roberts Commission - a feeling that it did not tell the full story. Another Presidential inquiry would be construed as another attempt to stall or delay the announcement of charges against any officers at fault. There seemed to be a feeling among the members canvassed that it was the intent of Congress that any investigation be directly under the control of the Armed Services, rather than convened and controlled by the President.
 - (2) The purpose of directing the investigation was primarily to provide the respective services with the necessary information for the drawing of charges and specifications against any offenders.

JAG:RA:WHS:ha

The directive for an investigation "forthwith" was motivated largely by the opinions expressed to the cognizant Congressional Committees that the Army and Navy did not have sufficient information upon which to base charges and specifications. It was not the intention of the Congress to specify any particular type or form of investigation. The Army and Navy should make whatever type of investigation they deem most efficacious for obtaining the above mentioned information.

3. These expressions of opinion confirm my original belief that the most appropriate action would be a Naval Court of Inquiry, to inquire into the facts and make recommendations as to disciplinary action of officers found to have been at fault.

Respectfully

T. L. GATCH
Judge Advocate General of the Navy

c.c Adm. T. C. Hart

Maj. Gen. Myron C. Cramer ←

*Copy furnished Adm
Gatch, Navy Jan 9*
CONFIDENTIAL *29 June 1944*
R.

SPJGJ 1944/8535

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR. Thru: Deputy Chief of Staff.

Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation directed by Public Law 339,
76th Congress, approved June 18, 1944.

1. Section 2 of Public Law 339, 76th Congress provides:

"The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify."

Admiral Gatch has advised me that in his opinion the above provision requires separate investigations. He says that various members of Congress have told him that this was their understanding of the resolution. There is something to be said for this viewpoint, the dictionary meaning of the word "severally" being "separately; one at a time; each by itself; . . . respectively" (Webster). Bouvier and Black in their law dictionaries define it as "distinctly, separately, apart from others". Admiral Gatch has, therefore, recommended to the Secretary of the Navy the appointment of a Naval Court of Inquiry, a copy of which recommendation is attached hereto.

2. It is my belief that public opinion will not be satisfied with anything less than a broad, sweeping investigation into the activities of the War, Navy and such other Departments as may be involved in the Pearl Harbor disaster. However, the Navy's viewpoint, and possibly the wording of the Act, precludes a joint investigation of this character at this time without higher authorization. Lacking such authorization a Board of Officers appointed by the War Department could hardly make an investigation into the activities of Navy personnel in connection with the Pearl Harbor disaster, nor could it inquire into the activities of other Departments on that occasion. It would appear, therefore, that the most that an Army Board may do at the present time is to make a thorough investigation into the activities of the War Department in connection with this disaster, find the facts, and make recommendations.

3. As to the method, it is recommended that a Board of Officers be appointed, to be composed of three General officers assisted by a recorder who should probably be an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department, and a technical adviser who should be an officer familiar with the military problems involved. Provision should administratively be made

CONFIDENTIAL

Hughes, W.J., Jr.-rm-ago

for such other military and civilian personnel as may become necessary. The employment of a civilian reporter or reporters should likewise be authorized, the expenses of which should be paid out of the appropriation for contingent expenses of the War Department. Such a Board would have power to administer oaths under Article of War 114.

4. In the event the above recommendations are concurred in, a suggested draft of directive appointing such a board is inclosed herewith.

Myron S. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

2 Incls.
Incl. 1-Draft of directive.
Incl. 2-Memo to the Secretary
of the Navy, 17 Jan 44.

(0924)

June 1944.

SPECIAL ORDERS)
)
 Re.)

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 389, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, a Board of Officers is hereby appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper, as follows:

- | | |
|----|------------------------------------|
| a. | . Member; |
| b. | . Member; |
| c. | . Member; |
| d. | . Recorder, without vote; |
| e. | . Technical advisor, without vote. |

2. Such military and civilian personnel may be assigned to assist the Board as the Board shall request.

3. The Board will convene at the call of the senior member and will hold sessions at such time or times and at such place or places as it may deem advisable. The Board is empowered to prescribe its own procedure and is authorized to employ a civilian reporter or reporters.

4. Military and civilian personnel will render the Board all necessary information and assistance.

By order of the Secretary of War:

S. C. MARSHALL,
 Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ELIS,
 Major General,
 The Adjutant General.

Hughes, W. J., Jr. - axb-rm

2

N.J.A.G.

30 June 44

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

General Cramer
 Admiral Reeser
 just told me that
 he believes that the
 copies of the trans-
 cripts of testimony
 of the Roberts Com-
 mission that the
 War and Navy
 Departments (2
 copies) are the

N. J. A. R .

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

*only copies in
existence.*

*Respy
Gard*

3940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington 25, D. C., 30 December 1943.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

H. J. Res. 199 has been approved by the President. This Resolution purports to extend the statute of limitations for trials by court martial for six months. Statements were made at the time of the passage of the Resolution that it would make mandatory the trial of Admiral Kimmel within the additional six months period. I foresee that such contentions will again be advanced.

It has been my view that the agreement Admiral Kimmel made not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial was not strictly necessary, but that his so agreeing made assurance doubly sure. Our statute of limitations reads:

"Article 61. No person shall be tried by court martial * * * for any offense * * * which appears to have been committed more than two years before * * * unless by reason of having absented himself, or of some other manifest impediment he shall not have been amenable to justice within that period."

It is my view that where the circumstances are such that the convening of a court martial and the summoning of the necessary witnesses would interfere with out prosecution of the war, as determined by the President or the Secretary of the Navy, there is clearly such a "manifest impediment" as is contemplated by the statute. There is an argument to the contrary, including two very ancient Attorney General's opinions where the circumstances were different, but I submit that the words of the statute mean exactly what they say.

In any event we are amply justified in ignoring H. J. Res. 199. The attached copy of a letter from the Attorney General to the Director of the Budget sets out the reasons.

I submit this memorandum that you may be prepared for developments.

Respectfully,

T. L. GATCH,
Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

Memorandum for General Cramer.

1. A statute of limitations can not be extended after it has run (*Falter v. U. S.*, 23 Fed. 2nd 420, 425; *Moore v. State*, 43 N J. Law 203), the reason being that the prosecution being dead, the accused has a vested right to repose. Thus in civil cases it can not be extended once it has run.

2. The above distinction is recognized in the Federal statute of limitations, 18 U. S. C. 582, which prescribed a new statute of limitations and provided in so many words that it should not apply to offenses already barred but would apply to cases wherein "the existing statute of limitations had not yet fully run".

3. General Short's offenses were all barred under Article of War 39 on December 7, 1943, and the act of December 20, 1943, was powerless to revive the dead prosecution.

4 It is unthinkable that General Short would break his word not to assert the statute of limitations. If he did so, he would alienate any vestige of chance of acquittal by public opinion. But assuming he did assert the bar of the statute, it is believed the agreement would stand up on the following grounds:

a. There was ample consideration on both sides.

b. The statute of limitations does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; it is a mere defense which must be asserted (*Johnson v. U. S.*, 13 Fed. Cases 867, No. 7418). If pleaded, the court must sustain the plea before the prosecution is barred. It is unbelievable that where an accused has lulled the Government into security until the statute has run he would be allowed to reap the benefit of his own fraud.

c. The agreement might constitute a "manifest impediment" to trial within the meaning of Article of War 39. 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 265 discusses a manifest physical impediment but there is no reason why the impediment need be a physical one. Fraud on the part of the accused might very reasonably constitute a manifest impediment.

d. The accused's fraud would make him a fugitive from justice which traditionally stops the running of the statute. See 18 U. S. C. 583.

5. The real danger of the present legislation is that someone might construe it to be different from an ordinary statute of limitations and to deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try the offenders at any other time than the period as extended. This is a very real danger.

WM. J. HUGHES, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Assistant Chief, Military Justice Division.

EXHIBIT NO. 171**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal dated 8 September 1945.
2. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 28 August 1945.
3. Dispatch #180328 December 1941 from CincPac for Action to PacFlt.
4. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 26 January 1942 with endorsement dated 27 January 1942.
5. Press and radio release from the Navy Department dated 14 April 1944.
6. Memorandum from T. L. Gatch, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, to Admiral King dated 13 April 1944.
7. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 10 September 1943.
8. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 7 September 1943 with enclosure.
9. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel with enclosure.
10. Memorandum from Rear Admiral Jacobs to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 17 August 1943.
11. Memorandum from L. E. Bratton, Acting Judge Advocate General of the Navy, to Rear Admiral Jacobs dated 4 August 1943.
12. Navy Department Communique No. 47 dated 28 February 1942.
13. Memorandum of Secretary of War, H. L. Stimson.
14. Memorandum of 26 February 1942.
15. Navy Communication #191909 February 1942 from Com12 for Action to SecNav.
16. First Endorsement from BuNav to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 17 February 1942.
17. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 16 February 1942.
18. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel.
19. Memorandum from Edwin Dickinson, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to Captain Gatch, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, dated 14 February 1942.
20. Memorandum from the Attorney General Francis Biddle to the Secretary of War, dated February 14, 1942.
21. Alternative suggestions of language referred to in the Attorney General's memorandum to the Secretary of War, dated 14 February 1942.
22. Covering title sheet addressed to Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
23. Memorandum from Captain Gatch, Ass't. JAG, Navy Department, to Ass't Solicitor General, Department of Justice, dated 14 February 1942, with letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel attached.
24. Letter from Secretary of War Stimson to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 14 February 1942.
25. Memorandum from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Admiral Jacobs dated 7 February 1942 with attached memorandum for the Secretary on Stimson's memo by Admiral H. R. Stark, dated 31 January 1942.
26. Notes by H. L. Stimson after meeting at the White House January 28, 1942.
27. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 28 January 1942 with endorsement of the same date.
28. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 26 January 1942 with endorsement dated 27 January 1942.

280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville 8, N. Y., 8 September 1945.

From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired)
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: General Court Martial in my case.

1. In view of the agitation for a Congressional Investigation before Congress reconvened and the action of the Senate in ordering a joint Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor, I wish to defer my reply to your letter of 28 August 1945 until that investigation is completed.

(S) H. E. KIMMEL.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

23 August 1945

To: Rear Admiral Harbord E. Mammel, U.S.N., Ret.

Subject: General Court Martial in your case.

1. In your letter of September 7th, 1943, to the Secretary of the Navy, you stated "It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date."

2. In his letter to you the Secretary of the Navy gave you his assurance that a trial before General Court Martial would be had at the earliest practicable date that the public interest and safety would permit. In view of the present state of the war and in view of this assurance of the Secretary of the Navy I am disposed to order your trial by General Court Martial in open court in the event that you still desire to be so tried.

3. It is requested that you advise as promptly whether or not you desire to be tried by General Court Martial.

/s/ James Forrestal

AIR MAIL

13-1-4

1
NPM NR 2734
FROM: CINCPAC 185328 CR 879 18 DEC 1941 DLH

ACTION: PACFLT

INFO: COM 14; SECNAV; BUNAV; CINCAF; CINCLANT ROUTINE

ADMIRAL HUSBAND E KIMMEL HAULED DOWN HIS FLAG THIS DATE AND VICE
ADMIRAL WILLIAM S FYE USN ASSUMED TEMPORARY COMMAND OF THE US
PACIFIC FLEET IN ADDITION TO HIS PRESENT DUTIES

DISTRIBUTION

BUNAV.....CDB

MARK ANY REPLY RESTRICTED

NSA, SEC, 10/11, 38, 28, 85, FILE

RESTRICTED

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

23 August 1945

To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret.

Subject: General Court Martial in your case.

1. In your letter of September 7th, 1943, to the Secretary of the Navy, you stated "It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date."

2. In his letter to you the Secretary of the Navy gave you his assurance that a trial before General Court Martial would be had at the earliest practicable date that the public interest and safety would permit. In view of the present state of the war and in view of this assurance of the Secretary of the Navy I am disposed to order your trial by General Court Martial in open court in the event that you still desire to be so tried.

3. It is requested that you advise as promptly whether or not you desire to be tried by General Court Martial.

/s/ James Forrestal

AIR MAIL

13-1-7

1
NPM NR 2734
FROM: CINCPAC 180320 CR 879 18 DEC 1941 DLH
ACTION: PACFLT
INFO: COM 14; SECNAV; DONAV; CINCAF; CINCLANT ROUTINE
ADMIRAL HUSBAND E KIMMEL HAULED DOWN HIS FLAG THIS DATE AND VICE
ADMIRAL WILLIAM S FYE USN ASSUMED TEMPORARY COMMAND OF THE US
PACIFIC FLEET IN ADDITION TO HIS PRESENT DUTIES
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RESTRICTED

3946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

KIMMEL, Husband E.
Rear Admiral, USN
(2207-00-Kn)

January 26, 1942

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N.
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions
of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. After forty one years and eight months service in the United States Navy, I hereby request that I be placed upon the retired list in accordance with the provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

2. I hold myself in readiness to perform any duty to which I may be assigned.

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

1st Endorsement

January 27, 1942

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating
Base, San Francisco, California
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of
Section 1443 Revised Statutes

1. Forwarded.

J. W. GREENGLADE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

IMMEDIATE RELEASE
PRESS AND RADIO

APRIL 14, 1944

PEARL HARBOR WITNESSES UNAVAILABLE DUE TO WAR ASSIGNMENTS

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox has received a memorandum from Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N., Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, in which Admiral King officially informed the Secretary that certain officers of the Navy now serving on battle fronts in various parts of the world, could not be withdrawn from their military duties in order to participate as members or witnesses in court martial proceedings in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

In his consideration of the case of Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel, U.S.N. (Retired), and of the procuring of members and witnesses for a court martial, the Secretary had requested Admiral King to advise him as to the availability of certain officers should a court martial be convened.

Admiral King, answering the Secretary, said: "About half the officers listed are on duty at sea in command of forces engaged with the enemy and in accordance with planned operations. Others at sea are performing duties on the staffs of those commanders."

At his press conference on April 11, 1944, Secretary Knox was questioned in connection with Congress' extension of the time for trial of those involved in the Pearl Harbor catastrophe to June 7, 1944, and the Secretary said he would obtain the opinion of his legal advisers.

"I have discussed this matter with Rear Admiral Gatch, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy," said Secretary Knox, "and I have been advised by him that, inasmuch as Admiral Kimmel has long since signed an agreement not to interpose the statute of limitations as a bar to his trial, there is now no necessity to construe any acts of Congress on this subject."

The Secretary further explained that Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S.N. (Retired), is now in Hawaii pursuing his investigation into matters relating to the attack upon Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on December 7, 1941.

"I would certainly feel derelict in my duty if I took from the Fleet and the fighting fronts the officers whom Admiral King has placed in those positions," concluded the Secretary.

FOR COURT MARTIAL ~~DUTY~~ PROCEEDINGS

57-1-31

IN REPLY, ADDRESS
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY
AND REFER TO NO.

707

726

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

There has been a great deal of agitation in the press recently regarding the Pearl Harbor matter, with especial reference to the delay in the trial of Admiral Kimmel.

Particular attention is directed to the statements of Secretary Knox at his press conference on April 11, in which the Secretary is supposed to have said that he would refer the matter to the Attorney General for a legal opinion as he (the Secretary) "was confused".

It is submitted that inasmuch as Admiral Kimmel has signed a valid waiver of his right to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial, there is now no need to "interpret" any Acts of Congress upon this subject - especially the one extending the time within which trial must take place.

Even though the Navy's case were complete in every respect, no action can now be taken for reasons you have already given, namely the non-availability of officers on duty at sea.

I have drafted a suggested press release which, I believe will do much toward settling this matter - for the duration of the war at least.

OKY → *[Signature]*
Judge Advocate General

57-1-31

T. L. Burt

10 October 1941

To: Rear Admiral Howard F. Knobel, U.S.N., Ret.,
180 Brownville Road,
Bronxville, New York.

Subject: Agreement not to plead the Statute of
Limitations in bar of trial by General
Court Martial.

Reference: (a) Your letter of Sept. 7, 1941 and
enclosures therewith.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your letter, above
referenced, with which you enclosed an agreement of the same
date, bearing your signature, in the following language:

"I, ROBERT E. MURPHY, Rear Admiral, United States
Navy, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and
a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit any attorney
or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of
limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in
open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be
charged relating to the period on or before December 7th,
1941, should my trial be held during the present war or
within six (6) months thereafter.

"I take this action voluntarily, believing it to
be in the public interest."

2. The Secretary of the Navy understands and fully
sympathizes with your personal desire to be brought to trial by
general court martial in open court at the earliest practicable date
for any alleged offenses with which you may be charged relating to
your performance of duty on or before December 7th, 1941. He there-
fore appreciates and commends the patriotic spirit in which you
voluntarily assumed the above obligation. This action on your part
is in keeping with the best naval traditions.

s/ FRANK KNOX
FRANK KNOX

CONFIDENTIAL

280 BRONXVILLE ROAD
BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

September 7th, 1943.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret.,
280 Bronxville Road,
Bronxville, New York.

To: The Honorable Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

Reference
(a) Letter from Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret., proposing a Waiver of the
Statute of Limitations.

Enclosure
A Agreement not to plead the Statute of Limitations in bar of
trial by General Court Martial.

Sir:

Receipt is acknowledged of your undated letter, Reference (a),
delivered to me by hand August 27th, 1943, concerning a General Court
Martial in my case, in which letter you state that the two year statute of
limitations controlling Naval Courts Martial will have run on my case on
December 7th, 1943, and you propose that I should now agree not to plead
the statute of limitations in bar of trial and you enclose a proposed form
of waiver.

You state in Reference (a) that you think that the public
interest and safety would now permit proceeding with my trial, but that you
further believe that so long as the war continues it will be manifestly
impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the
court on account of their war duties. For this reason, among others, you
feel that it would be in the best interests of all concerned if I should
now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial and you
give me your assurance that the trial will be held at the earliest practicable
date.

September 7th, 1943.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret.
To: The Secretary of the Navy

-2-

It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date. Delay in the matter is opposed to my personal interests, since the passage of time and the circumstances and casualties of war and of the period following may make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to assemble and produce the evidence and the witnesses required. I have at all times been anxious to subordinate my own interests to the national welfare, which appears to require that my trial be delayed. I am therefore forwarding to you herewith a waiver, Enclosure A, executed by me which I hope will be satisfactory to you.

Respectfully,

Husband E. Kimmel

Encl. (1)

13-1-44

September 7th, 1943.

Enclosure A - to letter dated September 7th, 1943, from
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret.,
to the Secretary of the Navy.

I, HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I
will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to
plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court
Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be
charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my
trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the
public interest.

Husband E. Kimmel

To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N. Ret.

Subject: OCM in your case.

Enclosure: Form of agreement.

1. The report of the so-called Roberts Commission alleged certain derelictions of duty on your part. Your application for retirement was approved, and it was stated therein that this action "will be no bar to your requesting a general court-martial, or to the Navy Department's ordering you for trial should it be so determined." On February 28, 1942 I stated to the press that trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.

2. The two year statute of limitations controlling naval courts martial will have run in your case on December 7, 1943, subject to the exception therein relating to cases in which there exists a "manifest impediment" to the trial of the accused. Therefore, if orders for your trial are not issued prior to the date stated, you could plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial, and its application to your case would have to be determined in the manner provided by law.

manifestly
3. I think that the public interest and safety would now permit proceeding with your trial, but I further believe that so long as the war continues it will be impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the court on account of their war duties. For this reason among others I feel that it would be to the best interests of all concerned if you should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial upon my assurance that the trial will be had at the earliest practicable date subsequent to the expiration of the two-year period.

4. If you agree with the foregoing your prompt return of enclosure is requested.

Frank Knox

Received August 27, 1945.

H. H. H. H. H.

I, HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by general court martial for any alleged offenses I may have committed on or before December 7, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six months thereafter, and that I will not permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to make such plea.

I make this agreement voluntarily, in recognition of the fact that during the present war and for the stated period thereafter it will be impracticable to obtain the attendance before a general court martial of witnesses who would be important for my defense, as well as witnesses required by the prosecution.

Received August 27, 1943
H. E. Kimmel

Print address not the signer of this
Exhibit Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Refer to No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

See Harrison

17 August 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Memorandum for

The Secretary of the Navy.

The attached memorandum brings up the question of the trial of Rear Admiral Kimmel, based on the findings of the Roberts Board.

In order to be sure that he be brought to trial, if such is desired, it is necessary that specifications and charges be preferred prior to 7 December, 1943.

If such charges are preferred, I am of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel will demand immediate trial.

I do not think it is in the national interest to permit this case to come to trial at present.

I have discussed this case with Admiral King, and he agrees with me that the final decision in the case must be made by the President.

Randall Jacobs
RANDALL JACOBS.

A17

3956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

IN REPLY ADDRESS
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY
AND REFER TO NO
JAG:ad:ird



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 August 1943

Memorandum for Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs

Major General Myron C. Cramer, Judge Advocate General of the Army, came into my office this afternoon and stated that he had reported to General Marshall that if any action is going to be taken relative to the trial by general court martial of General Short a determination should be arrived at because the Statute of Limitations expired on December 7, 1943. General Marshall stated that the matter would have to be taken up with Secretary Stimson and then asked General Cramer to make inquiry as to what action the Navy Department was taking with respect to Admiral Kimmel for the reason that it would be advisable that the War Department and the Navy Department be in accord with the action that is to be taken.

General Cramer was informed that Captain Gatch had been selected as the relief of Admiral Woodson as Judge Advocate General and in view of the importance of the matter I would immediately take the matter up with him. Likewise I advised General Cramer that in view of the fact that the subject was one affecting personnel presumably Captain Gatch would want to take the matter up with Admiral Jacobs, the Chief of Naval Personnel. Furthermore, I expressed the view to General Cramer that the ultimate decision as to the action to be taken in the case of General Short and Admiral Kimmel would be for the decision of the President of the United States, that the respective Secretaries would very likely be the ones to present the matter for the decision of the President and that the respective Secretaries might express their views as to the policy governing the action to be taken but that the President would render the decision to the Secretaries who in turn would then take such action as was determined upon.

It so happened that upon the arrival of Captain Gatch you came in to my office and the above subject matter was discussed. You requested that a memorandum be prepared with respect thereto and that you in turn would take the matter up with Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.

JAG:AJ:rld

This memorandum consequently is being forwarded for your information and such instructions in the premises as are determined upon.



L. E. Bratton
Acting Judge Advocate General of the Navy

CONFIDENTIAL

N A V Y D E P A R T M E N T

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FEBRUARY 28, 1942

NAVY DEPARTMENT COMMUNIQUE NO. 47

The Navy Department issued the following communique:

The Secretary of the Navy announced today the acceptance, effective March 1, 1942, of the application for retirement of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."

The Secretary of the Navy announced at the same time that, based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts Commission, he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court-martial of Rear Admiral Kimmel, alleging dereliction of duty. The Secretary of the Navy made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.

* * * * *

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM

I think this form
will be O.K. for an
announcement - But I
am going to have ~~the~~ it
or its substance given to
Genl. Short before it appears
in the form. This I
think is required by decency.
Let me know if you
approve & will follow a
similar course. H.S.

1-1-16

February 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

The certification of General Walter S. Short for
reappointment has been suspended, effective February 25, 1943,
pending completion of any offense or violation for which
disciplinary action is warranted.

The Secretary of War has directed that charges
be preferred against General Short based upon the findings
of the Board of Investigation, with a view to the taking of
this officer as General Short's conduct as such officer as
the interest and safety of the nation require.

10-1-18

ACTION **NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE** **PRIORITY**
5248 NPS NAVY DEPARTMENT
Z KATY 191909 SNOW Q STAR P GR 10
FROM COMTWELVE
ACTION SECNAV
INFO BUNAV
PRIORITY NY
RECEIVED AT ROOM 202
RE-100-227, 10-107
Secretary East has seen.
ORDERS RETIREMENT RADN KIMMEL DELIVERED ELEVEN ZERO FIVE THIS DATE
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act-00A
Bunav - File
10-1-31

3962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

First Endorsement

February 17, 1942

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Twelfth Naval District.
Via: The Commandant.
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40)
years' service.

1. Forwarded.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

3963

February 16, 1942

From: The Secretary of the Navy
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
Subject: Transfer to the retired list after forty (40)
years' service.
Reference: Your request for retirement, dated
January 26, 1942.

1. Your request to be transferred to the retired list after the completion of forty (40) years' service in accordance with the provisions of U. S. Code, Title 34, Section 341 is, by direction of the President, approved. You will be transferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Navy as of March 1, 1942.
2. This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action.
3. Acknowledgment of receipt is requested.

/s/ Frank Knox

3964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

1. The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of the War, dated January 1, 1942, stated that the Navy Department had received information from the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government had decided to attack the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

2. The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of the War, dated January 1, 1942, stated that the Navy Department had received information from the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government had decided to attack the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

3. The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of the War, dated January 1, 1942, stated that the Navy Department had received information from the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government had decided to attack the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

4. The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of the War, dated January 1, 1942, stated that the Navy Department had received information from the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government had decided to attack the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

5. The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of the War, dated January 1, 1942, stated that the Navy Department had received information from the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government had decided to attack the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

See after air

6. The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of the War, dated January 1, 1942, stated that the Navy Department had received information from the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government had decided to attack the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

7. The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of the War, dated January 1, 1942, stated that the Navy Department had received information from the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government had decided to attack the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

8. The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of the War, dated January 1, 1942, stated that the Navy Department had received information from the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government had decided to attack the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

RECEIVED BY DEPT. OF JUSTICE
- MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL
AND REFER TO
RECEIVED AND NUMBER

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 10, 1934

ADmiral Kinsel's Retirement

For information of the President, I enclose a copy of the Attorney General's opinion on the Secretary of the Navy's proposed retirement of Admiral Kinsel, as requested by the President in the President's letter of retirement requests of Admiral Kinsel, U.S.N.

The three alternative opinions on the bill have been submitted to the Attorney General and the President's decision is attached to the Attorney General's decision. The Attorney General's decision will cover the question of the Secretary of the Navy's proposed retirement of Admiral Kinsel, U.S.N.

Your file is returned herewith.

For the Acting Assistant
Solicitor General

E. A. Tamm

Special Assistant to the
Attorney General

3966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

COPY

1907-1908

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[illegible][illegible][illegible]

NOV 1941

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

RE: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

N.J. A. 8

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

2-14-42

Asst Solicitor General

I understand the Army is putting before you similar papers in the case of General Short.

The Secretary of the Navy says that the President wants the opinion of the Attorney General whether or not the Secretary's letter attached will properly protect the interests of the country.

He would like this opinion Monday.

Respectfully,

John L. Gatch
Gatch
Asst JAG, Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
 To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
 Subject: Transfer to the retired list after forty (40) years' service.
 Reference: (a) Your request for retirement.

1. Your request to be transferred to the retired list after the completion of forty (40) years' service in accordance with the provisions of U. S. Code, Title 34, Section 381 is, by direction of the President, approved. You will be transferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Navy as of March 1, 1942.

2. This action in approving your request for retirement will be no bar to your requesting a general court martial, or to the Navy Department's ordering you for trial should it be so determined.

3. Acknowledgment of receipt is requested.

*is without prejudice to such
 action in the interest of the
 government.*

*It was found that the
 action was in the interest of the
 government.*

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1902.


Dear Frank:

Here is my own revised suggestion as to the saving clause to be inserted in the acceptance of the retirement:

" - without condemnation of any offense or prejudice to any action on behalf of the Government."

Any reasons we want to give for our action can be said to the press. I am in favor of leaving the acceptance itself in this language if the Attorney General says that it is sufficient to keep open the power to court martial. I would like to write you about it on Monday if you have time.

Faithfully yours,



Secretary of War.

Hon. Frank Knox,
The Secretary of the Navy.

3971-10

3972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

February 2, 1940

SECRET

FROM: ADMIRAL JACOB

I am attaching herewith a confidential memorandum dealing with treatment of Admiral Kimmel and the program outlined in Secretary Stimson's memorandum is the one which is being followed.

I wish you would hold this memorandum in confidence and be sure to remind me to carry it out in the sequence indicated.

ATTACHMENT

Meeting with the President and the Chief of Staff
January 24, 1942

At the close of the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff in the President's office, I took up the following points with him alone:

1. The treatment of Short and Kimmel: He told me that Short would stay in the regiment. I told him that Short had, I think, given my last view, which was to conclude, namely that the objections to an immediate court martial were (1) that it would inevitably raise public matters which are military secrets; (2) that it would be impossible to give the defendants a fair trial.

He then suggested this:

- (1) Both the Army and Navy must act alike - on parallel lines.
- (2) Wait about a week and then announce that no officers have applied for this immediate re-irement and that this is under consideration.
- (3) About a week later announce that the applications had been accepted but with the distinct condition (the legality of which is ratified by the respective Judge Advocate Generals) that this does not in any way bar a subsequent court martial; that the reason for this is the impossibility of a court martial without the disclosure of military secrets and also that it would be impossible to give them a fair trial.

2. In the next place I told the President that I thought that probably all other matters in the present excitement about the Pearl Harbor report would die down except the pressure for unity of command. I told him how I had treated a similar question last week by an off-the-record statement, taking care to disclose nothing except such matters as wouldn't do harm if they should leak. He agreed with this suggestion and off his own bat suggested the same method of approach that I was, namely disclosure of the unity of command at Panama, in the Caribbean, and some other places up the coast.

Resubmitted 1/24/42

3976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

DISTRICT STAFF HEADQUARTERS

TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

KIMMEL, Husband E.
Rear Admiral, USN
(2208-70-Kn)

FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING CIVIC CENTER
SAN FRANCISCO - CALIFORNIA

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 28 1942

January 28, 1942

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N.
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: My Request for Retirement
Reference: (A) My ltr. to the Secretary of the Navy of 26
January 1942 requesting retirement under the
provisions of Article 1443 Revised Statutes

1. Reference (A) was submitted after I had been officially informed by the Navy Department that General Short had requested retirement.
2. I was officially informed today by the Navy Department that my notification of General Short's request was not intended to influence my decision to submit a similar request.
3. I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service.

Husband E. Kimmel
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

1st endorsement

January 28, 1942

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating
Base, San Francisco, California
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: My Request for Retirement

1. Forwarded.

W. W. Greenblade
W. W. GREENSLADE

-13-

TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

KIMMEL, Husband E.
Rear Admiral, USN
(2207-00-Kn)

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

January 26, 1942

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N.
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions
of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. After forty-one years and eight months service in the United States Navy, I hereby request that I be placed upon the retired list in accordance with the provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

2. I hold myself in readiness to perform any duty to which I may be assigned.

Husband E. Kimmel
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

1st Endorsement

January 27, 1942

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating
Base, San Francisco, California
To: The Secretary of the Navy

Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of
Section 1443 Revised Statutes

1. Forwarded.

J. W. Greenslade
J. W. GREENSLADE

-14-

EXHIBIT NO. 172

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

Room 4D757
The Pentagon

20 March 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON:

In response to your oral request, you will find inclosed:

(1) a table, based on information supplied by the Army Air Forces, containing the following data on American-produced bombers for the period 1 February - 30 November 1941: (a) brief description, (b) range with and without bomb load, (c) total deliveries, (d) deliveries to foreign countries (showing whether pursuant to cash contract or lend-lease), (e) Army shipments to Hawaii, and (f) Army shipments to the Philippines. It will be noted that (c) and (d) represent deliveries in this country while (e) and (f) represent arrivals at destination. Navy shipments to the Hawaiian and Philippine areas are not shown.

(2) a table, based on information supplied by the Army Ordnance Department and the Army Service Forces, containing the following data on Army anti-aircraft weapons for the period 1 February - 7 December 1941: (a) production, (b) transfers to foreign countries, (c) shipments to Hawaii, and (d) shipments to the Philippines. Navy production, transfers and shipments, if any, are not shown.

Hamon Duncomben
HARMON DUNCOMBEN
Lt. Colonel, GSC

Incls. - 2



Type	Description	Range with max. bomb load ¹	Range without bombs ¹	1 February-30 November 1941					
				Total deliveries	Deliveries to foreign countries			Shipments to Hawaii ²	Shipments to Philippines ³
					Cash	Lend-lease	Total		
B-17.....	AAF Heavy Bomber, 4-eng.	1,800	2,750	101	20		20	³ 12	³ 35
B-24.....	AAF Heavy Bomber, 4-eng.	750	2,100	109	93		93		
B-25.....	AAF Medium Bomber, 2-eng.	1,000	1,700	122		8	8		
B-26.....	AAF Medium Bomber, 2-eng.	1,250	1,600	147					
PB2Y.....	Navy Patrol Bomber, 2-eng.			3					
PBY.....	Navy Patrol Bomber, 2-eng.			323			⁴ 165		
PBM.....	Navy Patrol Bomber, 2-eng.			4					
A-20.....	AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.	700	1,000	805	455	⁵ 108	563	13	
A-22 (167).....	AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.	1,237	1,425	91	91		91		
A-28.....	AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.	660	1,120	836	735	⁶ 59	794		
A-29.....	AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.	1,100	2,090						
A-30.....	AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.	800	1,100	78	78		78		
212.....	Light Bomber, 2-eng.			4	4		4		
A-27.....	AAF Light Bomber, 1-eng.	550	900	10	10		10		
V-12.....	AAF Light Bomber, 1-eng.			1	1		1		
8A.....	Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.			2		2	2		
SBD (A-24).....	Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.			289					⁷ 52
SB2U.....	Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.			107	50		50		
V3PB.....	Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.			24	24		24		
SBN.....	Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.			22					
SBC.....	Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.			50					
Total.....				3,128	1,561	177	1,903		

¹ Maximum for latest 1941 model under ideal conditions.

² Navy shipments not shown.

³ In September 1941, 9 of the 21 B-17s then in Hawaii were flown to the Philippines.

⁴ Army records do not indicate whether transferred under cash contract or lend-lease.

⁵ Originally French contracts, transferred to Britain then repossessed by U. S. at date of Pearl Harbor. Aircraft transferred after Pearl Harbor.

⁶ Defense Aid Contract.

⁷ Enroute at outbreak of war; diverted to Australia.

1 February-7 December 1941

Antiaircraft weapon	Production	Transfers to foreign countries ¹	Shipments to Hawaii ²	Shipments to Philippines ³
3 inch, mobile.....	³ 182	98	7	44
37 mm., mobile.....	282			22
90 mm., mobile.....	136	4		
50 cal., water-cooled.....	4,808	1,805		34

¹ All pursuant to lend-lease except 80 3-inch guns for the Netherlands East Indies.

² Equipment already held by organizations transferred to Hawaii or the Philippines between 1 February-7 December 1941 not included.

³ Includes 80 3-inch mobile guns for the Netherlands East Indies believed to have been produced during this period.

3980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 12 April 1946**

1083A (JFB)

R #160

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to your request dated 21 March 1946, for a table containing data outlined by you in respect of American produced bombers for the period 1 February to 30 November 1941, there has been prepared and is forwarded herewith a set of tables entitled:

**LONG RANGE PATROL BOMBER AND SCOUT BOMBER ACCEPTANCES SHOWING DELIVERIES
TO THE NAVY AND TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES 1 FEBRUARY-30 NOVEMBER 1941**

The term "acceptances" as used in the tables includes all deliveries of military aircraft of the types described that were produced by the specified manufacturer in question. It will be noted that the foreign deliveries were not lend-lease transfers, and that of the total acceptances of 835 long range and scout bombers there were delivered to the Navy 582, and to the foreign countries 253; and those to the Navy, 218 were sent to the Hawaiian area and to carriers operating in the Pacific as explained in the footnotes to the attached tables.

**JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USN.**

Encls. (Tables)

1 Negative

10 Positives

Long Range Patrol Bomber and Scout Bomber Acceptances Showing Deliveries to the Navy and to Foreign Countries, 1 Feb.-30 Nov. 1941

Type and Description	Range ¹ Without Bombs	Range With Bombs	Manufacturer	Customer	Acceptances	Total Deliveries To Navy	Total Deliveries To For. Countries ²	Total Deliveries to Hawaiian Area	Total Deliveries to Philippines
Navy Patrol Bombers—2 Eng. ³									
PBY-5	2,990	2,320 (4 x 1,000)	Consolidated-Vultee, S. D.	U. S.	146	146		454	40
28-5ME	2,990	2,320 (4 x 1,000)	Consolidated-Vultee, S. D.	Britain	90		90		
28-5ME	2,990	2,320 (4 x 1,000)	Consolidated-Vultee, S. D.	Canada	37		37		
28-5ME	2,990	2,320 (4 x 1,000)	Consolidated-Vultee, S. D.	Australia	18		18		
28-5MN	2,990	2,320 (4 x 1,000)	Consolidated-Vultee, S. D.	Netherlands	36		36		
PBY-5A	2,545	1,265 (4 x 1,000)	Consolidated-Vultee, S. D.	U. S.	12	12			
PBM-1	4,050	2,775 (6 x 1,000)	Martin	U. S.	3	3			
Navy Patrol Bombers—4 Eng. ⁴									
PBY-2	2,310	1,380 (8 x 1,000)	Consolidated-Vultee, S. D.	U. S.	3	3			
Navy Scout Bombers—1 Eng. ⁵									
SBC-4	775	655 (1 x 1,000)	Curtiss	U. S.	50	50			
SBD-2	1,370	1,225 (1 x 1,000)	Douglas	U. S.	57	57		625	
8A-5 (SBD)	1,370	1,225 (1 x 1,000)	Douglas	Norway	1		1		
SBD-3	1,415	1,205 (1 x 1,000)	Douglas	U. S.	154	154		6121	
SBD-3A						78			
SBN-1	1,110	690 (1 x 500)	Naval Aircraft Factory	U. S.	22	22			
SB2U-3	2,450	1,120 (1 x 1,000)	Vought-Sikorsky	U. S.	57	57		618	
V156-B-1 (SB2U)			Vought-Sikorsky	Britain	50		50		
N3PB ⁶			Northrop	Norway	21		21		
Totals					835	582	253	218	0

¹ Range is considered as the maximum total distance under ideal conditions. Figures are in statute miles with planes in patrol or scout condition, as case may be.

² It is to be noted that there were no Lend-Lease transfers of long range patrol bombers or scout bombers during the period covered.

³ Not included in this category are 20-2 Engine land planes (PBO/A-26) transferred by the Army to the Navy in September and October 1941.

⁴ This figure does not indicate the complete picture of the movement of patrol planes to the Hawaiian area during January-November 1941. During January 1941, 1 squadron of Pat Wing 1, equipped with 12 PBY-3's left the west coast for the Hawaiian Area. In April Pat Wing 1 headquarters and a second squadron equipped with 12 PBY-3's also moved to the Hawaiian Area. This increased the number of planes in Hawaiian Area by 24 over the number present on 1 Jan. 1941, but by 12 during the period covered by this report. In October and November, 3 squadrons of 12 planes each and 1 squadron of 6 planes then in the Hawaiian Area returned to the West Coast and exchanged their PBY-3's for PBY-5's after which they returned to the Hawaiian Area. During this same period the third squadron of Pat Wing 1, equipped with 12 new PBY-5's left the West Coast for Hawaii. This accounts for the 54 new PBY-5's moved into the Hawaiian Area during the period covered by this report and represents a total of 24 additional planes in the Hawaiian Area over the number present on 1 Feb. 1941; an increase of 36 during the period 1 January-30 November 1941.

⁵ 28 PBYs had been transferred to the Philippines in December 1940 and remained in that area until after 7 December 1941.

⁶ Assigned to carriers in the Pacific.

⁷ These 78 SBD-3A's were turned over to the Army by the Navy during September and October 1941.

⁸ Arrived at Ewa 13 May 1941, assigned to Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 231.

⁹ Single-engine G3 seat float plane—not used by U. S. Navy.

3982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1083A
R#164

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

6 May 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to your oral request, and also that of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 12,997) referred in Item #19 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there has been prepared and is forwarded you herewith, since Navy activity in sending shore based anti-aircraft guns to the Pacific Ocean area was accomplished through the Marine Corps, tables showing the troop and weapon status, with increases and decreases as the case may be, of the U. S. Marine Corps defense battalions and post and station personnel at Oahu, Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, Samoa, Guam, Cavite, Olongapo and Shanghai, on 1 February 1941 and 7 December 1941, together with a concluding summary.

John Ford Baecker
John Ford Baecker
Commander, USNR

U. S. Marine Corps troops and weapons status

OAHU

(Defense Battalions)

	Personnel		5" 51 cal.	3" AA Army Type	3" AA	S/L	AA, 50 cal. M 3	AA, 30 cal. MG
	Officers	Men						
2/1/41.....	27	645	6	12		6	30	30
12/7/41.....	90	1,800	10	12		6	58	40
Increase.....	77	1,155	4				28	10

OAHU

(Post & Station)

2/1/41.....	18	716						
12/7/41.....	41	855						
Increase.....	23	139						

PALMYRA

2/1/41.....								
12/7/41.....	7	147	4		4		8	10
Decrease.....	7	147	4		4		8	10

JOHNSTON

2/1/41.....								
12/7/41.....	7	153	2		4		6	10
Increase.....	7	153	2		4		6	10

MIDWAY

2/1/41.....	8	79						
12/7/41.....	29	769	6		12		30	30
Increase.....	21	690	6		12		30	30

WAKE

2/1/41.....								
12/7/41.....	27	427	6		12	6	18	30
Increase.....	27	427	6		12	6	18	30

SAMOA

	Personnel		Navy 6"/50	3"/50 AA	3"/23	S/L	AA, 50 cal. MG	AA, 30 cal. MG
	Officers	Men						
2/1/41.....	2	20	3	4	1			
12/7/41.....	23	590	4	6	1		18	30
Increase.....	21	570	1	2			18	30

¹ Includes: Aviation, 11 officers and 49 men, Army, 1 officer and 5 men.² Includes 190 Samoan Reserves.

3984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

GUAM

	Personnel		Navy 6"/50	3"/50 AA	3"/23	S/L	AA, 50 cal. MG	AA, 30 cal. MG
	Officers	Men						
2/1/41.....	8	148						
12/7/41.....	8	145						
Decrease.....		3						

CAVITE

2/1/41.....	15	343						
12/7/41.....	23	705		3			1	
Increase.....	8	362						

OLONGAPO

2/1/41.....	4	71						
12/7/41.....	4	72						
Increase.....		1						

SHANGHAI

	Personnel		Mortars	37 mm. Guns	Lewis MG	S/L	AA, 60 cal. MG	AA, 30 cal. MG
	Officers	Men						
2/1/41.....	52	884	7	11	3		12	133
Dec. '41 ⁴	48	778	7	11	3		12	133
Decrease.....	4	106						

³ Supplied by Navy Yard Cavite and manned on 1 May 1941 by Marines.

⁴ Sailed from Shanghai 28 Nov. for Olongapo. Arrived Olongapo 2 Dec. 1941.

Summary

U. S. MARINE CORPS. TROOPS AND WEAPONS STATUS PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

	Personnel		6"/50	5"/51	3"/50	3" AA, Army Type	3"/23	3" AA	S/L	AA, 50 cal. MG	AA, 30 cal MG	Mortars	37 MM	AA, Lewis MG
	Off- icers	Men												
2/1/41.....	134	2,906	3	6	4	12	1		6	42	163	7	11	3
12/7/41.....	307	6,441	4	28	9	12	1	32	12	151	283	7	11	3

44.P3112

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK



HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 20

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 173 THROUGH 179

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman* -

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE , Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY , Representative from Pennsylvania
SCOTT W. LUCAS , Senator from Illinois	BERTRAND W. GEARHART , Representative from California
OWEN BREWSTER , Senator from Maine	FRANK B. KEEFE , Representative from Wisconsin
HOMER FERGUSON , Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK , Representative from North Carolina	

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(Through January 14, 1946)

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JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
1-----	23 11-15-45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2-----	24 11-15-45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3-----	87 11-16-45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4-----	142 11-16-45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5-----	153 11-16-45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.
6-----	153 11-16-45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.
7-----	172 11-17-45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8-----	233 11-19-45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8-A-----	1792 12-18-45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-B-----	1792 12-18-45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-C-----	1792 12-18-45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8-D-----	2480 1-5-46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9-----	256 11-19-45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10-----	279 11-20-45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11-----	319 11-21-45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12-----	363 11-21-45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13-----	387 11-21-45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14-----	397 11-21-45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15-----	401 11-23-45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed " <i>Modus Vivendi</i> ," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115; (c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22-B-----	1783 12-18-45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22-C-----	1783 12-18-45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22-D-----	1783 12-18-45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Wells and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23-----	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24-----	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25-----	574 11-26-45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26-----	634 11-27-45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27-----	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28-----	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1883.
29-----	670 11-27-45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943), Department of State Publication 2008.
30-----	670 11-27-45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	737 11-28-45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11-29-45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11-29-45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33-A	2092 12-31-45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11-30-45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11-30-45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11-30-45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11-30-45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11-30-45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12-4-45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12-4-45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (979645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12-5-45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages; Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42-----	990 12-5-45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43-----	997 12-5-45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44-----	1001 12-5-45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45-----	1019 12-5-45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46-----	1027 12-5-45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47-----	1041 12-5-45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850"; dispatch 300850 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48-----	1044 12-5-45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48-A-----	2093 12-31-45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49-----	1053 12-6-45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1).
50-----	1053 12-6-45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

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51	1063 12-6-45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).
52	1053 12-6-45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12-6-45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12-6-45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12-6-45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12-6-45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12-6-45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12-6-45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12-6-45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12-6-45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12-7-45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12-10-45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.
63	1345 12-11-45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64-----	1544 12-13-45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65-----	1541 12-13-45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66-----	1642 12-15-45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (#61255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67-----	1642 12-15-45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68-----	1675 12-15-45	1689	Log of U. S. S. <i>Boise</i> for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69-----	1677 12-15-45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70-----	1695 12-15-45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71-----	1696 12-15-45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72-----	1696 12-15-45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73-----	1700 12-15-45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

74.-----	1703 12-15-45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74-A-----	2768 1-19-46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75.-----	1705 12-15-45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76.-----	1709 11-15-45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77.-----	1712 12-15-45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78.-----	1724 12-17-45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79.-----	1724 12-17-45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80.-----	1724 12-17-45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81.-----	1724 12-17-45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82.-----	1728 12-17-45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).
83.-----	1754 12-17-45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (#31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84.-----	1775 12-17-45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12-31-45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12-31-45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12-31-45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2094 12-31-45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12-31-45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12-31-45	2023	Log of U. S. S. <i>Enterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12-31-45	2107	Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12-31-45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, <i>Enterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12-31-45	2122	"U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12-31-45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12-31-45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1-4-46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A	2479 1-5-46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1-5-46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1-15-46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1-15-46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1-16-46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Force—Organization and Missions".
113-C	3449 1-31-46	2538	(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

114	2558 1-16-46	2568	WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1-16-46	2721	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2568 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123-----	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A-----	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124-----	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125-----	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the U. S. S. <i>Wright</i> from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126-----	2767 1-19-46	2832	(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127-----	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128-----	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129-----	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130-----	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131-----	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132	2917 1-21-46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132-A	5137 2-20-46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1-23-46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1-23-46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1-23-46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1-23-46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1-23-46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1-23-46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1-22-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339. 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2-7-47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2-7-46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2-8-46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158-----	5201 4-11-46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159-----	5201 4-11-46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160-----	5240 4-11-46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161-----	5241 4-11-46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161-A-----	5464 5-23-46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162-----	5269 4-11-46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A-----	5464 5-23-46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163-----	5292 4-11-46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. <i>Helena</i> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164-----	5292 4-11-46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165-----	5292 4-11-46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166-----	5468 5-23-46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5-23-46	3652	(a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4182	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178.	5470 5-23-46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179.	5470 5-23-46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180.	5471 5-23-46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181.	5520 5-23-46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182.	5537 5-23-46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183.	5468 5-23-46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Uta</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 173

MEMOIRS OF PRINCE KONOYE

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 1 May 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson.

In accordance with your oral request, there is forwarded herewith a copy of the Memoirs of Prince Konoye. It is a translation prepared by the Language Section G-2, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, of a document turned over to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Prince Konoye. He stated that he had prepared the document during the period between the resignation of his cabinet in October 1941 and March 1942. This translation was checked by T. Ushiba, Konoye's personal secretary, who verified all of the factual data, raising questions only as to the literary style of the translation.

ROBERT M. DIGGS,
Capt., AUS.

THE PROGRESS OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE TIME OF THE
SECOND AND THIRD KONOYE CABINETS

March 1942

[1]

I

Beginning in December 1940, conversations for the readjustment of Japanese relations were conducted secretly between Bishop Walsh, president, and Mr. Draft, administrative secretary of Maryknoll (a high institution of American Catholicism), on the one hand, and Colonel IWAKURO of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry and Mr. Tadao IKAWA on the other.

By April 1941, the time had become ripe for the Governments of the two countries to conduct the conversations themselves. It should be remembered that because of the personal connections of the participants in the conversations from the first, private contact was maintained between President Roosevelt himself and Mr. Hull on the American side, and between Ambassador NOMURA and the Japanese Military and Naval Attachés in Washington on the Japanese side. Thus, both the President and the Japanese Ambassador were kept informed of what was going on.

On April 8th, the first tentative plan was presented by the American side, and after examining this, the Japanese side drew up a second tentative plan. On April 14th, and 16th, Mr. Hull held the first of the series of conversations on this problem with Ambassador NOMURA. At this time, Mr. Hull stated that the conversations theretofore conducted by private persons might be taken over by unofficial conversations between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador, and that the negotiations might be conducted with the second tentative plan as a basis. At the same time he expressed the wish that the Ambassador obtain official instructions from his Government.

Ambassador NOMURA's dispatch containing these important representations by Mr. Hull and the contents of the plan (tentatively called the Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding), which was to provide the basis for the conversations, was received at the Tokyo Foreign Office between the afternoon of April 17th and the morning of the 18th. Since Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA was then in Siberia on his way home from his visit to Europe, Mr. OHASHI, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, at 11 A. M. on the 18th, brought the first section of the dispatch to me while I was in a Cabinet conference. At 4:30 P. M. on the same day, after waiting for the cable to be decoded, he called on me at my official residence, accompanied by Mr. TERASAKI, Chief of the American Bureau.

This Proposal for Understanding was to announce, in the form of a joint declaration, an agreement between the two Governments on several fundamental items necessary for breaking the deadlock between the two countries. Detailed agreements were to be arranged by a Japanese-American conference to follow the joint declaration.

[2] The following seven items are those concerning which the two Governments were to establish mutual understanding:

1. International and national ideals embraced by America and Japan.
2. The attitudes of the two countries toward the European War.
3. The relationship of the two countries to the China Incident.

4. Matters pertaining to the Naval strength, air strength and shipping of the two countries in the Pacific.

5. Trade and monetary agreements between the two countries.

6. Economic activity of the two countries in the Southwest Pacific.

7. Policies of the two countries regarding political stability in the Pacific.

From the Japanese point of view, the vital points of the Proposal for Understanding were the prevention of the spread of the European War to the Pacific, the termination of the China Incident, and the promotion of economic co-operation between America and Japan.

[3]

II

In view of the importance of the matter, I summoned a joint conference of high government and military leaders for 8 o'clock that very night.

The Government was represented by the Premier, the Home Minister, the War and Navy Ministers and also by Mr. OHASHI, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs represented the Supreme Command. Also present were the Directors of the Military Affairs Bureaus of the War and Navy Ministries, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary. The consensus of opinion regarding the American proposal was as follows:

1. Acceptance of the American proposal would be the speediest way toward disposal of the China Incident. That is to say, no effective results had been obtained by the setting-up of the Wang Regime, direct negotiations with Chungking were becoming more difficult, and Chungking was entirely dependent upon America; consequently negotiations with Chungking were possible only through the good offices of America. In view of these facts it was quite clear that acceptance of the American proposal would be the speediest way toward disposal of the China Incident.

2. To accede to this proposal and to plan for a rapprochement between the two countries would not only provide the best means of avoiding a Japanese-American war, but would also be a prerequisite to preventing the European war from assuming the magnitude of a world war and to the creation of world peace.

3. The considerable depletion of Japan's national strength made it desirable to restore and cultivate that strength by disposing of the China Incident as quickly as possible. For the success of Japan's southward advance which was being advocated in certain quarters, the supreme command itself confessed to having neither the confidence of success nor the necessary preparation. The cultivation of national strength, moreover, necessitated the temporary restoration of amicable relations with America and planning for the replenishment of the supply of vital commodities for the future.

Thus, the participants were in favor of accepting the American proposal. However, the following items were brought forth as conditions of acceptance.

1. It should be made clear that there would be no infringement of the Tripartite Pact. This was considered axiomatic in view of Japan's keeping faith with Germany.

[4] 2. It should be made more clear that the object of Japanese American cooperation was the promotion of world peace. If the understanding between the two countries were to relieve America of her commitments in the Pacific and thus afford her an opportunity for increasing her support of Britain, Japan would be breaking faith with Germany, which would be improper, and it would constitute a lowering of the tone of the whole concept of the proposal.

3. The contents of the proposal were too complex.

4. Since the text gives the impression of a return to the old world order, clearer expression should be given to the constructive side of the proposal, namely, the idea of building a New Order.

5. Speedy action was necessary to avoid the probable leakage of intelligence. For this reason the return of the Foreign Minister to Japan must be urged.

There were the following two opinions as to whether or not this affair should be reported to Germany.

1. Fidelity demanded that Germany be informed of a matter of such importance as this. She should be informed at least prior to Japan's answer being given to America.

2. If Germany were informed before the fact, she might express her opposition. Since this might vitiate the success of the desired conversations, they should be kept secret from Germany while negotiations were in progress.

[5]

III

After the joint conference on the 18th, the Army, Navy and Foreign Office immediately started examination of the proposal. In the meantime, TERASAKI, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, wished to cable instructions to Ambassador NOMURA to transmit to America Japan's "acceptance in principle" of the proposal. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs OHASHI, although in favor of the idea, vetoed it; he insisted that the answer be dispatched after the Foreign Minister's return. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA finally reached Dairen on the 20th, and I got in touch with him by telephone. It was learned later that the Foreign Minister then said to persons close to him, "The American proposal has probably come as the fruit of what I said in Moscow to Mr. Steinhardt, the American Ambassador to Soviet Russia". In fact, the Foreign Minister on his way, both to and from Europe, had held conversations in Moscow with Mr. Steinhardt, an old acquaintance, asking him to urge President Roosevelt, if the latter was really fond of gambling, to have faith in Japan and to lend a helping hand for the sake of Sino-Japanese peace. MATSUOKA had reported this to me by cable under the date of April 8th, and apparently had been secretly expecting his move to bear fruit.

Because of adverse weather, the Foreign Minister was delayed a day, returning to Tokyo on April 22nd. Since a joint conference had been scheduled for the very evening of his arrival, the examination of the American proposal, by the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries, had been roughly completed on the 21st. In addition, the Army and Navy held a joint conference that same day at the Navy Club, the respective Ministers and Heads of Departments, Bureaus and Sections participating, and presented a memorandum to me which stated that "Japan must turn the American scheme to good advantage and by embracing the principles embodied in the proposal, attain the objectives of the China Incident, restore the national strength, and thereby attain a powerful voice in the establishment of world peace".

I went to Tachikawa airfield to meet the Foreign Minister personally. Realizing the significance of MATSUOKA's first glimpse of the American proposal, since he is an extraordinarily sensitive man, I had intended to explain the proposal to him in the automobile on the way back to Tokyo. However, MATSUOKA had already planned to pay homage at the Imperial Palace at Niju Bashi, so Vice Foreign Minister OHASHI rode in MATSUOKA's car in my place, and to OHASHI was entrusted the delicate task of discussing the American Proposal. I was told afterward, that as expected, the Foreign Minister was extremely annoyed and showed no interest whatever. At the joint conference held after his return, MATSUOKA talked endlessly about his European trip, and when the conversation turned to the American proposal, he showed signs of excitement and laid special emphasis upon the question of keeping faith with Germany.

[6] He said that he interpreted the American proposal as being 70% ill-will and 30% good-will. He recalled that America had entered the first World War after safeguarding her interests in the Pacific by concluding the Ishii-Lansing Agreement, and had scrapped the agreement after the war without regard for the difficult task which had been imposed upon Japan during the period of hostilities. MATSUOKA asked for two weeks' time to ponder the question and left at 11 P. M. ahead of everyone else. The conference continued until 1:30 the next morning, the participants agreeing to proceed with the matter as far as possible, regardless of MATSUOKA's opinion.

When on the 23rd, I summoned the Foreign Minister alone for an informal conference at my official residence, he seemed to have regained a certain degree of calm as compared with the preceding day. The only thing that he said, however, was "Let me pass judgment after my experiences in Europe have worn off".

In the meantime, ill-feeling toward the Foreign Minister increased among Army and Navy leaders. Among these were some who in their anger demanded that resolute steps be taken, even at the cost of changing the Foreign Minister. I, being familiar with MATSUOKA's complex nature, however, was aware that there was no other way than to let him alone for the time being. The next day, I took to my bed with a cold and remained confined to my OGIKUBO home until May 1st. The Foreign Minister, too, for about the same period, spent his days in recuperating from an illness. During this time, the Directors of the Military Affairs Bureaus of the Army and Navy Ministries called on the Foreign Minister jointly and separately, exerting their utmost efforts to soothe his feelings, so that

Japan's answer might be sent to America as soon as possible. However, the Foreign Minister, either on the pretext of illness, or for the reason of his disagreement with the contents of Japan's answer to the American proposal, was difficult to move from his position.

[7]

IV

There was no denying, however, that despite his outward demeanor, the Foreign Minister was giving concentrated thought to the handling of the problems then pending between America and Japan. It was learned later that on his sick-bed Matsuoka had been closely examining both the text of the American proposal and the revision of the same which had been drawn up by the appropriate authorities of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries. In addition, he was also thoroughly revising the latter. A third joint conference was finally held on May 3rd.

Those participating in the conference approved, on the whole, of the revised proposal prepared by the Foreign Minister. The main points of the revision were the elimination of Item IV, "Naval Strength, Air Strength and Shipping of the two countries in the Pacific"; the insertion of a new clause under Item "2", "Attitudes of the two countries toward the European War", covering the mediation of Japan and America between Britain and Germany; and clear definitions of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Other points were the withholding of the announcement of the China Incident peace terms, the deletion of Japan's declaration not to carry on a southward military advance, and the deletion of the agreement concerning Japanese-American conversations. (See Appendix II).

Although the demand to submit the revised plan immediately to the Americans was overwhelming, Foreign Minister Matsuoka stubbornly maintained that the conclusion of a neutrality treaty should be proposed to the United States as a test. His point was finally approved.

The next point was whether or not the Germans should be informed of the entire matter. Different points of view were expressed on this matter also. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister demanded that the whole affair be entrusted to his own diplomatic ability, and so it was left entirely to his discretion.

After the conference adjourned, the Foreign Minister dispatched two telegraphic instructions to Ambassador Nomura. The first was a tentative reply to the American proposal, and was in the form of an oral statement addressed to Secretary Hull by the Foreign Minister. The gist of this statement was that the German and Italian leaders were absolutely confident about the outcome of the European War; that American participation in the war would serve only to prolong hostilities, and thereby bring about the downfall of world civilization; and that Japan could never act in any way injurious to the position of her allies; Germany and Italy. The other dispatch instructed Ambassador Nomura to propose as his personal idea a simple and clear-cut Japanese American neutrality treaty.

Before the Foreign Minister left Tokyo on May 4th to visit the Ise Shrine, he instructed Sakamoto, Director of the European and Asiatic Bureau, to inform in strict confidence both the German and Italian Ambassadors that a secret proposal for the readjustment of Japanese-American relations [8] had been made by the American Government; that the Japanese Government had made the above-mentioned tentative reply; and that it had proposed a neutrality treaty. When the Foreign Minister returned to Tokyo on May 6th, he himself inquired whether "Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had any opinions", and he further stated that it would be ultimately profitable to Germany to turn to America's ill-intentioned proposal to good advantage and terminate the China incident.

Meanwhile, in Washington, Ambassador Nomura and other members of the Embassy were growing impatient at the delay in Japan's submission of a reply to America. Having received the tentative instruction from Foreign Minister Matsuoka, the Ambassador had an interview with Secretary Hull on the 7th and sounded out his opinion regarding the conclusion of a neutrality treaty. However, Mr. Hull showed no interest whatever. Later, Ambassador Nomura discovered that the American Government authorities, although they might be interested after the conclusion of the Proposal for Understanding, were not at all interested in concluding a neutrality treaty at this stage of the negotiations. As for the oral statement, the Ambassador refrained from transmitting the document to Mr. Hull, lest the feelings of the Americans be antagonized. He

did not even read the document in its entirety to Mr. Hull. It was said that during the interview, Mr. Hull in a tone unusually strong for him, urged commencement of the negotiations themselves as speedily as possible. Thus, Foreign Minister Matsuoka's test plan failed to produce its desired effect. Also, American domestic conditions were rapidly becoming more difficult, particularly in view of the National Defense Act and convoy problems. Ambassador Nomura repeatedly urged the Japanese Government to reply. He also reported that he had held in check the American demands insisted upon from the beginning, namely, the establishment of four basic principles: 1) Preservation of territorial integrity and respect for national sovereignty; 2) Non-interference with domestic issues; 3) Establishment of the equality principle, including equal commercial opportunity; and 4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific, with the exception of changes in present conditions through peaceful means, by proposing to keep at a minimum discussions involving principles, and to give precedence to a Japanese-American understanding which would be actual and effective. His report emphasized that an impatient demand by Japan at this time for recognition of the New Order and for mediation in the European War would be more harmful than beneficial. The Japanese Military and Naval Attaches in Washington, furthermore, sent to Japan a statement of their opposition to Matsuoka, terming his policy "gesture diplomacy". On the other hand, the Military Attache in Berlin sent a cable to the War Minister to the effect that it was known from reliable sources that the Japanese Government was conducting negotiations with America, that his office was completely opposed to such negotiations, and that, depending upon circumstances, his whole office might submit their resignations. This might be regarded as one repercussion to having informed German and Italy of the Japanese-American negotiations.

[9]

V

As the situation became more confused and complicated, the activity of the Cabinet members concerned grew more intense. On May 8th, the Foreign Minister was received in audience by the Emperor and informed him that in case America should enter the war, Japan must stand by Germany and Italy. In such an eventuality, the readjustment of Japanese-American relations would be brought to nothing. In any case, if Japan were to break faith with Germany and Italy by inclining too much toward American problems, he, the Foreign Minister, would be obliged to resign. This the Foreign Minister himself reported to me on the 9th.

On the same night, I secretly summoned the Army and Navy Ministers to my house at OGIKUBO, and we held an informal discussion as to the best way of dealing with the Foreign Minister's attitude. We agreed that thereafter the Army and Navy should remain in close contact with me concerning the attitude to be taken by our country if America entered the war, and concerning what measures were to be used if Germany opposed or demanded revision of the Japanese-American negotiation.

When on the following day, May 10th, I was received in audience by the Emperor, he revealed to me, with the air of great concern, the substance of the Foreign Minister's report on the previous day. The Foreign Minister had informed the Emperor that if America were to enter the European War, Japan would have to attack Singapore; and that since America's participation would result in a prolongation of the war, there might be the danger of a German-Soviet collision. In such an eventuality Japan would have to abrogate the neutrality treaty, stand by Germany, and advance at least as far as Irkutsk. I advised the Emperor not to be concerned, since the Foreign Minister's utterances represented only one possible plan under the worst eventuality, and even if the Foreign Minister held such opinions, the military high command would have to take part in, and the Cabinet would have to be consulted about, any final decision. Taking advantage of the opportunity, I advised the Throne that for the settlement of the China Incident, which was proving to be the most urgent matter at present, making use of America was the only way, that the present American proposal was the best and only opportunity, and that I would exert all my efforts toward furthering it. I further explained in detail the difference of opinion among Cabinet members and the split in public opinion that might occur in the event of: (1) Germany's signifying her opposition; (2) America's further revising the Japanese revisions, and; (3) America's participation in the war after a Japanese-American understanding had been reached. I assured the Emperor of my resolve to do my best

to reach an amicable settlement, though if that were impossible, it might be necessary to use emergency measures. The Emperor acquiesced in all that I had said and ordered me to proceed according to the policies I had described. Upon consulting with Marquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, I learned that the [10] Foreign Minister's reasoning had become so flighty after his visit to Europe that he had lost the Emperor's confidence. In fact, on the 8th, after receiving the Foreign Minister in audience, the Emperor had gone so far as to consider the advisability of changing the Foreign Minister.

[11]

VI

The German reply did not come. Meanwhile in spite of urging by both myself and the Army and Navy, the Foreign Minister postponed from day to day the presentation to America of the Japanese revised proposal decided upon on May 3rd. Pressed by the necessity of being in time for the American President's speech scheduled for May 14th, however, the Foreign Minister, on May 12th, without waiting for the German reply, cabled instructions to Ambassador NOMURA, authorizing him to start negotiations according to the revised proposal cabled on the previous day.

Ambassador NOMURA, in compliance with the belated instructions, called upon Secretary Hull on May 11th and 12th (May 12th and 13th) (Japanese time), and offered an explanation of the Japanese revised proposal. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, on May 13th, again sent a message to Secretary Hull. He laid stress upon the point that the two premises motivating Japan's decision regarding the conversations with America were: (1) America's non-participation in the European War, and; (2) America's agreeing at an early date to advise Chiang Kai-shek to open peace negotiations with Japan. Secretary Hull called upon Ambassador NOMURA to "talk frankly about everything, since the Japanese-American conversations now in progress are not negotiations conducted upon a definite basis, but are unofficial and free talks". Concerning the Japanese revised proposal, which had been handed to him by the Ambassador, he expressed not a little doubt concerning the Japanese deletion of the clause insuring Japan's armed invasion of the Southern regions. He showed special concern over the clause covering the China Incident and asked various questions. He remarked significantly that concerning this matter America would have to consult with Britain. Further, his explanation that American domestic conditions were not at all such as to make conversations with Japan easy, showed that he was proceeding with the utmost caution. More than this, the President's speech which had been scheduled for the 14th was postponed until the 29th, and American public opinion was excited about the issue of convoys. It was apparent that, pressed by international and domestic issues, America was finding it difficult to determine its attitude. At any rate, contrary to Japanese expectations, the American answer was slow in coming.

[12]

VII

It was because Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had wished to receive a German reply before submitting his reply to Washington that he had caused the delay in dispatching the Japanese revised proposal. His efforts had been unavailing, and he had been able to wait no longer. Immediately after the instructions had been sent to Ambassador NOMURA on May 12th, the German reply arrived. The gist of the reply was that, since America's underlying motive in planning conciliation with Japan apparently was that she wished to enter the war against Germany, it was desirable that the Japanese Government make it clear to the American Government that: (1) the patrolling and convoying being carried on by America was recognized as an act deliberately provocative of war, and one which would inevitably cause Japan to enter the war, and that; (2) if America refrained from such actions, Japan would be ready to study the American proposal. Furthermore, the German reply ended with the request that, in view of the effect of the present negotiations upon the Tripartite Pact, Germany be consulted before a final answer is sent to America. The Italian Government sent a communication to the effect that Italy's reply was the same as the German's.

Subsequently, on May 19th, as was more or less expected, Ambassador Ott made representations concerning the displeasure of his Government with Japan's having replied to America without waiting for the German reply. The German representations, by implication, expressed Germany's objection in principle to

the Japanese-American negotiations, and pointed out that any treaty concluded by any one of the signatories of the Tripartite Pact with a third country would weaken the common front of the Tripartite Pact signatories. The reply requested that at least "The American Government's obligation not to interfere with the war between England and the Axis countries" and "Japan's obligations accruing from the Tripartite Pact" be clearly defined. Lastly, the representations stated that "The German Government was obliged to express its desire for total participation by Germany in the Japanese-American negotiations and for an immediate report regarding the American reply. It constituted an infringement upon the articles of the Tripartite Pact for Japan to listen to American representations and to determine Japan's future policy without entering into a previous understanding with the German Government regarding all the important problems included in the proposal." Such were the high-handed representations of the Germans. At the same time Ambassador OSHIMA repeatedly sent cables, reporting that German national leaders were harboring extreme antipathy toward the Japanese-American proposal. He also declared his own opposition in strong language.

[13]

VIII

In Tokyo, joint conferences were held on May 15th and May 22nd, but they did not go beyond an exchange of information and opinions. It was evident that through the influence of the German representations and the repeated objections of Ambassador OSHIMA, the originally vague attitude of the Foreign Minister had become more and more vague; and it was more and more obvious that, in contrast with the other Cabinet members who were full of hopes, he was standing alone in his opposition. For instance, following the conference on the 22nd, Chief Cabinet Secretary TOMITA was asked by OKA, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry to transmit to the Premier the request that he "take into consideration a possible split among Cabinet members in the event of the establishment of an agreement, were the Foreign Minister to continue to hold such a contrary point of view."

On the other hand, the Foreign Minister had an interview with me on the 23rd, in which he argued strongly that "although it appeared that Army and Navy leaders were trying to have the Japanese-American understanding put through, even at the cost, more or less of disloyalty to Germany and Italy,—what could be accomplished by such a weak-kneed attitude?"

Concerning the interpretation of Article III of the Tripartite Pact, the Foreign Minister yielded not an inch in his stand that even if American convoys were attacked by the Germans, Japan would be obliged to enter the war and help the Germans, convoying itself being regarded as attack. In fact, the Foreign Minister frequently, in a half-threatening manner, stressed this point upon Ambassador Grew, thinking that this might just possibly prevent America's entry into the war. However, the American President was apparently determined to enter the war, and if that should happen, the Japanese-American understanding would be useless. Under such circumstances the nation would never be satisfied with an attitude such as the Army and Navy's present one, and a national uprising might ensue. At all events, Japan would have to clarify its stand, and come out for England and America, or for Germany and Italy. He took the stand that as Foreign Minister he must insist on union with Germany and Italy to the very last. Later, by saying that "as a subject there was no other course than to obey the Emperor's wishes," he by implication indicated the possibility of resignation.

Although it was possible to suspect from the Foreign Minister's words and actions that he might have made some serious commitments while he was in Germany, there was no alternative to putting faith in his report. According to it, both Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had urged that Japan attack Singapore, but he (MATSUOKA) had said nothing to commit himself. However, according to a cable from Ambassador OSHIMA, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had said "Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's personal view, at the time that he came to Germany, that Singapore would be attacked [4] seems to be entirely changed." The problem remained as to what was the truth. At any rate, it was extremely difficult to comprehend the Foreign Minister's actual intentions, pressed as he was between the American question on one side and loyalty to Germany and Italy on the other.

At about this time the Foreign Minister began to express frankly his displeasure and animosity toward Ambassador NOMURA. At an interview with me on May 23rd, he angrily declared that "it was clear that the present proposal was not made by the Americans but was initiated by Ambassador NOMURA." In spite of my explanation that the Foreign Minister was mistaken in his surmise, he continued to censure the Ambassador's "going beyond his powers". When it became more and more clear that the proposal was not at least the fruit of the Foreign Minister's own labors with Steinhart, he seemed to be extremely displeased. Further, according to a cable which Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to Washington, sent back to London, and which was intercepted by the Navy, Ambassador NOMURA had said to Secretary Hull that in Japan, the Emperor, and the governmental and Army and Navy authorities were all desirous of the success of the present undertaking; the Foreign Minister alone being opposed to it. When the Foreign Minister saw this, he became very angry, and sent a telegram rebuking Ambassador NOMURA for the above statement which he (MATSUOKA) had "received from a reliable source". He also ordered NOMURA to "correct the Secretary's misunderstanding immediately". Ambassador NOMURA immediately replied by cable, saying that he "was completely surprised, and that the accusation was totally unfounded on fact". It also said that "the only thing he could have said bearing on the situation was in answer to Hull's question in which he had replied that in Japan, diplomatic policies could not be decided by the Foreign Minister alone". In reply the Foreign Minister cabled back, "that is good, but if there are any persons in America giving such an impression, take the proper steps." This reply clearly revealed the Foreign Minister's animosity towards persons who were not members of the Ambassador's staff but who were close to him.

Though the issue was resolved for the time being, the opposition between the Foreign Minister on the one hand, and Ambassador NOMURA and his followers on the other, had already come out into the open.

[15]

IX

On May 14th, 16th, 20th, 21st and 28th, Ambassador Nomura held successive conversations with Secretary Hull "in an atmosphere of amity". They were "private conversations of from one to two hours, off the record," and did not appear to go further than to discuss back and forth the following subjects: the form of an agreement which was to cover the whole Pacific, the Tripartite Pact and the Chinese problem. From the Secretary of State's utterances and from inside information, the real facts seemed to be that America was suspicious of the sincerity of Japan's intention to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion, and in particular was taking careful note of the uncompromising attitude of such people as Foreign Minister Matsuoka. President Roosevelt gave his fireside chat on May 27th, with the whole world listening attentively. He made no direct reference to Japan, and touched but lightly on Chinese affairs. There was also information that the President had given special attention to relations with Japan. These things together seemed to reflect a cautious attitude on the part of America and at the same time to offer material for hope concerning Japanese-American negotiations. However, on the 29th, the *Washington Times-Herald* printed an account by Henning, the Chicago Tribune's Washington correspondent, exposing the inside story of the Japanese-American negotiations. According to this story, the President prior to his fireside chat, had summoned Congressional leaders, and had revealed that America's policy was to concentrate upon entering the war with Germany, while pursuing a policy of appeasement toward Japan. The President was quoted as having said that "in Japan, the opposition of financial interests to the policy of the military would gather strength to the point where the Tripartite Pact would be virtually nullified". This story was immediately banned in Tokyo, but Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on the contrary, insisted that it be published, and on the 30th made public his statement of "refutation" which emphasized the absolute unchangeableness of Japan's Axis diplomacy, and the existence of a limit to the peaceful southern advance policy.

[16]

X

I left on a trip westward on June 18th, and after fulfilling previous engagements at the Heian Shrine in Kyoto and at the Omi Shrine, I returned to Tokyo on the 16th. On the following day, the 17th, President Wang Ching-wei of the Nanking Government arrived on a visit to Tokyo. Until he left on the 25th, I

had to devote a good deal of time to his entertainment. Meanwhile, on the morning of the 22nd, to the utter consternation of the world, the German-Soviet War broke out. To make matters worse, by co-incidence the American reply had been handed to Ambassador Nomura on the previous day, June 21st, and was transmitted to Tokyo on the 24th. The Cabinet was now forced to concentrate its entire attention upon the development of the serious matter of the German-Soviet War.

As soon as Foreign Minister Matsuoka received word of the outbreak of the German-Soviet War, he immediately gained audience with the Emperor. He advised the Emperor that "now that the German-Soviet War had started Japan, too, must cooperate with Germany and attack Russia. To do this, it was better for the time being to refrain from action in the south. Sooner or later Japan would have to fight there. Ultimately Japan would be fighting the Soviets, America and England simultaneously. Of course, the Foreign Minister had not consulted with the Cabinet. This was his independent action. The Emperor was greatly astonished, and ordered him to "consult with the Premier immediately". At the same time, through Marquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Emperor informed me of the contents of the Foreign Minister's advice. In compliance with the Imperial order, the Foreign Minister called on me at my Ogikubo residence at ten o'clock the same night. What he said was not very clear, but in short it appeared that the Foreign Minister had conveyed to the Emperor his own personal forecast of the situation at its worst. Upon seeing the Emperor on the 23rd, I tried to relieve his concern by saying that such was the nature of the Foreign Minister's advice. It was not clear whether the Foreign Minister's "uncomprising attitude" was nothing more than his own personal forecast, or whether it was a conviction. Therefore, for fear of further complications, I telephoned from the Imperial Palace to the Chief Cabinet Secretary to postpone the joint conference to consider the German-Soviet question which was scheduled to begin that same afternoon. It was learned that in addition to his statement to the Emperor, the Foreign Minister had made not a few similar statements to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and to various private persons, and had caused quite a stir. A searching investigation by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and myself disclosed that the Foreign Minister's claims appeared to be that "First, we must attack the Soviets. Although we must try to avoid war with America, in the event that America does enter the war, we must fight her too." Even though that was the Foreign Minister's opinion, I held informal conversations with the Army and Navy Ministers to determine the Government's attitude. In addition, I summoned joint conferences in quick succession on June 25th, 26th, 28th and 30th, and July 1st. Finally, I requested the convening of a council in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd, where it was decided that for the time being Japan would not undertake action against the Soviets. (See Appendix III).

[17]

XI

America showed a profound interest in Japan's attitude toward the German-Soviet War. On July 4th, the President had the Secretary of State send a message to me directly, which said that "We have information that Japan is starting military operations against the Soviets. We request assurance that this is contrary to fact." This message was delivered to me on July 6th by Ambassador Grew. This procedure was unprecedented, and showed how seriously the American Government held Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in disfavor. I conferred with the Foreign Minister, and on the 8th he submitted to Ambassador Grew, in place of an answer, a copy of the communication to the Soviet Government (handed to Soviet Ambassador Smetany on July 2nd). Turning the occasion to advantage, I inquired whether "The American Government really intended to enter the European War." The American answer to this question arrived on July 16th, the day of the resignation of the Cabinet. This answer was bitterly ironical, saying that "it was quite proper to exercise the right of self-defense against Germany" and that "any country using force to keep America an indifferent bystander would be considered a partisan of the countries conducting armed invasion." Foreign Minister MATSUOKA at once disposed of this reply by expressing his opposition to unlimited abuse of the right of self-defense. Also, the Foreign Minister evinced considerable displeasure at the direct and secret transmission of the message to me. Whereupon Ambassador Grew could hardly hide his disappointment in having had a direct interview with me blocked. After this relationships between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew, which had always been cool, grew increasingly worse.

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XII

With the German-Soviet question settled for the time being, the American question permitted of no more delay. Also, the Foreign Minister's ambiguous attitude could no longer be disregarded. Consequently, on July 4th, purposely using the form of a letter, I transmitted the following views to the Foreign Minister.

1. Until the settlement of the Northern question, armed force should not be used against the Southern regions, and steps should be taken toward readjustment of diplomatic relations with America. Naval leaders clearly state that to fight America and the Soviets simultaneously offers almost insurmountable difficulties. From this point of view it is advisable that the invasion of French Indo-China should, if possible, be abandoned.

2. As a result of the readjustment of diplomatic relations with America, it would be impossible to satisfy German demands. This might temporarily create an undercurrent of misunderstanding among the Axis countries, but this could not be avoided.

3. Readjustment of American-Japanese relations was also necessary in view of these three points:

a. Expansion of national strength by acquisition of foreign goods.

b. Prevention of American-Soviet reapproachment.

c. Acceleration of peace negotiations with Chungking.

4. Not only was it necessary to continue the present negotiations with America, from the above point of view—it was also necessary to bring them to a successful conclusion, in the light of high national policies. Lastly, I added that "even though from the Foreign Minister's point of view a compromise between Japan and America might seem impossible, I, who carried the responsibility of vital state affairs, was obliged to do my best. Moreover, the Emperor was seriously concerned about the situation. I, therefore was determined to do my utmost, and would work for the success of negotiations even at the cost of some concessions."

The Foreign Minister said to me over the telephone that he was profoundly moved by my letter. When he saw me at my official residence the next day, the 5th, the following points were established.

"Fundamentally he was of the same mind as I. No matter what public opinion might be, he considered himself to be the most zealous person in respect to the American question. He was certainly not trying to please Germany. However, he was opposed to do anything detrimental to the Tripartite Pact. From that very day he was going to give his entire attention to the American Question." At the same time, he made the significant statement that [19] "if at any time he became a stumbling-block, he would resign his post."

XIII

[20] Deliberations on the Japanese-American Proposal for Understanding thus began again. Joint conferences were held on July 10th and 12th, which considered the American proposal of June 21st. The special points of this June 21st proposal were as follows:

1. In the item covering the attitudes of the two countries toward the European War, the clause advocated by Japan, which proposed joint efforts of Japan and America for the restoration of peace, was deleted. This suggested by implication a determination to work to the last for the overthrow of Germany.

2. In relation to the Tripartite Pact, America proposed that "Japan . . . make clear her intention of preventing a spreading of the European War resulting from provocative acts. This seemed to reveal an effort to have Japan make a written promise not to take up arms in the event of America's participation in the war as the result of "provocation" by Germany.

3. Concerning the China Incident, the distinction made in the first proposal between the Chiang Kai-shek Administration and the Nanking Government was omitted so as to make the recommendation of peace be to the "Chinese Government". Also, although the Konoye Principles were mentioned, only that part referring to amicable relations were included, and the matter of economic co-operation and a common front against communism was omitted. On the whole this marked a general reversion to a fear of American public opinion.

4. The Sino-Japanese Peace Terms, which Japan had deleted were included in an Annex. The necessity for the establishment of perfect agreement concerning this was indicated.

5. Whereas Japan advocated limiting the economic cooperation of Japan and America to the "southwest" Pacific, this was revised to cover the entire Pacific. (See Appendix IV)

Further, an oral statement was attached to the proposal. It attempted to sound out Japan's true intentions, saying that "America was ardently hoping for the realization of Japanese-American understanding, and would like to receive more clearly than it had up to this time assurances that the Japanese Government too was desirous of this realization as a whole. In one section it was mentioned that intelligence had been received that "among Japanese leaders in influential positions were those who had pledged themselves to further the demands of National Socialist Germany and its subjugation policies". In saying that under these circumstances the understanding between the two countries, presently being deliberated, might end in "disillusionment", the oral statement by implication censured Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. It also expressed doubts concerning [21] the stationing of Japanese troops in China.

This June 21st proposal was finally deliberated upon at the joint conference of July 10th.

However, in spite of my efforts, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude became increasingly uncooperative. It became clear that his attitude was one of opposition to the Japanese-American negotiations. During the joint conference of July 10th, he especially requested the presence of Dr. Yoshie SAITO, Advisor to the Foreign Ministry and MATSUOKA's confidential friend, and through him opened up a general attack upon the Japanese-American negotiations. He even distributed to those who participated in the conference, previously prepared leaflets expressing his views. These leaflets contained points almost the same as those of his spoken agreement, and might briefly be summed up as follows: The American proposal, from beginning to end, was based upon ill-will, which wanted to subjugate Japan or throw her into utter confusion. The Foreign Minister was particularly incensed over the suspicion cast upon his attitude, by implication, in the oral statement attached to the American proposal. This was a demand for a Cabinet change which would change the Foreign Minister, and constituted an interference in domestic affairs. Such a thing was unprecedented in diplomatic history since the time when the German Kaiser demanded the resignation of the French Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister's concluding statement was that, at the very least, the oral statement should be sent back at once, and that the Japanese-American negotiations should be broken off, the when and how of this being now the only questions. Troubled by the uncompromising attitude of the Foreign Minister, I held a secret conference that night with the Army, Navy and Home Ministers.

At the joint conference on the 12th, the Army and Navy made a joint statement of their opinions. It differed from the Foreign Minister's in that it stated: (1) Japan's attitude toward the European War should be determined according to treaty obligations and the question of self-defense. (2) The three Konoye Principles should form the basis of dealing with the Chinese question. America might make recommendations as to an armistice and peace, but should not intervene in the peace terms. (3) Japan reserved her right to use armed forces in the Pacific in case of necessity.

It was thought necessary to define these three points clearly for the sake of the future. In other respects the American proposal was all right. However, even in the eventuality of a breakdown in negotiations matters should be prolonged until after the entrance of Japanese troops into French Indo-China.

Ultimately Foreign Minister MATSUOKA agreed to draw up the Japanese counter-proposal on the basis of the Army and Navy views. On the 12th, [22] after the end of the conference, MUTO and OKA, Directors of the Military Affairs Bureaus of the Army and Navy Ministries, respectively; TERASAKI, Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office; TOMITA, Chief Cabinet Secretary; and SAITO, Foreign Office Advisor, met in conference and drew up Japan's final draft proposal.

There remained to obtain Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's agreement. In spite of strong Army and Navy pressure, the Foreign Minister, under pretext of illness, would not read the draft proposal. His seeing the German Ambassador and others in the meantime, however, angered the Army and Navy. Finally, on the 14th, the Foreign Minister listened to Dr SAITO's explanation, and the final proposal including the Foreign Minister's revised opinions was drawn up. This affair lasted only a day or two, but there was tense atmosphere in the government, and an added strain was felt in political circles.

The Japanese counter-proposal, which was drawn up according to the Foreign Minister's revision, differed from the American proposal of June 21st, chiefly in the following points:

1. To facilitate American acceptance the phrase "when the proper occasion arises" was added to the clause covering a joint effort by Japan and America to be exerted for the speedy termination of the European War.

2. The paragraph concerning the Tripartite Pact was revised to read "if by mischance the European War spreads, the Japanese Government shall execute its obligations under the Pact and determine its attitude solely according to consideration of national welfare and safety."

3. In the section pertaining to the Chinese question, the Konoye Principles were set forth as a whole, and the term "Nanking Government", which was disliked by America, was avoided. However, it was clearly stated that the American Government was to advise Chiang Kai-shek to make peace.

4. Sino-Japanese peace terms were again omitted.

5. For the reason that it was in the Southwest Pacific that Japanese-American cooperation was particularly needed, the "whole Pacific area" was changed to "Southwest Pacific."

When the Japanese counter-proposal was finally drawn up, everyone concerned was of the opinion that it should be sent to America immediately. However, the Foreign Minister clung to the opinion that "First of all, instructions rejecting the oral statement, and then two or three days later, the counter-proposal should be cabled. [23] The cabled instructions rejecting the oral statement termed it "an impolite and improper document", and indicated that "unless the American Government first withdrew it, Japan would be unable to proceed with deliberation on the Proposal for Understanding."

I, and the Army and Navy, strongly urged that at least the Japanese counter-proposal should be dispatched at the same time as the cabled instructions, since the latter by itself would only stir up ill feelings on the other side, and might lead to a rupture. However, late on the night of the 14th, the Foreign Minister, in disregard of an agreement with me and Dr SAITO, sent the cabled instructions of rejection alone. (Actually, Secretary Hull, surprised at the interpretation which had been given to it, withdrew it on July 17th, in order to clear away the misunderstanding). On the following day, the 15th, the Foreign Minister ordered SAKAMOTO, the Director of the European and Asiatic Bureau, to inform the Germans secretly of Japan's last proposal which had not yet been presented even to America.

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XIV

Upon arriving at this state of affairs, the Cabinet was of one mind with me that it could no longer deal with important diplomatic matters. So, on the 15th, after a Cabinet council from which the Foreign Minister was absent, I consulted with the Home, Army and Navy Ministers as to the best course available. The Army Minister declared that "realizing the various undesirable consequences which would ensue from the dismissal of the Foreign Minister, he had done his utmost to cooperate with him, but now it was no longer possible." At this point, there was nothing else for it but the Foreign Minister's dismissal, or the resignation of the Cabinet en masse. Four Ministers were agreed upon this point. However, should the Foreign Minister alone be dismissed, extremely serious consequences might follow, in view of the fact that the Foreign Minister had emphatically stated that "the American oral statement was a demand for a Cabinet change". At this time, it was decided that, quite apart from the Foreign Minister's attitude or the American question, and quite simply, from the viewpoint of the consolidation of the wartime structure, it would be better for the Cabinet to resign en masse.

The council broke up with the decision to have a consultation again the next day.

When I reported these circumstances to the Emperor at two o'clock that afternoon at his Hayama residence, the Emperor asked "whether or not it was possible to dismiss Matsuoka alone". I replied that I would do the best I could after careful deliberation, but that the Cabinet could not continue to exist like this. I then had an interview with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and explained the reasons why a general resignation was necessary. I suggested Home Minister Hiranuma as the best candidate for the next premiership. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, without saying whether he agreed or not, recommended that prompt action be taken.

On the following day, July 16th, in accordance with the previous day's agreement, I, the Home Minister, the Army Minister, the Navy Minister, and the President of the Cabinet Planning Board met at noon in a secret conference at my Mejiro residence. As a result of the deliberations, we agreed upon a general resignation. Then, after all preparations had been made by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, who was standing by in readiness, at half-past six an extraordinary Cabinet council was convened, and the resignations were handed over. The Foreign Minister being at home in bed, the Chief Cabinet Secretary called upon him and obtained his resignation. The Foreign Minister was taken unawares, and showed great annoyance. However, he could do nothing in the face of the general decision, and entrusted his seal to the Chief Secretary.

At 8:50 P. M. I tendered the resignations to the Emperor at his Hayama residence. At 11 P. M. I reported to the Cabinet Members. Thus the Second Konoye Cabinet came to an end.

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XV

On July 17th at 5:10 P. M. I was received in audience by the Emperor at the Imperial Palace and ordered to organize the Cabinet again. Commencing the selection of Cabinet members at once, I completed the task at 5:30 P. M. on the 18th. I reported to the Palace at 7:00 P. M. and presented the names of the Cabinet members. At 8:50 P. M. the newly-organized third Konoye Cabinet came into existence. The first Cabinet council was held at 9:45 P. M. The special feature of the new Cabinet was the appointment of Admiral Toyoda as Foreign Minister.

The previous Cabinet had done its utmost for the success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Particularly, the Army and Navy had maintained the closest cooperation. The opposition of the Foreign Minister alone had caused the Cabinet's collapse. Unexpectedly, only the Foreign Minister was changed, and actually the identical Cabinet had the opportunity of again taking the stage. (In addition to the Foreign Minister, four Ministers, Kanemitsu, Ogawa, Akita, and Kawada had resigned, but essentially it was a matter of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's being changed.) Thus, the mission assigned to the new Cabinet was clear to everyone.

It should be noted particularly that the Army and Navy Ministers remained in office, and that the important post of Foreign Minister was occupied by a representative of the Navy, which was most concerned with the American question, and hence had a significant voice in the matter. The Cabinet was given the additional privilege of holding joint conferences with the Supreme Command in the Imperial Palace, and launched immediately upon the attainment of its objectives, the solution of Japanese-American problems.

In the first part of July, the Imperial Headquarters was established in the Imperial Palace. The joint conferences between the Government and the Supreme Command were to take place in the Palace also. On July 23rd, the first meeting for exchange of information was held in the Palace. The Army, particularly Tojo, the Army Minister, was responsible for the establishment of the Imperial Headquarters and the joint conferences in the Imperial Palace. It was thought that by this maneuver orders issued by the joint conferences within the Palace would have more weight, and that such orders in themselves would completely obviate divisions within the Cabinet or a split in public opinion. That such a hope could be fully attained was inconceivable in the light of later developments.

However, the significance of this very obvious political change was not clearly grasped by Ambassador Nomura in Washington. Because the Ambassador himself failed to understand it, almost nothing was done to convey its significance to the Americans. To the Tokyo Government, which had expected that a good impression would be made by the establishment of the new Cabinet, and that negotiations would progress ~~swiftly~~ now that the vague atmosphere had been dispelled, this situation was truly mortifying.

[26] The previous Cabinet in its last days had drawn up with great pains a Japanese counter-proposal to the American proposal of June 21st, and on July 25th had dispatched it by cable. In spite of this, the Embassy at Washington had not yet presented it to the Americans, first because of the change in Cabinets, second, because of fear that its contents might not be acceptable to the Americans. This was made clear in a cable from Ambassador Nomura on July 22nd.

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In addition to all that, Ambassador Nomura on July 23rd, requested that he be informed of the new Cabinet's policy toward America.

While the Japanese Cabinet's strong desire to proceed with the Japanese-American negotiations had not yet even been conveyed to the Americans, the time set by the Cabinet council for dispatching troops to French Indo-China drew near, and movements of forces on the Pacific grew frequent. This could not fail to increase the doubt and anxiety of the American Government. According to a cable from Ambassador Nomura on the 24th, rumors were circulating to the effect that, 1) Future conversations would be "torpedoed" in Tokyo; 2) Japan had given our explanation to the Axis that the Japanese-American diplomatic adjustments were a strategem until preparations for a Southern invasion were completed. In Japan, too, the expression "Japanese encirclement" was increasingly used, and in journalistic circles, for the most part, there was a strong anti-American tendency far removed from the attitude of the Cabinet.

On July 21st, Under-Secretary Welles, representing Secretary Hull, who was ill, summoned Minister Wakasugi, Ambassador Nomura's representative, and warned him that "According to information, Japan appeared to be planning the occupation of French Indo-China, and that such an action would nullify previous conversations. On the 23rd, Under-Secretary Welles had a conversation with Ambassador Nomura also, in which he made serious representations to the effect that "Up to now America had exercised all possible forbearance in holding conversations with Japan, but that because of recent events, the basis of the earliest conversations had been entirely lost."

On the 24th Ambassador Nomura had a private interview with the President. At this time, the President, declaring that the question of French Indo-China constituted a fatal problem, made the following important proposals.

1. Evacuation of Japanese troops from French Indo-China (if they have already entered), and with that as a condition,
2. A joint guarantee by Japan, America, England, Holland and China of the neutralization of French Indo-China
3. Guaranteed access to goods from French Indo-China.

[27] The Tokyo Government's announcement of the entry of troops into French Indo-China, and the American Government's announcement of the freezing of Japanese assets came simultaneously. In view of the sudden change in the situation, I ordered the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board, that night, to station a special police guard at the American Embassy.

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XVI

During the period of approximately ten days between the political change and the occupation of French Indo-China, there were many happenings which were unfortunate for mutual understanding between Tokyo and Washington. It now seemed as if the Japanese-American conversations had failed utterly. However, the Cabinet, refusing to give up hope until the last, devoted its efforts to the resumption of conversations about the American President's July 24th proposal regarding French Indo-China. An elaborated form of this proposal, including the neutralization of Thailand as well as of French Indo-China, was transmitted through Under-Secretary Welles on July 31st.

In Tokyo, successive joint conferences took place on July 29th and 30th, and on August 2nd and 4th. I exerted my utmost efforts, holding informal conversations with the Navy and Foreign Ministers on the 31st, and with the Army Minister on August 1st. I also summoned Mr. Mitsuru TOYAMA and others as a move toward the conservatives. And so, at the joint conference of August 4th, a single proposal to the United States was decided upon. Although in its form this was an answer to the President's proposal, it was designed to be the key to reopening the Japanese-American conversations which had come to a standstill. The gist of the proposal was as follows:

1. Japan has no intention of sending troops further than French Indo-China, and will withdraw them from French Indo-China after the settlement of the China Incident.
2. Japan will guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.
3. America will remove her armaments in the Southwest Pacific.
4. America will cooperate in Japan's obtaining resources in the Netherlands East Indies.
5. America will act as intermediary in the direct negotiations between Japan and China, and will recognize Japan's special position in French Indo-China, even after the withdrawal of troops.

These cabled instructions were sent to Ambassador NOMURA on August 5th. On the 6th, the Ambassador conveyed them to Secretary Hull. The Americans showed no special interest, however, and made it clear that there was no room for the continuation of conversations until Japan should abandon her saber-rattling policy. Ambassador NOMURA reported that America seemed to be ready to meet any situation.

Two days later, on August 8th, Secretary Hull handed the American answer to Ambassador NOMURA. It contained no reference to the contents of the Japanese proposal. It merely pointed out that, as a reply to the President's proposal, the Japanese proposal was not to the point. It was a sharp document, repeating almost word for word the President's proposal.

XVII

[29] During this time, I was considering every means by which to surmount the Japanese-American crisis. Finally, I made up my mind to personally meet with the President, and on the evening of August 4th, I told both the Ministers of War and of Navy about this for the first time. My words were as follows:

"1. The President of the United States has gone so far as to say that he 'wishes to leave nothing undone,' and it is our duty, I believe, to do everything that can be done. Behind the conversations which have been held between Japan and America to date, there have been various misunderstandings and differences of sentiment, and it seems that the real intentions of each are not thoroughly understood by the other. For a statesman to allow matters to develop in this manner into war could not be justified when viewed in the light of world peace. He would not be fulfilling his duties to the Emperor, who views Japanese-American relations with particular anxiety, nor to the people. If all that could be done had been done and still there is war, there can be no help for it. In such an eventuality, our minds can be made up, and the people's will determined. Although outwardly Chamberlain of England appeared to have been deceived by Hitler on his several trips to the Continent prior to the European War, it is believed that they were effective from the standpoint of solidifying the determination of the British people.

"2. In this most critical period, it is feared that the opportune moment might be missed if negotiations are carried on through Ambassador Nomura. The Prime Minister should meet personally with the President and express straightforwardly and boldly the true intentions of the Empire. If the President still does not understand, I shall, of course, be fully prepared to break off the talks and return home. It is, therefore, an undertaking which must be carried out while being fully prepared for war against America. If, after a direct meeting with the President, an understanding cannot be obtained, the people will know that a Japanese-American war could not be avoided. This would aid in consolidating their determination. The world in general, also, would be made aware that the primary factor is not aggression and invasion. It will know that great efforts were made in behalf of maintaining peace in the Pacific. This would be advantageous to us in that the unfavorable trend of the world's public opinion would be somewhat eased.

"3. Since the matter of the President's coming to Honolulu has already been brought up in the first Proposal for Understanding, I do not believe that having it materialize is an impossibility. It is not necessary to assume from the start that the conversations will fail. Japan will insist, of course, on the firm establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. American claims will be based on the provisions of the Nine-Power Pact. The contents of these are at odds with each other. However [30] America has stated that 'it is ready at any time to discuss making revisions to the Nine-Power Pact through legal means.' Japan's ideal, of course, is to bring about the firm establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In view of the national potential it is too much to expect this ideal to be fulfilled at once. Therefore, I do not believe that Japanese-American talks are an impossibility if they are carried out with broadmindedness.

"4. This conference must be held soon. The outlook of the German-Soviet war indicates that the peak will become apparent in about September. If, as people in some circles predict today, a stalemate is brought about, Germany's future cannot be viewed with optimism. If that does happen, the American attitude will stiffen and she will no longer entertain the thought of talking with Japan. On the other hand, even if the German-Soviet war develops favorably for Germany,

this conference would not necessarily bring about unfavorable results for Japan. Even if Germany's attitude toward Japan becomes cool, since there is no chance of a German conquest of the world or of a complete victory over Britain and America, there are many ways in which Japanese-German relations can be altered. Therefore, we need not feel much anxiety because of favorable developments for Germany in the German-Soviet War. On the contrary, in consideration of possibly unfavorable developments for Germany, it is of the utmost urgency that we reach an accord with America without a day's delay.

"5. But the problem is not merely to come to any agreement with America. The urgency, of course, must not force us to strike a submissive attitude. In other words, we shall do everything that can be done, and then if success is not attained, there is no help for it. It is my opinion that to do everything that should be done is absolutely essential from a diplomatic as well as from a domestic standpoint."

Both the War and Navy Ministers listened to me intently. Neither could give me an immediate reply but before the day was over, the Navy expressed complete accord and, moreover, anticipated the success of the conference. The War Minister's reply came in writing, as follows:

"If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created. For these reasons, the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The attempt to surmount the present critical situation by the Prime Minister's offering his personal services, is viewed with sincere respect and admiration. If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister's intention to attend such a meeting [31] with determination to firmly support the basic principles embodied in the Empire's Revised Plan to the "N"-Plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even after this final effort is made, the army is not necessarily in disagreement.

"However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if, after making preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with someone other than the President, such as Secretary Hull or one in a lesser capacity. (2) You shall not resign your post as a result of the meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war against America."

The War Minister was of the opinion that "failure of this meeting is the greater likelihood." After considering the matter from all angles, the Foreign Minister concluded that "matters should be carried out expeditiously." On the morning of the 6th, immediately after the joint conference, I was granted an audience, and I conveyed my intentions to the Emperor. During the afternoon of the 7th, I was summoned to his presence and was advised: "I am in receipt of intelligence from the Navy pertaining to a general oil embargo against Japan by America. In view of this, the meeting with the President should take place as soon as possible." Instructions were despatched to Ambassador Nomura during the morning of the 7th.

The first impression made on America by even this major proposal, was discouraging. The President was absent from Washington at the time, having gone to meet with Prime Minister Churchill. Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on the 8th, and relayed the proposal to him. As stated before, however, this coincided with our receiving the American reply to Japan's proposal of August 4th. With regard to this most important new proposal, Hull's comment was: "As long as there is no change in Japan's policy, I lack confidence in relaying this proposal to the President." Ambassador Nomura did not press the matter further but suggested by telegraph that the matter be taken up in Tokyo with Ambassador Grew.

In America, the joint statement of the President and Churchill was publicly announced and subsequently the caustic Japanese press comments concerning it were reported. The attempt on Minister Hiranuma's life on the 14th was reported in a sensational manner. On the 13th, Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura a note of protest enumerating the various instances in which Japan had disregarded American rights and interests in China, calmly explaining that all representations that should be made would continue to be made in the typical tradition of American diplomacy. Among American Cabinet officials with whom Ambassador Nomura came in contact, the matter was viewed with pessimism on the theory that there was no reason for [32] America to participate in

a meeting of leaders which had no chance of succeeding. Realizing the very critical situation, Ambassador Nomura met once more with Hull on the 16th, just prior to the President's return to Washington from his conference at sea. Ambassador Nomura made every effort to convey to Hull our true intentions, but as usual, Hull repeated his opposition to "military domination." At the same time, however, his attitude with regard to the meeting of the two leaders, softened somewhat and replied: "If the Ambassador is sufficiently confident, Japan's wishes may be conveyed to the White House."

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XVIII

As expected, President Roosevelt requested Ambassador Nomura to call on August 17th—in spite of its being Sunday—which was almost immediately upon his return to Washington from the conference at sea. He brought up two subjects: One was a warning against any further southward advance by force of arms, and the other was his reply to the proposal for the meeting between the leaders of the two nations. First, he expressed the appreciation of the American Government to me and to the Japanese Government for making this proposal. Then he said, "If the Japanese Government halts Japan's expansion activities and readjusts its stand; and if it desires to embark upon a program of peace in the Pacific along the lines proposed in the program and principles proposed by the United States; and if, moreover, it is able to effect such a program, the United States is prepared to reopen the unofficial preparatory discussions which were broken off in July, and every effort will then be made to select a time and place to exchange views." Thus he expressed agreement in principle. Finally: "For this purpose, it is requested that a statement concerning the present attitude and plans of the Japanese Government, with more clarity than heretofore, be submitted." Clarification of the term, "a peaceful program," showed that it included the application of the principle of equality of economic opportunity and treatment in the entire Pacific area; the voluntary and peaceful cooperation of all the nationals in the said area; the offering of assistance to any people who might be threatened; the abolition of control through military or political pressure; and the abolition of monopolistic or preferential economic rights.

The President was in high spirits throughout this Nomura-Roosevelt conference. He even went so far as to say: "As for the locale of the meeting, Hawaii is impossible from a geographical standpoint. Juneau, Alaska, would be more suitable. As for time, how about around the middle of October?"

That the President took up this matter personally without having it proceed through regular administration channels, because he was of the opinion that the matter could be settled more quickly through his personal intercession, was indicated by one Cabinet official (Walker?) who met with Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Nomura wired Tokyo: "A reply should be made before this opportunity is lost" and accompanied this with a draft of a reply to be used as reference.

In Tokyo, after the instructions had been despatched on the 7th, aside from holding joint conferences on the 9th, 13th, 14th, and the 16th, I remained in constant touch with the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers. On the 18th, Foreign Minister Toyoda invited Ambassador Grew to call and explain why the meeting between the leaders of the two nations was of the utmost importance, and requested his cooperation in having it materialize.

[34] At about this time, Captain Iwakuro and Mr. Igawa, who had been aiding Ambassador Nomura in the talks with America, returned to Japan. Captain Iwakuro was invited to attend the joint conference of the 20th, at which he described in detail the developments up to then and explained conditions in America. My relationship with the army was explained to Mr. Igawa and his good offices in clarifying the situation were requested. Minister Wakatsuki also returned and described the Japanese-American negotiations as seen from a slightly different angle, principally to Foreign Office circles.

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XIX

At the joint conference held on August 26th the Japanese Government decided upon Japan's reply to the American proposal, which was handed over to Ambassador Nomura by President Roosevelt on August 17th. In this reply, Japan pointed out that it was hard for Japan to accept the American Government's hitherto assumed attitude. In addition, Japan's attitude and intentions

toward the Southern Regions and the Soviet Union were clarified. Japan further declared that the program which America claimed should be applied to the entire world should, by inference, be applied to the Pacific Area, which is a part of the world. In its reply Japan also expressed her view that it was reasonable to assume that any demand which was vitally necessary for the existence of a nation should be duly accepted.

At this same joint conference held on August 28th, in addition to deciding upon her reply, the Japanese Government approved a message addressed directly from me to President Roosevelt. In this message I, freeing myself from the past business-like negotiations, discussed the Japanese-American problem from a broader point of view. I frankly stated my sincere intention of proposing an interview which would aim at tiding over the present crisis. I also expressed my hope that the interview would take place as early as possible.

On August 28th these two documents were handed personally to the President of the United States by Ambassador Nomura. After reading my message, President Roosevelt showed his appreciation by calling it a "splendid message" and expressing his hope for a three-day interview with me. Thus, although the President did not mention the date for the interview, he exhibited an unmistakable desire for such an interview with me. Compared with the President's enthusiasm, Secretary Hull, who was present at the time, took an extremely cautious attitude. On the same night Hull summoned Ambassador Nomura and emphasized America's feeling that the interview between the two Governmental heads should take the form of a ratification of matters discussed in already completed conversations. He also made clear his basic disagreement with the Japanese feeling in this matter and stressed the fact that before the interview Japan's intentions concerning the China Problem, especially that of the evacuation of Japanese troops and the right of self-defense, should be clarified more thoroughly than heretofore.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Nomura sent two reports to Tokyo on August 29th and August 30th respectively. In one report Ambassador Nomura described the optimistic air surrounding his interview with the President, and in the other report he sent word concerning Mr. Hull's pessimistic opinion. These two reports contained important suggestions for a solution of the present crucial problems. Meanwhile, Japanese Governmental circles held two different opinions, one optimistic and the other pessimistic. However, in anticipation of the meeting becoming an actuality, the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries began selecting representatives. The Japanese Foreign Office [36] seems not to have viewed very seriously the State Department's "theoretical diplomacy" as represented by Hull, and their faith in the President's "statesman-like" way of resolution seems to have grown stronger. In the joint conference held on August 30th, Foreign Minister Toyoda inclined strongly toward the optimistic point of view.

On September 3rd, President Roosevelt secretly summed Ambassador Nomura and personally handed him his reply to my message. Although the President addressed himself to me as being "very sincerely sympathetic," he showed none of his former enthusiasm. Even in his reply the President, while he used extremely polite language, avoided any clear expression indicating his consent to the proposed interview. Instead, he stated in his message that prior to the interview it would be necessary for Japan to agree upon certain basic principles. In the light of the President's message, it became clear that the State Department's opinion had become the dominant opinion. In his oral statement, President Roosevelt clearly specified the Four Principles which he had up to that time avoided bringing up. He stated that these were the basic principles upon which the conversations had been conducted up to that point. Furthermore, he said that though the Japanese reply handed to him personally on August 28th (the reply accompanying my message) seemed to have made clear its agreement with these principles, there still remained various untouched-upon and unsolved problems in respect to the June 21st American Proposal for Understanding. He argued that it was necessary first to settle these problems and that he wished to learn the Japanese Government's stand in respect to them. In all this the President's attitude was the same as that of the State Department.

On the following day, the 8th, when Ambassador Nomura met with Hull, the latter's attitude had become all the more firm. Hull stated that the Four Principles were the most important considerations, and that the Japanese Government must show more clearly its intention to support them. In short, the

United States strongly maintained the attitude that the basis for any conversations between the Governmental Heads should be the same as the basis on which the earlier proposal for understanding was founded.

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However, on September 3rd, at the same time that the interview was being held between Ambassador Nomura and President Roosevelt, a joint conference was being held in Tokyo to discuss a new proposal to be sent to the United States. This proposal was drawn up by the Foreign Office. Based upon a different principle from that of the Proposal for Understanding that was considered by Nomura and Hull in their previous informal conversation, it was in its essence a simplification of this proposal, and reads as follows:

1. Japan will not send occupational troops further than French Indo-China.
2. Japan will make an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact.
3. In accordance with a Japanese-Chinese Agreement, Japan will withdraw her troops from China.
4. Japan will not restrict American economic activities in China provided such activities are carried out along just lines.
5. The principle of nondiscrimination in respect to trade will be established in the Southwest Pacific.
6. The necessary steps will be taken to restore normal trade relations between Japan and America.

The above proposals were to be offered to the United States, and the United States was to reciprocate. The Foreign Office set great store by the proposal, and on September 4th Foreign Minister Toyoda conveyed this proposal to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo at the same time that Ambassador Nomura was conveying it to Secretary Hull.

This proposal was not exactly a new one, since Japan had done her utmost to make known her desires. However, it would be difficult to say how long it would take to consider all of the important fundamental principles contained in the Proposal for Understanding which was used as the basis for negotiations in April. Since, in having to consider all of these, the present crisis might not be averted, Japan's purpose was to bring up only the immediate and concrete problems and on these to base the conversations between the Governmental Heads.

However, the American interpretation was that Japan found it difficult to adopt, in toto, the Proposal for Understanding and therefore, to avoid the issue, was offering new proposals based upon a new policy. Under these [38] circumstances, contrary to the sanguine expectations of Foreign Office, the September 9th proposal merely invited misunderstanding and confusion.

Nor was it unreasonable that America should have fallen into this misunderstanding, since America had presented the June 21st Proposal to Japan as the final American proposal. As stated above, Japan's reply was dispatched on July 15th. However, because of the cabinet change, etc., Ambassador Nomura had failed to submit this reply to the American side. Thus, before the Japanese counter-proposal to the American proposal of June 21st had been received by Washington, another Japanese proposal dated September 4th had arrived. This seems to have been the principle reason for the American misunderstanding.

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XXI

While the complicated and prolonged diplomatic negotiations were being conducted between Tokyo and Washington, in Tokyo itself a question of special significance was being deliberated upon by the cabinet. The question was whether to continue negotiations indefinitely with America, or whether to break them off abruptly. And more important still, they were considering whether war with America would follow upon the heels of the breaking off of negotiations.

The diplomatic negotiations for establishing a better American-Japanese understanding were being participated in by only the highest leaders of the Government, Army, Navy and the Supreme Command. They were progressing to the absolute exclusion of lesser officials. With the sole exception of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, all the leading participants were hoping for the success of the negotiations, and for this very reason they were conducting it in absolute secrecy lest it encounter opposition.

Nevertheless, news began to leak out, particularly as a result of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's secret reports to the German and Italian Ambassadors.

As they began to perceive the general outline of the negotiations, the lesser officials began to give evidence of their disapproval. The Army in particular stiffened in its opposition. Just at this moment, the German-Soviet war suddenly broke out. Though the governmental leaders were able to set aside the insistent demands for an immediate war against the Soviets, they were obliged to decide upon the armed occupation of French Indo-China as a sort of consolation prize. At the same time, in order to be prepared for any emergency, they proceeded with full-scale preparations for a possible war against England and America. Though it was no easy task, the division between preparation for war and the war itself had to be firmly borne in mind. As preparations for war progressed, opposition to American-Japanese negotiations became more vociferous.

Meanwhile, the effect of Japan's armed occupation of French Indo-China was immediate and powerful. America immediately effected a breaking off of economic relations painful to Japan and without hesitation made clear that her own country's traditional policy alone was the policy conducive to peace. This strong American retaliation created a proportionate reaction in the anti-American camp in Japan. Opposition to American-Japanese negotiations came out into the open, and the course of action of the Cabinet, which had been created expressly for this purpose, became fraught with difficulties. Developments finally induced me to request a personal interview with the American President. However, the fact of the existence of the so-called "Konoye Message" had leaked out as a consequence of the conversations between Nomura and the President, and, while the actual contents were not known, various vague conjectures began to circulate, making even more difficult the problems confronting negotiations. It would [40] seem that from about August 1941, the Army General Staff, even including the highest quarters, began advocating an immediate breaking off of negotiations and an opening of American-Japanese hostilities. Seeking in every possible way to contravene these policies, from the latter half of August I repeatedly held consultations with the Army and Navy Ministers and called together countless joint conferences. To a certain degree, the "National Policy" calling for the breaking off of negotiations and the immediate opening of hostilities against England and America was brought under discussion.

Thus it came about that on September 6th, at a conference held in the Imperial presence, the "Outline for the Execution of the National Policy of the Imperial Government" was decided upon. (See Appendix 5.)

On the day before the conference held in the Imperial presence, I had an audience with the Emperor in order to informally discuss the "Outline for the Execution of the National Policy of the Imperial Government." The Emperor, in examining the program, pointed out that it placed war preparations first and diplomatic negotiations second. This, he said, would seem to give precedence to war over diplomatic activities. He expressed the desire to question the chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs regarding this point at the meeting on the following day. In reply I explained that the order of business in the program did not indicate any differences in degree of importance. I also said that the Government intended to pursue diplomatic negotiations as long as possible and to commence preparations for war only when there seemed no prospect of successful negotiation. I also suggested that if he wishes to question the Chiefs of the Supreme Command on the subject, perhaps it would be more advisable to summon them privately rather than question them at the conference. The Emperor requested that they be summoned at once. They arrived promptly and in my presence were asked the same question and gave the same answer that I had given. In continuing, the Emperor asked the Army Chief of Staff General Sugiyama what was the Army's belief as to the probable length of hostilities in case of a Japanese-American war. The Chief of Staff replied that he believed operations in the South Pacific could be disposed of in about three months. Turning to the Chief of Staff, the Emperor recalled that the General had been Minister of War at the time of the outbreak of the China Incident, and that he had then informed the Throne that the incident would be disposed of in about one month. He pointed out that despite the General's assurance, the incident was not yet concluded after four long years of fighting. In trepidation the Chief of Staff went to great lengths to explain that the extensive hinterland of China prevented the consummation of operations according to the scheduled plan. At this the Emperor raised his voice and said that if the Chinese hinterland was extensive, the Pacific was boundless. He asked how the General could be certain of his [41] three month calculation. The Chief of Staff hung his head, unable to answer. At this point the Navy

Chief of General Staff lent a helping hand to Sugiyama by saying that to his mind Japan was like a patient suffering from a serious illness. He said the patient's case was so critical that the question of whether or not to operate had to be determined without delay. Should he be let alone without an operation, there was danger of a gradual decline. An operation, while it might be extremely dangerous, would still offer some hope of saving his life. The stage was now reached, he said, where a quick decision had to be made one way or the other. He felt that the Army General Staff was in favor of putting hope in diplomatic negotiations to the finish, but that in case of failure a decisive operation would have to be performed. To this extent, then, he was in favor of the negotiation proposals. The Emperor, pursuing the point, asked the Chiefs of the Supreme Command if it was not true that both of them were for giving precedence to diplomacy, and both answered in the affirmative.

The Conference was held on September 6th at 10 AM in the Imperial presence. During the conference the President of the Privy Council Yoshimichi Hara spoke up and said the proposal before the conference gave the impression that the emphasis was being placed upon war rather than upon diplomacy. He wished a clarification of the views of the Government and the Supreme Command on this point. The Navy Minister, representing the Government, answered Hara's question, but the Chiefs of the Supreme Command remained silent.

The Emperor now spoke up suddenly and seconded the opinion put forth by the President of the Privy Council, Hara, and expressed his regret that the Supreme Command had not seen fit to answer. He then took from his pocket a piece of paper on which was written a poem by the Emperor Meiji: "Since all are brothers in this world, why is there such constant turmoil?" After reading this poem aloud, the Emperor stressed that he had read it over and over again and that he was striving to introduce into the present the Emperor Meiji's ideal of international peace. Everyone present was struck with awe, and there was silence throughout the hall. Soon the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Nagano, rose and said that he was filled with trepidation at the prospect of the Emperor's displeasure with the Supreme Command. The truth was, he said, that when the Navy Minister spoke, he had been under the impression that the Navy Minister was representing both the Government and the Supreme Command, and he had therefore remained silent. He assured the Emperor that the Chiefs of the Supreme Command most certainly concurred with the Navy Minister's answer; that they too were conscious of the importance of diplomacy, and advocated a resort to armed force only when there seemed no other way out. The meeting adjourned in an atmosphere of unprecedented tenseness.

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XXII

The American-Japanese negotiations gave the outward appearance of progress, and yet made no material headway. And while the proposal for an interview between the nation's leaders seemed perceptibly to move the President, no progress was made toward a realization of this objective. This was partly due to the fact that Ambassador Nomura's actions were governed solely by official cables from Tokyo, and for this reason Japan's true intentions were not fully transmitted. Therefore, I made up my mind to meet personally with Ambassador Grew. On September 6th, the day that the above mentioned "National Policy Outline" was approved, with the full cognizance of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers, I dined in extreme secrecy with Ambassador Grew and the Councillor to the American Embassy, Mr. Dooman, who acted as interpreter. I stressed the fact that the present cabinet, including the Army and Navy representatives, was unified in its wish for a successful conclusion of negotiations, and moreover that the present cabinet was the only one capable of carrying it through. I also made a most significant statement when I said that should we miss this one opportunity, another one might not arise in our lifetime. I also informed them that the Japanese delegates to the proposed conference were all selected, including those of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Office. I laid emphasis upon the necessity of my meeting with the President at the earliest possible date in order that ideas could be exchanged concerning basic problems.

Ambassador Grew asked for my views regarding Hull's Four Principles, and I said that they were splendid as principles but when it came down to actual application a variety of problems arose. It was in order to solve these very problems that I deemed it necessary to hold the meeting with the President.

After this informal talk which lasted about one hour and a half, Ambassador Grew, who appeared to be much impressed, promised to report immediately the contents of the conversation in the form of a direct message from me to the President. He stated in all sincerity that the report he was about to despatch to the President was the most important cable to go from his hand since the start of his diplomatic career.

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XXIII

As far as Japan was concerned, since April, just about everything possible had been done to forward American-Japanese negotiations. I had taken the important step of proposing a personal interview with the President. I had sent him a message, and I had in addition explained by true feelings to Ambassador Grew. On the other hand, as a result of the important National Policy decided upon at the Imperial Conference on September 6th, as far as Japan was concerned, a point had been established beyond which negotiations could not proceed. We came more and more to feel that we were approaching a show-down. By this time we were largely aware of the difficulties confronting the negotiations, as well as the intentions of the United States. In other words, when it came to fundamentals, the difficulty was the "Four Principles," and when it came to more concrete obstacles, we were faced with the problems of the stationing of troops in China, the establishment of a principle of equal economic opportunity, and the problem of the Tripartite Pact. America seemed for the present to feel that Japan had no objections to the "Four Principles." And since I myself had told Ambassador Grew that they were "splendid as principles," it could well be imagined that this did not represent a real obstacle. Nevertheless, among certain elements of both the Army and the Foreign Ministries, there was undeniably powerful opposition even to agreeing upon these as principles. (The fact that the United States misinterpreted the Japanese proposal of August 28th was due to a misunderstanding on the part of Ambassador Nomura. There was considerable discussion as to whether this proposal should be cancelled, or whether Ambassador Nomura should be recalled.) However, since it was evident that to reject the "Four Principles" would be to doom the American-Japanese negotiations to failure, I was hard put to know how best to handle this problem.

In regard to the problem of a basic economic principle, Japan was prepared to acknowledge equal opportunity in China, and was of the optimistic opinion that America would understand her peculiar geographical relationship with that country. As for the problem of the Tripartite Pact—although the following cannot be considered as a record—the view had been put forward that it might be desirable for America to enter the European War since she would then waste her national strength. Nevertheless, I was of the opinion that a way could be found to settle these things if an interview could be arranged between myself and the President. Lastly, in respect to the stationing of troops, there were times when the Army seemed to hold the moderate view that pretext and form were of no importance, but at the very next moment one would come up against a firm resolution not to give in on any account. Even within Japanese Government circles there was a strong tendency to feel that this constituted a real problem.

[44] Moreover Government circles were of one opinion in feeling that an official indication of peace terms would have to be made if we were to ask the United States to act as liaison between ourselves and China. It was in the light of recent negotiations and after careful consideration that these terms were to be decided upon.

Thus at the Joint Conference of September 20th a proposal which adjusted and combined the views of the Japanese side was approved. (See Appendix VI.)

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XXIV

Thus, on Japan's side, there was the feeling that she had finally settled upon everything that should be expressed on paper, and she assumed the position that she would, beyond this depend entirely on diplomatic success.

Foreign Minister Tōjō decided that he would first of all unofficially submit the conditions of Sino-Japanese peace to the American side. Thus on September 22nd he himself presented these conditions to Ambassador Grew, and on the 23rd, presented them to Secretary of State Hull through Ambassador Nomura. At this time Ambassador Nomura brought up the problem of a meeting with leaders who in principle were supposed already to have received the approval of

the President himself and requested Secretary Hull to grant him "agreement at least in principle," but this was a procedure which surely would be questioned. Since Secretary Hull had frequently gone so far as to disclose to other people the opinion of the State Department that the President had "gone too far," this proposal by Ambassador Nomura might have been something he was waiting for, but in any case he was completely hesitant about giving a definite answer. The feeling existed that the effect of thus unofficially submitting the peace terms was to bring about a sharp turn-about in the attitude of the United States to the problem of our stationing armed forces in China. The Americans said, and they stated that Foreign Minister Toyoda so explained it, "Whereas we had understood that Japan would at once withdraw all of its forces from China, sign a new treaty, and through its terms station its armed forces in fixed areas, according to the terms that were unofficially submitted, it would have a portion of the expeditionary forces then abroad remain just as they were, and would withdraw the rest; if this is so, the stories differ." Though the actuality was the same, the attitude taken was that the forms differ in their real nature.

On the 23rd, Foreign Minister Toyoda and Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau, explain in detail to Councillor Dooman the reasons for the stationing of troops, and as to the substance itself of the stationing of troops (in China) the American side also had no objection. The problem resided in the forms to be followed. On this point the American side in the end did not yield.

On September 27th, Foreign Minister Toyoda submitted to the opposite side the comprehensive Proposal for Understanding that was determined upon on September 20th and that had been reserved to the last. Thus, on that day, on the one hand, the Foreign Minister himself handed it over to and explained it to Ambassador Grew, and, on the other hand, at Washington, Ambassador Nomura and Matsudaira visit Valentine and present this plan.

[46] At the Foreign Office, they regarded this plan only about as follows: "It is our opinion, that as far as American desires are concerned, it is all right to use this plan as a basis and to proceed with negotiations." But they did not embark upon any principle that they would proceed with this plan alone, in complete disregard of the various plans of the past. This was a matter of diplomatic technique, but it was hard to believe that it was proper.

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XXV

As expected, on October 2nd the United States submitted a memorandum (See Appendix 7). The point of this memorandum which drew attention was that the United States, just as before, regarded with utmost importance the plan of September 4th. This observation was based, for one thing, on the fact that the memorandum took the form of an answer to the plan of September 4th, but nevertheless, since the Japanese side had on September 27th put forth a comprehensive final plan, the Americans, depending on the manner of handling, might have concentrated their attention upon this latter plan. In actuality, as stated before, half of the responsibility for this state of affairs might have been due to the attitude of our Foreign Office authorities in laying stress upon the plan of September 4th. Perhaps the Americans interpreted the complete plan as being simply an explanation of the plan of September 4th. But they did not mention this specifically. They stated that "It is regrettable that the negotiations that had almost reached a settlement have been split by the September 4th plan." They were concerned to the very end with the September 4th plan. And, as before, the Americans limited too much the applications of the peace policy made manifest by Japan, and the application of the principle aimed against economic discrimination. They also criticized the stationing of troops in China as a condition of peace between Japan and China. As for the Tripartite Pact, they expressed no opinion whatsoever. From its tone, one can understand that they still raised their greatest objections to the matter of stationing troops in China. Thus, in short, they said, "Japan agrees with the Four Principles, and gives wide guarantees for peace, but on concrete matters it contradicts them or insists upon delimiting them unreasonably." It seemed that because of this memorandum pessimistic arguments about the future of Japanese-American negotiations took on a darker color all at once.

On October 7 the Foreign Minister invited Ambassador Grew to visit him and devoted himself to sounding out the real intentions of the United States. However, the Ambassador, contrary to previous occasions, was extremely circumspect. He made almost no explanations, and gave no pledges whatsoever. In Washington,

too, Ambassador Nomura called upon Secretary Hull in accordance with instructions and strove to arrive at a break in the deadlock, but he was similarly unsuccessful. Later, Hamilton, in accordance with instructions from Hull, called upon the Ambassador, and said, "America's intentions are completely set forth in the memorandum of October 2nd, and in the plan of June 21st as more or less revised." He did no more than indicate that when the Japanese side had scrutinized these carefully and would again revise its plan of September 4th, then the United States was prepared to give it (the revised version) careful consideration.

[48] About this time, even though the Japanese alone were stating their opinions on all sorts of problems, the Americans merely criticized or attacked these and did not at all try to show what was in their minds. This was the point on which the Japanese felt dissatisfaction. The focal point of their diplomacy was directed toward making the United States say something on its own side. At the same time, day by day, in the midst of anxiety, suspicion and fretfulness, the argument gained strength that "Since the United States had already discovered the innermost mind of Japan, it will henceforth only drag out negotiations as long as possible." In contrast to Japan, it feels no need to bring negotiations to a swift conclusion. Rather, if the negotiations were to extend themselves, the longer they did so the better it would be for the United States. Therefore it should be concluded that there is no sincerity on the part of the United States."

On October 13th, Minister Wakasugi, who had returned from Tokyo to his post of duty, called upon Under-Secretary Welles on receipt of telegraphic instructions, and spoke intimately with him on the entire range of Japanese-American negotiations. He tried somehow or other to draw out positive expressions of opinion from the American side, but although Welles did say that "There is no change at all on the point that the President and Hull desire a meeting with Premier Konoye, just as soon as the three problems that are outstanding are settled," as regards the question, "If that is so, what is the opinion of America on those problems?" there was only an insistence on the point, that, "This also is fully taken up in the memorandum of October 2nd, and a clarification beyond this is unnecessary."

In the end, the Japanese side insisted that "It is now the United States' turn to say something," and to this the Americans continued to say stubbornly. "It is Japan's turn." The negotiations had now reached a complete deadlock.

In the end, it was just as Ambassador Nomura's report had it, "The opposite side will not retreat at any point its former position. It will firmly adhere to its answer of October 2nd, and it takes the stand that it will consider at any time any Japanese proposal that agrees with it." On the Japanese side, we did indeed make up an answer to this memorandum of October 2nd, but nothing was achieved by it that improved the situation, and in any case the urgency of the political situation in Japan increased with oppressive force, and at last resulted in the resignation of the Cabinet en masse.

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XXVI

After Japan's final comprehensive plan had been determined upon at the joint conference of September 20th, the activities of the Government frequently began to show an acute seriousness. This was by reason of the balance struck between the progress of Japanese-American negotiations on the one hand and on the outline of national policy determined upon in the conference that was held on September 8th in the presence of the Emperor. On September 24th, and 25th, I held conferences for two days with the War Minister, the Navy Minister and the Foreign Minister and the President of the Cabinet Planning Board. From the 27th to October 1st, I took a rest at Kamakura, but during that time I called the Navy Minister, Oikawa, and asked in detail concerning the atmosphere in his circle. Upon the arrival of the American memorandum of October 2nd, I went to the Imperial Palace on the 4th. Afterwards, driving away a group of bureau chiefs, I held a liaison conference with only the Cabinet Ministers and the leaders of the Supreme Command. On the evening of the 5th, I asked the War Minister to come to my house in Ogikubo, and expressed my opinion that I would continue negotiations to the very end.

Late on the night of the 7th, the War Minister visited me in my Japanese-style rooms, and declared, "As to the problem of withdrawing troops from China, such a formality as to once withdraw—in principle—all troops and after that to station them there, as insisted upon by the United States, is something that is difficult for the Army to submit to". In view of the stiff attitude of the Army, on both the 6th and 8th, I conferred separately with the Minister of the Navy

and with the Foreign Minister, and deliberated with them on the methods of avoiding a crisis. The Foreign Minister further visited me twice on the 10th, and we spoke intimately on how we might somehow or other continue the negotiations. The joint conference also held a meeting on October 11th. During this time the movements of the three *chōkan* (the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, the Director of the Bureau of Legislation, and the Chief Secretary of the Board) and especially of President Suzuki (of the Cabinet Planning Board) became objects of attention.

October 12th. My fiftieth birthday. In spite of its being Sunday, early in the afternoon I gathered together the three ministers, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy, and the Foreign Minister, together with President Suzuki of the Cabinet Planning Board at Ogibuko, and held with them almost the last conference relative to peace or war. Before this meeting there was previous notification from the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet as follows: "The Navy does not desire a rupture in the negotiations. Thus it wishes as much as possible to avoid war. But as far as the Navy is concerned it can not of itself bring this openly to the surface and say so. At today's conference the Navy Minister is expected to say that the decision for peace or war is entirely up to the Premier, so I beg you to keep this matter in your mind."

[50] Surely enough, at the very beginning there were the following opening remarks by the Minister of the Navy: "We have now indeed come to the cross-roads where we must determine either upon peace or war. I should like to leave this decision entirely up to the Premier. And, if we are to seek peace, we shall go all the way for peace. Thus, even if we make a few concessions, we ought to proceed all the way with the policy of bringing the negotiations to fruition. If in the midst of negotiations—after negotiations have gone on for two or three months, one says that "they won't do from any point of view, and "well, we've got to have war now,—the Navy will be put to inconvenience. If we are to have war, we must determine upon war here and now. Now is the time. We are now at the final moment of decision. If we decide that we are not to have war, I should like to have us proceed upon the policy that we will bring negotiations to fruition no matter what happens." To this I said, "If we were to say that we must determine on war or peace here, today, I myself would decide on continuing the negotiations." But the Minister of War said, "This decision of the Premier's is too hasty. Properly speaking, ought we not to determine here whether or not there is any possibility of bringing the negotiations to fruition? To carry on negotiations for which there is no possibility of fruition, and in the end to let slip the time for fighting, would be a matter of the greatest consequence. In fact, does the Foreign Minister think that there is any possibility or not of bringing the negotiations to fruition?" Thus, turning to the Foreign Minister, he asked this question, whereupon the Foreign Minister replied, "That depends entirely on the conditions. The most difficult point in the problem today, I believe, is the matter of stationing troops in China, but if in this regard the Army says that it will not retreat one step from its former assertions, then there is no hope in the negotiations. But if on this point the Army states that it would be all right to make concessions, however small they may be, then we can not say that there is no hope of bringing the negotiations to fruition." But the Minister of War said in answer to this, "The problem of the Stationing of troops, in itself means the life of the Army, and we shall not be able to make any concessions at all." I said, "At this time isn't it all right to forget about the glory but to take the fruits; perform the formalities as America wants, and achieve a result that will in actuality be the same as 'stationing troops.'" To this, the Minister of War did not yield, and in the end, though the conference lasted from two o'clock till six o'clock, we did not arrive at any conclusion and adjourned.

On the next day, the 13th, I went to the Palace and made a detailed report on the crisis which the Cabinet was facing. Then I spoke intimately with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis Kido. On the following day, the 14th, at nine o'clock in the morning, prior to the meeting of the Cabinet, I asked the Minister of War to come to my official residence and once again asked his considered opinion concerning the problem of the stationing of troops. I said, "I have a very great responsibility for the [51] China Incident, and today, when this Incident has lasted four years and still sees no settlement, I find it difficult to agree, no matter what is said, to enter upon a great war the future of which I can not at all foresee. On this occasion, we ought to give in for a time, grant to them the United States the formality of withdrawing troops, and

save ourselves from the crisis of a Japanese-American war. Moreover, I believe that on this occasion both from the point of view of the nation's strength and from the point of view of the people's thinking it is necessary to end the China Incident. The advancement and development of the nation are, of course, things that we should aspire to, but in order to develop greatly we need also at times to fall back and to cultivate the national strength." Thus did I declare my sincerest feelings and explain them to the Minister of War. To this, the Minister of War declared, "If at this time we yield to the United States, she will take steps that are more and more high-handed, and will probably find no place to stop. The problem of withdrawing troops is one, you say, of forgetting the honor and of seizing the fruits, but, to this, I find it difficult to agree from the point of view of maintaining the fighting spirit of the Army." Thus he insisted and did not move from his position. Therefore, my talk with the Minister of War ended at odds, and as soon as possible as the meeting of the Cabinet opened, the Minister of War strongly and excitedly set forth the reasons why the Japanese-American negotiations should no longer be continued.

These opening remarks of the Minister of War were so sudden that the other Cabinet Ministers were somewhat taken aback and there was no one who would open his mouth to answer. The Cabinet meeting, after settling other subjects for discussion, made no reference to this problem of continuing negotiations and adjourned.

On the afternoon of the same day, Muto, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, came to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, and said, "Somehow or other it seems that the reason that the Premier can not make up his mind is due to the fact that the Navy can not make up its mind. Thus, if the Navy really does not wish war the Army also must think about it. But the Navy does not say anything openly to the Army and only says that 'it will leave it up entirely to the Premier'. Just to say that it will be up to the decision of the Premier will not be enough to control the inner circles of the Army. But if the Navy will openly come to the Army and say that 'The Navy at this time does not wish war', then the Army can easily control its command. I wonder if you can not manage it so that the Navy will come and say something along this line." Thereupon, the Chief Secretary spoke to Oka, the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, concerning this matter, but all that the latter could say was this: "As far as the Navy is concerned, no matter what anyone may think, for it to say that it does not wish war is something that it can not do in any formal manner. What the Navy can say is that 'it is entirely up to the decision of the Premier.'"

[52] Again that same night, Suzuki, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, came to my home in Ogikubo as the messenger of the War Minister. The War Minister's message was as follows: "According to what we have been able to discover lately, it looks as if the Navy does not wish to have war. If this is so, why does not the Navy Minister clearly say so to me? If there were any clear statements to me from the Navy Minister, then I too would have to reconsider matters once more. But it looks as if the Navy Minister is making the Premier shoulder the entire responsibility. This is indeed a matter of regret. If the Navy can not make up its mind, the conference on September 6th in the presence of the Emperor will have been fundamentally overturned. Hence, this would mean that, beginning with the Premier, the Ministers of War and the Navy and the President of the Supreme Command all did not sufficiently perform their responsibilities as advisors to the throne. Hence I believe that there is no other way but that at this time we all resign, declare insolvent everything that has happened up to now, and reconsider our plans once more. There is no one who is now a subject who has the power to keep control over the Army and the Navy and to refashion a plan. Therefore, I believe that at this time there is no other way but to have an Imperial Prince come forth as the leader of the next Cabinet. I believe, to begin with, that among the Imperial Princes, Prince Higashikuni is most suitable for the position. As far as myself am concerned, it is very hard for me to ask the Premier to resign, but as matters now have come to pass, I can not help but do so. I should like to beg that you kindly exert your efforts to having the Emperor ask Prince Higashikuni to become the next Premier."

The next day, the 15th, I went to the Palace and reported on developments since the last time that I had been there. At that time, I said, "Last night there was, indeed, a message from Tojo, and he says that he would like to have Prince Higashikuni as the head of the succeeding Cabinet." Thus I inquired concerning the inner feelings of the Emperor, whereupon the Emperor said, "Prince Higashikuni, I believe, is indeed most suited to his position as Chief

of the General Staff. And I believe that to have a member of the Imperial Family stand in a Governmental position is something that requires considerable thought. In time of peace, it would be all right, but in a situation in which we fear that there may be war, and when we also think further of the interests of the Imperial House, I question the advisability of a member of royalty standing forth", but it did not seem that he was completely out of favor with the idea. On the way home, I met Marquis Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and broached the matter of Prince Higashikuni, but the Lord Keeper seemed not at all to rise to the idea.

The same night, I secretly visited the residence of Prince Higashikuni, reported to him the opinions of Tojo, the War Minister, and urged him to come forth. But the Prince said, "The matter is too important, so please let me think about it for two or three days." On the morning of the next day, the 16th, I spoke over the telephone with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal but [53] he said, "As to the matter of the Prince, there are great difficulties at the Imperial Court." But the situation was such that it did not allow for even a single day's delay. Thus from about ten o'clock in the morning, I had each Cabinet member come individually to the Japanese-style room of my official residence, stated the unavoidable reasons for a resignation, obtained their understanding, and in the evening, after gathering together all of their letters of resignation, went to the Palace. The letter of resignation of the Premier at that time was as follows (see Appendix 8).

After presenting the resignations, I met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, whereupon he said, "The Emperor will not appoint Prince Higashikuni as the next leader of the Cabinet. The leader of the next Cabinet will in any case become the subject of consultation at the meeting of the senior statesmen tomorrow, but as far as I myself am concerned, looking back on the chain of events up till today, I feel that it seems reasonable that the command to form the next Cabinet will fall on either the Navy or War Minister. As to which is better, the Navy or War Minister, we are now greatly racking our brains over it. What is your opinion?" Thus, I was asked by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, so I said, "From the point of view of politics, I feel that it is a post that is more suitable to the War Minister than to the Navy Minister. At the same time, the situation as it now stands is such that the War Minister is on the surface opposed to the continuation of negotiations between Japan and America; but, just as we may understand from his talk of two or three days ago, he even states that as long as the opinion of the Navy is not clear, we ought to declare everything insolvent and revise our plans, so I think that even if the Minister of War were to receive the command to form the next Cabinet, he would not plunge us immediately into war. Especially if there were a few words to this effect at the time of the command, I feel that the War Minister will take a prudent attitude all the more." It seemed that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal also was of the same opinion. The Lord Keeper, furthermore, asked if I would be present at the conference of the senior statesmen on the following day and explain the chain of events leading to our resignation. I decided that I myself would not be present but would explain everything by means of a letter. The letter that I submitted to that conference of senior statesmen was as follows (see Appendix 9).

[54]

SUPPLEMENT

[55]

SUPPLYING OF MILITARY STORES AND MATERIALS

PRO AND CON OF THE THEORY OF GRADUAL EXHAUSTION

The motive behind the Government's persistent efforts to bring Japanese-American negotiations to a successful conclusion, which called for patience and more patience in view of world criticism, was the two great reasons described in a separate volume. Aside from these, an important consideration was the problem of economics, particularly the supplying of military stores and materials.

Reliance on Britain and America for material, particularly for military stores, was our big weakness. The Planning Board was ordered on several occasions from the time of the first Konoye Cabinet to consider ways and means of overcoming this weakness, but each time their reply was that it was an "impossibility."

The chief aim of the normalization of Japanese-American trade relations, which was one of the items of the Japanese-American negotiations as well as of the economic activities in the Southwest Pacific, was to obtain the materials mentioned above. During the negotiations, however, the order to freeze assets

became effective, making it impossible to obtain or to be supplied with these goods, and causing this problem to be an even more critical one. If matters were permitted to rest as they were, our stock piles would gradually dwindle. The principal advocates of war, therefore, proposed starting the war against America without delay.

There were no means of avoiding this gradual impoverishment of military supplies other than to obtain goods through the successful conclusion of Japanese-American negotiations, or by increasing domestic production, at least to the extent of satisfying the requirements of the military. This was one of the main reasons for the extreme interest of the Government in the Japanese-American negotiations.

When the Japanese-American negotiations reached the danger point, the President of the Planning Board was again ordered to make a survey. This time, he reported that petroleum was the only item which posed a problem and that we could get along somehow as far as all other materials were concerned. Even where petroleum was concerned, it was reported that if two billion yen were sunk into expanding the synthetic oil industry, 500,000 tons could be produced by the end of 1943 and four million tons could be produced by the end of 1944. On the other hand, if the Netherland East [56] Indies were obtained through the force of arms, it is certain that the enemy would destroy all the oil field installations. Moreover, there would be the transportation problem. When there were given consideration, not more than 300,000 tons during the first year, and not over a million and a half tons during the second year, could be expected. It was believed that five or six years would be required before a five million ton figure could be reached.

In other words, even by force of arms, we would be unable to obtain oil in necessary quantities in the immediate future. The report clearly established the fact that the gradual impoverishment of military supplies could best be avoided by expanding the synthetic oil industry.

According to the decision reached by the Council in the Imperial presence on September 6th, "we shall resolve to open hostilities against America (Britain, and the Netherlands) if, by early October, there is no probability of our demands in the Japanese-American negotiations being met". There would therefore, be no objection to assuming that a resolution to open hostilities need not be made because a successful conclusion of the negotiations "is probable". Moreover, though the decisions states that we shall resolve to open hostilities, it does not state that "hostilities will be opened". It would, therefore, be possible to proceed without war and with only the economic relations broken off, even if the Japanese-American negotiations end in failure. As a matter of fact, the Government did consider taking this step in the event that it could not be avoided, and then to consider secondary steps without haste.

The principal advocates of war, however, basing their arguments on the theory of the gradual impoverishment of military supplies and resources would not make any concessions. I, therefore, told the President of the Planning Board, Suzuki, that if this gradual impoverishment of oil and other military supplies and goods could be avoided by increasing domestic productions, then the domestic production facilities should be expanded regardless of how many billions in capital would be required. It seems extremely foolish to make such a great sacrifice as a war against America and Britain for the sake of such goods. President Suzuki concurred but added that opening hostilities was a matter of domestic politics. Shortly after this, the Cabinet resigned en masse and all came to an end.

Although this was a later occurrence, at the Senior Statesmen's Conference held on November 29th, which was just before the Tojo Cabinet plunged into the Greater East Asia [57] War, I asked whether it would not be possible to prevent the gradual impoverishment of military supplies and goods by stepping up domestic production; and that if it could be, was it not true that opening of hostilities against America, Britain, and the Netherlands, was not absolutely essential? Why could we not proceed as we were, with broken economic relations but without war, and at the same time consider subsequent plans, I asked. Prime Minister Tojo replied that from the time his Cabinet had been formed until today he had been concentrating on that point and could only conclude that, if we were to proceed with broken economic relations, even without war, the final consequences would be gradual impoverishment. That was the reason for reaching the decision to open hostilities, he said.

Prime Minister Tojo claimed that gradual impoverishment could not be avoided. President Suzuki claimed that gradual impoverishment could be avoided. One

of the two had to be lying. It must be admitted that President Suzuki's statement that "opening hostilities is a matter of domestic policies", was indeed one with much meaning.

[58]

WAR WITH NO PROSPECT OF SUCCESS

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND PRINCE ITO

On the occasion of an informal conversation with War Minister Tojo on the subject of the Japanese-American negotiations, the War Minister said: "Sometimes it is necessary for a man to risk his life in one leap." I replied: "This might happen once or twice in the course of an individual's life; however, a person in a responsible position, when he considers a 2600 year-old national polity and a hundred million subjects, cannot take such a risk."

Although I did not speak of this to the War Minister, there are people who talk about "crossing the Rubicon," or "risking the fate of the nation". Foreign Minister Matsuoka frequently uttered such phrases, and every time I heard them I had an uncomfortable feeling. "Crossing the Rubicon" and "risking the fate of the nation" are exciting words, but starting a war without seeing the prospect of success is very different from the case of an individual. At least, when one thinks of the 2600-year-old faultless national polity, one cannot act so irresponsibly. Even when criticized as slow or old-fashioned, people like myself cannot act in such a way.

However roundabout the way may seem, I firmly believe that war, unless it is a question of safety or 100% safety, must be avoided.

At this time there are a number of military men who speak in this manner: "We did not have 100% confidence in our success when we entered the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars. It is, in fact, impossible to have such a thing as 100% confidence in victory".

At the time when War Minister Tojo and I dined together at my residence in Og kubo in the early part of October, we talked over Japanese-American problems, and I referred to the above opinion as follows:

"We believe that Ito and Yamagata had sufficient confidence in victory when they plunged into the Russo-Japanese war. If they plunged into the war without confidence in victory, they were being extremely irresponsible. Thus, even though the war ended in our favor, we should have to consider it as a pure bit of luck.

"Previous to the declaration of the Russo-Japanese war, Emperor Meiji experienced difficulty in making up his mind. Katsura, who was Premier at that time, decided one day that he would ask for the final words of the Emperor on that very [59] day. Prince Ito, however, held him back in order to allow the Emperor one more night in which to consider the problem.

"The following morning, Emperor Meiji granted an audience to Prince Ito and questioned him as to whether he had confidence in success. To this Prince Ito replied: 'The Russian forces will certainly not be able to set foot inside Chosen, and it will be possible for us to hold the Russians for a year along the line of the Yalu River. At some time during the year in which such a condition obtains, we can expect the intervention of a third nation. When we speak of a third nation, since Britain is our ally, and France and Germany are on the Russian side, we can mean none other than the United States. Hence we can commence preparations at once and with confidence in our success.'

"On hearing this, the Emperor was very much relieved, and at Council in the Imperial presence on the very same day he announced his final decision.

"However, this time there will be no third nation, and there will be no country ready to intervene. Hence any prediction as to future prospects of success is quite impossible. If, in spite of this, our country is to be plunged into war, the decision will have to be made with extreme care and with consideration of the national polity."

On the morning of October 14th I had a final consultation with War Minister Tojo in a Japanese-style room at my official residence. At that time, the War Minister stated: "I believe that the view of the Premier is rather overly pessimistic. This is because you are too well aware of the weak points of your own country. Is it not possible that the United States too has her weaknesses?"

Our conversation at this time threatened to lead us into violent disagreement over the problem of the withdrawal of troops. However, the War Minister finally said, in a voice filled with emotion: "All this must be due to the difference in our characters."

[60] THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SUPREME COMMAND AND STATE AFFAIRS
FROM EACH OTHER

THE ANGUISH OF CABINETS FROM GENERATION TO GENERATION

The fact that the Supreme Command and State Affairs are independent of each other has been a matter of anguish for cabinets from generation to generation.

During the present Japanese-American negotiations, too, the government on the one hand was conducting these negotiations with all its powers, but the military was vigorously making preparations in case the negotiations should be broken off: Moreover, as to what those preparations were, we did not know at all, and it was not possible to have them go along step by step with diplomacy. Since the military vigorously went about moving ships, mobilizing troops, etc., and these things were discovered by the United States, the United States would question the sincerity of our diplomacy, so that we were frequently embarrassed because the relationship between diplomacy and military matters was not smooth.

In the pressing atmosphere since September last year, when we were either to have war with the United States or not, Prince Higashikuni, who was one of the supporters of prudence, used to say that in order to effect a break in this situation there was no other way but for the Emperor to stand firm. But it is said that the Emperor—and this is something that he also said to me—said a number of times to Prince Higashikuni too, that he was having a hard time of it because of the military. On such occasions the Prince said to the Emperor that it wouldn't do for him to say things that a critic might say, but if he were to feel that anything was improper he should say so.

The fact that the Emperor practically never expressed his opinions, so rarely that one would think he was on the reserved side, was due, I think, to Prince Salonji, Count Makino, and others, who, thinking of the operations of a constitution in the English style, said that the Emperor, as far as possible, ought not to take the initiative and interfere in matters aside from stating three items at the time of issuing a command to form a new Cabinet, namely, respect for the constitution, not being unreasonable in diplomacy, and not bringing about sudden and great changes in the financial world.

But the Japanese constitution is built on a framework of direct rule by the Emperor, and is fundamentally different from the English constitution. Especially in reference to the problem of the authority of the Supreme Command, the [61] government has no power at all of raising its voice, and the only person who may restrain both the government and the Supreme Command is the Emperor. And yet, the fact that the Emperor is on the passive side, acting in the English style, gives rise to numerous difficulties in wartime, although it may be all right in peace. In the Japanese-American negotiations, I bitterly felt the fact that it could not be settled simply by the urgings and suggestions given, in the English style, by the Emperor.

To give one or two examples of our experience with the relationship between the Supreme Command and State Affairs, what was submitted at the meeting of the Cabinet at the time of the start of the China Incident was as follows: the dispatching of a division or so for the purpose of protecting Japanese residents over there was first proposed by the Minister of War, Sugiyama, and this was decided upon; but as to where those troops would go and as to what was to be done with them afterwards, the government did not know these things at all. At the time of the outbreak of the China Incident too, the dispatching of troops solely under the pretext of protecting Japanese residents was proposed at the meeting of the Cabinet, but as to what would happen to them afterwards, and what the intentions were as to their use, the situation was such that we did not know these things at all. At the time of a special session of the Diet, Otani, the Minister of Overseas Affairs, received my understanding, and after discussing the matter with the other Cabinet members too, directed his words to Sugiyama, the War Minister at a Cabinet meeting in the Diet Building and asked for an explanation of the following: that, in spite of the war situation expanding more and more; the members of the Cabinet knew nothing at all of the future; if nothing was done to keep it within certain bounds, then he was afraid that Japan would not be able to come out of it. But before Sugiyama, the War Minister, changed color and turning to Yonai, the Navy Minister, said fiercely, "What's the matter? Can't you see?" The Navy Minister Yonai, looked startled, and at this point, being the sort of person he is, said, "Is that so?" and withdrew

from further talk. However, this was enough finally to get a hint of the general situation. That there were talks between the Army and Navy can be seen from this, but as a matter of course they said nothing about these matters to the members of the Cabinet nor to the Premier. Among the Cabinet members there were those who afterwards protested as follows, "To call a Cabinet meeting 'this sort of place', what does he mean by that?" but there was nothing that could be done about it, and nothing further was said or done.

After that Cabinet meeting, during an audience with the Emperor, I told him what the situation in the Cabinet meetings was, and expressed my belief that although there were [62] among the members of the Cabinet those who came from the various political parties, etc., the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and the Finance Minister at least ought to be given a general idea of things; but the Emperor said that he would like to have time to think about this matter. At the next audience I was told that there was an agreement between the Army and the Navy that the operations would stop between the Paoting and the Yingting Rivers, but that this information should go only to the Premier and the Foreign Minister.

After this, although Paoting was taken, the war situation expanded more and more, and when I questioned the Emperor about this a second time he said something to the effect that they had thought that they would stop things at about that point, but it was the kind of situation which I would not understand.

After the Cabinet meeting at which we determined to send to Shanghai, I asked Sugiyama, the War Minister, whether he was going as far as Nanking or thereabouts, and he said that he would not possibly go to Nanking.

At the time of the departure of General Matsui, the Supreme Commander in the Shanghai area, from Tokyo Station, he persistently told Sugiyama, the War Minister, to bring things about so that the Army would go as far as Nanking, and since the general had also told me the same thing, I asked the War Minister about it on the way home. He replied that although General Matsui spoke as he did, the Army would not possibly go as far as Nanking.

However, it soon came to pass that the Army had gone as far as Hankow, not to mention Nanking. How to attack Nanking concerns the military operations of the Army, and is not something that concerns the government, but unless the government knows in general about how far the Army is going, it stands to reason that it can make no move in diplomacy. Both in the case of the attacks on Nanking and Hankow, and in the spreading of the great military operations in North China, the China Incident has in all respects proceeded in this manner. If, from the beginning, the Army had had a far-reaching plan and had kept it a secret because of the demands of strategy, it would still have been embarrassing to the government, but there would have been something understandable about it. However, just as it had appeared in the conversation between Matsui and Sugiyama there was, as a matter of fact no great and firm plan. The situation was such that they were pushed on by developments and went on, gradually extending themselves. Herein lies the dangerous nature of [63] the China Incident. From the point of view of the relationship between State Affairs and the Supreme Command, among those matters that are dangerous is the point that things do not completely reach to the lower ranks of the Supreme Command. At the Five Ministers' Meeting that was convened after the great renovation of the first Konoye Cabinet, we took up, from the point of view of preserving international peace with Britain and America, each of 300 hostile incidents occurring between Japanese and Americans and between Japanese and Englishmen during the one-year period after the outbreak of the China Incident. But when we informed the Army Headquarters on the spot concerning their disposition, they acknowledged it but did not bring anything into actuality. And although we told them again in September or thereabouts, it was the same. After that, when a year and a half had passed and I examined the matter during the time of the second Konoye Cabinet, I could not but be amazed to find that just as before, not even one of the so-called outstanding questions had been settled. If one were to speak of egregious cases, the one where the Army was to remove ropes hung at railroad stations to prohibit the entering of foreigners had not been settled.

Recently Premier Tojo spoke to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, and sympathetically that, now that he had become Premier, he understood for the first time how difficult it was for the previous Premiers to do things, and that he himself would to the very end proceed with a duplication of posts; to this I understand the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, replied that that

was not the first time that someone had said this, that it had been exactly the same from the time of the first Konoye Cabinet, and that, late though it may be, to have the Army realize this point was fine.

Again, when General Abe came to see me to express his greetings on taking the office of president of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, he said that at first he declined Premier Tojo's invitation to accept office, whereupon Premier Tojo said that if he would not take the office he himself (Tojo) would have to do so, but if this were done, he would have to resign from active service and thus would not be able to keep this added portfolio of War Minister. It was thus that General Abe finally accepted the position.

Whether it be the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, or General Abe, they know from long experience that unless the same man is both War Minister and Premier, there can be no adjustment between diplomacy and military affairs. So we may believe that both were of the same opinion as Premier Tojo, and sympathized with his words. Even if Premier Tojo were to quit, someone would have to become the Minister of War, and his adding the post of Premier is something that will probably continue for a time.

[64] AMERICA GIVES UP NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE OF CABINETS

Ambassador Nomura returned to Japan in August. Soon afterward he visited me at my villa in Karuizawa with Ambassador Kurusu. I heard about the American situation from both Ambassadors. Because the Konoye Cabinet had resigned, and the Tojo Cabinet taken its place, America had concluded that there was no hope whatever for the success of the Japanese-American negotiations.

When Ambassador Nomura met President Roosevelt at the beginning of November, the President said that he had heard from reliable sources that Japan had finally decided upon war. The Ambassador denied this, but the President did not believe him. Also, Secretary Hull went so far as to say to Ambassador Nomura that he expected nothing whatever from Ambassador Kurusu's coming. It seemed that America had already given up hope for the negotiations.

The resignation en masse of the Konoye Cabinet gave a considerable shock to America. Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval Operations, and a close friend of Ambassador Nomura—he was captain of the ship which brought back Ambassador Salto's remains to Japan—visited Ambassador Nomura. At that time he said that he supposed that the reason for that resignation of the Konoye Cabinet was due to the fact that Premier Konoye considered the success of the Japanese-American negotiations to be hopeless, inasmuch as the President had refused the meeting which the Premier had proposed. However, the President had not refused flatly; there were merely two or three points which he wished to clear up. If these points had been clarified, he would have been more than willing to see him. It had been decided to send a personal message to that effect from the President to His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, and it was understood that steps already had been taken. Two or three days later, the Admiral again visited the Ambassador and told him that the decision referred to and told him that the decision referred to on his previous visit had been cancelled, since opinions had arisen within the American Government that such a procedure would constitute an interference with internal affairs.

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APPENDICES

1. Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding—(American) (Omitted. English original available)
2. Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding—(Japanese)
3. Outline of the Policy of the Imperial Government in View of Present Developments
4. American Counter Proposal
5. Plans for the Prosecution of the Policy of the Imperial Government
6. Proposal for Arriving at an Understanding for the Adjustment of Japanese-American Diplomatic Relations
7. American Memorandum of October 2 (Omitted. English original available)
8. Resignation of Premier Konoye at the Time of the Resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet
9. Details of the Cabinet Resignation and the Progress of Japanese-American Diplomatic Negotiations under the Direction of the Council of Senior Statesmen following the Resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet

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APPENDIX I

1. Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding—(American) (Omitted English Original Available)

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APPENDIX II

PROPOSAL FOR JAPANESE-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING

(TN. Official English Translation available in the State Department. An informal Translation follows:)

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States of America accept joint responsibility in drafting a general agreement for the purpose of restoring the traditional friendly relations between the two countries. No attempt will be made to enter into a discussion of the reasons for the recent deterioration of diplomatic relations. The purpose of these negotiations is to prevent the recurrence of incidents which tend to destroy the friendly relations between the peoples of the two countries or, in case unfortunate incidents do occur, to check the reverberations of the same.

It is the purpose of the two countries to work together for the establishment of peace in the Pacific based on the principles of morality and, by securing a deep and friendly understanding on mutual problems, to bring to an end to the sad turmoil which threatens to wipe out civilization. If this is impossible, it is the sincere purpose of the two countries to at least prevent the present struggle from spreading.

In view of the fact that the above-mentioned ideals must be carried out resolutely and speedily, the two Nations propose to draw up a general agreement based on the principles of morality and embodying measures for the attainment of immediate ends.

The present understanding covers only pressing problems and all related detailed considerations will be left for a later conference to work out. The two governments believe that a clarification of the attitudes and an adjustment of the matters covered in the following list will greatly contribute to improving relations:

1. International and national ideals embraced by America and Japan.
2. The attitudes of the two countries toward the European War.
3. The relationship of the two countries to the China Incident.
4. Commerce between the two countries.
5. Economic activities of the two countries in the Southwest Pacific.
6. Policies of the two countries regarding political stability in the Pacific.

[68] The following understandings have been reached on these above-mentioned matters.

1. *International and National Ideals Embraced by America and Japan:* The two countries agree to respect each other's positions as equal and independent neighboring Pacific powers and declare their intention to bring about a new era of trust and co-operation based on mutual respect and a determination to bring about a lasting peace.

The two countries declare that all nations and all races form a universal family whose members should enjoy equality of opportunity, that their mutual interests and spiritual and material welfare should be furthered by peaceful means, and that the preservation of these blessings shall be the responsibility of all. They further declare that it has ever been their purpose to prevent the oppression of backward peoples.

The two countries declare that they shall mutually assist each other in preserving their traditional ideals and the social orders and moral principles upon which the lives of their respective peoples are based. They are also determined to prevent the influx of foreign ideas that would break up the present order.

2. *The Attitudes of the Two Countries Toward the European War:* It is the purpose of the Japanese and American Governments to cooperate in bringing about a world peace, to prevent the spread of the European War and to restore peace to the warring countries.

The Japanese Government declares that the Axis Pact is a defensive agreement and aims to prevent the entrance of any more nations into the European conflict. The Japanese Government further declares its intention to furnish military aid in pursuance of its responsibility under the Tri-Partite Pact, in case the situation outlined in Article 3 develops.

The American Government declares that it has no intention of taking sides in the European conflict either now or in the future. It also declares its antipathy toward war and states that it will take no part in the European conflict either now or in the future unless the welfare and safety of the nation itself are at stake.

3. *The Relationship of the Two Countries to the China Incident:* The American President understands the three principles of the Konoye Statement and those embodied in Japan's Treaty with Nanking and the Japan-Manchuria-China Joint Declaration which are based on those principles. He also has confidence in the good-neighbor policy of the Japanese Government and will immediately take steps to urge Chiang-Kai Shek's Government to make peace with Japan.

[69] In the event that the Chiang Regime accepts the advice of the American President, the Japanese Government will immediately take up peace negotiations with the United Government of China or with the various elements that will go to make up that Government.

After this agreement has been drawn up and ratified, the Japanese and American Governments will take mutual steps to guarantee the flow of necessary raw materials. Furthermore, both Governments will take suitable steps to restore the normal trade relations that existed while the Japanese-American Commercial Pact was in force. Whenever it is desired to make a new commercial agreement, conversations will be opened and study will be given to drawing up such a treaty following the usual precedents.

5. *Economic Activities of the Two Countries in the Southwest Pacific:* In view of the fact that Japan has declared that it is her policy to expand her interests in the Southwest Pacific by peaceful means, America will co-operate in making it possible for Japan to secure the raw materials which it needs from those areas such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel.

6. *Policies of the Two Countries regarding Political Stability in the Pacific:*

A. Japan and America will jointly guarantee the permanent neutrality of the Philippines with the understanding that Japanese nationals in the Islands will not suffer discriminatory treatment.

B. Friendly consideration will be given to the matter of Japanese immigration to the United States and Japanese nationals shall be accorded treatment similar to that accorded to the nationals of other nations.

Addendum: It is understood that this Agreement shall be embodied in secret memoranda. Mutual exchange of views shall precede any decision to announce the contents of this Agreement and the time of such announcement.

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APPENDIX III

AN OUTLINE OF THE POLICY OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT IN VIEW OF PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS

(Decision reached at the Conference held in the Imperial Presence on July 2)

I. POLICY

1. The Imperial Government is determined to follow a policy which will result in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and world peace, no matter what international developments take place.

2. The Imperial Government will continue its effort to effect a settlement of the China Incident and seek to establish a solid basis for the security and preservation of the nation. This will involve an advance into the Southern Regions and, depending on future developments, a settlement of the Soviet Question as well.

3. The Imperial Government will carry out the above program no matter what obstacles may be encountered.

II. SUMMARY

1. Steps will be taken to bring pressure on the Chiang Regime from the Southern approaches in order to bring about its surrender. Whenever demanded by future developments the rights of a belligerent will be resorted to against Chungking and hostile concessions taken over.

2. In order to guarantee national security and preservation, the Imperial Government will continue all necessary diplomatic negotiations with reference to the southern regions and also carry out various other plans as may be necessary. In case the diplomatic negotiations break down, preparations for a

war with England and America will also be carried forward. First of all, the plans which have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai will be prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern territories.

In carrying out the plans outlined in the foregoing article, we will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and America.

3. Our attitude with reference to the German-Soviet War will be based on the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact. However, we will not enter the conflict for some time but will steadily proceed with military preparations against the Soviet and decide our final attitude independently. At the same time, we will continue carefully correlated activities in the diplomatic field.

[71] In case the German-Soviet War should develop to our advantage, we will make use of our military strength, settle the Soviet question and guarantee the safety of our northern borders.

(Pencilled Note: On this occasion the Army and Foreign Minister Matsuoka took a strong attitude toward the Soviet Union, and the Army began concentrating its armed forces in Manchoukuo. This resolution was drawn up to off-set the policies of the Army and the Foreign Minister.)

4. In carrying out the preceding article all plans, especially the use of armed forces, will be carried out in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic military preparations for a war with England and America.

5. In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America into the European War, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations under the Tri-Partite Pact. However, with reference to the time and method of employing our armed forces we will take independent action.

6. We will immediately turn our attention to placing the nation on a war basis and will take special measures to strengthen the defenses of the nation.

7. Concrete plans covering this program will be drawn up separately.

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APPENDIX IV

THE AMERICAN COUNTER PROPOSAL

(TN: The original document is available in the State Department. An informal translation of the Japanese copy follows.)

The United States of America and the Japanese Government share responsibility in drawing up a joint declaration and a general agreement aiming at the restoration of their traditional friendly relations.

No effort will be made to enter into a discussion of the special reasons for the recent deterioration of diplomatic relations, but it is the sincere desire of both countries to prevent the recurrence of anything which would cause a further deterioration in friendly relations or, in case unexpected and unfortunate events do occur, to check the reverberations of the same. It is the purpose of the United States and Japan to establish a lasting peace in the Pacific and, by effecting a friendly mutual understanding, to promote the interests of world peace. Furthermore, if it is impossible to bring to a speedy end the present war which could easily result in the destruction of civilization, the two countries will cooperate in preventing the spreading of that conflagration.

It is felt that prolonged discussions would be fruitless and that they are out of place at a time which demands speedy and resolute action. Therefore, the two countries are resolved to effect a general understanding based on the principles of morality and to take certain measures to guide their actions in the future.

The two governments are agreed that only important questions demanding emergency action should be included in the agreement, leaving related and minor matters to be settled by a future conference.

The two governments acknowledge that a clarification of the attitudes and problems listed below will bring about a friendly reconciliation.

1. American and Japanese ideals with reference to international relations and the nature of the state.

2. The attitudes of the two countries toward the European War.

3. Plans for the establishment of peace between Japan and China.

4. Commerce between the two countries.

5. The economic activities of the two countries in the Pacific area.

6. Policies of the two countries regarding the political stability of the Pacific area.

[73] 7. The neutrality of the Philippine Islands.

Therefore, the Governments of the United States and Japan issue the following statements concerning their policies and mutual understandings:

1. American and Japanese Ideals with Reference to International Relations and the Nature of the State:

The two countries affirm that it is their policy to work for the establishment of permanent peace and to bring about a new era characterized by mutual trust between their two peoples. They declare that it is their present and traditional belief that all nations and all peoples form one great family characterized by the ideals of harmony, justice and equity. They acknowledge that the relations of nations and peoples should be built up and improved by peaceful means, that their spiritual and material welfare should be based on a consideration of mutual interests, and that the enjoyment of equal privileges should be based on a mutual sharing of responsibility. Each nation must take care not to endanger the welfare of others and this is the surest way of preserving its own welfare. Furthermore, the two Governments will work together to prevent the oppression and exploitation of other peoples.

The two Governments acknowledge their responsibility in safeguarding the traditional ideals, the social orders and the basic and moral principles underlying the national lives of each other's peoples and in preventing the influx of any disturbing ideologies.

2. The Attitudes of the Two Countries towards the European War:

The Japanese Government declares that the purpose of the Tri-Partite Pact is and always has been a defensive one. The said Treaty aims to prevent the spreading of the European War by the unprovoked entrance of additional powers into the struggle.

The United States Government declares that its present and future policy toward the European War is to avoid participating in it unless its own safety is endangered.

Note: This article embodies a tentative proposal for a change in the corresponding article in the American proposal of May 31, 1941.

3. Plans for the Establishment of Peace between Japan and China:

Inasmuch as the Japanese Government has informed the American Government concerning the basic conditions of her proposal for a Sino-Japanese peace based on a good-neighbor policy and respect for [74] each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as embodied in the Konoye principles, the American President will propose to the Government of China that the latter enter into negotiations with Japan looking toward the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of a mutually advantageous peace.

Note: The problem of joint action against the inroads of communism and the matter of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, which are covered in the preceding paragraph, can be changed, if desired, in later negotiations. The matter of stationing Japanese troops on Chinese territory is a part of the communist problem). We believe that any proposals for the revision of this paragraph and any additional proposals in regard to these matters should be embodied in one draft and that the entire resulting proposal should be given unified consideration to the satisfaction of all concerned.

4. Commerce between the Two Countries:

With the formal ratification of this understanding, America and Japan agree to furnish each other with needed raw materials. They also agree to restore the normal commercial relations which existed under the former Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. In case the two countries desire to draw up a new commercial treaty, negotiations will be entered upon immediately to draw up the same in harmony with the usual precedents.

5. The Economic Activities of the Two Countries in the Pacific Area:

Japan and America's activities in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, and all countries shall be guaranteed equal commercial opportunities. Based on this agreement, the Japanese and American Governments will cooperate in assisting one another in securing the natural resources, such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel, which are necessary to guarantee the safety and development of their national economies.

6. Policies of the Two Countries Regarding the Political Stability of the Pacific Area :

Both governments agree that the fundamental principle underlying this understanding is a guarantee of peace in the Pacific area. They will exert all possible efforts to cooperate in the preservation of that peace and declare that they have no territorial ambitions in the said area.

7. The Neutrality of the Philippine Islands :

The Japanese Government declares that it is prepared to enter into negotiations to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines [75] whenever the American Government decides to grant independence to that nation.

THE ORAL STATEMENT

The Secretary of State appreciates the sincere efforts of the Japanese Ambassador and his associates in working for a mutual understanding and the establishment of peace in the Pacific. The Secretary also appreciates the straightforward attitude of these officials in recent conversations.

The American Government shares the earnest desire of the Japanese Ambassador that Japanese-American relations be speedily improved so that peace may be restored to the Pacific area. The Secretary of State himself shares the same spirit and has given careful consideration to the various viewpoints embodied in the Japanese proposal. The Secretary of State has no reason to doubt that many of Japan's leaders share the viewpoint of the Ambassador and his associates and support them in pressing forward to the attainment of our high purposes. Unfortunately, however, among the powerful leaders of Japan are some who have committed themselves to follow the path of Nazi Germany and its policy of aggression. These people can think of no other possible understanding with America than that they must join on Hitler's side in the event that America's considerations of self-defense force her into the European War. Well-authenticated reports to this effect have been flowing to this Government from many different countries and from the pens of many who for many years have been very friendly to Japan.

The tone of many recent unnecessary declarations by Japanese spokesman concerning Japan's plans and promises under the Tri-Partite Pact unmistakably reveal this attitude. As long as those occupying responsible positions keep up this attitude and persist in directing Japan's public opinion in this direction, any hopes for the acceptance of the proposals now under consideration or the attainment of practical results from these discussions are inevitably doomed to disillusionment.

Another source of suspicion in the Japanese proposals is the suggestion which calls for the stationing of troops in Inner Mongolia and North China for the ostensible purpose of cooperating with China in the suppression of communism.

Very careful consideration has been given this matter. While it is not desired to enter into a discussion of the actual nature of this problem, as has often been stated to the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, the United States cannot agree to any plan which runs counter to the principles of freedom which have always been supported by the American Government. While it is admitted that careful consideration would naturally have to [76] have to be given before agreeing to any concessions which might adversely affect this nation, in this case the freedom of a third power is involved and this government will, therefore, have to give very special consideration to the problem. Therefore, the Secretary of State has unfortunately been driven to the conclusion that the United States Government must ask the Japanese Government for a statement clearer than any heretofore ever delivered which will show that the said Government is impelled by a desire to follow the ways of peace, as this forms the basic principle which should underlie the understanding we are attempting to arrive at. This government earnestly desires that the Japanese Government will make a clear statement clarifying its attitude on this point.

Note: This is an informal, tentative and unbinding statement delivered to the Japanese Ambassador on May 31 in an endeavor to bring these negotiations in line with the present situation. On June 21 a revised proposal was handed to the Japanese Ambassador.

APPENDIX V

[77] PLANS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE POLICY OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

(Agenda for a Council in the Imperial Presence)

In view of the increasingly critical situation, especially the aggressive plans being carried out by America, England, Holland and other countries, the situation in Soviet Russia and the Empire's latent potentialities, the Japanese Government will proceed as follows in carrying out its plans for the southern territories as laid in "An Outline of the Policy of the Imperial Government in View of Present Developments".

1. Determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with America (and England and Holland) in order to secure our national existence, we will proceed with war preparations so that they be completed approximately toward the end of October.

2. At the same time, we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic means to have our demands agreed to by America and England. Japan's minimum demands in these negotiations with America (and England), together with the Empire's maximum concessions are embodied in the attached document.

3. If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland).

Policies with reference to countries other than those in the southern territories will be carried out in harmony with the plans already laid. Special effort will be made to prevent America and Soviet Russia from forming a united front against Japan.

ANNEX DOCUMENT

A LIST OF JAPAN'S MINIMUM DEMANDS AND HER MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS IN HER NEGOTIATIONS WITH AMERICA AND ENGLAND

I. *Japan's Minimum Demands in her Negotiations with America (and England).*

1. America and England shall not intervene in or obstruct a settlement by Japan of the China Incident.

(a) They will not interfere with Japan's plan to settle the China Incident in harmony with the Sino-Japanese Basic Agreement and the Japan-China-Manchoukuo Tri Partite Declaration.

(b) America and England will close the Burma Route and offer the Chiang Regime neither military, political nor economic assistance.

[78] *Note:* The above do not run counter to Japan's previous declarations in the "N" plan for the settlement of the China Incident. In particular, the plan embodied in the new Sino-Japanese Agreement for the stationing of Japanese troops in the specified areas will be rigidly adhered to. However, the withdrawal of troops other than those mentioned above may be guaranteed in principle upon the settlement of the China Incident.

Commercial operations in China on the part of America and England may also be guaranteed, in so far as they are purely commercial.

2. America and England will take no action in the Far East which offers a threat to the defense of the Empire.

(a) America and England will not establish military bases in Thai, the Netherlands East Indies, China or Far Eastern Soviet Russia.

(b) Their Far Eastern military forces will not be increased over their present strength.

Note: Any demands for the liquidation of Japan's special relations with French Indo-China based on the Japanese-French Agreement will not be considered.

3. America and England will cooperate with Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials.

(a) America and England will restore trade relations with Japan and furnish her with the raw materials she needs from the British and American territories in the Southwest Pacific.

(b) America and England will assist Japan to establish close economic relations with Thai and the Netherlands East Indies.

II. *Maximum Concessions by Japan.*

It is first understood that our minimum demands as listed under I above will be agreed to.

1. Japan will not use French Indo-China as a base for operations against any neighboring countries with the exception of China.

Note: In case any questions are asked concerning Japan's attitude towards Soviet Russia, the answer is to be that as long as Soviet Russia faithfully carries out the Neutrality Pact and does not violate the spirit of the agreement by, for instance, threatening Japan or Manchuria, Japan will not take any military action.

2. Japan is prepared to withdraw her troops from French-Indo-China as soon as a just peace is established in the Far East.

3. Japan is prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine Islands.

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APPENDIX VI

A PROPOSAL FOR ARRIVING AT AN UNDERSTANDING FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

(TN: Official translation available in State Department)

The American and Japanese Governments accept joint responsibility for initiating negotiations looking toward a general agreement embodying a joint statement on Japanese-American understanding aiming at the restoration of the traditional friendship between the two nations.

It is believed that it is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the special reasons for the recent deterioration of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. It is the sincere desire of both countries to aim at the prevention of any further incidents tending to destroy friendly relations or, if any unexpected and unfortunate events do occur, to check the reverberations of the same.

The two countries agree to cooperate in bringing about peace in the Pacific, to make an effective contribution to the preservation of that peace, to bring about friendly relations in order to promote world-wide peace and to bring to an end the tragic struggle which now threatens to destroy civilization or at least to prevent the same from spreading over a wider area.

A decisive resolution of this kind precludes long and delaying negotiations which might only tend to vitiate the same. The two countries desire quickly to formulate an understanding and to determine the necessary measures for implementing the same.

Only important questions requiring emergency action will be covered in this agreement while minor related matters will be postponed to a future conference.

The two countries believe that a clarification of the attitudes and other matters listed below will greatly improve their mutual relations.

1. American and Japanese ideas on international relations and the nature of the state.

2. The attitude of the two countries towards the European War.

3. Plans for appeasement of the Sino-Japanese problem.

4. Commerce between the two countries.

[80] 5. Economic questions in the Southwest Pacific Area.

6. Policy for the political stability of the Pacific area. Therefore, the two countries have agreed to make the following declarations concerning their plans for mutual understandings.

1. American and Japanese Ideas on International Relations and the Nature of the State:

The two countries declare that it is their purpose to establish a lasting peace and to set up a new era characterized by cooperation and mutual trust.

The two countries further declare that it is and ever has been their firm conviction that all nations and all peoples should form one great family based on the ideals of justice, equity, and harmonious living. They acknowledge that this comity of nations and peoples should be built up by peaceful means, that their spiritual and material welfare should be based on a consideration of mutual interests, and that the enjoyment of equal privileges should be based on a sharing of responsibility. Each nation must take care not to endanger the welfare of others and this is the surest way of preserving its own welfare. Furthermore, the two governments acknowledge their responsibility to prevent the oppression and exploitation of other peoples.

The two governments acknowledge their responsibility for safeguarding the traditional ideals, the social order, and the basic and moral principles

underlying the national lives of each other's peoples in preventing the influx of any disturbing ideas or ideologies.

2. The Attitude of the Two Countries Towards the European War :

The two countries declare that it is their purpose to bring about peace in the world and that they are determined to work together in bringing an end to the present conflict whenever a suitable occasion arises. Until the restoration of world peace, the two countries are determined to act only in self-defense. With reference to her interpretation of and her obligations in the European War under the Tri-Partite Pact, Japan reserves freedom of action in case America should join that conflict.

3. Plans for a Peaceful Settlement of the Sino-Japanese Problem :

The two governments recognize that bringing a peaceful end to the China Incident will prove to be a large contribution to the interests of world peace and they are therefore determined to bring an early end to that conflict.

[81] America acknowledges Japan's efforts and her sincerity in endeavoring to settle the China Incident and in bringing about an early cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace. America will urge China to open up peace negotiations with Japan and will place no obstacles in the way of any efforts which Japan may make to settle the China Incident. The Japanese Government declares that its basic conditions for the settlement of the China Incident are those embodied in the Konoye Statement and in the Sino Japanese Agreement which is in harmony therewith. It further declares that Sino-Japanese economic cooperation shall be undertaken by peaceful means, that international trade shall be nondiscriminatory, that special rights inherent in geographical proximity will be respected, and that the economic activities of Third Powers will not be interfered with provided they are based on the principle of fairness.

Note : The basic conditions upon which Sino-Japanese peace is to be based are as given in a separate document. These were decided upon at the joint conference.

4. Commerce between the Two Countries :

The two countries are agreed to take immediate steps for the restoration of normal trade relations between them. They guarantee that their mutual freezing orders will be cancelled and they they will assist each other in furnishing necessary raw materials.

5. Economic Questions in the Southwest Pacific Area : The two countries covenant to carry on their economic activities in the Southwest Pacific by peaceful means alone. They further guarantee that the principle of non-discrimination shall characterize their international trade. The two countries are agreed to cooperate in permitting all reasonable latitude in commercial intercourse and international investments in order to make it possible for each nation to secure those raw materials and those articles which are necessary for it to preserve and build up its economic life.

They are agreed to cooperate in a distribution of oil, rubber, nickel, tin and other special raw materials and special products without discriminating against anyone and to make the necessary agreements with the countries concerned in order to carry out this principle.

6. Policy for the Political Stability of the Pacific Area :

The two countries realize the vital importance of bringing about the immediate stabilization of the situation in the Pacific area and covenant to take no steps which would tend to threaten that stability. The Japanese Government agrees not to use its troops stationed in French-Indo China for military operations against neighboring countries (China excluded) and, further, to withdraw its troops from French-Indo China as soon as peace is restored in the Pacific area.

[82] The United States Government agrees to cut down its military establishments in the Southwest Pacific. The two countries agree to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thai and the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, they declare their readiness to make an agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of the Philippines when independence is granted that nation.

[83]

ANNEXED DOCUMENT

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS ON WHICH SINO JAPANESE PEACE IS TO BE BASED

1. Good Neighbor Policy.
2. Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity.
3. Sino-Japanese Defensive Cooperation.

This Sino-Japanese cooperation includes action against communism and any other movements which tend to disrupt the present order and mutual efforts to preserve the peace.

This envisages the stationing of Japanese troops and Japanese warships for a limited time in stated areas in harmony with past agreements and precedents.

4. Withdrawal of Troops.

All troops which have been sent to China in connection with the China Incident will be withdrawn except those mentioned in the preceding article.

5. Economic Agreement.

a. A Sino-Japanese economic agreement will be drawn up covering the exploitation and utilization of those raw materials necessary in the national defense program.

b. It is understood that the preceding understanding shall not limit the economic activities of Third Powers providing they are carried out in harmony with the principle of fairness.

6. A Unification of the Chiang Regime and the Wang Government.

7. No annexation.

8. No reparations.

9. Recognition of Manchoukuo.

[84]

APPENDIX VII

AMERICAN MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 2. (Omitted. English original available)

[85]

APPENDIX VIII

THE RESIGNATION OF PREMIER KONOYE AT THE TIME OF THE RESIGNATION OF THE THIRD KONOYE CABINET

By Your Majesty's Humble Servant, Fumimaro

At the time when I was honored for the third time with the totally unexpected Imperial order to organize a Cabinet, I felt that it was very urgent for the sake of guaranteeing the future progress of the nation to put forth all possible efforts to continue the negotiations with America and bring about a speedy settlement to the China Affair. We have, therefore, exerted ourselves to the utmost in conducting successive conversations with the American Government and have endeavored to bring about a meeting between the President of the United States and myself. The result of these efforts is still pending. Recently, however, War Minister Tojo has come to believe that there is absolutely no hope of reaching an agreement with America by the time we specified, (Namely, the middle or latter part of October), or, in other words, that we should now decide that "there is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to" as specified under Section III of the "Plans for the Prosecution of the Imperial Program" which was drawn up at a council in the Imperial Presence on September 6th. He thus concludes that the time has arrived for us to make up our minds to get ready for war against America. However, careful reconsideration of the situation leads me to the conclusion that, given time, the possibility of reaching an agreement with the United States is not hopeless. In particular, I believe that even the most difficult question involved, namely, that of the withdrawal of troops, can be settled if we are willing to sacrifice our honor to some extent and agree to the formula suggested by America. To plunge into a great war, the issue of which is most uncertain, at a time when the China Incident is still unsettled would be something which I could not possibly agree to, especially since I have

painfully felt my grave responsibility for the present state of affairs ever since the outbreak of the China Incident. It is vitally necessary now, not only to strengthen ourselves for the future but also to set the people's minds at ease, that the Cabinet and the Army and Navy cooperate in the closest possible manner in bringing to a successful conclusion the negotiations with America. Now is the time for us to sacrifice the present for the future and let our people concentrate their entire efforts for the prosperity of the Emperor and the nation. Thus I have done my utmost in stating my earnest convictions in an endeavor to persuade War Minister Tojo to accept my viewpoint. In response to this, the War Minister insisted that although he greatly appreciated my position and sincerity, it was impossible from the standpoint of preserving military morale for him to agree to the withdrawal of troops; that if we once gave in to America that country would become so arrogant that there would be no end of its depredations; and that even if we should be able to settle the China Affair now, Sino-Japanese relations would again reach a deadlock in a mere two or three years. He pointed [86] out that while there are certain weak points in our position America also has its weak points and that we should therefore grasp the present opportunity and get ready for war at once. I have had four serious conversations with him on this subject but was unable to change his position. It is therefore clear to me that my ideas will not prevail and that I shall be unable to carry out my responsibilities as an advisor to the Throne. I realize that this is entirely due to my insufficiency and I feel very humble as I approach the Throne. It is with trepidation that I present my request, but I humbly and sincerely ask that you relieve me of my present responsibilities.

October 16, 1941.

PRINCE FUMIMARO KONOYE,
Prime Minister.

[87]

APPENDIX IX

THE DETAILS OF THE CABINET RESIGNATION AND THE PROGRESS OF JAPAN-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE COUNCIL OF SENIOR STATESMEN FOLLOWING THE RESIGNATION OF THE THIRD KONOYE CABINET

I. Differences between the Viewpoint of the Government and the Army.

1. Concerning the "Decisions Reached at the Council in the Imperial Presence: "Clause 3 of the Plans for the Prosecution of the Imperial Program", as decided upon at the Council in the Imperial Presence on September 6th, states: "If by the early part of October, there is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to—we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America, England and Holland". The Army takes the position that the progress of the negotiations with America in the early part of October impels us to decide that "there is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to", as referred to in the said article and that, therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that by the middle or end of October we "must make up our minds to ready for war".

The Cabinet contends that not only have the diplomatic negotiations not reached a hopeless state, but that in the light of the diplomatic documents which we have received from America and many other reports, the American Government also entertains considerable hope of arriving at a satisfactory agreement. However, that Government harbors certain misunderstandings and suspicious (for example, the Army's gradual infiltration into Northern Indo-China in the early part of October, though, of course, this was carried out in harmony with definite treaty stipulations); is influenced by the deliberate misrepresentations of certain Third Powers, or is carefully watching the future of the international situation, especially of the European War. There are also activities on the part of strong anti-Japanese elements in the Far Eastern Sections of the State Department, activities which have covered up the true feelings of the President and Secretary of State Hull. In view of these facts, we can not decide that there is no hope of successful negotiations even with the present conditions as suggested by us, if time is allowed for the conduct of the negotiations. Especially, if we could get our Army authorities to relax their position somewhat, namely, with reference to the withdrawal of troops, we believe that there is a good possibility of reaching an agreement.

The Army feels that although the early part of October is the ideal time for us to decide on war in harmony with the demands of the Supreme Command, it can defer it till the middle of the month, but by all means not later than the

latter part of the month. Otherwise, the Army feels itself seriously handicapped in the event of war. It, therefore, rigidly adheres to the middle of the month, the latter part of October, as the time to decide upon war, should war be decided upon, and this is a point that must ever be kept in mind.

[88] 2. The obstacles in the negotiations with America (especially the problem of the withdrawal of troops); Diplomatic negotiations are still proceeding with America and while the true intentions of that country are not clear the following three points may be listed as the major unsolved problems:

- (1) The problem of stationing or withdrawal of troops from China.
- (2) Japan's attitude toward the Tri-Partite Pact.
- (3) The problem of non-discriminatory trade in the Pacific area.

Among the three, it is clear to all that the outstanding problem is the withdrawal of troops. In other words, that problem is really the one problem, the negotiations with America.

A summary of the Army's attitude concerning the withdrawal of troops is as follows:

Our Government's terms for a Sino-Japanese peace, as indicated to America are very liberal, inasmuch as they include the principles of no annexation and no reparations. They merely insist on the stationing of troops in certain areas for a stipulated period in order to facilitate cooperation with China in preventing the inroads of communism and any other movements tending to disrupt the present order. It is evident that these dangers are a threat to the safety of both Japan and China and to the welfare and prosperity of the peoples of both countries. These measures are also vitally necessary for the economic development of the country. It is, of course, understood that all troops not necessary for the above purposes will be withdrawn as soon as the China Incident is brought to a close. In view of the above, the stationing of troops in China is an absolutely necessary stipulation. In other words, the Army insists that this point is a consideration of first importance and that the stationing of these troops in China is, after all, the one and only tangible result of the China Incident. It follows that the Army can not agree to any plan which envisages the giving up of the right to station troops in China. If our troops' withdrawal from China is carried out, the Army will be overcome by a spirit of defeatism and it will be impossible to preserve its morale.

On the other hand, the final position of America on this matter of stationing troops is not yet clear. It may be possible if we give time for further negotiations to have our terms for the China problem agreed to by America. Up to the present, the American position in this matters seems to be as follows:

[89] (1) Japan is to agree in principle to the withdrawal of troops. (The matter of stationing troops in China must be decided after this principle has been accepted.) It is not clear at the present moment whether America will agree to the stationing of troops in China but in the light of the negotiations so far conducted, America's position does not seem to be entirely negative in the matter.

(2) America desires to be assured of Japan's sincerity in the matter of the withdrawal of troops. For instance, Under-Secretary Welles stated to Minister Wakasugi in Washington that if Japan was sincere in here decision to withdraw the troops, America was willing to give more consideration to the manner in which this should be done.

In the light of the above, the Cabinet's position in regard to the withdrawal of troops is as follows:

- (1) Diplomatic negotiations should be continued for a longer period.

(2) We understand, of course, that the stationing of troops in China is a very necessary consideration. However, if the success or failure of the present negotiations hangs on this one problem, the Cabinet holds the view that it would be better for us to agree to the American formula for the withdrawal of troops and yet secure stationing of troops in China for a specified period.

3. *Views in Regard to War Against America:* The Army points out that as a result of the British and American freezing orders, the import of necessary materials (especially oil) has become almost impossible and our shortages will become so severe that should America come upon us with impossible demands, we shall find ourselves unable to resist even for the sake of defending our very existence. Therefore, the Army insists that even though the situation is fraught with certain dangers, there is no cause for alarm and that now is the time for us to take decisive action if our people stand united in a determination to overcome all obstacles, remembering that America as well as Japan has certain weaknesses.

EXHIBIT NO. 174

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1. Three reports from the Commercial Attache, U. S. Embassy, Tokyo, for period September 1 to November 8, 1941.
2. Four documents concerning coordination of communication facilities in case of Far East emergency: (a) Dispatch dated October 18, 1941 from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; (b) Memorandum from Secretary Knox for Secretary Hull dated November 8, 1941; (c) Memorandum from Chief of Staff for State Department Liaison Officer, dated November 26, 1941; and (d) State Department dispatch #5603 to American Embassy, London, dated December 2, 1941.
3. Four memoranda of conversations between State Department officials and British Embassy officials concerning the Far Eastern Situation, dated November 25, 1940; December 13, 1940; May 27, 1941; and September 23, 1941.
4. (a) Memorandum dated September 16, 1941 concerning conversations between Netherlands Minister Counselor and State Department officials; and (b) Dispatch dated November 18, 1941 from Ambassador Biddle through Ambassador Winant to State Department concerning Biddle's conversation with Netherlands' official. Both documents refer to U. S.-Japanese conversations.
5. Memorandum dated September 4, 1941 of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Chinese Ambassador concerning U. S.-Japanese relations.
6. Dispatch dated December 4, 1941 from Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, to State Department on the general situation in the Far East.
7. Dispatch dated December 2, 1941 from U. S. Consul General Foote, Batavia, to State Department concerning Japanese activities in Netherlands East Indies, and general situation there.
8. Memorandum dated November 12, 1941 from Leo Pasvolksy to Mr. Ballantine, both State Department officials, concerning a proposed economic policy which might be proposed to the Japanese.
9. Memorandum dated December 6, 1941 concerning destruction of Japanese codes at their Embassy in Washington, D. C.
10. Federal Bureau of Investigation letter to State Department concerning reported conversation of a Japanese Embassy official on December 1, 1941.
11. Two memoranda dated November 15, 1941 concerning information reported by Mr. Kestwick, a British official, regarding reported scope of Ambassador Kurusu's mission to the U. S., and four other documents on the same subject.
12. Documents relating to a rumor that the Australian Government had prior knowledge of the impending Japanese attack.
13. Letter dated December 19, 1941 from Owen J. Roberts, Chairman, Roberts Commission to the Secretary of State asking for a statement from him for the Roberts Commission record, and the reply of Secretary Hull.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 5859 dated September 17, 1941 from the Embassy at Tokyo

REQUIRED
(Bureau of Foreign & Domestic Commerce - Department Instruction June 25, 1941, File 102.81/4878)

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OCT 30 1941

DEC 5 - 1941

FINANCIAL DIVISION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Strictly Confidential Fortnightly Background Report No. 1

REPORT FOR PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER 1 - 15

DIVISION OF COMMERCIAL POLICY AND AGREEMENTS
DEC 9 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DEC - 8 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 4 1941
Department of State

24280

From Commercial Attache

Frank S. Williams

American Embassy, Tokyo Date of Completion: Sept. 17, 1941

Date of Mailing: Sept. 22, 1941

File No. 850

Enclosure:-

- ST. (5)
- 1 - Copy of Letter to American President Lines
 - 2 - Memorandum on Ford Motor Company

Distribution:

- Original and 1 copy to Department
- 1 hectograph copy

- 2 -

FREEZING ORDER

While long anticipating some action on the part of the United States directed against Japan's financial holdings, the scope of the American freezing order of July 26th was not only a complete surprise, but a distinct shock to the Japanese. Their counter move had been prepared several weeks previous and, in the typical Japanese manner, was far broader and more specific and detailed than our order. We had similar orders and established routine regulations as precedents and experienced personnel to fairly and efficiently implement our order. This is the first experience Japan has had in freezing assets of a foreign power, and like the huntsman preparing a squirrel stew, they threw in all the available "scrap", the resultant concoction being extremely indigestible to American residents of Japan. The sweeping regulations embrace numerous foreign exchange control and other laws formerly in force, thus creating legal barriers against practically every liberty American individuals and corporations previously enjoyed.

Moreover the interpretation and enforcement of this array of regulations has been placed in the hands of inexperienced but super-conscientious officials who, in their zeal for detail and perfection, spiced with an inherent dislike of foreigners - now particularly Americans - have in most instances gone to

to extremes in demanding exact compliance to their own version of the new order. From the numerous unhappy experiences Americans have reported it is quite apparent that, to a very large extent, the Japanese are utilizing these freezing regulations as another wedge to drive foreigners, especially American and British, out of Japan, Manchuria and China.

As a matter of fact Americans residing in Manchuria and occupied areas of China have been subjected to substantially more disagreeable and aggravating treatment than has been meted out to Americans living in Japan as the former areas are almost completely controlled and dominated by the Japanese military authorities. Such actions as the closing of American firms, placing Americans and their employees under strict surveillance, opening and detaining mail addressed to Americans, prohibiting Americans to travel within these areas or to depart for the United States, refusal to allow taxis to carry American passengers, in some instances actual confiscation of American property, and exorbitant demands for retirement allowances by employees of American firms, are all indicative of the prevailing animosity against the United States. This feeling also exists against British nationals but the attitude of the United States is held chiefly responsible for all of Japan's present ills.

It

- 4 -

It is not surprising that the Japanese Army is exerting every possible effort towards the steady course of eliminating all non-Japanese enterprises from areas which it controls - and particularly those areas under American and British protection. This has been proceeding with progressive rapidity for the past several years and it is my firm conviction that Army authorities, especially the Young Officer Group, long ago reached the definite decision that their future, as the dominating force in this country, depends entirely upon their ability to conquer China or at least bring the China Affair to a successful conclusion. And failing this it would be better for the Army to go down fighting a major power.

In activating these personal persecutions, threats, bombing, and blackmail tactics, the military authorities are only openly expressing their determination to rid the Far East of foreign influence. Until that is accomplished the China Incident cannot be successfully liquidated nor the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere completely established.

That the Army is meeting strong resistance from numerous Japanese conservative groups, consisting largely of business, financial and Government leaders and certain sections of the Navy, is well known. This opposition is all that stands in the

way of an open break between Japan and the United States. The trend of future relations between these two countries, therefore, depends entirely upon the strength these two opposing Japanese forces will be able to muster.

Reverting to the freezing orders. The impact of the Japanese order on Americans in Japan would have been vastly different had the American Government first presented its plan for enforcing its order against Japanese assets and individuals to the Japanese Government with the notification that such privileges embodied therein would be extended to Japanese nationals in the United States provided similar privileges were extended to Americans residing in Japan. The voluntary granting in the United States of such liberal exemptions to Japanese residents made little if any impression on the authorities in Japan, particularly the subordinate police officials in the interior districts of Japan and in Manchuria and China. Furthermore, the idea behind the American order was not so much to impose restrictions on individual Japanese as to implement the control of Japanese assets in the United States, to prevent the use of the financial facilities of the United States in ways harmful to national defense and other American interests and to curb subversive activities in the United

Stated,

States. Japan's order was all embracing in a general way, but in its actual enforcement it was applied specifically to American individuals, including American Government officials. From July 26th to September 18th no American individual or firm was able to negotiate a draft or check through the Japan branches of the National City Bank of New York or any other foreign or Japanese bank. No financial transactions exceeding Yen 100 are now allowed between Japanese and designated foreigners without an official permit. Naturally such restrictions have completely stopped foreign trade and seriously disturbed business relations between local foreign and Japanese firms. However, these financial and trade difficulties have been greatly intensified by the irritating and petty regulations enforced relative to travel and the absolute refusal of police officials to allow Americans to leave Japan when there were no valid reasons for their detainment.

Another serious outcrop of the freezing order is the attitude adopted by Japanese employees of American firms. These employees have taken advantage of the prevailing disturbed situation to make exorbitant and unreasonable demands for retirement allowances. It has always been the

accepted

- 7 -

accepted practice in Japan for foreign firms and individuals to pay higher wages and salaries than the domestic scale. Such wage and salary levels, however, were in lieu of the bonus and retirement allowances provided for in the Japanese system. The enforcement of the freezing orders, other control measures, and the tense international situation naturally have seriously jeopardized the position of American business concerns in Japan and have forced a number to initiate plans for liquidating their interests. Local employees, sensing this dilemma, and inspired by certain patriotic societies, and evidently with the connivance of the police authorities, have presented ridiculous demands for retirement allowances. These have usually called for from one to three months' pay for each year of service and an additional amount equal to two years' salary. The American motion picture companies were presented with demands from their Japanese employees which, if accepted, would have necessitated the payment of approximately Yen 1,500,000. The motion picture companies have offered (with the assistance of the police and this Embassy) to settle with their staffs on the basis of one month's salary for each year of service up to five years, and one and a half months for each year beyond five years.

The American President Lines finally settled with its employees on the basis of one

month's

- 8 -

month's salary for each year of service, but this involved the payment of Yen 89,280.90 or U.S.\$16,237.71. The original demands are set forth in the attached copy of a letter addressed to the Kobe agent of the American President Lines under date of December 12, 1940.

Several other American companies such as Ford and Singer have received similar demands. There is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum covering a recent conversation with Mr. Benjamin Kopf, General Manager of the Ford Company in Japan, bearing on this subject.

American tea companies in Japan have been particularly hard hit by these freezing orders. Detailed reports of their position have been submitted to the Department by cable and it is sincerely hoped that something can be done to rescue them from their extremely precarious situation.

The instances cited above clearly demonstrate the wide disparity between the treatment accorded Japanese in the United States and that meted out to Americans in Japan under the Japanese order. Here it was applied with special emphasis to individuals although American business interests naturally have been compelled to temporarily curtail their activities. However, the Japanese are by far the greater sufferers.

Perhaps the phase of our order which

struck

struck deepest into the sensibilities of the Japanese was that at last the United States has shown this country that it is no longer bluffing! Our negative attitude toward Far Eastern problems has created a sense of security in the minds of the Japanese people to the extent that even today the man in the street is convinced that war between Japan and the United States is impossible. And while this feeling still predominates there has developed widespread uncertainty over what sacrifices may be demanded for an acceptable settlement of the major issues.

From an economic standpoint the Japanese may well be disturbed for they have been given unassailable proof that the United States and Great Britain can muddle through without their assistance. They can see their profitable silk business fading away, their millions of tons of merchant marine standing idle, their cotton mills cutting operatives by 50%, their rayon production out to the bone, their iron and steel industry lagging far behind in output, their transportation system deteriorating from lack of oil, replacements and repairs, their agricultural output diminishing, and their financial strength declining. In addition they are cognizant of the antagonism prevailing against them throughout the United States and the British Empire. Moreover, I believe that a large percentage of the thinking

Japanese

- 10 -

Japanese people realize that it would be national suicide for their country to become engaged in an all out war with the United States and Great Britain.

The only hopeful development is that this large percentage will finally muster sufficient influence to tip the scales in Japan's favor.

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Enclosure:-

- 1- Copy of Letter to American President Lines
- 2- Memorandum on Ford Motor Company

Distribution:

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No.
5915 dated October 13, 1941
from the Embassy at Tokyo

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(Bureau of Foreign & Domestic Commerce - Department
Instruction June 25, 1941, File 102,61/4978)



Strictly Confidential Fortnightly Background
Report No. 2

REPORT FOR PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER
18TH TO 27TH



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

From Commercial Attache

Frank S. Williams

American Embassy, Tokyo Date of Completion: Sept. 29, 1941

Date of Mailing: Oct. 23, 1941

FSW/mp

File No. 880

Distribution:

Original and 2 copies to Department

1 hectograph copy

Enclosures:

15 - as listed on pages



- 2 -

GENERAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS

The complete cessation of trade with the United States and the major portion of the British Empire as a result of the freezing orders has notably intensified the already serious financial situation which has gradually but steadily been developing during the past four years. Today Japan is practically isolated from the money and commodity markets of all nations. Her ocean going steamers are either tied up in harbors or being utilized by the military authorities as transports. Her export warehouses are filled with stocks of merchandise which cannot be moved and on which interest and storage charges are eating away profits. Corporate business excepting munitions is being severely restricted by control measures and shortage of supplies - and profits are dwindling. The rate of increase in bank deposits is showing definite signs of receding as a result of higher operating and living costs, stagnated foreign trade, heavy shifting of industrial output to munitions and allied materials, and decreasing volume of domestic business. The rate of increase of national savings is also falling from higher living costs and dull business conditions. The supply of money appears to be short and inflation continues upward despite the strenuous efforts being exerted to combat its spreading. The Bank of Japan's note issue circulation on September 30th reached a record high for the year of

Yen

Yen 4,519,382,000 and is expected at the year end to far exceed the all time high mark of Yen 4,930,000,000 on December 31, 1940.

There are rumors to the effect that the Government is seriously contemplating the freezing of all Japanese assets in Japan in order to obtain necessary funds to finance the war in China and augmented military expenditures at home and in other occupied areas.

Another important phase of Japan's financial situation is the difficulty now being encountered in expending funds allotted under the fiscal budget. General industrial production is undoubtedly declining every month because of lack of supplies, labor and official restrictions. Production of war materials probably is being maintained at a fairly uniform rate, but this is questionable and even if granted it cannot long continue under existing conditions. There is reason to believe therefore that the reductions recently announced in the current year's budget allotments were made possible principally through the inability of industry to produce the goods necessary to complete the various projects contemplated when the budget allotments were approved. Also, an important point to keep in mind is that these reductions and deferments indicate the growing urgency of even the Japanese Government

- 4 -

Government tightening its belt in the face of the falling rate of national savings and the declining volume of available funds.

Then there must be a saturating point somewhere along the financial thermometer for national bonds. According to the latest Ministry of Finance report, total national bond issues for the first nine months of 1941 aggregated Yen 5,682 million and redemption Yen 5,414 million, giving a rate of absorption of 98.2%, this compared with 95.7% for the corresponding period of 1940. Bond issues for the July-September quarter represented Yen 3,300 million, an increase of Yen 1,000 million compared with the corresponding period of last year. The rate of digestion for the July-September quarter was 92.9% against 95% for the preceding quarter and 93.5% for the corresponding quarter of 1940. These figures indicate a rather significant decline in the absorption rate for the third quarter. The total amount of China Incident bonds issued from the beginning of the China Affair to October 2nd has reached the enormous figure of Yen 15,054,805,000. In other words this figure represents the amount of actual cash which has been set aside so far to finance the war in China. Of course this does not by any means represent the total expenditures for this purpose.

There

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There are many large Japanese firms which have branches abroad particularly in the United States and the British Empire. Since the freezing orders went into effect these branch companies have been isolated from Japan and most of their normal business transactions have entirely ceased. Such interests must represent high investments in frozen funds, cargoes, equipment, staff expenses, etc., especially for concerns such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Okura, N.Y.K., O.S.K., and some of the large insurance companies. A report of all the holdings of Japanese interests in the United States, the Philippines, and the Hawaiian Islands based on the results of data accumulated from our freezing order would be most illuminating.

Another strain on Japan's financial situation arising from the freezing order and the resultant stoppage of foreign trade is the financing of merchandise which was destined for export. Many manufacturers of export goods are operating on small capital structures and are dependent upon rapid turnovers. There must be millions of yen worth of goods intended for shipment abroad which are now stored in warehouses with interest and storage charges rapidly mounting. Some one has to finance the owners. The Government has been called on for assistance and has promised something like Yen 70 million in ~~subsidies~~ this deviation

of

of funds will be heavily felt in other directions.

The cessation of exports and the freezing of Japanese credits have placed Japan in a very embarrassing and serious situation in regard to the fulfilment of exchange contracts in free currencies especially Swedish kronan. There is attached hereto copy of a memorandum dated October 3, 1941, addressed to the Ambassador giving a concrete instance of Japan's inability to discharge a foreign exchange obligation. What has happened is that Japan is now in exactly the same embarrassing international financial position as "designated foreigners" are in Japan. Both have assets but neither can use them. Naturally Japan can make no purchases from abroad under such financial restrictions, for even suppliers of essential Swedish ball bearings (SKF) will not extend any credit to Japan until their matured exchange contracts have been liquidated.

This financial "encirclement" is reflected in the new trade policy now being evolved whereby Japan is to curtail her exports to other yen bloc areas and to Thailand, but at the same time exact pressure on those areas for larger quantities of all kinds of raw materials to compensate for the losses in imports from the United States, the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies.

The

- 7 -

The prevailing shortage of practically every vital material precludes the continued large scale supplying of manufactured products to the yen bloc areas. On the other hand the authorities here admit that the only sources of supply now available are within the co-prosperity sphere; therefore, these sources must be explored and developed in a most vigorous manner and the resultant materials transported to Japan in the shortest possible time. So now Japan is faced with the absolute necessity of attaining that self-sufficiency of which she has so often and loudly boasted.

Then we turn to Japan's complicated agricultural financial problems. The Government recently increased the official rice purchase price in Japan Proper by seven yen and decided to buy up the entire rice, wheat and barley crops, excepting small quantities allowed to be retained by the farmers for their own use. On rice alone the augmented price subsidy will aggregate something over Yen 400 million. As the official selling price has not been changed the Government will be Santa Claus to the farmers to that extent. Further expenditures will most probably be made towards satisfying the farmers of Taiwan and Chosen on their rice production.

The raw silk industry, which produces Japan's real money in so far as foreign trade is concerned, is facing certain decadence. The cotton

1000

- 8 -

loss of a cash business running into the neighborhood of Yen 400 million annually with no prospective substitute market would be a serious blow to any industry in any country. To Japan the impact is particularly staggering because of her inability to consume the surplus silk, the disorganization it has caused in agriculture and the total loss of income in foreign currencies sorely needed for the purchase of vital materials and equipment if and when the freezing orders are terminated.

Numerous other instances could be cited as indicative of Japan's increasing financial burdens and decreasing resources. The loss of income from the thousands of Japanese nationals living abroad must reach quite a sizable figure. The same would apply to the wholesale evacuation of foreigners from Japan. The increasing rate of taxation, the added pressure being exerted on individuals and private and corporate business for large scale purchases of national bonds, the steady tightening of restrictions on expenditures of all kinds, the ever mounting volume of Government disbursements, together with other factors previously mentioned in this report, all point to a definite worsening of Japan's financial position.

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Enclosure:

see next page

1. An Order.
2. Report of Senate and Subcommittee, September 1941.
3. Wage Control - August 1941.
4. Retail Price Index - September 1941.
5. Statement of National Economy - End of August 1941, 1941 & 1942 Fiscal Year.
6. History of the State Policy on Finance and Banking.
7. National Debt - End of August 1941.
8. Ordinances Pertaining to Control over Transactions Concerning Specified Foreigners in China.
9. Bank Deposits, Loans, and Security Holdings as the End of August 1941.
10. Statement of National Economy - End of July 1941, 1941-1942 Fiscal Year.
11. Retail Price Index - August 1941.
12. Loans of Senate and Subcommittee, August 1941.
13. Retail Price Index, July 1941.
14. The Chinese Service Translations:
 - August 17, 1941
 1. Enforcement Ordinances for Medical Protection Law.
 2. Revision of Labor Statistics Monthly Survey Ordinances.
 - August 22, 1941
 1. Ordinance Controlling Exports in China.
 2. Revision in Regulations Controlling Transactions Concerning Foreigners.
 3. Revision in Rules Concerning Entry, Stay, and Departure of Foreigners.
 - August 24, 1941
 1. Regulations Concerning Investigations into Conditions of Males in Prisoners.
 - September 12, 1941
 1. Life and Death Struggle for Protection of Bank of Japan.
 2. Interview between Mr. Fitch and Bank President After Approval of American Trade.

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September 14, 1941

1. Ordinance Governing Temporary Measures for Appraisal of Shares in Possession of Corporations.

September 21, 1941

1. Revision in Corporation Accounting Control Ordinance.

Translation from Asahi Shimbun - September 8, 1941
Profit Increases Rate of Seven Leading Banks
Declines in First Half of This Year.

18. Bank Statements.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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No. 5963

Tokyo, November 13, 1941

SUBJECT: STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FORTNIGHTLY BACKGROUND
REPORT FROM THE COMMERCIAL ATTACHE FOR THE
PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 27TH TO NOVEMBER 8TH

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL




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DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNICATIONS



The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington

Sir:-

I have the honor to submit herewith Strictly
Confidential Fortnightly Background Report No. 3
from the Commercial Attache for the period from
October 27th to November 8th. I entirely concur
in Mr. Williams' appraisal of the situation in
Japan and in this connection reference is

respectfully

OCT 24 1942

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711.94/2539 1/2

PS/MEL

respectfully made to my strictly confidential
telegram No. 1723, November 3, 3 p.m.

7/11.9/24

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Joseph C. Grew.

File No. 850

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✓ Enclosure: 1 - as stated

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Enclosure No. 1 to Report No. 1
1909 dated November 13, 1941
from the Embassy at Tokyo

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(Bureau of Foreign & Domestic Commerce - Department Instruction June 23, 1941. File 102.81/4074)

Strictly Confidential Fortnightly
Background Report No. 3

REPORT FOR THE PERIOD FROM
OCTOBER 27TH TO NOVEMBER 8, 1941

From Commercial Attache

Frank S. Williams

American Embassy, Tokyo Date of Completion: Nov. 10, 1941
Date of Mailing:

File No. 850

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Japan's economic structure cannot withstand the present strain very much longer. For three months no supplies of oil, copper, iron, steel, aluminum and other essential products have been received from abroad. No exact data is available on present stocks of these commodities but from unofficial reports and personal studies of Japan's economy over a period of several years it is firmly believed that on the average the volume of these stocks, with the exception of fuel oil for the Navy, is relatively small - probably adequate to maintain the already unbalanced level of production and consumption for from ten to twelve months. The Navy's supply of fuel oil is generally estimated at sufficient for two years' wartime consumption.

To assure any substantial degree of success in the execution of declared wartime policies Japan's vast economic structure must be continuously nurtured. Her industries must be supplied with innumerable kinds of materials, her people must be fed, her national defenses must be substantially extended and strengthened, her transportation facilities must be improved and maintained, domestic business must be carried on and public utilities must be operated at full capacity. All of these activities demand materials and supplies, and more materials and supplies, and these in an uninterrupted flow. Japan has never even moderately been self-

sufficient

sufficient in these essential materials and supplies but has always leaned heavily upon contributions from the United States and the British Empire. Today these supports have been completely removed and this nation left entirely on its own. Extensive geographical areas have been added to Japan's sphere of influence during the past ten years but these have proven very small donors of vital resources and have permitted only a slight reduction in the nation's dependency upon the United States and Great Britain.

That strenuous efforts have been and are being made to remedy this dangerous situation is all too obvious. It is equally apparent that little real progress has crowned these efforts. Given a period of another ten years some measure of success might be achieved but unfortunately for Japan her problems must be solved immediately.

No nation can erect a wall around its national defense structure. Every phase of national economy must contribute heavily to its development and maintenance. Japan in her present economic position cannot long continue without replenishment the consumption of such large quantities of essential materials in efforts to create a defense force sufficient to withstand the self-inflicted encircling pressure from the

United

United States and Great Britain. The bottom of the barrel is plainly in sight. She must have access to foreign supplies of oil and other vital products in order to keep her industrial wheels turning. If she cannot obtain these supplies she must accept the inevitable or fight, and the writer firmly believes that the military leaders of Japan decided months ago that it would be far better for the Japanese Army to go down fighting a major power than to withdraw from China for any other reason.

Stripped of all pretense the glaring fact is that Japan has steered her course to the point where she now must choose one of three routes. She must either, (1) Curtail production of all types of goods, conserve her supplies of materials and drift with the current of international developments, or (2) Make an all-out effort to establish her Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and finish the China Affair, or (3) Reach some definite understanding with the United States. The first route would mean that in another twelve months Japan's economy would be so weakened she would be unable to forcefully resist any demands imposed by the United States. The second road leads to war and national suicide. The third to the preservation of her Empire, the security of her people and the continuation of her existence.

as a major world power - but the probable loss of a certain amount of "face".

It appears, therefore, that Japan's present position briefly is this: On the one hand she can exist for say another twelve months on material now in stock and new supplies available within the Empire and her "sphere of influence". At the end of this period, however, the nation will be a wackling free both a military and economic standpoint. On the other hand by pooling her entire resources and taking a desperate gamble on victory in a short "blitzkrieg" she could, from an economic standpoint, wage what might be termed a fairly efficient war for a few months, at the end of which time she would be economically bankrupt. The remaining alternative is to forego her aggressive action in the Far East and "make the best out of a bad bargain".

There are definite signs that most Japanese leaders and very large segments of the people have conclusively abandoned the first alternative. This leaves only two moves, i.e., war or an agreement with the United States. A decision must be made in the very near future. On this decision rests the nation's destiny.

No. 550

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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Reference underlying copy of
Tokyo's despatch dated 1969 of
November 13, 1964, with enclosure.

It is probable that the original of this despatch and enclosure never reached the Division of Communications and Records because of the breakdown of the mail. If the original has not arrived, would you please index and return to me.

Also please inform me of the date of the last previous similar weekly report of the Commercial Attaché in Tokyo which has reached the Department.

FE:Salisbury

Telegram **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

922. PH London

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 3 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State, Washington.
4979, October 18, 4 p.m.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 20 1941
MR. WEIR

SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 20 1941
NOTED

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HANDELMAN
DEC 2 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U - LIAISON OFFICE
OCT 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

740.0011 P.W./570

DEC 4 - 1941

PS/MHA
Confidential File

A high official of the Foreign Office today handed an Embassy official the following memorandum of a plan for quick communication in the event of an emergency in the Far East, the need of which was realized following the staff talks at Singapore. He expressed the hope that we would place a corresponding plan into effect without delay:

"One. In the present situation in the Far East a threat from Japan might easily develop with very little warning and it is not possible to determine in advance what type of action by Japan would necessarily call for military counteraction. The British authorities concerned have accordingly been studying the problem of reducing to a minimum the delay which might be caused in such an eventuality by the necessity of intergovernmental consultation. A further problem has been to ensure that all British

-2- #4979, October 18, 4 p.m., from London.

all British authorities concerned are simultaneously and immediately warned when a dangerous situation arises.

Two. The procedure which has been devised is outlined below. It is intended to be brought into immediate effect should any one of the authorities concerned receive information indicating that Japan is about to take or has taken action which in his view may necessitate immediate military countermeasures. The authorities in question are the four commanders in chief, i.e., Far East, China, East India and India; the governors of Burma, Hong Kong, and Fiji; His Majesty's representatives at Tokyo, Chungking, Shanghai, Bangkok, and Washington.

Three. In the eventuality contemplated, any such authority would at once telegraph, by the quickest possible method, a code word of warning to London. He would follow this preliminary warning by a second telegram reporting the facts on which he considered it necessary to base his warning.

Four. Any telegram sent under the above procedure would be repeated by the sender to all the authorities

-3- #4979, October 18, 4 p.m., from London.

the authorities enumerated in paragraph two above and also to the Governments of Canada, New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Union of South Africa.

Five. Special arrangements have been made in London for any telegram sent under this system to be immediately dealt with by the highest political and military authorities.

Six. His Majesty's Governments in the dominions are being invited to introduce analogous arrangements.

Seven. On the receipt in London of telegrams of the nature contemplated in paragraph three above, the Foreign Office will notify both the United States Ambassador and the Netherlands Government by the speediest possible means.

Eight. It is hoped that the United States and Netherlands authorities will be willing to consider the introduction of corresponding arrangements whereby any information of threatening action by Japan which the United States or Netherlands authorities in the Far East may receive may be
immediately

-2- #4879, October 18, 4 P.M., From London.

all British authorities concerned are simultaneously and immediately warned when a dangerous situation arises.

Two. The procedure which has been devised is outlined below. It is intended to be brought into immediate effect should any one of the authorities concerned receive information indicating that Japan is about to take or has taken action which in his view may necessitate immediate military countermeasures. The authorities in question are the four commanders in chief, i.e., Far East, China, East Indies and India; the governors of Burma, Hong Kong, and Fiji; His Majesty's representatives at Tokyo, Chungking, Shanghai, Bangkok, and Washington.

Three. In the eventuality contemplated, any such authority would at once telegraph, by the quickest possible method, a code word of warning to London. He would follow this preliminary warning by a second telegram reporting the facts on which he considered it necessary to best his warning.

Four. Any telegram sent under the above procedure would be repeated by the sender to all the authorities

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PARAPHRASE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram no. 4979

Dated: October 18, 1941.

From: London

4 p.m.

Rec'd: October 18, 1941.

Extremely secret for the Under Secretary and Secretary.

The following memorandum was handed today to an official of the Embassy by a high official of the Foreign Office. It contains a plan providing for rapid communication should an emergency arise in the Far East. The necessity of such a plan became apparent after the staff talks which took place at Singapore. The official in question stated that he hoped that it would be possible for us to put into effect immediately a similar plan.

1. Owing to present conditions in the Far East, Japan might at very short notice become menacing, and it is impossible to decide beforehand what kind of action Japan might take which would of necessity demand military counteraction. Therefore the appropriate British officials have been making a study of the question of reducing as much as possible the delay which in such an emergency might be occasioned by the need of consultation between

-2-

between governments. An additional problem which has presented itself is that of making it certain that all interested British officials should receive warning without delay and at the same moment whenever perilous conditions might arise.

2. Outlined below is the plan that has been worked out. This plan is to be placed immediately in effect whenever any of the interested officials should obtain information showing that the Japanese are about to take, or have taken, measures that in his opinion might require military counteraction without delay. The interested officials are the four chief commanders, namely, China, East Indies, India, and the Far East; the Governors of Fiji, Hong Kong, and Burma; and the British diplomatic representatives at Chungking, Shanghai, Washington, Tokyo, and Bangkok.

3. If the contemplated eventuality should take place, any of these officials would communicate at once by telegraph and as quickly as possible to London a code word indicating warning. This preliminary notice would be followed by a second telegraphic message outlining the facts on which the official believed it essential to issue his warning.

4. The

-3-

4. The sender would repeat any telegraphic message sent in accordance with the foregoing procedure to all of the officials indicated in the second paragraph as well as to the Governments of New Zealand and Canada, the Union of South Africa and the Commonwealth of Australia.
5. The authorities in London have completed special arrangements so that any message transmitted according to this plan will receive the immediate attention of the highest authorities, both military and political.
6. The Dominion Governments have received invitations to put similar arrangements into effect.
7. As soon as London receives telegraphic messages of the kind indicated in the third paragraph, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will transmit the information in as speedy a manner as possible to the Ambassador of the United States and the Government of the Netherlands.
8. The British authorities hope that the officials of the Netherlands and the United States will be agreeable to considering the establishment of similar arrangements according to which any news of menacing activity by Japan which may be received

by

-4-

by the Dutch or American authorities in the Far East may be transmitted without delay not only to London but equally, on a reciprocal basis and by the most appropriate means, to the British Commander in Chief in the Far East.

9. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the foregoing proposed method refers only to urgent reports. It is obvious that the interested governments must determine what action must be taken.

Winant

U-L:OW:BAE

*delivered
switchboard*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NAVY DEPARTMENT
DEC 17 1941
WASHINGTON
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEC 4 - 1941
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
(SC)A6-3/EP13

SECRET

U - LIAISON OFFICE
NOV 8 1941
NOV 12 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 2 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

In reply to State Department Liaison Officer's memorandum U-L 740.0011 P.W./570 of October 24, 1941, relative to the plan of British officials for coordination of urgent communications in case of emergency in the Far East, the following comments are submitted.

Insofar as the Navy is concerned, it is believed that the communication channels and procedures now existing are entirely adequate for the transmission of urgent and important information and for insuring that information of this nature receives the prompt attention of appropriate authorities. Adequate arrangements are in effect for full local cooperation between United States Naval and British Intelligence organization concerning Far Eastern matters.

In brief the situation is as follows:

(a) Suitable codes and communication channels for the transmission of information have been established between the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of the British China station and have proved effective in use.

(b) All United States naval intelligence personnel on duty in the Far East, including those stationed in Australia, New Zealand and Colombo, have been instructed to cooperate fully with British Intelligence organs in their areas on all intelligence matters concerning Japan. British naval intelligence officers have received similar instructions.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet has established and is using effectively communication channels for the transmission of information to and from United States diplomatic and consular officers in China.

(d) At important posts other than in China the United States Naval Attache or United States Naval Observer is available to transmit important diplomatic and consular information.

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/ 1241 Confidential File
PS/H

DEC 18 1941

Tol to India
11/27/41
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DEC 6 1941
RECEIVED
NAVY DEPARTMENT

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 8 1941
Department of State

to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and to the Navy Department.

(e) Under routine procedure in effect all important and urgent information is transmitted direct to the Department and to the appropriate naval commanders afloat and ashore and to appropriate naval intelligence offices. Local cooperation with the British insures that information of this nature is given on the spot to appropriate British officials for transmission to their higher authorities.

(f) Standard United States naval communication procedure provides means for insuring that important despatches receive the prompt attention of the officer or officials who are responsible for appropriate action.

(g) Adequate and effective means of rapid intercommunication have been established between the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Navy and Chief of the Netherlands Navy Department in the Netherlands East Indies.

In view of the foregoing it is believed that a special system, including special codes, for the transmission of urgent information is entirely unnecessary.

Frank Knox
Frank Knox

The Honorable

The Secretary of State.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WD 311 (10-24-41)MC-B



NOV 26 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LIAISON OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

Subject: Plan of British Officials for Coordination
of Urgent Communications in Case of an
Emergency in the Far East.



Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 6 1


Department of State

1. Referring to the British proposal transmitted as an enclosure to your letter of October 24, 1941, on the above subject, the War Department is of the opinion that existing methods of communication are, in general, adequate for a rapid interchange of urgent intelligence covering Japanese military activities in the Far East.

2. With the exception of the Philippines, the War Department has in the Far East no rapid communication facilities of its own; its representatives therefore use the United States Navy radio nets wherever possible, and otherwise commercial radio or cable. Consequently it is believed this is a matter of primary interest to the Navy Department. All military intelligence officers are in constant touch with their British and Dutch colleagues and would thus receive urgent information as quickly as under the proposed British scheme.

3. With regard to details of the British proposal, paragraph 8 of the memorandum enclosed with your letter is interpreted to mean that United States authorities in the Far East would report directly to London as well as to the British Commander in Chief of the Far East at Singapore. The United States should enter no agreement whereby its authorities in the Far East would report directly to London. The exercise of proper control by the United States Government in Washington would seem to demand that it retain sole authority to communicate with the British Government in London.

4. There appears to be no objection to the adoption of a code warning to insure that the information which follows will receive the prompt attention of the proper authorities concerned. The United States representatives in the Far East should, however, direct their communications to Washington, and, on a reciprocal basis, to Singapore and Batavia. On receipt of these messages, the State Department should promptly inform the British Ambassador in Washington. The procedure with respect to reports from United States sources in the Far East

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CONFIDENTIAL

would thus conform with the procedure proposed by the British for reports emanating from British sources.

5. The code word selected by the British to indicate warning should be immediately reported to the War Department to insure that the same word has not already been assigned by the United States as a code name for another purpose.

For the Chief of Staff:

Robert H. Young
ROBERT H. YOUNG,
Major, U.S.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER Collect ☐ Full rate ☐ Day letter ☐ Night letter Charge Department ☐ ☐ Full rate ☐ Day letter ☐ Night letter Charge to \$	TELEGRAM SENT Department of State DEC 2 - 1941 <i>Washington</i> November 28, 1941 <i>9pm</i>	TO BE TRANSMITTED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE PARTIAL PLAIN
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AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON.
5603
SECRET. NO DISTRIBUTION.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone. *SC*

✓ 740.0011 PW.15

Your 4879, October 18, 4 p.m.

Existing communication channels and procedures are considered wholly adequate for the transmission of urgent and important information and for insuring that information of this character receives the prompt attention of the appropriate high authorities in Washington. These arrangements provide for communication between the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, British China station, the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Navy and the Chief of the Netherlands Navy Department in the Netherlands East Indies, as well as for communication between the corresponding military authorities. Arrangements have also been made for local cooperation on the spot between American army and navy intelligence officers and their British counterparts.

In view of the foregoing it is not believed that any new arrangements need be made.

Eu: TCA: MEI
 Enciphered by *10/25*
 Sent by operator *M.*, 19 *41*

DEC 2 1941 *U-L* *FE* *PH* *PA* *AI*

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/570
 Confidential File
 PS/WH

D-3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED *Memorandum of Conversation*

NOV 28 1940

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DATE: NOVEMBER 25, 1940.

SUBJECT: *Far Eastern Situation*

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,
LORD LOTHIAN

COPIES TO:

740.0011 P.W. 140
Pacific War

The British Ambassador came in at his request, having just returned from London. He referred to the Far Eastern situation with apprehension, saying that he believed the Japanese were likely soon to attack Singapore. We dwelt briefly on the general situation in the Far East as it has developed thus far. I did not undertake to specify just what the future plans of this Government in that area would or might be from month to month and week to week, but added that he knew the various steps in our program thus far, which contemplated a firm and resolute policy toward Japan, both diplomatically and militarily, and aid to China at the same time.

The main point the Ambassador raised was that there should

740.0011 P.W. 140

LEP 8-2040

PS-MR

-2-

should be conferences between the naval experts of our two Governments with respect to what each would or might do in case of military outbreaks on the part of Japan. I said that, of course, there could be no agreements entered into in this respect, but that there should undoubtedly be collaboration with the view of making known to each other any and all information practicable in regard to what both might have in mind to do, and when and where, in case of a military movement by Japan in the South or in some other direction.

The Ambassador said that the information he had gathered in London was that, while our Naval Attaché, Admiral Gormley, was a good man, he consistently declined to discuss possible future plans on the ground that he had absolutely no authority. This brought him back again to the question of military consultation among appropriate officials of our two Governments in regard, for instance, to the military situation that Singapore will present from all standpoints until the conclusion of the war. He added that some naval experts felt that the American Navy might largely make its base at Singapore, and that that would safeguard the entire situation. He expressed the view that the fleet at Singapore could reach Japan much sooner than a Japanese fleet could reach the Pacific Ocean, and that, therefore, there

-3-

there would be no risk involved. I merely remarked that that was a matter for experts to pass on, and he said he hoped there would be discussion between his and our high naval officials with respect to all phases of the Pacific situation.

C.H.

3 CH:MA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 13, 1940

SUBJECT: BRITISH ATTITUDE REGARDING JAPANESE AIMS IN SOUTH SEA AREA

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, MR. NEVILLE BUTLER

COPIES TO:



Mr. Neville Butler, Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy, called at his request and said he desired to bring up a matter relating to one of the last statements of Ambassador Lothian to the effect that if the Japanese should be made to feel reasonably certain that their invasion of the South Sea countries would bring the United States into war with them, they would be fairly certain not to undertake such invasion. He then said that he was under the impression that we had already taken certain steps calculated to deter Japan from such a course. I replied that we had done so to a certain extent and in different ways, with all of which he is familiar. I said nothing more. Mr. Butler then stated that

740.0011 P. W./56

Confidential File

DEC 30 1940

LOC 740

-2-

that his Government was interested in the question of what sort of military relations from a defensive standpoint it might be possible to develop in a mutually feasible and desirable way among the South Sea countries. I replied that I had heard some British or Dutch official suggest what was considered very wise; that the British and the Dutch discuss all phases theoretically and each would readily see what the view and the attitude of the other would be under given conditions in case of a Japanese invasion and attack, and that this would in no sense involve any sort of a military or other alliance. I also added that sometime ago I had suggested to Ambassador Lothian that the British would logically discuss these matters with the Dutch and that whatever discussions the United States Government might have would be with the British only. I added that, of course, any such discussions on our part would in no sense involve any departure from our past policies of non-involvement.

C.H.

S:CH:AR

*DCR*

DATE: MAY 27, 1941

SUBJECT: FAR EASTERN SITUATION

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,
LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

711.94/2129

The British Ambassador called at his request. He referred to the casual and unofficial conversations which I have recently had with the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the possibility of instituting negotiations for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. He was very much interested in the matter and desired to know how soon it might be before I would know whether there were any definite grounds for taking up such negotiations. I replied that it might be very soon; that, of course, as I said to the Chinese Ambassador here some days ago, and as I have said to my associates in the Department from the beginning, I would not think of entering into any

JUL 25 1941

PS Confidential File

-2-

any discussions looking to an agreement without first having full and free conference with the Chinese representatives. I then added that the three basic points I am constantly keeping in mind relate to a satisfactory Chinese settlement, assurances that the Japanese will not go South for purposes of military conquest, and assurances that they will not fight for Germany in case the ^{United States} Japanese should be drawn into the war. I concluded by saying that everything naturally revolved around these phases. The Ambassador seemed to be pleased with this view.

C.H.

* Correction made by
direction of Mr. Stone (S)
5-21-41 [signature]

S CH:MA



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

September 23, 1941

SUBJECT: Conversations between Japan and
United States

PARTICIPANTS: British Chargé, Sir Ronald Campbell;
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: S, PA/H, FE, PA/D, Eu



711.94/2327

The British Chargé d'Affaires, Sir Ronald Campbell,
called to see me this morning at his request.

Sir Ronald first stated that he had received a telegram from Mr. Eden requesting that Secretary Hull be informed that the Secretary's wishes with regard to information concerning the conversations proceeding between the United States and Japan had been scrupulously observed by the British Government. Mr. Eden stated that no reports concerning these conversations are being circulated to British missions and that the very small number of members of the British Government advised concerning the conversations had been impressed as to the complete secrecy of these reports.


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SEP 26 1941


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PS/H

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS



September 16, 1941



Baron van Boetselaer, Minister Counselor of the Netherlands Legation, came in to see Mr. Atherton and myself today to say that the Minister of the Netherlands had asked him to come to the Department to inquire whether there was any information we could give the Legation with respect to the reported conversations between the American and Japanese Governments.. The Minister Counselor said that the Netherlands Government were, of course, very much in favor of the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and hoped that some arrangements would be eventually arrived at which would avoid the extension of hostilities to the Far East. He went on to say, however, that the Netherlands Government were extremely interested in the economic aspects of the Far Eastern situation, that they were carrying out certain measures now which had a bearing on such important questions as petroleum and other

END
SEP 17 1941

711.94/2323

FO/M

-2-

products, and they were very anxious to be informed as soon as possible of any situation which might have an influence on the economic measures now in effect or planned in the Netherlands Indies.

Both Mr. Atherton and I informed Baron van Boetselaer that for information with regard to the Far East we would suggest that he speak to Mr. Hamilton or Dr. Hornbeck. Baron van Boetselaer said that he had spoken with Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Hornbeck from time to time but the Minister wished to have the desire of the Netherlands Government for information on the present situation in the Far East also laid before the offices concerned with European Affairs as well. We further added that we realized fully the interest of the Netherlands Government in developments in the Far East and that if we ever had any information which would be of interest to that Government we would take immediate steps to communicate with him.



James Clement Dunn

PA/D:JCD:FB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

QZ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

London

Dated November 18, 1941

Rec'd 12:02 p.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

November 18, 4 p.m.

NETHERLANDS SERIES 46. FROM BIDDLE.

Dr. Van Kleffens yesterday spoke to me
with great concern regarding the Netherlands
Government's lack of knowledge of the trend
of conversations with Admiral Nomura. He
said they were extremely unhappy over their
complete ignorance. The Netherlands Indies
were after all in the most exposed position
and if the United States became involved
in war with Japan the Netherlands Empire
would likewise consider itself at war with
that power. This being their position they
felt that their natural desire for information
was comprehensible.

They had had no information from us con-
cerning these talks since August 17. On Oct-
ober 9 Dr. Loudon was asked to inquire as to
the situation



740.0011 P. W. / 628

Confidential
PS/DR
Confidential File

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JUL 3 - 1943

HNS

-2- Unnumbered, November 18, 4 p.m. from London.

the situation and again on November 10. He was told to stress that the Netherlands Government did not consider it indiscreet to express the earnest hope that they might be kept informed since their interests were most immediately at stake. Being so long without information they could not judge how their interests were being affected. Should the conversations break down they would have to review the situation with a view to making the necessary dispositions. At such a time a matter of 48 hours delay might prove vital.

Van Kleffen said that thus far they had received no reply to these instructions. Meanwhile messages from Batavia indicated that Government circles there despite their normal stolidity were highly nervous and indeed alarmed, a situation attributable mainly to their being left in the dark. He therefore very earnestly hoped we might see our way clear to making available some information. He felt that in the circumstances even a negative reply was preferable to no reply.

I should

-S- Unnumbered, November 18, 4 p.m. from London.

I should add that members of the Netherlands Government have not infrequently referred to their inability to obtain information regarding our conversations with Japan and have asked me whether I had any information. I have on these occasions pointed out the inherent difficulties in stating precisely what the situation may be at any given moment with conditions so fluid and delicate. I have felt, however, that I should accede to Dr. Van Kieften's present request to let you know their state of mind.

WINANT

CSB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: SEPTEMBER 4, 1941

SUBJECT: U.S. - JAPANESE RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR,
DR. HU SHIH

COPIES TO:

The Chinese Ambassador called at his request and said that he had come to inquire about the reported conversations between Japan and the United States. I said that I had hoped to be able within a week or two to send for the Ambassador and give him somewhat definite information as to the course of these conversations, meaning by this that I had hoped by that time they would have taken such a definite turn one way or the other that I could tell him something new in addition to what I said to him some months ago on this same subject. I added that I would be glad now, however, to make known to him anything I knew that would be of interest in the foregoing connection;

71.1.94/2283

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

2283

-2-

connection; that the same casual or exploratory conversations after an interruption of several weeks were now going on; that they have not reached any stage that would afford a basis for negotiations; that, as I promised the Chinese Ambassador at our meeting some time ago, this Government would not think of any negotiations that would affect the Chinese situation without first calling in the Ambassador and talking the entire matter over with him and his Government, as I would talk it over with the British, the Dutch and the Australians.

I then gave the Ambassador in very strict confidence the chief points which are set forth in the record of conversations and exchanges of memoranda between the Japanese Ambassador and myself and between the Ambassador and President Roosevelt. I made some reference to the military situation, as I had in my other conversations, stating that we were continuing to treat it as a world military movement. I then reviewed the military possibilities, pro and con, both in the West and in the East.

The Ambassador made it rather clear that China did not desire any peace at this time. His theory seemed to be that Japan was showing signs of weakening - which did not necessarily mean an early collapse - and that within a reasonable

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-3-

reasonable time she would be obliged to abandon any aggressive military activities and to seek peace.

I brought out several possible developments that might occur in future, such as the possible collapse of Japan, referred to by the Ambassador; the possibility of Japan's adopting all the basic principles of peaceful and normal international relations which this Government has been preaching and practicing, as well as applying those principles in a satisfactory manner; the possibility of Japan's endeavoring to face both ways by entering into an agreement whereby under an implied reservation which Japan would contend for she would have a right to exercise force against another country or countries in a given set of circumstances; and the possibility that the governments opposed to Japan, including the United States, might refuse to enter into a peace settlement at the present time. I said that any of these developments might arise and that it was a question of the attitude towards each other of the governments concerned, if and when any of the foregoing possibilities should arise.

In conclusion I said that I would be only too glad to keep in close contact with the Ambassador in connection with this entire matter.

C.H.

S CH:MA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD

GRAY

FROM Chungking via N.R.

Dated December 4, 1941

Rec'd. 3:18 a.m., 6th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

470, December 4, 9 a. m.

711.94

The Chinese press has continued to give close attention to the American-Japanese talks. The burden of comment is that the talks are doomed to failure largely because of the intransigence of Japan's leaders as shown in Tojo's recent bellicose statements, the reaffirmation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and warlike preparations in Southern Indochina. The only possible solution of the situation is war and it is therefore vital for the democracies to seize the initiative which may best be carried out by a military alliance of the ABCD powers and Russia. Confidence in the United States has been maintained and foreign news reports of urgent Chinese representations at Washington inferentially induce a proposed agreement have been excluded from the Chinese press.

Sent to Department; repeated to Peking.


GAUSS

FPD

711.94/2548

PS/AD FILED
DEC 11 1941

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



TEM

Batavia

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM Dated December 2, 1941

Rec'd 4:18 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

U. S. LIAMSON OFFICE
Department of State


APR -3 1942

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Japanese steamship HUBI (FOOT) left

Surabaya November 29 for Keelung with 1800 Japanese men, women and children evacuated from the Netherlands Indies. This leaves only 400 to 500 Japs in this country against about 7,000 on July 1. These evacuations have occurred since the beginning of the present American-Japanese discussions in Washington, but chiefly during the past three weeks.

A few days ago the Japanese Consul General warned all of his local nationals through various Japanese organizations that the HUBI would be the last evacuation ship to visit this country and that evacuation was desired by the Japanese Government. Representatives of Japanese shipping companies, banks, retailers and other firms then met with the Japanese Consul General who emphasized the desire of his Government that evacuation proceed as quickly as possible.



740.CC11 PACIFIC WAR/666 PS/RK

DEC 17 1941

-2- #217, December 2, 4 p.m., from Batavia.

possible. During this meeting the following decisions were made: all small shopkeepers to turn their stocks over to a large retailer and then evacuate, the large firm to retain only a skeleton staff to liquidate the business; all small importers to follow the same procedure; shipping companies to close branches in the Netherlands Indies and retain only a small staff at one main office; banks to ask for further instructions from Japan but Yokohama Specie Bank will probably be the only one to remain; Japanese plantations and Borneo Oil Company to retain only nucleus staffs; consular officers to remain except for women and children.

The general opinion, both official and civil, is that hostilities are unavoidable and that the Netherlands Indies will be attacked in the near future. All elements of the Netherlands Indies army were mobilized today in outer possessions but not in Java. On the other hand, all air force reservists were mobilized today throughout the Netherlands Indies. They will not be concentrated, however, but will remain at their home bases at least temporarily.

Local

-3- #217, December 2, 4 p.m. from Batavia.

Local reaction to our discussions with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu is that time is being lost; that Japan must be fought and that it is dangerous to delay further; that Japan is in a hopeless position, being unable to retreat from her announced policies and that she must continue her aggressive policy unless stopped by force of arms.

FOOTE

NK

DO NOT release teletype to Navy
under Confidential classification,
endorse sending time
and return to U-L, Room 185.

FROM STATE DEPARTMENT FOR OPNAV:

Following received 12-2-41, 4:18 p.m. from
Batavia dated 12-2-41, 4 p.m., no. 217.:

On November 29 the HUKI (FUJI), a Japanese steamer cleared
Surabaya with 1800 Japanese men, children and women for Keelung.
These passengers were withdrawn from the Dutch Indies.


FOOTE

UL:EMA
Teletyped and confirmation sent NAVY 12-3-41.
copy to SA/T 12-3-41.

D/N 27
R3P 12-3-41

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY



November 12, 1941

FE

Mr. Ballantine:

Attached is my suggestion for a document on economic policy which might be handed to the Japanese. For the sake of convenience, it is in the form of a joint declaration on economic policy. I think it covers all of the points that should be of interest to us, and it ought to be acceptable to the Japanese.

The only question in connection with the draft is whether or not we are prepared to state, in the form indicated in paragraph 4 of section II, our intentions with regard to Cuban preference. As the Secretary knows, we have discussed this matter a great deal but have never reached a definite decision. He may want to give that point some special consideration.

Mr. Hawkins has read the attached draft and concurs fully.

Ly.
Lee Pasvelsky

SA:LP:BNM

Confidential File

JUN 28 1945

FILED

711.94/2540-8/35

711.94
note
711.94~

DRAFT

UNITED STATES JAPANESE DECLARATION ON ECONOMIC POLICY

I. GENERAL POLICY

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake to cooperate fully in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, to eliminate all forms of discrimination in international commercial relations, and in general to work toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which all countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure, through peaceful trade processes, the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its economy.

2. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake that each of them shall make its appropriate contribution toward the creation of the type of international economic relations envisaged above.

3. As important steps in that direction, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan shall establish between themselves and shall seek to establish in the Pacific area the economic relationships indicated below.

II. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP

1. The United States and Japan undertake to inaugurate, as rapidly as possible, all necessary measures for restoring the commercial, financial and other economic relationships between them to a normal basis.

2. The United States undertakes to accord Japan as favorable commercial treatment as it accords any third country.

3. Japan undertakes to accord the United States as favorable commercial treatment as it accords any third country.

4. The United States re-affirms its policy of abandoning its present preferential arrangements with the Philippine Islands and intends to move in the direction of abandoning its present preferential arrangement with Cuba. As regards the latter, the United States is prepared to give up unilaterally the preferences which it receives in Cuba as the first step toward a complete abrogation of the existing preferential relationship.

III. POLICY IN THE PACIFIC AREA

1. Complete control over its economic, financial and monetary affairs shall be restored to China.

2. It is the intention of the Japanese Government that, upon the inauguration of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan and China, the subsidiaries of certain Japanese companies, such as the North China Development Company and the Central Promotion China Company, will be divested, so far as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights which they may exercise in fact or which may inure to them by virtue of the present circumstances in China under Japanese military occupation. It is likewise the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and to redeem the Japanese military notes which are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China, the necessary measures to this end to be initiated immediately upon the inauguration of negotiations with the Government of Chungking for a peaceful settlement and the process of withdrawal and redemption to be concluded within a period of two years after the conclusion of a peaceful settlement.

3. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake not to seek in China any preferential or monopolistic commercial or other economic rights for themselves or their nationals, but to use all their influence toward securing from China commercial treatment for themselves no less favorable than that accorded to any third country and full cooperation in the promotion of the general policy stated in paragraph 1 of this Declaration.



4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake to urge upon China the inauguration, with foreign assistance where necessary, of a comprehensive program of economic development, a full opportunity to participate in which shall be accorded the United States and Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

5. The relations between the United States and Japan, respectively, and other countries of the Pacific area shall be governed by the same basic principles as those stated above in the case of China, and the Governments of the United States and of Japan undertake to urge these countries, wherever feasible, to undertake comprehensive programs of economic development with full opportunity to participate in such programs accorded the United States and Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

SA: LP: DBM

Nov. 12, 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION



Commander Davis of ONI called and said that he has received information that the Japanese Embassy burned its secret codes and ciphers yesterday.

701.9411

mf
mf

701.9411/1532 1/2

JAN 12 1942


Q

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

December 5, 1941



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:


Information has come to the attention of this Bureau through a highly confidential source indicating that on December 1, 1941, Shigeo Kobata of the Japanese Embassy, Washington, D. C., contacted a woman named Kinoshita in San Francisco, California, and advised her that the efforts of the Embassy were failing and all of the staff were getting ready to leave within twenty-four hours, although all of the officials were not going back to Japan. Kobata allegedly asserted that he had been given the choice of staying in the United States or going to either Mexico or Argentina and seemed unable to make up his mind as to which he would accept.

Kinoshita reportedly inquired that if American-Japanese relations were broken and the Embassy was closed how long the resultant condition would last. She commented that the opinion of people in San Francisco was that the war would probably last two years. However, Kobata supposedly expressed the opinion that it would last longer.

It has also been reported that Kobata mentioned something about employees of the Embassy being placed in a concentration camp in the event of war, although he assured Kinoshita that "other people have nothing to worry about."

This information is being submitted as a matter of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,



74C.C.11 F. 1. /E17

FC/GC

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
 MR. HON. BECA
 NOV 17 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 19 1941
 CONFIDENTIAL
 DIVISION OF OPERATIONS AND RECORDS
 November 15, 1941. *File*

Mr. Keswick called on me this afternoon. He told me what is set forth in the second paragraph of the attached memorandum. He said that his information was based on comment made to him by an adviser to the Netherlands East Indies Government whom Mr. Keswick met in Manila. The adviser to the Indies Government said that the Dutch secret service had seen a copy of the Japanese Prime Minister's instructions to Mr. Kurusu along the lines indicated.

The only other comment of special interest made by Mr. Keswick was that, speaking on a comparative basis, recent British official surveys had indicated that Malaya is overprepared, as contrasted with Burma, which is underprepared. Mr. Keswick said that no decision had been reached whether reinforcements for Burma would be sent from Malaya or from India.

111.94
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 NOV 18 1941
 MR. WELLES
 NOV 19 1941
 FILED
 2527
 101171

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 NOV 21 1941
 DIVISION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
 NOV 21 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 NOV 22 1941
 THE SECRETARY
 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY OF STATE
 NOV 18 1941

November 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM

The War Department has received the following report from the Commanding General at Honolulu:
 Mr. Keswick, secretary to Duff Cooper, who traveled from the Far East to the Pacific Coast with Kurusu, and who is continuing on to Washington and London as a courier, states that Kurusu's mission to this country is to confirm reports that the United States Government is not bluffing; that if there is any weakness in our attitude the Japanese Government will continue on its path of aggression in a bigger and better way; but that if Kurusu and his Government are convinced of the strength and determination of the American Government, there is a strong possibility that there will be no further hostile actions on the part of the Japanese Government.

The foregoing was telephoned to me by Colonel Bratton, who suggested the possible advisability of a member of the Department talking with Keswick while he is here in Washington and before he leaves for London.

John F. Stone

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 21 1941
 Department of State

FW 711.94/2527
 FILED PS (EP)
 NOV 22 1941

Noted
 FC
 DCR

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 11 1941
RECEIVED

SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 14 1941
NOTED

Peiping, November 11, 1941.

According to information said to have been given to the German embassy in Peiping by the Japanese military, Mr. Hirose, the Japanese special envoy, is bringing proposals embodying the following points: First, Japan will withdraw from the axis. Second, she wishes, for reasons of "face", to postpone settlement of the Manchukuo problem. Third, negotiations on the subject of a new distribution of zones of influence in the Pacific. Fourth, Japan to continue economic expansion to the south, but to cease her military and political movements in that quarter. Fifth, Japan will agree to China's returning to the status she occupied prior to the start of the present war on July 7, 1937. The Japanese military are very much against these proposals.

U - LIAISON OFFICE

NOV 12 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

G-2 Comment: G-2 feels that this report must at present be accepted with reserve.

Distribution:

- China Mission
- Mr. Laughlin Currie
- Assistant Secretary of War
- Chief of the Army Air Forces
- Chief of the Air Corps
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

G-2-C
State Department
Director of Naval Intelligence
Situation Section
Far Eastern Section

NOV 12 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NA
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (SC)

Praying via N. S.

Dated November 11, 1941

Rec'd 1:58 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington



348, November 11, 4 p.m. (See line 1)

Kurusu takes following program to Washington:
(one). Japan abandons Tripartite Pact; (two) Man-
chukuo for future discussion; (three) distribution
Pacific spheres influence; (four) Japan ceases pol-
itical, military but not southward expansion; (five)
China returns to status quo ante prior China incident.

He stated Japanese government desire sabotage any
Washington agreement and have placed above informa-
tion before German Embassy here.

foregoing obtained from different fairly reliable
local contacts by AP representative who has also in-
formed assistant Military and Naval Attaches who
will doubtless inform their departments.

BUTRICK

WPC

NOV 21 1941

Confidential File

711.94/2432

PS/AD

HMS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PH FROM
This caption must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

346, November 11, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

I was told yesterday by a usually well-informed American that he had been reliably informed that there were two groups of high ranking naval officers, namely, the political to which Admirals Nomura and Toyoda belong and the service to which Admiral Oikawa belongs. Oikawa, then Navy Minister, desired to intercept American oil shipments to Vladivostok and risk war with us but was dissuaded by a General Suzuki. Presumably President of Cabinet Planning Board. (END MESSAGE. Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Shanghai, Tokyo).

BUTRICK.

1993

FW 711.94/2432



NAVY DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON



Memorandum for State Department.

The Commander South China Patrol reports that he has received the following information from the Assistant Military Attache who has obtained it from a reliable source:

THE JAPANESE EMISSARY IS CARRYING TO WASHINGTON THE FOLLOWING FIVE POINTS:

- (1) REDISTRIBUTION OF THE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN PACIFIC.
- (2) JAPANESE WITHDRAWAL FROM AXIS PACT.
- (3) JAPAN TO GIVE UP MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVANCES SOUTHWARD BUT NOT HER ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN THAT DIRECTION.
- (4) FOR SAKE OF FACE MANCHUKUO NOT TO BE DISCUSSED FOR TIME BEING.
- (5) CHINA TO RETURN TO STATUS QUO EXISTING AT TIME OF MARCO POLO INCIDENT.

MILITARY FACTIONS ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED AND HAVE CONVEYED THE POINTS TO THE GERMAN EMBASSY PEIPING.

H. E. Schuirmann.

NOV 21 1941

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/642

PS/ATB

740.0011 P.W.

CONFIDENTIAL	Copy No. _____
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION DEPARTMENT OF STATE WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS	
G-2 Report	
Subject: <u>Mr. Kessick</u>	Country Reported In: _____
Source and Degree of Reliability: _____ Interview with Mr. Kessick by Col. A.E. Andrews, Friday, November 14, 1941	
Summary of Report What Reported: _____	
DEPT. OF STATE EASTERN AFFAIRS DEC 15 1941 Department of State	
To: AECIS, G-2, WD, Washington, D. C.	
1. In compliance with your radiogram November 13, I met Mr. Kessick, who arrived by clipper at 10:00 a.m. today. Remained with him, acting as aid, until 11:30 at the United Airlines office from which he was to leave at 11:45 for the airport.	
2. During the conversation with Mr. Kessick, he made two points in his estimate of affairs:	
a. Mr. Kessick's mission is to ascertain whether or not the United States is bluffing.	
b. If Japan finds out the United States is not bluffing she will back down.	
3. Attention is invited to my confidential telegram of this date.	
AIR MAIL	DEC 15 1941 U. S. LIAISON OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEC 11 1941
A. E. ANDREWS Colonel, Infantry Officer in Charge S.P. Office, MID	
G-2 Distribution: 4, <u>SA</u> 5, _____ 6, _____ Copy No. 1, <u>WAR DEPARTMENT</u> MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE From: <u>THE DEPT. OF STATE</u> Report No. <u>47</u> Date: <u>November 14, 1941</u>	
WAR DEPARTMENT COM FORM 17-A	

(COPY)

21st September, 1944.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have just been informed over the telephone by a representative of the press that Congressman Church informed the House of Representatives this afternoon that he had made a sworn statement that on some private occasion I had said that in Australia, forty-eight hours before Pearl Harbour, I knew that a Japanese task force was about to attack somewhere and that a little later I learned that it was about to attack American territory. I at once informed the press, as the fact is, that I had never had any information that any Japanese force was about to attack any territory of the United States or any information that any warlike measures were likely to be taken against the United States and never said so.

I have not yet had an opportunity of seeing the Congressional Record or any other report of what actually took place in the House, but I felt that I should not delay acquainting you with the matter.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Owen Dixon

The Honourable Cordell Hall,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEP 12 1941

AGL:STATION
CANBERRA (AUSTRALIA)
20.9.41 102

Representative Harness in the course of an address in the House of Representatives on September 11 made the following statement:

QUOTE There appears to be an abundance of evidence to show that 72 hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Australian Government advised the American Government in Washington that an aircraft carrier task force of the Japanese Navy had been sighted by Australian reconnaissance headed toward Pearl Harbor; that our Government was again notified 48 hours before the attack that this Japanese task force was still in progress toward Hawaii, and the same notification was sent 24 hours before Pearl Harbor. None of this information was, I am informed, given to General Short. UNQUOTE.

The Department received no such report from the Australian Government to the American Government.

Please get in touch with the appropriate Australian authorities at once and inquire whether they have any information concerning the report which Representative Harness states was made by the Australian Government to the American Government QUOTE that an aircraft carrier task force of the Japanese Navy had been sighted by Australian reconnaissance headed toward Pearl Harbor. UNQUOTE.

Telegraph your reply as soon as possible.

BC:JH:MDH
9/12/41

Hall

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

SP-608
This telegram must be
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone
other than a Government
agency. (RESTRICTED)

Caribbean

Dated September 14, 1944

Rec'd 7:12 A.M.

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

110, September 14, 11 a.m.

Commenting on Press report that Representative
Scott had made the same statement, the Prime Minister
on September 7, in answer to a question at his press
conference, said: "This is pure invention. Our cables
had no data regarding the Japanese fleet" (Reference
Department's telegram No. 102, September 12, 7 p.m.)

9-1244
JOHNSON

RR

740.0011 E.W. 7-1444

OMM 740.0011 PW/9-1444

SEP 1 1944

**EXCERPT FROM REMARKS BY REPRESENTATIVE
McCORMACK IN THE HOUSE, SEPTEMBER 21, 1944**

"I am also authorized by the State Department, having discussed this with Assistant Secretary Breckinbridge Long who cleared it with Secretary Hull to make the following statement:

"The Department of State did not receive prior to December 7, 1941, from the Australian Government or from any other source information as alleged to the effect that Japanese naval units were heading toward the Hawaiian Islands. There was no oral communication to the Department of State on that subject by anybody, either private citizen or official. There was no written communication received by the Department of State on that subject or to that effect. When the allegation was made that information to this effect had been received from Australia, the State Department instructed the American Minister in Canberra to get in touch with the Australian authorities at once and inquire whether they had any information concerning the report that the Australian Government had informed the American Government "that an aircraft carrier task force of the Japanese Navy had been sighted by Australian reconnaissance headed toward Pearl Harbor." The American Minister to Australia replied on September 14, 1944, that the Australian Prime Minister stated: "This is pure invention. Our cables had no data regarding the Japanese Fleet." ' "

STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
File

4110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

December 30, 1941

My dear Mr. Justice:

In your letter dated December 19, you request that I write to you, as Chairman of the Commission to Investigate the Facts and Circumstances connected with the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stating whether I "conveyed to the Departments of War and Navy of the United States, in the period intervening between November 1 and December 7, 1941, warnings of the immediate danger of possible attack by the forces of the Japanese Empire". You add that for your purposes it will be sufficient if I "will state briefly approximately the times when such warnings were given and, in outline and summary only, the purport of the warnings".

I would say in reply that I have constantly kept myself as familiar as possible with all important developments and conditions arising in the relations of the United States with other countries. Recognizing the cooperative relationships which exist between the Department of State and the Departments of War and of the

Navy,

Mr. Justice Roberts,
Chairman, Commission to Investigate the Facts
and Circumstances connected with the
Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

-2-

Navy, especially in times of danger to this country, I had during the year many conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and at intervals conferences with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and officers of their staffs. Our conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over the world, including--of course--developments in the Pacific area.

These exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations. At these conferences I was given the benefit of the knowledge which representatives of the War and the Navy Departments possessed of military factors involved in the world situation and I in turn took up political factors in the world situation and other matters of which I had special knowledge.

In reply to your express inquiry, I recall that at the regular meeting of the Cabinet on November 7, 1941, I stated among other things that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was imminent possibility that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force
in

-3-

in accordance with her many times announced purpose and policy. It thereupon became the consensus of opinion that some members of the Cabinet might well emphasize this critical situation in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary Knox, four days later on Armistice Day, delivered an address, in which he especially emphasized this imminent and dangerous situation. He expressed the following strong warning:

" We are not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we are likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world--on the far side of the Pacific. Just what the morrow may hold for us in that quarter of the globe, no one may say with certainty. The only thing we can be sure of is that the Pacific, no less than the Atlantic, calls for instant readiness for defense. In the Pacific area, no less than in Europe, interests which are vital to our national security are seriously threatened."

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out this Cabinet suggestion in an address, used the following language of urgent warning:

" today the United States finds itself in far greater peril than it did in 1917. The waves of world conquest are breaking high both in the East and in the West. They are threatening, more nearly each day that passes, to engulf our own shores."

"
"In the Far East the same forces of conquest under a different guise are menacing the safety of all nations that border upon the Pacific."

" our

-4-

"... our people realize that at any moment war may be forced upon us, and if it is, the lives of all of us will have to be dedicated to preserving the freedom of the United States, and to safeguarding the independence of the American people, which are more dear to us than life itself."

It will thus be seen that knowledge of the gravity of the situation in the Pacific was not confined to me, but was shared by many high officers of the Government. I might add that throughout this period officials of the Departments of War and of the Navy manifested a spirit of wholehearted cooperation and indicated in statements made to me from time to time their keen concern regarding the seriousness and critical nature of the danger.

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that
the

-5-

the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

Sincerely yours,

S:CH:HMS(FE)
12724

FE

PA/H
Slat

Le

EXHIBIT NO. 175

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

Herewith
the figures on Japanese
military & naval forces
in Indo-China - concerning
which I have just talked
with you on the phone.

Sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Hon Cordell Hall

7519.94
note
1951920

December 5, 1941

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S.I. estimates of Japanese forces in Indo-China, and adjacent areas.

25,000 men in Tonkin Province (North)
50,000 " " Southern Indo-China
125,000 men.....TOTAL

90 planes near Hanoi (North)
140 " " Southern Indo-China
230 planes...TOTAL

NAVAL FORCES

At Canton Bay or vicinity

1 Heavy Cruiser
1 Converted Seaplane Tender
9 Submarines
21 Transports or supply vessels.

At Saigon

2 Destroyers

Indo-China Coast

1 Light Cruiser
1 Minelayer

In the general Hainan-Formosa area

1 Heavy Cruiser
3 Light Cruisers
20 Destroyers
10 Submarines
3 Aircraft Tenders
1 Submarine Tender
1 Minelayer
27 (approx.) transports or supply vessels.

In supporting distance are:

On Hainan 50,000 men and 200 planes.
On Formosa 45,000 " " 150 " "

7516.94/406-1/2

JUN 28 1943

FILED

Confidential File

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1941.

Personal and confidential

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose the figures of our G-2 estimate of Japanese air and ground forces in Indo-China, Hainan, and Formosa, as requested by the President yesterday.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

Hon. Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State.

FILED
JUN 26 1943

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

7510.34/407-1/2

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Estimate of Japanese Air
and Ground Forces in Indo-
China, Hainan and Formosa.

1. Indo-China.

Japanese troops in the theater
In the North 25,000
In the South 82,000
On ships in harbors 18,000
Total 125,000

125,000

(Other troops, number unknown, are in
transit toward Indo-China, south of
Shanghai)

Planes (bulk in the south)

450

2. Hainan.

Japanese troops
Planes

50,000

200 (approx.)

3. Taiwan (Formosa).

Japanese troops
Planes

40,000

400 (approx.)

4. Basis of the foregoing: Reports by M.I.D., O.N.I., State
Department and British Intelligence.

Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES.

Brigadier General, U. S. Army.
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

✓ Secretary of War
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD

CONFIDENTIAL

DCR
file

December 8, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

10-7

In compliance with your request there is enclosed a memorandum in regard to the number of Japanese forces in Indochina and the recent increase in Japanese military materiel and equipment brought into that colony.

Enclosure:

Memorandum.

GA
FE:GA:MHP

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/1242A
PS/RGB

DECEMBER 6, 194

JAPANESE FORCES AND RECENT INCREASE IN JAPANESE MILITARY MATERIEL
EQUIPMENT IN INDOCHINA

According to information reported by our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon, received by them from French military sources in Indochina and not confirmed, it is estimated that there are at present in northern Indochina (Tongking) 25 Japanese troops and 80,000 in southern Indochina, making a total of 105,000, that there are at the outside some 450 Japanese planes in Indochina. According to a statement made December 4 by the Governor General of Indochina to the Consul at Hanoi, there are approximately 70,000 Japanese troops in Indochina, a little less than 30,000 being in Tongking and the balance in the south. The estimate of 105,000 is considered to be approximately correct by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

According to the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, 21 transports were sighted in Camranh Bay on December 2 by an air patrol from Manila. 12 submarines were sighted at sea northeast of Saigon proceeding south and 1 of these submarines are now in Camranh Bay with other naval units including several destroyers. Our Consul at Hanoi reported on December 5 information from [2] a reportedly reliable source that there were in Camranh Bay transports carrying an estimated division of troops. Our Consul at Tsingtao reported on December 1 that for the preceding ten days an average of about 10 transports had left Tsingtao daily loaded with troops in summer uniforms.

An official of the French Foreign Office at Vichy stated to an officer of our embassy on December 3 that the Japanese recently had been sending large amounts of military equipment and materiel into Indochina. According to our Consul at Hanoi Japanese military equipment recently landed in Indochina includes estimated by French military sources, 3,400 trucks and tractors, 600 automobiles, 500 motorcycles, 260 tanks (categories unspecified), 300 cannon, 2,000 machine guns, 1,300 submachine guns, 2,100 pack horses and a large number of bicycles.

The marked increase in Japanese troops in Indochina reportedly began November 21 with the arrival of 21 troop and supply ships at Saigon, the landing of 20,000 troops there, the transfer of 10,000 troops from northern Indochina southward and the subsequent landing of additional troops at both Saigon and Haiphong, those landed at the latter place proceeding southward by train.

[3] At nearby Hainan Island there are estimated by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department to be some 30,000 Japanese troops and an unknown number of planes. Pursuit planes as well as bombers can fly from Hainan Island to northern Indochina, either direct or via Waichow Island, Pakhoi, Kwantung Province of China.

FE: GA: MHP

EXHIBIT NO. 176

LOCATION OFU.S. NAVAL FORCES IN THE ATLANTIC, PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

Also

FOREIGN NAVAL FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EASTAs of 7 Dec., 1941CONTENTS

U.S. Naval Forces in the Atlantic	Page 1
U.S. Naval Forces in the Pacific and Far East	Page 2-3
Japanese Naval Forces in the Far East	Page 4-8
British Naval Forces in the Far East	Page 8-9
Netherlands Naval Forces in the Far East	Page 9-10
Russian Naval Forces in the Far East	Page 10

Explanation of abbreviations used:

BB	Battleship
CV	Aircraft Carrier
CC	Armored Cruiser
CA	Heavy Cruiser
CL	Light Cruiser
DL	Destroyer Leader
DD	Destroyer
SS	Submarine
XCL	Converted Merchantman

PAGE 1

U. S. NAVAL FORCES IN THE ATLANTIC

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>
North Carolina	6 Battleships
Washington	
Idaho	
Mississippi	
New Mexico	
Arkansas	
New York	
Texas	
Ranger	4 Carriers
Wasp	
Yorktown	
Long Island	
Augusta	5 Heavy Cruisers
Quincy	
Tuscaloosa	
Vincennes	
Wichita	
Memphis	8 Light Cruisers
Milwaukee	
Cincinnati	
Omaha	
Philadelphia	
Brooklyn	
Savannah	
Nashville	

88 Destroyers (approximately)

67 Submarines

13 Patrol Squadrons

PAGE 2U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST1.) In Pearl Harbor

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>
California	8 Battleships
Maryland	
Nevada	
Oklahoma	
Tennessee	
Pennsylvania	
West Virginia	
<u>Arizona (overhaul)</u>	
Enterprise	2 Carriers
<u>Lexington</u>	
Chicago	10 Heavy Cruisers
Portland	
Indianapolis	
Northampton	
Salt Lake City	
Chester	
Minneapolis	
New Orleans	
Astoria	
<u>San Francisco (overhaul)</u>	
Phoenix	6 Light Cruisers
Helena	
Detroit	
Honolulu (overhaul)	
St. Louis (overhaul)	
<u>Raleigh (overhaul)</u>	

43 Destroyers (approximately, --
including 11 under overhaul)

11 Submarines (including 3 under
overhaul)

2) In San Pedro

Colorado (overhaul)	1 Battleship
---------------------	--------------

U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST
(continued)

3) In Manila

Boise

1 Light Cruiser

5 Destroyers

30 Submarines

4) In Balik Papan (Borneo)Houston

1 Heavy Cruiser

Marblehead

1 Light Cruiser

8 Destroyers

5) In San Francisco

1 Destroyer

7 Submarines (including
3 under overhaul)6) In San Diego

Concord (overhaul)

1 Light Cruiser

4 Destroyers

4 Submarines

7) Vessels at Sea

Saratoga

1 Carrier

(San Diego to Pearl Harbor)

Louisville

2 Heavy Cruisers

(One Pearl Harbor 21 days
(One Manila 2 days))

Pensacola

2 Light Cruisers (In Balboa)

Trenton

(7-G. / 81-H.)

Richmond

2 Submarines

(on route to San Diego 2)

1 Submarine

(in Balboa)

PAGE 4

FOREIGN
NAVAL FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

JAPAN

KURE NAVAL STATION

NAME

TYPE

Matsu
Miyagi
Miyama
Yamashiro
Ise
Mikasa
Kirishima
Fuso
Kii

623

Saikaku
Shokaku
Soryu
Hosho
Koko
Aoba
Kinugasa
Moya
Myoko
Nachi
Haguro
Tsunami
Kagami
Mikasa
Tone
Chikuma

407

1204

Abukuma
Yamato
Kiso
Yara

404

Izumi
Izumi
Sasagami
Hibiki
Fubuki
Shirayuki
Katsuyuki
Shirakumo
Shinonome
Usugumo
Murokumo
Isenami

4720

PAGE 3

NAME

TITLE

Shikinsai
 Agansai
 Uransai
 Anagiri
 Asagiri
 Ugiri
 Sagiri
 Nenchi
 Hatushara
 Hatushino
 Wakaba
 Shiratsuyu
 Ariake
 Taguro
 Shigure
 Asashio
 Arashio
 Oshio
 Michishio
 Kuroshio
 Oyashio
 Hatushio
 Hayashio
 Hatuskase
 Yukiase
 Amatsukase
 Tokitsukase
 Hokase
 Shiohase
 Hamikase
 Funakase
 Uruki
 Kikutsuki
 Mikotsuki
 Yutsuki

NO - 65
 NO - 66
 NO - 67
 I - 74
 I - 75
 I - 8
 I - 68
 I - 69
 I - 70
 I - 56
 I - 57
 I - 58
 I - 59
 I - 60
 I - 62
 I - 64

1688

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

4127

PAGE 6

NAME	SANNO NAVAL STATION
Miyai	1172
Kaga	118
Amagi	807
Miyu	
Koryu	
Kianga	
Suzuki	
Kurokawa	204
Nagata	
Kobori	402
Kitagami	
Sasaki	
Matsuki	
Kikaragi	1280
Miyai	
Mochitoki	
Ogura	
Takio	
Asakawa	
Amatoku	
Yoshi	
Kikuchi	
Kikuchi	
Yoshi	
I - 71	
I - 72	
I - 73	1288
I - 74	
I - 75	
I - 76	
I - 77	
I - 78	
I - 79	
I - 80	
I - 81	
I - 82	
I - 83	
I - 84	
I - 85	
I - 86	
I - 87	
I - 88	
I - 89	
I - 90	
I - 91	
I - 92	

NAME	YOKOSUKA NAVAL STATION
Suzuki	107
Kino	108
Okimura	400
Iokawa	
Kawano	
Kawano	

4128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NAME

TIME

I - 53
I - 54
I - 55
NO - 33
NO - 34

500

MAINSIDE NAVAL STATION

Kongo

120

SAIPAN

Oito
Koyato
Aomagi
Tunagi
Koshi

500

NO - 60
NO - 61
NO - 62

500

SEIK - POKAPU

Kashima
Tosuy
Tatenta
Tubari

400

Oito
Aomagi
Koyato
Tunagi

400

NO - 66
NO - 66
NO - 67
NO - 68
NO - 64
NO - 68

600

PALAU

NO - 56
NO - 57
NO - 58
NO - 59

400

TSINGTAO

Karakaya

120

Page 8

SHANGHAI

FAME

TYPE

Tsuang
Hori
Hoku

SIB

KAO-SARAO AREA (FORMOSA)

Tadachi
Hirayama
Hirayama
Homidare

430

1 - 21

1038

1 - 22

(Remaining 22 unidentified)

CAMRANH BAY

Shokai

10A

OFF INDO-CHINA COAST (NAST)

SIB

938 Identity unknown.

OFF SOUTHERN INDO-CHINA

Atago
Ashigara

9CA

Kuma
Haka
Hatori
Igusa
Kashii

6GL (1 unidentified)

20 DD (unidentified)

GREAT BRITAIN

CHINA STATION

SINGAPORE

Prince of Wales

123

PAGE 2

NAME

TYPE

Regulus

100

30L (Identity unknown)

400 (Identity unknown)

EAST INDIES STATION

Revenge

100

Hornet

100

Australia

30A (1 Identity unknown)

Cornwall

Hunter

Avroff

Caledon

110L

Capetown

Ceres

Colombo

Emerald

Enterprise

Glasgow

Hawkins

Mauritius

(3 Identity unknown)

30L (Identity unknown)

100 (Identity unknown)

AUSTRALIAN WATERS

10A

30L

40L (Identities unknown)

400

NEW ZEALAND WATERS

30L

(Identities unknown)

20L

THE NETHERLANDS (NEM)

SOERABAYA

De Ruyter

40L

PAGE 10**NAME****TYPE**

Jawa
Sumatra
Borneo

Van Esee
Witte De With
Banchart
Van Ghent
Berkton
Piethwin
Kortenaar

720

K. VII
K. VIII
K. IX
K. X
K. XI
K. XII
K. XIII
K. XIV
K. XV
K. XVI
K. XVII
K. XVIII
O. 16
O. 19
O. 20

1800

USE**VLADIVOSTOK**

Leningrad Glass
Corry Glass
Unknown
Bittern Glass
Unknown
Unknown

22L
4 large 20
2 medium 20
5 small 20
3 small 20

25 25

EXHIBIT NO. 177

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Dispatch #234 dated May 18, 1939 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, transmitting a proposal of Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma, and attached memoranda dated June 13 and May 22, 1939.
2. Dispatch #242 dated May 23, 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to State Department.
3. Dispatch #245 dated May 26, 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to State Department.
4. Information Letter No. 3936 dated June 7, 1939 from Eugene H. Doonan, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Tokyo, to Secretary of State concerning "Japanese Foreign Policy in Relation to the Situation in Europe".
5. Dispatch #265 dated June 8, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State Department.
6. Memorandum dated July 1, 1939 for the President from Secretary Hull, concerning the Hiranuma proposal.
7. Dispatch #187 dated July 7, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo, concerning reply to Embassy's dispatch #234, above.
8. Letter of Instruction #1767 dated July 8, 1939 from Secretary of State to American Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Tokyo, in reply to Hiranuma proposal.
9. Dispatch #319 dated July 10, 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to State Department, in reply to dispatch #187, above.
10. Dispatch #196 dated July 13, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo, in reply to Embassy's dispatch #319.
11. Dispatch #194 dated July 12, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo, reporting conversation between Secretary Hull and Japanese Ambassador on July 10, 1939.
12. Memorandum dated July 10, 1939 of conversation concerning "American rights and interests in China", between Secretary Hull and Japanese Ambassador Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi, at which time Secretary Hull protested the Japanese bombings of American nationals and property in Chungking, China, and a general reply to the Hiranuma proposal.
13. Dispatch #376 dated July 31, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State Department, acknowledging receipt of Instruction Letter #1767.
14. Dispatch #235 dated August 1, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo.
15. Dispatch #239 dated August 2, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo.
16. Dispatch #384 dated August 3, 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to State Department (two parts).
17. Dispatch #242 dated August 4, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo.
18. Dispatch #389 dated August 5, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State Department.
19. Dispatch #390 dated August 5, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State Department.
20. Dispatch #393 dated August 8, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State Department.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 13, 1939.

On June 12 Mr. Grew delivered to the Secretary in person the original of the message quoted in Tokyo's 234, May 18, 5 p.m. The message is not signed; is not dated; and is typed on plain, unheaded paper.

mm

FE:MMH:REK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 22, 1939

~~ADM:~~

PA/H

Mr. Hornbeck:

The Japanese Prime Minister's message transmitted through the Foreign Office, and contained in the attached telegram from Tokyo (no. 234, May 18, 5 p.m.), is evidently inspired by his concern lest in the event of a European war the United States might align itself with the so-called "democratic powers" with the result that the United States and Japan would confront each other from opposite camps. It is because of this concern that Japan would especially regard the eventuality of a European war to be detrimental to Japanese interests.

In essence the message advances the thesis that conditions making for true world peace can only be obtained through assuring to nations their "proper places in the world", and there is a scarcely disguised plea that the political thinking of this Government with regard to the so-called "have-not" nations be revised. Toward this end there is apparently an attempt to capitalize upon the known interest of the American Government and people in peace and the avoidance of a catastrophe such as a general world war.

FE:Ballantine:EJL
Sturgeon

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

July 8 1939

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated May 18, 1939

Rec'd 7:10 a.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

254, May 18, 5 p.m.

At my conference today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Arita handed me the following message which the Prime Minister requested me to deliver personally to the Secretary of State on my forthcoming visit to Washington in the hope that the message may also be brought to the attention of the President:

"At present, there is a serious antagonism among the nations of Europe and no one can assure that there will be no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war is to break out, its consequences would be practically beyond our imagination and that indescribable sufferings of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete destruction of civilization would ensue. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary for us to exert our effort to prevent the occurrence of such a calamity, and, I believe, that is the duty mainly incumbent on the United States and Japan since these two nations are situated outside the scope of European conflict."

Then

740.00/1531

G.B

Confidential File

-2- #234, May 18, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

Then what are the causes of this antagonism in Europe? There may be contentions on both sides but on cool scrutiny of the European situations since the World War we come to the conclusion that, although Germany and Italy may be advised to be more patient, Great Britain and France also have a great deal to reconsider.

Undoubtedly the intention of the United States Government is to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe and thus to save Europe from the misery of war. Similarly it is the ardent wish of Japan that nations should have their own proper places in the world and thus the true world peace might be established and maintained. I, for myself, am doing my utmost to realize this ideal, and on this point, I believe, will be found the possibility of much closer cooperation between Japan and America as well as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations".

GREY

RR:VTC

At present there is a serious antagonism among the nations of Europe and no one can assure that there will be no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war is to break out, its consequences would be practically beyond our imagination and the indescribable sufferings of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete destruction of civilization would ensue. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary for us to exert our effort to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe, and, I believe, that is the duty mainly incumbent on the United States and Japan since these two Powers are situated outside the scope of European conflict.

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- 2 -

their own proper places in the world and thus the true world peace might be established and maintained. I, myself, am doing my utmost to realize this ideal, and at this point, I believe, will be found the possibility of much closer co-operation between Japan and America as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations.

[This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)]

TOKYO

Dated May 23, 1939

Rec'd 5:01 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington, 242, May 23, 11 p. m.

(Strictly Confidential for the Secretary, Please Restrict Distribution)

Our 234, May 18, 5 p. m.

One. I dined this evening privately with the Prime Minister who had sent me word that he wished to explain his purpose in addressing the letter to you.

Two. The first part of his discourse ran substantially along the lines of his letter. I pointed out that there would have to be the closest collaboration between the United States and Japan if they were to move jointly toward seeking a solution of the troubles in Europe and I doubted whether such collaboration were possible so long as Japan adhered to its policies and actions in China. The Prime Minister said that public opinion in Japan would not permit of the settlement of the conflict with China being made a condition precedent to the American-Japanese move which he had in mind. The following is a summary of his statement explaining the Japanese position.

Three. Japan had no legal obligation to enter the European war on the side of Great Britain but she believed that she had a moral responsibility. Her fleet and merchant marine were used in operations against the enemy she wrestled Shantung from Germany and later restored it to China and she cooperated in other ways toward bringing about the ultimate victory but the only thanks she got was the abrogation by Great Britain of their alliance. Further Great Britain along with the United States was complacent when China began to whittle down the fruits of Japan's victory over Russia. Finally the Washington and London naval treaties together with the Nine Power Treaty completely tied Japan's hands. There was bound to be a revulsion to these restrictions and that came with the Manchuria incident in 1931. The Prime Minister said that so strong was the sense of grievance of the Japanese people that the Japanese Government could not, even if it wished, make peace with China on terms which did not assure Japan economic security, and that under existing world conditions such security could not be provided by restoration of the status quo ante. He had already given careful thought to the question I had raised with regard to the need for making peace with China and he had come to the conclusion that it would be impossible to dissociate the Far Eastern problem from the conditions of unrest which prevailed in Europe and elsewhere and that this problem is capable of solution by negotiation only when the conditions which lie at the root of the European problem as well as of the Far Eastern problem can be considered.

Four. I asked the Prime Minister whether he believed it likely that the American people would look with favor on American collaboration with Japan in approaching the difficulties in Europe when Japan herself was considered to be guilty of the same acts of which Germany and Italy stood condemned and when moreover the press is almost daily reporting acts of Japanese violations of American rights in China. The Prime Minister replied that in respect of the first point he hoped that the American Government at least realized that Japan had not intended or expected to engage in a war with China. In respect of the second point he admitted that there is justification for complaint but he said that Japan's first preoccupation must be the success of her military operations. Nevertheless if the powers could come together to find by negotiation a solution of the world's troubles these issues involving American rights in China could be disposed of without difficulty. In the meantime the Government would continue its efforts to satisfy the American position with regard to the open door but one difficulty was the sense of grievance to which he had previously referred.

Five. In conclusion the Prime Minister said that this might prove to be the last opportunity to save the world from chaos. He was prepared to sound out Germany and Italy with regard to the holding of a conference such as he had suggested if the President were prepared at the same time to sound out Great Britain and France.

Six. He urged on me the supreme importance of secrecy with regard to his approach.

DOOMAN.

EMB: NK

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi- FROM
cated to anyone (C)

TOKYO

Dated May 26, 1939

Received 11:35 a.m.

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 26 1939
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

245, May 26, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 740.00/1331

Our 234, May 18, 5 p.m.

One. The Ambassador immediately before his departure and I more recently have had conversations with leading Japanese, including members of the Cabinet, which give me the definite impression that, in view of the way in which events in Europe are shaping, there is taking place here an anxious search for a position which would afford Japan security.

Two. In a conversation on May 16 with the Ambassador and me one well informed person stated that he and those who think as he does, who had sufficient influence to defeat the proposal of an alliance with Germany and Italy, are convinced that the only safe course for Japan to follow is to restore good relations with the democratic states especially the United States and he made a strong plea for some indication by the United States

EDA - 2 - #233, May 26, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

13.4.41
States that restoration of good relations with Japan was desired, a step which would greatly support those who were opposing any new anti-comintern commitment. The Ambassador replied that he could not recommend to his Government that it give such indication unless Japan could first offer evidence of intention to make peace with China on terms which could be expected to merit the Chinese terms and command the approval of the American Government. The informant said that an indication of Japan's peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs; that he would report the conversation to Arita; and that he would urge Arita to defer any new anti-comintern commitment until the Ambassador had time to communicate with the Department.

7.4.41
Three. When I talked with Arita on the 17th I found that he was familiar with the conversation of the preceding day. He was, however, excited over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations and was in no mood to talk of anything else. In view of this conversation and of the conversation which the Ambassador had with the Foreign Minister on the following day, as reported in our telegram under reference, the Ambassador felt as I then did that the views expressed by the informant referred to in paragraph two should be discounted.

Four. However, in subsequent conversation with the

EDA - 3 - #235, May 26, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

high official mentioned in my strictly confidential 942, ^{740 004543-4} May 23, 11 p.m., and with one of his personal advisers, I was told that Japan did not want to tie up with Germany and Italy as there are in those countries under surface currents which gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrangement which Japan might make with them. The thought was subtly conveyed that if war broke out in Europe there would be little security for Japan in seeking to maintain neutrality and that Japan would greatly prefer to be associated on terms of close friendship with the democratic states than with Germany and Italy through an alliance. I might add that there was expressed doubt whether the latter countries could defeat the democratic states.

Five. There is in these and other authenticated evidence that the President's message to Germany and Italy and other signs of probability that the United States would not be indifferent to a war in Europe have awakened some Japanese to the risk of involvement with the United States figuratively by way of Europe if not directly across the Pacific. The high official referred to in paragraph four said to me that Japan would be prepared eventually and under certain conditions to moderate its peace terms to China; but this willingness

EDA - 4 - #235, May 26, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

if it exists springs not from any moral regeneration but from realization that Japan's security can be safeguarded so long as war threatens in Europe only by liquidating the conflict with China. It is impossible at this time to determine whether the more rational views herein reported are those which predominate within the Japanese Government but the standing of those who utter them entitles them to much weight.

DOOMAN

KLP:RR



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, June 7, 1939.

No. 3936

SUBJECT: JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO THE
SITUATION IN EUROPE.



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL: FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I had the honor to receive your telegram No. 241, May 16, 1939, to present an analysis of certain trends in Japanese thought with regard to foreign policy in relation to the situation now developing in Europe. I observed that the

were

-2-

were elements in Japan - not to be confused with certain commercial, but with ineffectual, persons educated abroad who have been telling us that reaction to Japan's China policy was "just around the corner" - who realized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the maintenance by Japan of neutrality between the democratic and totalitarian camps would afford Japan little security, and that national security could be assured in the long run only by liquidating the conflict with China. I was not unaware of the need for resting an observation of this nature on a reasonably firm basis, and it is my purpose in this despatch to lay before the Department the circumstances, some of personal knowledge and the others which derive by deduction, on which my view was based. As there is no discussion in the press or in any other public forum of the question whether or not Japan should align itself with Germany and Italy - indeed, any reference by the press to this question is officially interdicted - information with regard to thought trends has come to me largely by word of mouth.

The first conversation which needs to be recorded took place on May 14, at a luncheon which was given in honor of the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew by a Japanese who, while holding no official position, is a close friend and confident of high

officials

-3-

officials of the Court and of Prince Konoye, Minister without Portfolio, and Tanaka Giichi, Minister of the Interior. He is in a position to exercise through various contacts considerable influence on the Government. As we left the table, our host drew the Ambassador and me into another room and talked substantially along the following lines:

Although the Japanese Government has decided not to conclude a military alliance with Germany and Italy, there was being exerted on the Government, not only by Germany and Italy but by reactionary groups in Japan, strong pressure toward entering into some arrangement with the latter countries which would reaffirm the solidarity among the nations whose policies were opposed by the democratic nations. The groups to which we belonged had succeeded in defeating the proposal to conclude the alliance and are now doing their best to defeat the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact", or at least to prevent it from becoming a political link with Germany and Italy; but it was difficult to meet the argument of those who had advocated the alliance and are now favoring close association with Germany and Italy, that Japan cannot afford to

-4-

to be isolated. Germany and Italy are urging Japan "to come over to their side", while the democratic nations are turning to Japan a very cold shoulder. If, therefore, the democratic nations, especially the United States, could indicate to Japan that restoration of good relations with Japan is desired and that the way is open for Japan to align herself with the democratic nations, but not against the totalitarian states, those Japanese who are working for precisely these objectives would have their hand greatly strengthened.

The Ambassador said that he was very much interested in the views just expressed, but that it must be obvious that the restoration of peace and good relations between Japan and China must be a condition precedent to the restoration of good relations between Japan and the United States and other democratic nations. He could not, therefore, recommend that his Government give any gesture of welcome to Japan unless he were first satisfied that the terms of peace with China which Japan had in view could be reconciled with China's peace terms and would meet with the approval of the American Government.

Our host then talked very vaguely about the readiness of Japan to withdraw from Central and South China, but when asked to give specific details he replied that

-5-

that a full statement on Japanese peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He undertook to report the conversation to Mr. Arita, and to suggest to Mr. Arita that he give the Ambassador a precise explanation of Japanese objectives in China during the conversation which the Ambassador had arranged to have with Mr. Arita on May 18th.

Mr. and Mrs. Arita were entertaining the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew at luncheon on May 17, and Mr. Grew prearranged with me that I should endeavor during the luncheon party to ascertain from Mr. Arita whether our staff of the previous day had consulted him. I accordingly took advantage of a favorable opportunity to engage Mr. Arita in conversation. I found that he was quite familiar with the discussion of the previous day. He said that there had been a suggestion that he give Mr. Grew an assurance that Japan would withhold any action to "strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact" until Mr. Grew returned to Washington and had an opportunity to discuss with his Government the possibility of making to Japan some "gesture of welcome". Mr. Arita said that there was no important opinion in the country unfavorable to the measure which had been proposed to combat communistic activities, and that, if the time became ripe for the conclusion of the agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy, the Japanese Government intended to proceed with it.

He

-8-

He could, however, assure Mr. Brown that the agreement would contain no military, political or economic clauses; but with this proviso - if it were found that these activities were being instigated by the Soviet Government, the counter-measures, no less, would have to be directed against that Government.

Mr. Arita then passed on to the negotiations between the Soviet and British Governments concerning the "common front against Germany". He said that Japan is very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, but that Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that, whether Japan liked it or not, its policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other. The British Ambassador had, he said, given him definite assurances that the arrangement under discussion by the British and Soviet Governments would specifically be made inapplicable, but he (Mr. Arita) replied that any arrangement which formed the basis for the close collaboration contemplated by Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union in respect of their common interests in Europe would be bound to bring about similar collaboration among them in the conduct of their policies in the Far East. He delivered himself at some length and with considerable show of heat over Sir Robert Craigie's insistence that the assurances given Mr. Arita should dissolve any Japanese anxiety with

-7-

with regard to the effective scope of the proposed arrangement. Mr. Arita concluded the conversation with me with the observation that decision over Japan's attitude vis-à-vis the situation developing in Europe would have to be withheld until results of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were known.

A full account of the Ambassador's conversation on May 18 will be found in his telegram No. 235, May 18, 7 p.m.

The impressions which the Ambassador and I had formed of Mr. Arita's views as expressed in the conversations of May 17 and 18 agreed in every respect. It seemed to us that Mr. Arita, far from indicating any eagerness to find a way to approach the democratic nations, was preoccupied with the effects on the Far East of the establishment of the "front against aggression" and was not in a conciliatory mood. The Ambassador came, therefore, to the conclusion, as I did, that there was no justification for believing that desire to bring Japan into line with the democratic nations as against the totalitarian nations animated the Japanese Government as such.

Whether by accident or by design, I was approached on the same day, May 18, by a Japanese hitherto unknown to me but who had made the acquaintance of the Ambassador as a fellow passenger during

-8-

U.S. - during a voyage across the Pacific, with the suggestion that I have a "chat", as he put it, with the Prime Minister. I asked the gentlemen to call again, as I wished to consider the matter. I informed the Ambassador of the call and of the suggestion that I have a talk with the Prime Minister. Mr. Grew said that he had formed a favorable impression of Mr. Fujii, the person who had called on me, and that he saw no reason why I should not return a favorable reply. When Mr. Fujii called again, I said that I would be glad to have an opportunity to make the acquaintance of the Prime Minister, but that I had heard rumors of the possibility of a change of government and wondered, therefore, whether a call at that time would be opportune. Returning on the following day, Mr. Fujii brought an invitation from Baron Hiranuma to dinner on May 23, when he intended to explain his purpose in sending through Mr. Grew his message to the Secretary, and word to the effect that no change in the government was impending. I accepted the invitation. Mr. Fujii then emphasized the importance of keeping a profound secret the forthcoming talk. He said that Baron Hiranuma's political position was reasonably secure, but that the alignment of factions within the Government over European policy was so delicate as to require that the Prime Minister act very cautiously.

Mr.

-9-

Mr. Fujii called for me on the evening of May 23. As we went in my car, which bears an Embassy license tag, Mr. Fujii proposed that we alight some distance from the Prime Minister's private residence and go the rest of the way on foot; which we did. At the gate of the residence there stood a number of policemen, who, although obviously surprised by seeing a foreigner, made no attempt to stop me. The servants were prepared for my visit, but I have reason to believe that they, as well as two female relations of the Prime Minister's who served us later at dinner, had no knowledge whatever of my identity. It might be added that the residence, which is situated in the suburbs, is small and quite unpretentious and would barely grace a small tradesman. These details, while inconsequential, may perhaps reflect my impressions at the moment.

Baron Hiranuma received me very courteously. He said that he unfortunately had few opportunities to meet foreigners and thus to receive at first hand the impressions of foreigners with regard to conditions in various parts of the world. The situation in Europe was, in his view, a delicate one, and he felt confident that he could obtain from an American a more objective appraisal of that situation than he would be likely to procure from an European.

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I expressed regret that I was not in a position to give him any information other than that which was public knowledge. There then ensued a colloquy on the situation in Europe, during which Baron Hiranuma displayed knowledge not only of a factual nature but of political trends in Europe which surprised me. One of the points brought out which, in his view, made for danger in Europe was that Chancellor Hitler - with the objectives which he has in mind for Germany to achieve - provides an issue around which all elements in Great Britain can rally: the imperialists, who do not propose to tolerate a Germany which can pretend to equality with Great Britain; the industrialists, who fear German commercial competition; and, finally, the Jews, radicals and even the Germanophiles, who vie with each other in their hatred of Hitler.

Baron Hiranuma then said that the possibility of a war arising in Europe was one which he contemplated with horror. It would inevitably result in the total destruction of civilization, as no nation, however remote from the seat of war, could hope to escape the eventual consequences even though it might be fortunate to avoid direct involvement. He had publicly stated on several occasions that Japan could never be a democracy or a totalitarian state, and that Japan could make its greatest contribution by bringing together in harmonious and peaceful relations the two groups of nations. There were, he continued, elements in Japan which considered that

Japan

-11-

Japan could not afford to maintain a condition of isolation and that her security demanded that she enter into "special relations" with Germany and Italy. He was insisting, however, that Japan follow what he termed "moral diplomacy". A nation's existence was not to be measured by decades, and it was essential, therefore, that statesmen charged with the destinies of nations fix their attention on long term objectives rather than on gaining favorable tactical positions, which were after all, ephemeral. The most important of these objectives was a stabilized peace to replace interludes of preparation for the next war. Japan, like the United States, was not directly involved in the troubles of Europe; and it was his thought that these two nations, which were the only Great Powers situated outside of Europe, were in a position to exercise a moderating influence on Europe. To exercise that influence was a duty which they owed their own peoples, for the downfall of Europe would inevitably bring with it the downfall of the rest of the world. In his opinion, the first step which had to be taken was to check the tendency toward the division of Europe into two politically hostile camps. He wondered whether the views of the American Government were responsive to those which he had expressed in his message to the Secretary.

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I said that the American Government had taken a lead, in respect of both time and emphasis, in making known the fact that nations are today interdependent and that discord between any nations is a matter of concern to all others. His message to the Secretary did not, I said, contain any definitive suggestion as to how the United States and Japan might proceed toward averting war in Europe. The principal difficulty, in my opinion, in the way of the collaboration which he had suggested in talking to me was Japan's policies and actions in China. I felt certain that the American Government would, in other more happy circumstances, have welcomed Japanese cooperation toward alleviating the threat to peace in Europe which, the great majority of Americans believed, arises from the policies and actions of Germany and Italy; and I doubted whether the American people would favor collaboration with a nation which it believed to be following in the Far East precisely those policies and actions that are considered to be the root of the trouble in Europe. I also said that the American people have laid before them nearly every day reports of bombings of American property and of other instances of violations of American rights and interests in China. The Foreign Office was trying to exculpate the Japanese military authorities by pleading military necessity or inadvertence, but enough had happened to justify belief that

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the Japanese authorities, in China at least, were systematically and deliberately trying to expel American and other foreign interests from China. The views of the American people in these respects were, I said, very definitely formed. I could not but feel, therefore, that the adjustment of the conflict in China on terms satisfactory to all concerned would have to be a condition precedent to that degree of collaboration between the United States and Japan which could reasonably be expected to bring about the desired results in Europe.

The Prime Minister observed that he was well aware of the state of feeling which prevailed in the United States against Japan. The American people had assumed that Japan had deliberately provoked the conflict in China with a view to seizing the more populated and productive parts of that country, but he felt confident that the American Government realized that it had not been the original intention or desire of Japan to do anything more than to protect its rights in North China. It was also supposed by Americans that Japan intended to close the Open Door in China; and to his regret the actions of the Japanese authorities in China were not entirely reconcilable with the desire of the Japanese Government to respect foreign rights and interests in China.

But

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But he wondered whether the American Government realized that the Japanese people labored under a very real feeling of grievance against the Occidental Powers, especially Great Britain. When the Great War broke out, Japan was an ally of Great Britain. There were no legal obligations on Japan to support her ally, but she conceived that she had a moral obligation to do so. She accordingly declared war against Germany, her navy undertook operations against the German fleet in the Pacific, her merchant marine cooperated in various ways, and finally her military forces eliminated Germany from Shantung. "The only thanks we got from Great Britain", continued Baron Hiranuma, "was the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired Japan to support Great Britain." Again, the rights which Japan had acquired in Manchuria as a result of her war with Russia and later by agreement with China were essential to Japan; nevertheless, the efforts of China to prejudice those rights were regarded by Great Britain and the United States with complacency, if not with benevolence; China took courage to persist, with the result that Japan had to resort to force in 1931 to protect those rights. Finally, the Japanese people came to the conclusion that the Nine Power Treaty and the Naval Treaties operated, not to stabilize peace in the Far East, but to bind Japan against safeguarding her interests in China. So long as the Japanese people

-15-

people felt that it had just cause for grievance, it was politically impossible for his government or any government which would succeed him to bring about complete equality of opportunity in China for all nations.

The Japanese people, Baron Hiranuma continued, have considerable sympathy for Germany and Italy, as they conceive these countries to be in many important respects in the same position as Japan. It was not to be expected that Germany would have permitted herself to remain under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, nor that Italy would have been content to be dependent on other nations for supplies of raw materials. At the same time, the consequences of efforts on their part to redress their grievances by force, or of the stubborn refusal of the democratic nations to offer to correct these grievances, could not possibly be confined to the protagonists in the European quarrel but would have to be shared by other nations. He referred to my observation that the settlement of the China conflict would probably have to be a condition precedent to joint American-Japanese efforts to moderate the situation in Europe. If that were to be the view of the American Government, any hope of proceeding along the course which he had in mind would have to be abandoned. The objectives which Japan has had in China are essential for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes, closing

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closing of markets to foreign competition, and lack of free access to raw materials, and so long as such conditions exist any moderation of her objectives in China and, therefore, of her peace terms, could not be considered. Nevertheless if conditions could be brought about which would assure to all nations markets for the world's goods on the basis of quality and price and supplies of the materials which they needed, the importance to Japan of securing a market and sources of raw materials in China would greatly diminish; and by the same token there would not be the urge that there now is on Germany and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker and smaller nations. Baron Hiranuma stated that the conditions which brought about the situations in the Far East and Europe are not local but universal in character, and that neither situation could be settled in a manner calculated to bring about a stabilized peace unless the conditions which brought them about were corrected.

Baron Hiranuma said that the belief was widely held abroad that Japan was considering a military alliance with Germany and Italy. He had endeavored to explain frankly the basis of Japanese sympathy for Germany and Italy, and he could say quite definitely that the basis of what appeared to be a concerting of Japanese policy with that of Germany and Italy lay in the fact that all three countries are in the same economic strategic position. He personally

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personally was of the opinion that Japan, whose government would for all time to come rest on the sanctity of the Imperial Family, could not tie itself by special relations to any foreign government whose stability depended on the continued existence and political prestige of one individual. There were both in Germany and Italy political currents flowing beneath the surface which, in his view, would gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrangement, such as an alliance, which Japan might make with those countries. Hidden dissident elements would be certain to make themselves felt in time of war and thus are to be reckoned as a threat to the success of German and Italian arms.

At this point we were interrupted by notice that dinner was served. The conversation during dinner was not in any way pertinent to the subject of this despatch, being confined to discussions of points in Chinese philosophy, personal reminiscences, and so on, the Prime Minister discoursing in a most interesting manner.

Returning to his study, the Prime Minister said that he wished to draw together the various threads of our conversation, as follows:

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The United States and Japan were the only powers which could help to prevent the crystallization of the trend toward the division of Europe into armed camps. There can, however, be no confident hope that a permanent peace can be established until the world-wide economic and political conditions which bring about unrest in Europe and in the Far East can be corrected; and if an international conference can be called to solve the problems which create unrest, Japan would be prepared to agree to the inclusion of the Far Eastern situation among the problems to be discussed. Before any call for such a conference could be issued, Great Britain, and France, and Germany and Italy, would have to be sounded out. If the President were prepared to make a confidential approach to the European democracies; he would be glad to approach Germany and Italy; and, if there were returned favorable replies by these nations, he would be glad to have the President call the conference under such conditions as might be agreed upon after discussion through normal diplomatic channels.

I wish to make it clear, before setting forth certain conclusions which I drew from these conversations, that I do not put forward the views of those Japanese - even though they be persons of great importance and influence - who harbor hopes of restoring good relations with

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with the democratic nations, as being necessarily the views of the Japanese Government. These are, however, the views of a powerful element in the Government: they may prevail or they may not, but they cannot be ignored.

Any observer who is in any way sensitive to things not seen would, if he were in Tokyo today, become aware of the growing fear for security against the gathering storm in Europe. I should perhaps add parenthetically that the European situation today has assumed primary proportions, and that it would be visionary to suppose that the present confusion concerning the course which Japan should follow is due to despondence over the apparently ineffectual hostilities in China. The Army and other elements which have thus far controlled China policy have assumed that the Far Eastern conflict could be permanently and completely insulated against repercussions from situations elsewhere, as they did not look to American and other occidental armed intervention in that conflict. Although reference has been made in the Embassy's telegrams to the effects of the President's message to Chancellor Hitler, I do not believe that I could, by further reference to that message, exaggerate the impulse which it had toward persuading the Japanese Government to realize that there may be grave danger of involvement with the United States "not directly across the Pacific but by way of Europe", as one Japanese put it to me. I should, however, place that observation in proper perspective. A threat by the United States to eject Japan from China would, I am confident,

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be resisted. But if war were to break out in Europe with the United States participating on the side of Great Britain and France, the outcome in the view of those Japanese who think along rational lines would admit of no doubt. With Germany and Italy crushed, the prospect of confronting the victors would not be a palatable one to Japan.


There are, therefore, in the situation which seems to be developing but two courses for Japan to follow - either to go over unreservedly to the totalitarian side, or to restore good relations with those nations which, in the opinion of one element of the Japanese Government, would be the victors. True, in rejecting the proposal to join Germany and Italy in an alliance, Japan provisionally chose a third course - neutrality. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether there are many Japanese who confidently believe that neutrality would afford security. The arguments of those who believe in the superior power of Germany and Italy are obvious and simple: Japan has only to associate herself with those countries and wait for the European war to pluck China like a ripe plum. But, for those Japanese who have other views concerning the power of Germany and Italy, there is but one way by which Japan's security can be safeguarded, and that is to bring the conflict with China to an end on some reasonable terms. Here again I wish to make it clear that the desire for a settlement of the conflict does not derive from a real regeneration but from realization of stark facts.

In

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In concluding this despatch, which is already unconscionably long, I wish briefly to allude to the discrepancy between the attitude of the Prime Minister as indicated in his conversation with me and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose preoccupation over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations has already been mentioned. It is obvious that the desire of the Prime Minister for American collaboration to bring about peace in Europe (and in the Far East) cannot be reconciled with the readiness, which is almost an eagerness, on the part of the Foreign Minister to meet a fancied threat from Great Britain. These two points of view reflect conflicting policies, and which of these policies will prevail may perhaps be decided by events of the next few days.

Respectfully yours,



Eugene H. Logman,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

EHL:c

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (G)

Tokyo

Received June 8, 1939

Rec'd 8:05 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

265, June 8, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Our 245, May 26, 8 p.m.

One. The Polish Ambassador gave me in strict confidence an account of his conversation yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows: (a) He told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had heard that there had been renewed pressure on Japan to adhere to the German-Italian alliance and he inquired whether there had been any change in the negative decision taken in April by the Japanese Government. The Foreign Minister replied that there had been no (repeat no) change but that Japan's position would have to be reexamined upon the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations concerning an anti-aggression pact. (b) The Ambassador then asked for clarification of the Japanese attitude vis a vis the difficulties between Poland and Germany. The Foreign Minister said that his reply to that question would be found in his presentation of the four cardinal points Japan's attitude toward European problems. The first point is that Japan maintains friendly relations with both Germany and Poland and therefore

ADVISOR ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
JUN 15 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 9 - 1939
Department of State

PM
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUN 14 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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- 2 - #265, June 8, 7 p.m., from Tokyo

and therefore hopes that they will peacefully resolve their present difficulties; Japan is prepared, without commitment as to the merits of the causes of their dispute, to lend its good offices toward restoring good relations between the two countries. The second is that without prejudice to Japan's intention to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, "Her relations with Germany extend beyond the framework of the Anti-Comintern Pact". The third is that the results of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations will determine to a large extent whether or not Japan can avoid involvement in Europe. The fourth is the possibility of Japan and the United States collaborating to bring about a détente in Europe and thus creating opportunity in Europe for laying down a basis of durable peace; the views of the American Government in this respect are being explored. (c) In the general discussion which followed the Foreign Minister again emphasized Japan's concern over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations pointing out that Japan cannot be indifferent to any arrangement which would strengthen the position in the Far East of the Soviet Union. The Ambassador in defense of the British desire to bring the Soviet Union within the anti-aggression front in Europe referred to an innovation of action calculated to prevent the Soviet Union from falling into the arms of Germany. The Foreign Minister

- 3 - #265, June 8, 7 p.m., from Tokyo

Minister ridiculed that possibility whereupon the Ambassador made the rejoinder that his Government has indisputable evidence from both German and Soviet sources that rapprochement between those two countries is now an active question.

Two. The Ambassador gained the very definite impression that the so-called decision with regard to Japanese policy recently referred to by the press is not a definitive decision but merely a conclusion reached by the Cabinet to await the result of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. He believes that the hardening of American sentiment against Germany is largely responsible for the present confusion of the Japanese Government with regard to its European policy; his analysis of local trends following very closely that presented in our telegram under reference.

DOOMAN

BPD



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith, for approval:

- (1) Draft of proposed note to Japan. Though it takes off from the Tientsin situation, it raises the whole issue of the Japanese "new order" in China.
- (2) Proposed personal message from the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of Japan.

Also:

- (3) A personal message (Document No. 3, attached) sent me by the Prime Minister through Ambassador Grew, (to which No. (2) above is the answer). Its drift is that the United States and Japan, as the only two powers outside European conflict, might cooperate to "save Europe from the misery of war".

- (4) A long mail despatch from Dooman (Document No. 4 attached), explains the Prime Minister's message. It relates an amazing conversation between Dooman and Prime Minister Hiranuma. From page 9 on, it is well worth reading. This is, in effect, a private demarche of the Prime Minister to us. On its face, it suggests Japanese-American cooperation in endeavoring to work out a peace agreement between Germany and Italy (through Japan) and France and Great Britain (through us).

If you approve, I plan to send the Japanese note and the reply to the Prime Minister together.

JUL 1 - 1943

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Department of State

1939 JUL 8 AM 10 15

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 234, May 18, 5 p.m.

The Department is sending you by pouch the text of
a reply to the message quoted in your telegram under
reference.

The Department authorizes you, if you feel that a
useful purpose would be served thereby, to inform the
Foreign Minister orally and in confidence that a reply
is en route. If you feel that it would be advantageous
to present the reply before the text will have reached
you by mail, please so inform the Department by cable,
giving a statement of your reasons, whereupon the
Department will consider telegraphing the text to you.

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be so marked and inserted before
being communicated to anyone.

Washington
July 8, 1939. "B"
11am By Cable

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JUL 1939

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Sent by operator

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D. C. R.—No. 20

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

July 8 1939

CONFIDENTIAL -- FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 1767

Eugene H. Dooman, Esquire,
American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
Tokyo.

Sir:

Reference is made to the Embassy's telegram no. 234, May 18, 5 p.m., in which there is given the text of a message from the Prime Minister which was handed to Ambassador Grew by the Minister for Foreign Affairs with the request that Mr. Grew deliver the message personally to me. There is enclosed a reply to this message.

The Department desires to be consulted by telegraph with regard to the question of the time when the reply should be delivered. Therefore, before arranging to call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of handing the reply to him for transmission to the Prime Minister, please telegraph your opinion whether an opportune time for presentation of the reply has arrived, offering also such comments or suggestions as may occur to you with regard to the text of the proposed reply.

When you deliver the reply, the Department desires that you inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is requested that the reply be regarded as strictly confidential and not for publication.

Very truly yours,

Enclosure:
Reply to Prime
Minister.

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On his return to Washington Ambassador Grew delivered to me personally the message which Your Excellency was so good as to place in his hands through the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have read with unusual interest the expressions of Your Excellency's concern at the existence among the nations of Europe of antagonism which may lead to open conflict, and of Your Excellency's concern as to what the consequences might be to millions of people and to civilization should such antagonism lead to an outbreak of war. In this situation Your Excellency sees it as the duty of the Governments of our two countries, owing to their situation "outside the scope of European conflict" to exert efforts to prevent the occurrence of the casualty envisaged.

I have carefully noted also the statements pertaining to the causes of strained relations in the European situation, the interest of my Government in the preservation of peace, and finally the "ardent wish of Japan" that the relations of nations might be so arranged that true world peace would be established and maintained.

Your Excellency will have no doubt, in the light of the published utterances of the President and myself and of the principles we have advocated and supported, that the Government of the United States wholeheartedly desires to see established and maintained upon the

basis

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basis of fair dealing and fair play between and among nations a condition of true world peace. With especial reference to the situation in Europe, Your Excellency will be apprised of the recent earnest efforts of this Government: the President's identic messages sent on September 26, 1938, to the heads of several European governments which had reached an alarming crisis in their relations; identic messages addressed on April 14, 1939, by the President and myself respectively to the Chancellor of the German Reich and to the Premier of Italy with regard to the possible removal of the pervading threat or fear of a European war.

It would be most gratifying to me, and I may also speak for the President, if there could be found ways for the use of your Government's influence toward discouraging among European governments, especially those governments with which your Government may have special relations, the taking of any action, or the pursuance of any policy, that might endanger the general peace. I am confident that any such contribution as this would constitute a high service to those great sections of humanity which live in fear of the devastation of war.

In further reference to Your Excellency's expressed desire to see a true world peace established and maintained, I venture to observe, in a spirit of frankness which I trust will not be misunderstood, that this objective is made the more remote by the existence and the continuance of armed conflict and consequent political disturbances in the Far East today. Just as the unfolding of events in the European sphere have

their

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their repercussions in the Far East, so, it appears, the prolongation of abnormal conditions in the Far East contribute to causes of unrest in Europe. American opinion is therefore perturbed by the trend of events in the Far East, especially with regard to the methods of Japan in relations with China.

If, therefore, it should prove impracticable or inexpedient to make effective contribution at once to the settlement of problems arising in the European area, there nevertheless would be urgent need for the exertion of efforts in connection with disturbed conditions in other geographical areas, especially by those nations which may unhappily now be engaged in armed conflict. It is my view that each peaceful settlement, in whatever geographical sphere, constitutes a stabilizing element and an important step toward improvement in the general world situation.

Your Excellency may be assured of the genuine desire of the President and myself to do all within our power to convert into practical results those principles and hopes to which we have frequently given expression in connection with the foreign relations of the Government of the United States. While this Government does not perceive any practicable steps which it might usefully take at this time in addition to those already taken, this Government is sincerely interested in the suggestion contained in Your Excellency's message, and in giving further consideration to that suggestion would be pleased to have such further information as

Your

-4-

Your Excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making more definitive Your Excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe.

FE:LDS/MMH:RES
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MAIL
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[Handwritten signature]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



EG

FROM

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

Tokyo

Dated July 10, 1939

Rec'd 7:43 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

319, July 10, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 187, July 8, 11 a.m.

If my assumption is correct that the reply to the message is not definitive, the presenting of it is not (repeat not) a matter of particular urgency. However, I am being asked every few days whether I have received any reaction to the views and definitive suggestion reported in our 242, May 23, 11 p.m. Some indication of the Department's views thereon would be greatly appreciated.

DOOMAN

WTC:HFD

Collaboration by the United States and Japan to settle political difficulties in Europe.

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AMEMBASSY.

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Your 319, July 10, noon, last

CONFIDENTIAL.

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.

July 13, 1939.

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The Department's reply mentioned in our 187, July 8, 11 a.m., follows in part the lines of the first paragraph of the Department's 194, July 12, 6 p.m., especially the latter half. It is indicated in the reply that while this Government does not repeat not have any further steps in mind at the present time this Government is interested in the suggestion which has been advanced and it is intimated in the reply that additional clarifying information might be helpful in our further study of the matter. The reply thus includes indication of our general reaction to the views reported in your 242, May 23, 11 p.m.

In view of the fact that the indications of the reply, as set forth above, are only in summary form, the Department would prefer, unless you perceive substantial objection, that you await the receipt of the full text of the reply, before undertaking to acquaint the Foreign Office with the nature of our reply or to indicate our reaction to the views ^{reported} ~~expressed~~ in your 242.

740.00/1890

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

JUL 13

D. C. R.—No. 80

FK:JWB:HES

1-173 **gov. government printing office**

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740.00/1390

3

PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

"Br"

Washington,

1939 JUL 12 15 15

July 12, 1939.

EMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Confidential.

One. On occasion of Japanese Ambassador's call on July 10 he expressed a desire that I comment on the question, raised by Mr. Arita with Mr. Grew, of action by our two Governments directed toward averting war in Europe. I told him that we regard the preservation of peace of such supreme importance to the future of all nations that we make a distinction between peaceful countries, without reference to their form of government, and countries which are threatening military conquest; that we will collaborate with every peaceful nation and have indicated our desire to cooperate in every practicable way toward peace and toward a restoration to normality of international finance and commerce, and that we have made earnest pleas to the nations of Europe looking to the adjustment by peaceful means of their economic and other relations. I intimated that, while Japan might itself have made or may be making similar efforts, inasmuch as it might appear to other nations that Japan is engaged in military operations

for

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

D. C. R. No. 10

1-142 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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Washington,

for purposes of conquest, Japan might, by bringing this situation to an end, exercise its fullest influence along with the United States and other countries in efforts to discourage aggression in other parts of the world.

The Ambassador made no repeat no particular comment other than to refer to and deny reports that Japan might enter into a military pact with Germany and Italy.

Two. The Ambassador said also that he would be interested in anything that I might have to say in regard to this Government's concern over the possible detriment to American interests arising from possible Japanese policies for permanent control over China and in regard to the reported apprehension of this Government that the Japanese occupation of Hainan is part of a plan of permanent military conquest, subjects which the Ambassador said had been mentioned to Mr. Grew by the Japanese Foreign Minister shortly before Mr. Grew left Tokyo.

In regard to the first point I referred to the fact that for six years I had been urging upon his Government the view that the world was large enough for all nations and that great progress of the whole world would flow from cooperation along progressive and mutually helpful lines.

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Sent by operator M., 19.....

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Washington,

In regard to the second point I said that while existing American rights and interests in the Far East are very important a paramount consideration was whether all of China and the adjacent islands were to be disposed of by Japan as was Manchuria, with the observance of treaties abolished, international law destroyed and the door shut and looked except as to preference for Japanese subjects. I said that I need not speculate upon how Japan would feel if it were announced that the western hemisphere and a part of Europe were to be foreclosed against Japan in a similar way. I observed that the interference which was taking place beyond all possible military requirements with the rights and interests of third power nationals all over China aroused resentment of the governments whose nationals are thus affected, that Japanese businessmen were being permitted to step in to the places of American and other businessmen who were being obliged to abandon their businesses, and that it was these circumstances and indications which gave rise to American apprehension that, as the "Manchuria-izing" of all China proceeded, American rights and interests might be permanently jeopardized or held in abeyance by Japan.

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Sent by operator M. 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1472 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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Washington.

I also pointed out, speaking from my viewpoint, that efforts by any nation to dominate a large part of the world could result only in disaster to all and that I had endeavored for six years to urge this general idea upon Japanese statesmen.

Hue

JUL 2 1938 PM

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7/2/38

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

D. C. E.—No. 80

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 10, 1939.

SUBJECT: American rights and interests in China.

PARTICIPANTS: *Copies sent to Tokyo +*
SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE *Peiping (Chungking)*
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KENSUKE HORINOUE.

COPIES TO:



JUL 22 1939

Cpy sent to President July 25 1939

The Japanese Ambassador came in at my request. I then proceeded, without particular preliminaries, to read him the following:

"On two occasions between midnight and 2:00 a.m., July 8, two squadrons of Japanese planes raided Chungking. Bombs fell at random on both banks of the Yangtze River and in the city. One bomb fell within 400 feet of the residence of the Counselor of the American Embassy. Other bombs fell in the same general neighborhood, one landing about 300 yards from the residence of the American Ambassador. The Lewis Memorial Institutional Church at Chungking, an American institution, was badly damaged.

"Another

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793.94/15236

JUL 20 1939

F/A

- 2 -

"Another raid was made by Japanese planes on Chungking on July 7 commencing about 12:40 a.m., and lasting until about 2:10 a.m. On this occasion bombs fell in various areas of the city and also on the south bank of the Yangtze, one bomb falling within 50 yards of the quarters of the Counselor of the American Embassy and causing about 30 Chinese civilian casualties.

"During these raids five bombs struck within 300 yards of the U.S.S. TUTUILA.

"The bombing appears to have been carried out in an indiscriminate manner and the damage and loss of life inflicted to have been confined almost exclusively to civilians. The Government of the United States has repeatedly expressed this country's abhorrence of such indiscriminate bombing. Added to this general humanitarian concern is the consideration that the bombings under discussion, which are but the most recent of a long list of similar bombings, have exposed to grave hazards the American ambassador, his staff, an American naval vessel and American naval personnel thereon, and all other Americans at Chungking.

"The President in person has asked that the Secretary of State protest to the Japanese Ambassador against a continuation of these indiscriminate bombings. The

President

- 3 -

President would like to have an immediate statement from the Japanese Government, without making the matter one of a formal exchange of notes."

At the conclusion of the reading, I handed the Ambassador a copy of what I had read. He began to indicate his lack of belief in the facts, by saying that his Government had given special instructions to the military authorities in China to be careful to avoid injuries to persons and properties of other nations, etc., etc. I interrupted him and said that without taking up the question of what kind of instructions the military authorities were under from Tokyo, the official facts speak for themselves and show clearly that the Japanese military authorities are proceeding indiscriminately and recklessly with bombings in and about Chungking; that I was speaking from the facts, while the Ambassador was speaking from his understanding that instructions to be careful in bombing had been issued. He then abandoned this phase. I said that, of course, if this sort of reckless bombing went on something serious in the way of injuries to other nationals and their properties would inevitably occur, and, that in the interest of both his country and mine, my Government seeks to avoid such an unfortunate development. The

Ambassador

- 4 -

Ambassador then said he would promptly transmit the written statement I had read to him to his Government.

He then referred to a conversation between Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Arita, before the Ambassador recently left Tokyo for America, in which Mr. Arita had brought up (1) the idea of our two countries exercising their influence toward avoiding war in Europe; (2) the reported apprehension of my Government that the Japanese occupation of the Hainan Islands is part of a plan of permanent military conquest; and (3) my Government's concern about the extent of possible injury and loss of American interests, including American trade, in China, by reason of possible permanent Japanese policies of control. He said he would be interested in anything I might have to say on these points.

Point 3. I said that, taking the last point first, I need not remind him that for six years I had been earnestly pleading with and urging upon his Government the view that there is enough room on this planet for fifteen or eighteen great nations like his and mine, and that by cooperating along progressive and mutually desirable lines, great progress of the entire world population would gradually follow, etc., etc.

Point 2. -

- 5 -

Point 2. I said that, on the other hand, while present American interests and rights in the Far East are highly important, the big consideration relates to the question whether all of China and the Pacific islands skirting it is to be Manchuria-ized by Japan, with international law destroyed and treaty observation abolished and all other nations not allowed into that one-half of the world - the door shut and locked by Japan except over preferences for her own citizens. I added that if some one nation is to do this in one-half of the world, some other nation in the other half of the world might undertake to follow the same example, and nothing would be more absurdly impossible for the future progress of the population of the world, including the countries assuming this species of domination, than such attempted course. I proceeded further to say that the Ambassador might suppose an announcement that this hemisphere and a part of Europe would be foreclosed against his country in the sense of being Manchuria-ized, and added that I need not speculate on what his country would think and how it would feel. I said that such efforts at domination, with no facilities for financing and progressive development, and the going forward on such

- 8 -

such a huge scale, could only result in disaster for all concerned, speaking, of course, from my viewpoint, and that this general idea had been urged by me on his statesmen for six years.

The Ambassador undertook to advance the idea that Japan was just interfering temporarily with other people's interests on account of military exigencies. To this I replied that the fact that the rights and interests of other nationals all over China are being seriously interfered with, beyond all possible military requirements or even pretext, gives rise to the disappointment, not to say resentment, of the governments whose nationals are thus affected; that these excesses have occurred in north China and in South China and all up and down the Yangtze River; that Americans and other nationals are required to abandon their businesses, while the Japanese businessmen are permitted to step in and take their places and carry on business almost as usual - not temporarily, but apparently indefinitely. I added that these signs and circumstances indicating the Manchurization of all China, or an attempt to do so at least, gives rise to the American apprehension, to which the Ambassador referred, that American trade and other interests

- 7 -

interests might be permanently jeopardized or held in abeyance by Japan.

740.00
Point 1. As to the question raised with Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Arita about the possible cooperation of our two countries to compose the threatened dangers of Europe, I said that the single test of my Government in dealing with other Governments relates to the question of peace; that we consider the preservation of peace so supremely important to the future of all nations that we draw the line between honest, law-abiding, peaceful countries and peoples, without reference to their form of government, on the one hand, and those who are flouting law and order and officially threatening military conquest without limit as to time or extent; that we will work in a friendly spirit with every peaceful nation to promote and preserve peace, without serious thought as to who they are; that while we have not the slightest alliance, or secret or other understandings with any nation on earth, and do not propose to have any, we will keep thoroughly armed and prepared to take care of our interests and rights; that we have, in the spirit I was describing, made every kind and character of plea to the countries of Europe to indicate a willingness for the peaceful settlement and adjustment of their economic and

- 8 -

and other relations, and we have indicated our readiness to cooperate in every feasible plan to restore international trade and finance to a normal basis; that, notwithstanding these earnest pleas, (which the Japanese Government itself might well have been making, if it has not been doing so, or might well make now and persistently in the future,) nations perhaps could not but take notice that Japan herself is engaged in military operations for purposes of conquest, and that this situation might well call for an ending, if Japan were to exercise her fullest influence along with the United States and other countries in efforts to compose threatened military conquest in other parts of the world.

The Ambassador made no particular comment, except to state that there had been reports in this country to the effect that Japan might enter into a military pact with Germany and Italy, whereas the truth is that his country has no idea of doing so; that Japan, because of its proximity and difficulties with Russia, has been interested in the anti-Comintern policy of certain European states and in working with them against Bolshevism. I replied that, of course, this was primarily the business of his country; that my country, of course, strongly
opposes

opposes the doctrines of Bolshevism, and he said he knew this; that it also, as I had indicated, abstains from any entanglements or involvements with European countries; that, of course, if Japan desires to tie herself up with the terribly complicated European controversies, so as to make herself immediately involved in any European war, that still was her business primarily; and I might again reiterate that my Government is keeping itself in a detached position, with peace as its supreme objective, and with armaments sufficient for all purposes of security.

The Ambassador again and finally indicated that he would present my written statement, regarding bombing of American nationals and property, to his Government. I again emphasized that, in my opinion, something serious would inevitably occur if this sort of reckless conduct should continue; that, of course, we were making complaint primarily from this viewpoint and in the end it should be highly to the interest of both Governments thus to deal with dangerous practices before something happens of a serious nature; that my Government, of course, desires to preserve relations of fair-play and fair-dealing and friendliness with all nations at all disposed to this end.

I said

- 10 -

I said that if I ought to add, without in any way referring to the racial differences between Japan and Great Britain in China, but only basing my remarks on an incident, I would suggest that stripping nationals of other countries of all clothing in public is something abhorrent to the average citizen everywhere; that while it accomplishes next to nothing for the Government engaging in such practice, it does arouse universal resentment and condemnation; that the point I was coming to and the only thing I had in mind in thus referring to this sort of practice was that if some of our American nationals in China should be thus stripped to the point of stark nakedness and exposed to the public view, there would doubtless arise a surprising amount of bitterness and denunciation; and that, therefore, I did hope the Government of Japan would see its way clear to refrain not only from all excesses in depriving our nationals of their rights and interests and businesses in China, but also from other such practices as may be calculated to create unfriendliness and hostility between our peoples. The Ambassador spoke approvingly of these views.

G.E.

S CH:HR

HERE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (C)

TOKYO

Dated July 31, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 4:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

376, July 31, 11 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

PLEASE RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION.

Instruction No. 1767 of July 8 transmitting the text
of the reply to the Prime Minister's message has been
received and as directed I submit comment as follows

One. The text of the proposed reply combines frankness
with measured language and seems to me to be perfectly
clear. As it addresses itself specifically to the Prime
Minister's formal message delivered through Mr. Grew
there occurs to me no (repeat no) suggestion for change
in the text.

Two. With regard to the question of opportuneness
have no doubt whatever that the reply, if delivered now,
would heavily emphasize the impression in official circles
as elsewhere in Japan that the United States has now
initiated a definitely positive attitude toward Far Eastern
problems. If that is the effect which the Department
desires to obtain the sooner the reply is delivered the
more effective it will be.

Three

740.00/1991

FILED

GMB

HRE

2-#376 From Tokyo July 31, 11 p.m.

Three. Although I have carefully studied the draft reply in the light of the Department's 196, July 13, 6 p.m., I desire the Department's further guidance as to what I should say to the Prime Minister concerning his definite proposal with regard to the holding of an international conference to be called by the President to discuss problems causing world unrest including Far Eastern problems. It has been quite definitely suggested to me that the message which was handed to Mr. Grew and which contained no concrete proposal was intended as an opening for the move which the Prime Minister made a few days later when he asked that I communicate his proposal in the strictest confidence to you and the President.

Four. I lay before the Department the following suggestion as to procedure on this last point (A) if notwithstanding the invitation in the draft reply for "further information" the Department does not desire to explore the proposal for an international conference that I invite the Prime Minister to read between the lines of the reply which I am to hand to the Foreign Minister; or (B) if the Department is in process of studying the proposal, that I so inform the Prime Minister and add that the reply which I am to hand to the Foreign Minister is addressed only to the message delivered to Mr. Grew and that a reply to his proposal will be forthcoming in due course.

NPL:NK

DOOMAN

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Department of State

Washington
August 1, 1939.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Your 376, July 31, 11 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The Department has re-examined the text of the proposed reply in the light of the comments contained in your telegram under reference. Although we can appreciate that some of the statements contained in the reply, if taken by themselves, might tend toward creating an impression somewhat along the lines suggested in your paragraph numbered two, it does not repeat not seem to us that the message viewed as a whole need give or emphasize the impression which you estimate that it would. We therefore would welcome further clarification of the thought suggested in the first sentence of your numbered paragraph two.

Two. In the view of the Department our proposed message answers both the Prime Minister's message handed to Mr. Grew and the Prime Minister's subsequent proposal communicated through you which we construe as an elaboration of the message. As stated in the Department's

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

74C.00/1531

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Washington.

196, July 13, '6 p.m. / our reply thus includes indication
of our general reaction to the views reported in your
242, May 23, '11 p.m.

Three. As the matter appears to the Department,
neither repeat neither of the alternative procedures
suggested in your numbered paragraph four need be
adopted. We believe that the reply needs no repeat no
explanatory comment and that when you deliver it you
should make no repeat no interpretative comment other
than to say, if expressly asked, that the reply is
meant to cover both the Prime Minister's written message
and his statements reported in your telegram no. 242, / 50
May 23, '11 p.m.

Four. The Department is sending you by separate
telegram the text of a change which the Department / 531
desires be made in the text of the reply.

Five. Upon receipt from you of the clarification re-
quested in paragraph one above, the Department will expect
to send you definitive instructions with regard to the
question of when the reply should be delivered.

FLA:KJB:RES

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by .

Send by operator

M.

19

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Department of State

Washington,

Special Gray

August 2, 1939.

EMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Reference Department's mail instruction no. 1767
of July 8. On page 3 of the enclosure, lines 5 and 6,
please substitute for the words QUOTE especially with
regard to the methods of Japan in relations with China
UNQUOTE the words QUOTE especially with regard to
various declared Japanese aims and to various methods
and instrumentalities which various Japanese agencies
employ in pursuit thereof UNQUOTE.

Helby
Acting

740.00/1531

GMB

OR *OK*
AUG 2 1939

FE:MMH:RES

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PA/H

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Enclaved by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ P. _____

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

This message must be closely
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone. (C)

Tokyo

FROM

Dated August 3, 1939

Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

384, August 3, 4 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 25, August 1, 8 p.m.

Enc. - Report proceeding to clarify the report discussed
in a message from the Department's telegram under reference
and correct a misapprehension which I have inadvertently
permitted the Department to form by failing to stress that it
was not addressed to me, and I believe correctly, that
knowledge of the Prime Minister's proposal with regard to an
international conference is confined only to his entourage.
(Please see last two sentences part 2 of Dispatch No. 334-2
and 3). The Prime Minister has no knowledge of the
subject as far as I am concerned and I am sure he and
the other Ministers, who have not yet been received by the
Prime Minister, are not aware of the conditions of the Prime
Minister's proposal (which is to be sent to the Prime Minister).
I have not yet received the Prime Minister's reply and
I am sure that the Prime Minister will be able to give
me a reply in the near future. I have not yet received
any official reply to the official reply to the
official reply.

Two.

740.00/2007

FILED

ML -2- from Tokyo Aug. 3, 10:45 a.m. #384

Two. With regard to the point which I am desired to clarify, I am strongly impressed by the primary significance which is generally attached in Japan to the fact that notice of termination of the commercial treaty was given by the United States without prior intimation as there would have been had the action been motivated in large part by economic considerations. The deduction that the motivating considerations were political in character is confirmed by noting American press and other popular reaction to the notice of termination.

(END SECTION ONE)

DOOMAN

TIC:RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

II
 This message must be closely Tokyo
 paraphrased before being com-
 municated to anyone. (C) FROM: August 3, 1939
 Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

304, August 3, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I find no dissent either in the press or among individuals Japanese from the conclusion that the recent American action demonstrated a positive American attitude. There is, however, complete uncertainty as to the compass of issues which might cause the United States to give effect to that attitude by further decisive action and conversely silent on field within which American and Japanese policies can be respectively pursued without conflicting with each other. Every action and statement of Chinese attitude is now being microscopically examined in the hope of finding a clue towards solving these questions.

Three. I realize that there are considerations leading to the action taken by our Government last week which fall entirely outside the field of my observation and which made necessary a step obviously falling within the realm of high policy. But I feel that before this correspondence is closed I should record my estimate of the effects which will be produced by delivery of the reply in the form decided upon by the

ML #2- from Tokyo, Aug. 3, 10:35 a.m. #384 Sec.2

the Department. I believe that the reply would be interpreted (a) by the Japanese Government as an indication that the attitude now taken by the American Government requires the termination of the conflict with China as a condition precedent to the betterment by Japan of her relations with the United States; and (b) by the Prime Minister as a closing of the door to insure peace in the Far East. (END MESSAGE)

DOOMAN

HR:DDM

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

August 4, 1942

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CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

August 3, 4 p.m.

One. With reference to your suggestion that the Prime Minister's personal and confidential move merits a reply separate from the written reply to his written message, we feel that as his move was made orally you might, subsequent to the delivery of our written reply, indicate to him or to some appropriate official in his immediate entourage that, in view of the statement contained in your numbered paragraph one of your 242 of May 23, 11 p.m., we construed his proposal as an elaboration of his message and for this reason the written reply thus includes indication of the reaction to the Prime Minister's confidential views.

Two. We find it difficult to understand your statement that knowledge of the Prime Minister's proposal is probably confined to the Prime Minister's entourage in the light of the statement made to you by the Polish Ambassador as reported in your 266, June 8, 7 p.m., that the Foreign Minister had informed the Polish

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

740.00/2007

CMB
Confidential File

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Day letter
Night letter

-2-

Washington,

Charge to

5

Ambassador that the views of the American Government in regard to the possibility of Japan and the United States collaborating to bring about a detente in Europe were being explored. Also, the British Government some time ago approached the Department and stated that it had heard a report along this line and inquired as to the attitude of this Government.

Three. It would appear from your comment that it is the reaction in Japan to the action of this Government in giving notice of intention to terminate the commercial treaty, rather than anything in the tone or contents of the proposed reply itself, which, if the reply should be delivered now, would in your opinion be likely to emphasize the impression that the United States has now initiated a definitely positive attitude toward Far Eastern problems. The reply was prepared a number of weeks ago and was addressed solely to the contents of the Prime Minister's message as amplified by his subsequent comment. It is realized, however, that the reply, although it has no repeat no reference to the question of treaty termination, might, if delivered now, tend to cause the reactions you anticipate. In as much as it has not repeat not been and is not repeat not the Department's intention that the reply be interpreted as related to the question of treaty termination the

Enclosed by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

7-4202 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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Department of State

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-3-

Washington

Department authorises you to withhold its delivery for a short time if in your judgment such delay would be likely to render the reply less susceptible to such interpretation.

Four. When delivering the reply please bear in mind the Department's desire, as indicated in the last paragraph of the Department's mail instruction no. 1767 of July 8 that the reply be regarded as strictly confidential.

Noting

FE: JWB: HJN/HES

FE

Enciphered by

Send by operator

M.

19

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

Tokyo

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. FROM
(C)

Dated August 5, 1939

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

389, August 5, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 342, August 4, 3 p.m.

One. I very greatly appreciate the authorization granted me by the Department to make in country to the Prime Minister the explanatory statement indicated by the Department.

Two. With regard to the question raised by the Department in the second paragraph of its telegram under reference I do not (repeat not) have the information from anything said to me by the Polish Ambassador during our conversation on June 9 or in any subsequent conversation that the Foreign Minister had told him anything on that subject which does not lie within the four corners of the message handed to Mr. Grew on May 18. That message was indeed an effort to explore the possibility of an American-Japanese detente in Europe but does not itself go so far as to propose for consideration as the Prime Minister did subsequently ¹⁰ the calling of an international conference to discuss business interests as well as European problems.



740.777.017

FILED

MA -2- tel # 389, August 5, 9 p.m. from Tokyo

problems. With regard to the inquiry at the Department of the British Ambassador, Craigie asked me about two months ago whether I could clarify a report he had heard (presumably from the Polish Ambassador) to the effect that the Japanese Government had approached our Government with regard to the situation in Europe, and I replied that as the Department alone was in a position to decide whether any information on this matter should be given to the British Government, inquiry would best be made in Washington.

Third. The Department will note from our immediately following telegram that the timing of the delivery of the reply has been further complicated by reported important developments in Tokyo. My inclination is to withhold action

~~as the reports for confirmation.~~

DOOMAN

NPL

~~(*) Apparent omission.~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
HIDEPART AFFAIRS
AUG 14 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to agent. (ER & C)

FROM

TOKYO

Dated August 5, 1939

Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

250, August 5, 10 p.m.

Our 388, August 4, 7 p.m.

One. I heard today from two reliable sources that the army supported by a joint recommendation by the Japanese Ambassadors at Berlin and Rome are again vigorously pressing the government for an alliance with Germany and Italy. My informants said that the government is resolutely opposing the proposal and has staked its existence on the issue and that if the government should fall the next Prime Minister would probably be General Araki although one informant made the statement that a strong effort would be made by his friends to bring forward General Ugaki.

Two. **STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.** The Minister of the Navy referring to reports of this character during the course of a conversation which I had with him upon the subject said, "The demagogues are getting busy again with their propaganda". He expressed confidence that this new effort of those he described as desperadoes would be fought off.

Three.

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FILED

NO -2- #390 from Tokyo, August 5, 1939

Three. The city is today alive with rumors-- that an attempt was made to assassinate Ikeda, former Minister of Finance, and a leading liberal; that the King of England has addressed a message to the Emperor recommending moderation of Japan's attitude toward Great Britain; that military exercises against the Soviet Union are to be taken in Szechuan and so on. Whatever element of truth that might be in them has undoubtedly been greatly exaggerated but the sudden currency of such sensational rumors is significant.

DOOLAN

NFL

-2- #323, August 3, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

gave him a copy of the reply and said that it included, for the reasons specified in paragraph one of the Department's 242, August 4, 3 p.m., indication of the Secretary's reaction of the Prime Minister's confidential views.

Two. Fujii's comment was that the reply seemed to be addressed to the Prime Minister's written message and looked as if that light, would be thought to be well received by his principal. He said that he would see the Prime Minister again this evening after the five minister conference (called to discuss the alliance with Germany and Italy).

Three. I marked the reply strictly confidential and told both Yoshizawa and Fujii that it was not (repeat not) to be published.

DOONAN

CSF

EXHIBIT NO. 178**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. Memorandum dated May 9, 1946 from State Department Liaison Officer to Committee Counsel concerning date of receipt of letter from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, dated September 22, 1941, addressed to President Roosevelt.

2. Memorandum dated October 30, 1941 from Secretary of State for the President enclosing a reply for the President to send to Ambassador Grew, pursuant to the Ambassador's letter of September 22, 1941.

3. Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State and attached letter dated September 22, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to the President.

4. Copy of letter dated September 1, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to a Japanese friend, in which he summarizes this government's policy concerning Japan, and which he enclosed with his letter to the President dated September 22, 1941.

5. Memorandum dated November 8, 1941 and attached dispatch #1769 dated November 7, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the State Department (two sections).

6. Dispatch #1803 dated December 5, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the State Department.

7. Dispatch #1910 dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department relating the reply of the Japanese Emperor to the President's message of December 6, 1941.

MAY 9, 1946.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

The Honorable SETH W. RICHARDSON,
*General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States.*

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: Reference is made to Mr. Masten's oral inquiry regarding the date of receipt in Washington of Ambassador Grew's letter to President Roosevelt dated September 22, 1941, which was transmitted by the President to the State Department on October 29, 1941. A careful search has been made, but no information has been found in the Department's records relative to this question. However, for your information in this connection the Department's records show that several mail despatches from Tokyo bearing the dates September 3, September 15 and September 20, 1941 were received in the Department's Division of Communications and Records on October 27, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your memorandum of October 29, 1941 transmitting a letter of September 22 addressed to you by Ambassador Grew at Tokyo, there is enclosed for your consideration a draft reply to Mr. Grew.

Ambassador Grew's letter and its enclosure are returned herewith.

C H

Enclosures:

1. To the Honorable Joseph C. Grew.
2. From the Honorable Joseph C. Grew, September 22, with enclosure.

October 30, 1941

Dear Jack:

I am much interested in the comments contained in your letter of September 22, 1941 in regard to Friess' message. It seems a pity that during the time that he was President there could not have been rallied in Japan a wider and stronger support for a moderate and peaceful policy.

I also have read with interest the copy, which you enclosed, of a letter addressed by you to a Japanese friend who had asked for American sympathy and cooperation in the pursuit by Japan of "her legitimate interests and aspirations". It seems to me that in your letter you covered admirably and comprehensively the subject of American attitude toward relations with Japan. I appreciate your having sent me a copy of the letter.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Joseph G. Green,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

October 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you read the enclosed
from Joe Grew and let me have a
suggested reply?

F. D. R.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
OCT 29 1941
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

911.94

2457

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Tokyo, September 22, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT,
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON.

DEAR FRANK: I have not bothered you with personal letters for some time for the good reason that letters are now subject to long delays owing to the infrequent sailings of ships carrying our diplomatic pouches, and because developments in American-Japanese relations are moving so comparatively rapidly that my statements would generally be too much out of date to be helpful when they reached you. But I have tried and am constantly trying in my telegrams to the Secretary of State to paint an accurate picture of the moving scene from day to day. I hope that you see them regularly.

As you know from my telegrams, I am in close touch with Prince Konoye who in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements in the country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's relations with the United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for having allowed our relations to come to such a pass and he no doubt now sees the handwriting on the wall and realizes that Japan has nothing to hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must shift her orientation of policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive that has led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means business and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the evidence of Japan's bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her commitments, I believe that there is a better chance of the present Government implementing whatever commitments it may now undertake than has been the case in recent years. It seems to me highly unlikely that this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased probability of war—*Facilis descensus Averno est*—and while we would undoubtedly win in the end, I question whether it is in our own interest to see an impoverished Japan reduced to the position of a third-rate Power. I therefore most earnestly hope that we can come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at least to some degree, the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to implement those terms.

I venture to enclose a copy of a letter which I recently wrote to a Japanese friend who had expressed the hope that the United States would ultimately come to sympathize and to cooperate with Japanese in pursuing her "legitimate interests and aspiration". The letter was sent by my friend, on his own initiative, to Prince Konoye.

My admiration of the masterly way in which you have led and are leading our country in the present turmoil in world affairs steadily increases.

Faithfully yours,

JOSEPH G. GREW.

Enclosure.

Copy of a letter from the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to a Japanese friend who wrote expressing the hope that the American Government would ultimately come to sympathize and, if possible, to cooperate with Japan in pursuing her "legitimate interests and aspirations".

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, September 1, 1941

My dear

I well know how deeply the present situation in international affairs is paining you, just as it is paining me. It is a dark and critical period that we are passing through, but during the past nine years I have seen our two countries pass through several crises and surmount them, and I firmly believe that we shall eventually surmount the present one. I cannot visualize the utter stupidity of war ensuing between Japan and the United States, and if ever a break should occur I feel convinced that it will not come as a result of any deliberated act on the part of either of our Governments but rather through some unfortunate act brought about by extremist elements. I know very well that Prince Konoye and Admiral Toyoda, and the President and Mr. Hull, are

doing their utmost to avoid war and are dealing with the situation with the highest statesmanship, courage and far-sighted vision. Pray God that they may be allowed to achieve success and that their unlightened efforts will not be wrecked by short-sighted and intransigent elements in either country.

But many things have been done over the past several years and are being done today which are not permitted to come to the knowledge of the public in Japan, and therefore it is very difficult, I should say impossible, for the Japanese people to view the situation objectively and to weigh all the factors which have led to the present unhappy pass in our relations. Merely as an illustration, I doubt if many Japanese know of the serious incidents which occurred only recently, when Japanese aviators attacked our Embassy and our navy ship the TUTUILA, sister ship of the ill-fated PANAY, in Chungking on several occasions; our Embassy was damaged, fortunately without loss of American lives, and a bomb missed the TUTUILA by only a few yards, but damaged her. Our Embassy and our ship are in a safety zone, recognized by the Japanese Government, and no military objectives are near them. Three American officers who witnessed the attack on the TUTUILA from a near-by hill have officially expressed their opinion

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that the attack was deliberate or, at the very least, due to criminal negligence. The Japanese planes came over in perfectly clear weather; one plane left the others and took a course directly over the TUTUILA, dropping its bomb as it passed over the ship and missing her only by a split-second of time. If the ship had been sunk, or if our Ambassador had been killed, as might easily have occurred, I do not think that the present status of our relations could have stood the strain because the entire American people would have become enflamed. I said this to Mr. Matsuoka early in June after the first attack on our Embassy, when the buildings had been actually hit; I said that never during my nine years in Japan had I been more anxious over any situation than these obviously deliberate attacks on our Embassy and ship, and that of all the difficult problems with which the Minister was faced, I felt certain that he was confronted with no more serious problem than this one. Mr. Matsuoka replied "I agree with you", yet the attacks continued, three or four of them within a few weeks. By such hair-breadth escapes are America and Japan still hoping and working to avoid a break.

You write of the desirability of our recognizing Japan's legitimate interests and aspirations. Indeed our Government has time and time again, and only recently, expressed its full appreciation of Japan's

legitimate interests and aspirations, realizing that Japan, restricted as she is in her islands, must have access to raw materials, markets for the products of her industries and a free flow of trade and commerce. Nevertheless, unless Japan is willing to abandon aggression by force there can be no hope for an improvement in our relations. We know by sad and bitter practical experience that Japan's so-called "New Order in East Asia" and "Co-Prosperity Sphere" visualize no neighborly relations on the basis of reciprocity and a free give-and-take but rather an order in which Japanese

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interests, or what she conceives to be her interests, are to be predominant and to be exercised to the exclusion of the legitimate interests of other countries. We have watched the gradual but inexorable elimination of our own legitimate interests over these past several years, our long-standing and patiently-established business, commercial, industrial, banking and cultural interests, all legitimate and cooperative activities, progressively ousted first from Manchuria, and then, in turn, from North China, the ports, the Yangtze, and now they are in process of being excluded from Indochina, in spite of the most categorical assurances and promises that the Open Door and equal opportunity would be scrupulously observed everywhere. Every Foreign Minister -- especially Hirota, Arita, Nomura -- have given us such promises but not one of those promises has been carried out. Why? Those promises were unquestionably given in good faith. But the military would not permit their implementation. Japanese armed force has prevented their implementation. Is it surprising that when Admiral Toyoda assures me of Japan's peaceful intentions, I am obliged to recount to him those past bitter experiences? How, in the light of those experiences, can my Government believe any such promise or assurance given us by any Japanese Government?

Highly placed Japanese are constantly talking and writing about Anglo-American imperialism in East Asia,

about Anglo-American encirclement. Please look at the record. So far as the United States is concerned, we have always wished Japan well, have proved our friendship by concrete acts. In the old days we protected Japan from unequal treaties which other nations attempted to foist upon her. We counseled and actively helped Japan in her splendid efforts to become a great modern Power. At the time of the Great Earthquake we did everything in our power, spiritually and materially, to show our friendship for Japan and to support and aid her in her hour of trial. Up until the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 we were negotiating with China for the abrogation of the unequal treaties, ready and willing to abandon our extraterritorial rights, including our extraterritorial judicial, commercial and customs rights, and this would unquestionably have come to pass if Japan had not set out on her long course of aggression and the use of armed force as an instrument of national policy. The Exclusion Clause of our Immigration Act of 1924 cast a dark shadow on our relations, but do you know that prior to 1931 our Government had been steadily working to have that clause cancelled? In a few months that obnoxious clause, which naturally wounded your proud and sensitive people (even though it was a domestic measure, taken for the same economic protection that Japan has been continually invoking and acting upon during

recent years), would almost certainly have been withdrawn. But then came Japan's invasion of Manchuria, and we then knew that further efforts at that time to withdraw the exclusion clause were hopeless.

I do not believe that you, my dear friend, or many of your friends, have any detailed knowledge of the patience and forbearance exercised by the American Government and people in the face of the truly outrageous treatment of our own legitimate interests at the hands of Japanese authorities, both military and civil, during these past years. Our missions throughout China, including churches, hospitals, universities and schools, have been ruthlessly bombed and wrecked and American missionaries and their families have been killed or injured in spite of the fact that such buildings were clearly marked by American flags both flying and painted on the roofs and their precise location marked on maps submitted to the Japanese military authorities, showing that they were seldom if ever in the neighborhood of any military objectives. There can be no shadow of doubt that these cruel and brutal attacks were planned and executed with careful intention. Accidents can happen, but not two or three hundred accidents of the same kind. It is a saying among the Chinese that when a Chinese city or town is bombed by Japanese aviators, the most dangerous spot and the one to get far away from is the

American mission. It is perfectly clear that the Japanese bombers were following a concerted plan to drive American missionary, educational, medical and cultural activities out of China permanently. We might have broken relations with Japan on this issue alone, but we didn't; we remained patient and, permit me to say, long-suffering. Yet you write: "Even an incident one-tenth as bad as that of the bombing of Iren will never take place in this our part of the world."

The same concerted drive against our business firms, banks, industrial interests, commercial and shipping activities, has steadily and inexorably progressed, first in Manchuria, then in North China, the ports, the Yangtze valley, and now in Indochina where American-owned cargoes have been ruthlessly seized and shipped away. Is this the Open Door and equal opportunity, of the scrupulous safeguarding of which I so often received the most categorical assurances from successive Japanese governments?

Meanwhile the southward advance progressed step by step, one step at a time, first occupation, then consolidation, a pause to watch its result, and then another forward step. All this time many of your leading men, Admirals, Generals, retired Ambassadors, prominent writers, publicists and politicians, were contributing articles to

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the daily press and magazines advocating the rapid pushing of the southward advance and the elimination of the Americans and Europeans and all of their interests and activities from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including the South Seas". And this advance was to be pursued first by high-pressure diplomacy and then, if necessary, by force. Can you possibly believe that if France had not been powerless she would have allowed the occupation of bases, both naval and aviation, in Indochina? Or can you possibly believe that Great Britain, completely occupied as she is with the war in Europe, where her own national life and the safety of the British Isles are at stake, would or could start a program of unprovoked aggression and invasion against Indochina or Thailand, or that the United States or the Netherlands would ever even consider such aggression? The fallacy of the alleged ABCD "encirclement" is too patent to fool even a school boy -- if he knows the facts. But in the light of Japan's recent actions and the clear intentions of so many of Japan's prominent men as expressed by them in their articles in the daily newspapers and magazines, is it surprising that the ABCD powers realize beyond a shadow of a doubt that it is they who are being "encircled" and that Malaya, Burma, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines themselves are in direct line for future aggressive moves

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by Japan in establishing and consolidating the so-called "New Order in Greater East Asia including the South Seas" and that defensive measures had therefore to be taken? From all that has passed and from all that is being said and written and done, the evidence is clear for all to see that what is euphemistically called the "Co-Prosperity Sphere" means eventual Japanese hegemony over all the areas therein contained. From all the evidence, is it not abundantly clear that we in the United States must now and in future be guided alone by facts and actions and that we can no longer rely on words or assurances of peaceful intentions? I have stated this fact categorically to Admiral Toyoda, after recounting to him our past bitter experiences when we did rely on such assurances.

To turn to the China Affair. Few people know, but I know, that about ten days or a fortnight after the outbreak of hostilities in July, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek sent a message through the British Embassy here to the Japanese Government, offering an immediate armistice and the withdrawal of all Chinese troops if the Japanese troops would likewise withdraw to a given line pending negotiations. Mr. Dodds was then the British chargé d'Affaires, and when he received that message from the British Ambassador in Nanking he came to ask my advice

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as to whether he ought to deliver it to the Japanese Government without instructions from London because his own Government might regard the step as in the nature of offering mediation, yet the message was too urgent for him to wait for instructions. I told him that he could not possibly take the responsibility of not delivering the message immediately, so he did so and later London approved. The message was delivered to Mr. Horinouchi who was then Vice Foreign Minister. But it died, alas, and nothing came of it. History will most certainly take full cognizance of that effort of Chiang Kai-shek for peace. The Japanese forces didn't want an armistice. They have now had war for over four long years with no end in sight. Chiang Kai-shek, a brave and far-sighted man, is still the legitimate head of the Chinese Government, is still fighting against ruthless aggression against his country, and Wang Ching-wei could not live a day if Japan's bayonets were withdrawn. How can he therefore be regarded as representative of China or, in fact, anything more than a puppet? I know well Japan's former troubles in China and with China, but those troubles could have been smoothed out eventually by peaceful negotiation. They have not and never will be smoothed out by war which, unless terminated on terms acceptable to the Chinese -- also a proud and sensitive people -- will

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make real friendship between Japan and the Chinese impossible for generations to come.

Another and essential aspect of the situation is this. We believe, with abundant reason, that Germany, as controlled by the Nazis, seeks world domination by force and that once in control of Europe and the British Isles it would be only a question of time before the Western Hemisphere was attacked. Hitler has said as much in published statements. We believe that the Nazis seek to control and to alter our whole way of life. Therefore, as a reasonable and sensible measure of self-defense, we determined to help Great Britain to avoid defeat. When Japan allied herself with Germany we inevitably came to associate Japan with the same general program, so far as the Far East is concerned, and we thereupon determined to assist not only Great Britain but all other victims of aggression, including China. In pursuing that policy we feel that it would be utterly short-sighted to pour supplies into Great Britain across the Atlantic while complacently watching the potential cutting-off of Great Britain's other great life-line to the East which would be accomplished by the fall of Singapore to any Axis Power. Therefore, whatever threatens Singapore, directly concerns the United States. The occupation of bases in Indochina definitely does threaten Singapore. The occupation of bases in Thailand would

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constitute a still more serious threat. Therefore, if Japanese forces should now undertake a further move on the line of the southward advance (and many Japanese openly advocate such a move), I question whether our relations could stand the strain involved.

Incidentally, you mention Iran. The British began to fight this war as amateurs perhaps, but at least like gentlemen. They trusted like gentlemen to Germany's pledged word. But gradually they saw what they were encountering, an enemy whose pledged word counted for nothing. In spite of non-aggression pacts and the most solemn assurances given on the very eve of aggression they saw one country after another fall to the absolutely ruthless invader and to the work of fifth columnists within those countries -- Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, France, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and now Soviet Russia -- as Churchill has so aptly said, "one by one". Do you remember what Hitler said after the seizure of Austria, and after Munich, and after the seizure of Czechoslovakia: "I am now completely satisfied. This is the last territorial readjustment I will seek." In every case Great Britain was too slow and too late. At last she has wisely learned by bitter experience, and it is that experience

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which prompted her very wise occupation of Syria and Iran -- before Hitler could get there and could threaten the Suez Canal and the whole Mediterranean area. But note the difference: Hitler aims to control all of Europe and has so stated; Great Britain has pledged herself, and the world by experience can rely on her pledges, to withdraw from Iran and to restore her complete sovereignty the moment the necessity for these measures of self-defense has passed. I applaud her action. I cannot admire the action of Japan's allies.

Incidentally we now learn that the bombing of Iranian cities by either the British or Soviet forces has been officially denied. I am inclined to believe that the bombing report was merely Nazi propaganda.

International relations, if they are to be stable and secure, must be based upon the scrupulous observance of international commitments. Breaking of the pledged word between nations can lead only to international anarchy. Was it not the breaking of the Nine Power Treaty that constituted the first step in this long line of breaches of international commitments by certain nations? It is maintained in Japan that Japan did not break the Nine Power Treaty. Yet look at the text and the facts which speak for themselves. It is held in Japan that under changed conditions that treaty had become obsolete. Very well, our Government has stated in

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categorical terms that it is ready at all times to consider the effect of changed conditions upon international commitments and to modify or modernize those commitments by peaceful negotiations. We do not regard and never have, as charged, regarded the status quo as permanently unalterable. Our negotiations with China for abandoning our extraterritorial rights proves the point, just as does our willingness to surrender our permanent leases in Japan and many other legitimate but outmoded rights. But once Japan resorted to force as an instrument of national policy in breaching an important international treaty, from which Japan had gained much when it was concluded because it was a carefully balanced undertaking, entered into by Japan freely and, at that time, gladly, a precedent was set and an example was created which were soon followed by other nations, beginning, as you will remember, by Italy's action in Ethiopia. This was the beginning of international chaos of which we see the sad result today.

Through the process of publicity and propaganda in Japan, largely stimulated from Axis sources, the Japanese people are today told that the Anglo-Saxon countries propose to "encircle" Japan by their imperialistic ambitions, to obtain complete hegemony in East Asia, to control commerce and trade and sources of raw materials, and to drive Japan to the wall. How untrue is this pic-

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ture you, my dear friend, know only too well, yet how can we hope to improve our relations so long as the Japanese people are made to believe these preposterous charges? My Government believes, and I believe, that Japan's legitimate interests and aspirations should be given the fullest recognition.

As you know, I am no defeatist. I believe that in spite of present difficulties we can still guide our ^{relations} respective countries into healthy channels, and for that high purpose I am constantly thinking and working. Below are four points which my Government regards as essential for our future good relations. We confidently believe that Japan would achieve the greatest happiness, security, prosperity and contentment by following a policy of peaceful and productive expansion based on the principle of free and equal treatment for all nations, a policy which would have the full support of the United States, while we believe that the continued use of armed force will lead eventually to social, economic and financial disaster. These are the points:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

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4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

On such a basis and, I fear, only on such a basis will the United States ultimately come to sympathize with us in our efforts and, if possible, cooperate with us.

If Japan will mould her policy and actions on the basis of the foregoing four points and will abandon aggression, I see a happy outlook for the development of a new era in Japanese-American relations, contributing to Japan's future prosperity and welfare through a free flow of trade and commerce, access to the needed raw materials and a successful continuation of industrial development, resulting in a progressive raising of the standard of living of her people and a return to the old cultural values of life which have so brilliantly illuminated her background and history.

We should at all times be aware that the facts of geography are immutable. For better or for worse Divine Providence has placed our respective nations on either side of the Pacific; we are neighbors for all time to come; and nothing that anyone can do can alter that fact. Since the beginning of relations between our two countries -- almost ninety years ago -- we have maintained peace between ourselves, and with the exception of the past ten

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years, our relations have been marked by friendship, good will, and respect, the one for the other. The tradition of good neighborly relations must be restored, for if we fail in that task, there will be introduced into the Pacific the tradition of war which has cursed Europe since the beginning of history. We who are charged with the accomplishment of this task, who are working for the welfare not only of this generation but of those yet unborn, need your help and the help of all other men of good will.

With expressions of warm friendship, I am as always,
My dear

Cordially yours,

JOSEPH C. GRANT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 8,
1941.

Commander Watts of ONI informed Mr. Schmidt of FE that the Navy Department had seen Tokyo's 1769, November 7, 11 p.m., and Commander Watts said that the Secretary of the Navy would like to be informed of the contents of Tokyo's 1736, November 3, 3 p.m., to which reference is made in the last sentence of Tokyo's 1769, November 7, 11 p.m. Commander Watts was thereupon given a full paraphrase of Tokyo's 1736, November 3, 3 p.m.

MWB
FE:Schmidt:HES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BAS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

FROM Dated, November 7, 1941

Rec'd. 2:10 p.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

1769, November 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND
UNDER SECRETARY.

One. A prominent Japanese who is in close
touch with the Government came to see me today
at the instance, he said, of the Foreign Minister.
He said that as the Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo
could not talk to me with the freedom he desired
and therefore was sending me the following suggestion
indirectly. The Japanese Government has reached
a decision as to the concessions it will be possible
to make toward meeting the viewpoint of the United
States, but even if these concessions should prove
disappointing to the American Government and should
be regarded as inadequate, it is highly important
that the conversations in Washington be continued
and that they be not (repeatedly) allowed to come
to a breakdown.

Two. Informant then continued as expressing
ostensibly



711.94/2425

PS/MHA

Confidential File

PRIORITY

NOV-1941

1950, November 7, 11 p.m. INJECTION ONE from Tokyo.

definitely his own point of view which may or may not have reflected the views of the Minister. He said that the present situation was exerting a disastrous effect upon Japan and that if continued it would oblige the Government in due course to meet the position of the United States. If only for that reason the Washington conversations should not be allowed to lapse.

Three. I pointed out to informant and asked him so to inform the Foreign Minister, that the present truculent and aggressive Japanese press campaign against the United States, especially such articles as that contained in the JAPAN TIMES and ADVERTISER on November 5 (Department's 716, November 5, 7 p.m.), last evening's NICHU NICHU article charging that the United States talked like a prostitute (Embassy's 1957, November 6, 6 p.m.) and other articles in similar vein, were rendering the efforts of the American Government and my own

GREW

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AMT

FROM Tokyo

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated November 7, 1941

Rec'd 12:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1769, November 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Efforts to bring about an adjustment of relations more and more difficult in the face of American public opinion which naturally believed that these inflammatory articles, particularly the articles in the JAPAN TIMES AND ADVERTISER, which is known to be the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, correctly represented the attitude of the Japanese Government. Informant said that he would repeat my remarks to the Foreign Minister and would show him the articles under reference.

Four. Informant said that we must not pay too much attention to the Japanese press. When dogs are frightened, they bark, and the more they are frightened the louder they bark. At present the Japanese military are frightened at the future outlook. Changing the metaphor, informant said that the United States makes the mistake of regarding the Japanese as mature people whereas they are

Confidential File

-2- #1769, November 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

they are but children and should be treated as children. A friendly word or gesture inspires confidence. The Germans have understood this psychology of the Japanese and have played upon it with success.

Five. Once again informant begged that whatever might happen, the conversations be not allowed to come to a breakdown because, if a complete breakdown should occur, he feared the results envisaged in the final sentence of my 1736, November 3, 3 p.m.

(END OF MESSAGE)

ORHW

EDM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HPL

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

FROM

Dated December 5, 1941

Rec'd 1:25 PM

Secretary of State

Washington.

1893, December 5, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My British colleague informs me that in the
opinion of the British Naval Attaché, who has
recently seen officials of the Japanese Navy
Ministry, the news of the arrival in Singapore of
British naval reinforcements including capital
ships has caused serious concern in Japanese naval
circles and the presence of British capital units
at Singapore, which was apparently not anticipated,
may have upset Japan's naval strategic plans.

GREW

NPL

DEC 13 1941

FILED

PS/ATB
Confidential File

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/677

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEV

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Dated December 8, 1941

FROM: d 6:23 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1910, December 8, 1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Embassy's 1906 December 8, 1 a.m.


One. The Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock this
morning asked me to call on him at his official
residence.

Two. He handed me a 13 page Memorandum, dated
today, which he said had been transmitted to the
Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present to
you this morning (evening of December 7th Washing-
ton time). He said that he had already been in
touch with the Emperor who desired that the afore-
said Memorandum be regarded as his reply to the
President's message.

Three. The Foreign Minister thereupon made
to me the following oral statement:

"His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness
and appreciation for the cordial message of the
President. He has graciously let known his
wishes

wishes



740.0011 P. W./891

PS/WHA
Confidential FileFILED
DEC 11 1941

-2- #1910, December 8, 1 p.m., from Tokyo

wishes to the Foreign Minister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the latter's message:

Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the circumstances of the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina to which His Majesty has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indochina constitutes one of the subject matters of the Japanese-American negotiations. His Majesty has commanded the Government to state its views to the American Government also on this question. It is, therefore, desired that the President will kindly refer to this reply.

Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact.

GREW

HPD

EXHIBIT NO. 179**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

The following documents from the files of former President F. D. Roosevelt have previously been placed in the Committee Record or Exhibits.

1. Memorandum entitled "Directive dated 30 November 1941 from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador General Oshima in Berlin". This appears at pages 204-206 of Exhibit 1, as messages Nos. 985 and 986 from Tokyo to Berlin.

2. Joint memorandum dated November 27, 1941, from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to President Roosevelt—Exhibit 17.

3. The following documents, all of which are included in Exhibit 18:

a. Telegram dated November 24, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill.

b. Memorandum of conversation dated November 24, 1941, of Secretary Hull, Lord Halifax, Dr. Hu Shih, Honorable Richard G. Casey, and Dr. A. Loudon, the Netherlands Minister.

c. Memorandum of conversation dated November 25, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Dr. Hu Shih.

d. Telegram dated November 25, 1941, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to Dr. T. V. Soong.

e. Memorandum of conversation dated November 25, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Lord Halifax.

4. Memorandum dated October 17, 1941, from Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt, enclosing proposed message from the President to the emperor of Japan—Exhibit 20.

5. Memorandum entitled "*MOST SECRET*", unsigned, which was attached to memorandum of conversation dated November 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Lord Halifax—Exhibit 21.

6. Two telegrams for Secretary Hull from President Roosevelt and draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government—Exhibit 22.

7. Telegram dated November 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt—Exhibit 23.

8. Telegram dated November 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt—Exhibit 24.

9. The following documents, which are published in Volume II, Foreign Relations of the United States and Japan, 1931-1941—Exhibit 29:

a. Memorandum of conversation dated February 14, 1941, between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura, Vol. II, p. 387.

b. Memorandum of conversation dated March 8, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, Vol. II, p. 389.

c. Memorandum of conversation dated March 14, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 396.

d. Memorandum of conversation dated April 14, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 402.

e. Memorandum of conversation dated April 16, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 406.

f. Memorandum of conversation dated July 24, 1941, between Acting Secretary Welles and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 527.

g. Memorandum entitled "PROPOSAL BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT", bearing handwritten notation "File lockbox. This is reply to my proposal." and accompanying two-page "oral" memorandum, both documents bearing notation "Copy of a document handled by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary on August 6, 1941"—Vol. II, p. 549.

h. Memorandum of conversation dated August 17, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 554.

i. Two-page memorandum dated August 27, 1941 entitled "TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE PRINCE PREMIER OF

JAPAN", and accompanying six-page memorandum commencing, "The Japanese Government has received the communication . . ."—Vol. II, p. 572.

j. Memorandum of conversation dated August 28, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 576.

k. Memorandum of conversation dated September 3, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, together with accompanying "oral statement" and message "TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN, FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES"—Vol. II, p. 589.

l. Memorandum of conversation dated November 15, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine, Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi—Vol. II, p. 722.

m. Memorandum of conversation dated November 17, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 740.

n. Memorandum of conversation dated November 18, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 744.

o. Memorandum of conversation dated November 19, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 751.

p. Memorandum of conversation dated November 20, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 753.

q. Memorandum of conversation dated November 22, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 757.

r. Memorandum of conversation dated November 26, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 764.

s. Memorandum of conversation dated November 27, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 770.

t. Memorandum of conversation dated December 1, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 772.

u. Memorandum of conversation dated December 5, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 778.

v. Memorandum dated December 1, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull and Undersecretary Welles—Vol. II, p. 779.

Note.—Except as indicated above, none of the foregoing copies of memoranda of conversations bear any handwritten notes; several of the memoranda have attached notes from Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt which are not published in Vol. II, of which the following is an example: "Memorandum for the President. I believe you may be interested in reading the attached copy of my conversation with Admiral Nomura on April 14. C. H."

10. G-2 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Recent Developments in the Far East"—included in Exhibit 33.

11. Telegram dated November 2, 1941, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt—included in Exhibit 47. There is attached to the telegram a copy of a memorandum dated November 11, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, as follows:

"This is the corrected telegram to me from Chiang Kai-shek. After reading it, let me know if I should make any change in the message I am to hand Hu Shih on Wednesday. F. D. R." Comparison of the "corrected telegram" with the telegram as appearing in Exhibit 47 discloses that the word "European" appearing in the next to the last line of the first incomplete paragraph on page 3 should be changed to the word "whole"; that the words omitted in the fourth line from the bottom of page 4 are the words "given a pretext"; that the word "seriously" at the end of the eighth line on page 5 should be changed to "gravely"; that the word "plea" in the twelfth line on page 5 should be changed to the word "help"; and that the following words, "as I have suggested to Mr. Churchill, I feel that success would be assured", should be inserted in the fourth line from the bottom of page 5 immediately following the words "combined operation".

12. General Marshall's Aide Memoire to the President re Defense of Hawaii—Exhibit 59.

13. General Marshall's memorandum to the President re Ground Forces—Exhibit 60.

14. Message dated August 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill—Exhibit 70.

15. Memorandum dated February 11, 1941, from Admiral Stark to President Roosevelt—included in Exhibit 106. Attached to this memorandum is a brief memorandum to President Roosevelt from Admiral D. J. Callaghan, as follows: "Admiral Stark asked me to forward this to the President since he considered the matter of some urgency."

16. Report dated December 14, 1941 by the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to the President after the Secretary's visit to Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack. Printed in transcript at page 6221.

17. Memorandum for the President from General Watson transmitting from Admiral H. R. Stark the letter dated Feb. 9, 1941 from Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias to Admiral Stark. The letter concerned the interview Zacharias had with Admiral Nomura on Feb. 8, 1941. See Exhibit No. 141.

18. Dinner guest list at White House for Dec. 6, 1941. See Exhibit No. 58.

19. List of outside telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. See Exhibit No. 58.

20. Letter dated Sept. 22, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the President, memorandum for the Secretary of State, and the President's reply dated October 30, 1941 to Ambassador Grew. See Exhibit No. 178.

21. Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941 from the President to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerned with a proposed visit to Australia by Mr. Willkie. Exhibit No. 111.

22. Memorandum for the file and attached copy of the President's remarks on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at 9:00 with legislative leaders on December 7, 1941. Exhibit No. 160.

23. Message dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, reporting the reply of the Japanese Emperor to the President's message of December 6, 1941.

In addition to the foregoing documents, items numbered 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 14 in Exhibit No. 158, and all documents appearing in Exhibit No. 159, were obtained from the files of former President F. D. Roosevelt. See tables of contents attached to those exhibits for descriptions of the individual documents.

The following documents from the files of former President F. D. Roosevelt have not previously been placed in the Committee record or exhibits, and are included in this exhibit:

24. Letter dated January 7, 1941 from President Roosevelt to Francis B. Sayre, High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands.

25. Letter dated December 13, 1940 from Commissioner Sayre to the President, with attached memorandum dated December 26, 1940 enclosing copies of dispatch #966 dated Dec. 10, 1940 from Commissioner Sayre to the President, transmitted by Naval radio through the Interior Department, and comments to the Press by Sayre and President Quezon of the Philippines, and a newspaper clipping.

26. Memorandum dated January 11, 1941 for the President attaching Naval message dated Jan. 6, 1941 from Alusna Tokyo to OpNav.

27. Navy dispatch dated Jan. 11, 1941 from Alusna, Tokyo to OpNav.

28. Memorandum dated January 19, 1941 from Secretary of War Stimson for the President concerning the Philippine Scouts.

29. Letter dated Jan. 21, 1941 from the President to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew.

30. Letter dated December 14, 1940 from Ambassador Grew to the President, and attached memoranda.

31. Memorandum dated April 10, 1943 from the President for the Secretary of State.

32. Letter dated Jan. 22, 1941 from Secretary of War Stimson to the President enclosing a memorandum entitled "Resume of Situation Relative to Bill 1776."

33. Copy of memorandum dated Jan. 31, 1941 from the President for the Secretary of the Navy and attached letter dated Jan. 23, 1941 from Evans Carlson to Miss LeHand, presidential secretary.

34. Memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 from the President for the Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

35. Memorandum dated Feb. 3 and 11, 1941 from the President and memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 from Secretary of State Hull for the President, and attached letter dated Jan. 27, 1941 from Father James E. Walsh to Postmaster General Frank C. Walker.

36. Memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President.

37. Memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 for the President on proposal by Father Walsh.

38. Memorandum dated Feb. 10, 1941 from the President for the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Budget.

39. Memorandum dated Feb. 12, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President with attached suggestions for interview with the Japanese Ambassador.

40. Memorandum dated Feb. 15, 1941 from the President for Secretary Hull concerning the Spratley Islands.

41. Memorandum dated Feb. 20, 1941 from the President for Mr. Sumner Welles.

42. Memorandum dated March 11, 1941 for the President, attaching a brief of Admiral Pratt's interview with Ambassador Nomura on March 4, 1941.

43. Memorandum dated March 13, 1941 for the President attaching copy of report made by Rear Admiral R. K. Turner of his conversation with Ambassador Nomura on March 12, 1941.

44. Letter dated March 13, 1941 from Joseph E. Davies to Stephen T. Early, and attached memorandum from Mr. Davies to the State Department.

45. Memorandum dated Feb. 17, 1941 from Wilbur A. Nelson, University of Virginia, for the President, and attached memoranda, and a copy of a reply dated March 13, 1941 to Nelson on behalf of the President.

46. Memorandum dated March 14, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President concerning suggestions for an interview with the Japanese Ambassador.

47. File memorandum concerning letter dated March 21, 1941 from General Douglas MacArthur to Mr. Stephen T. Early relating to the office of High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands.

48. Copy of a letter dated March 29, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the President concerning the Philippine defense.

49. Memorandum dated April 3, 1941 from the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning the Japanese government and its obligation to the Axis.

50. Letter dated April 4, 1941 from Resident Philippine Commissioner J. M. Elizalde to Secretary of the Interior, memorandum dated April 11, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President, and attached memorandum.

51. Memorandum dated April 10, 1941 from Secretary of the Interior for the President concerning Philippine defense preparations.

52. Memorandum dated April 15, 1941 from Stephen T. Early for the President and others concerning rumors of Japanese plans to delay American merchant shipping.

53. File Memorandum concerning a letter from Admiral T. C. Hart dated April 4, 1941 to Admiral H. R. Stark.

54. Memorandum dated April 28, 1941 from Secretary Knox for the President, transmitting memorandum dated April 22, 1941 from Joseph B. Phillips for Admiral Pratt, and memorandum dated April 30, 1941 by Admiral Pratt concerning his interview with Admiral Nomura on April 28, 1941.

55. Memorandum dated May 6, 1941 from the President for Secretary Hull concerning letter from Commissioner Sayre dated April 23, 1941.

56. Letter dated May 7, 1941 from the Secretary of the Interior to the President concerning the Philippines.

57. Memorandum dated May 6, 1941 from Gen. E. M. Watson, presidential aide, for the President concerning Japanese insurance firms in the U. S.

58. Letter dated May 10, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President and attached dispatch #120 dated April 1, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the State Department.

59. Letter dated April 23, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President and a cover letter to Brig. Gen. Watson, and memorandum dated May 15, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President suggesting a reply.

60. Letter dated June 20, 1941 from Secretary Ickes to the President, and the President's memorandum dated June 23, 1941 to Secretary Ickes, concerning suggestion made by Edwin W. Pauley relating to the Japanese situation.

61. Memoranda and letters dated June 6, 9, 13, 14 and 17, concerning sugar exports and political matters in the Philippines.

62. Navy Department reports to the President dated June 17, 18; July 2, 3, 7, & 16, 22, on the general intelligence available.

63. Letter dated June 25, 1941 from Raymond Haight to the President and reply dated July 11, 1941 on behalf of the President.

64. Memorandum dated July 15, 1941 from Gen. G. C. Marshall for the President concerning a Japanese intercept relating to an ultimatum planned for Indo-China from Japan.

65. Dispatch proposed in July 1941 from Gen. G. C. Marshall for Gen. Douglas MacArthur setting up the U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, bearing approval of the President on July 26.

66. Miscellaneous correspondence in July 1941, and letter dated Dec. 11, 1940 from the Director of the Budget to the Secretary of War, between various govern-

ment offices concerning the "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the U. S., the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines."

67. Draft of dispatch dated July 26, 1941 from the President to Harry L. Hopkins in London, concerning trip to Moscow proposed by Hopkins.

68. Memorandum dated July 26, 1941 from WDH for RF concerning Philippine military forces.

69. Letter dated July 18, 1941 from Ambassador Josephus Daniels to the President enclosing a memorandum from E. Stanley Jones on the Far East problem, which documents were transmitted to the President by Mr. Sumner Welles by memorandum dated July 28, 1941.

70. Information Bulletin dated July 25, 1941.

71. Letter dated July 25, 1941 from Harry Hopkins to the President.

72. Memorandum dated July 29, 1941 from the President to Sumner Welles and his reply dated July 31, 1941 concerning reports of withdrawal of Japanese troops from sections of the China front.

73. Dispatch #1131 dated July 30, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the State Department concerning the Japanese advance on Indo-China.

74. File Memorandum dated Aug. 9, 1941 concerning proposed executive order "Establishing Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area."

75. File Memorandum dated Aug. 12, 1941 concerning proposed executive order "Transferring the U. S. Coast Guard for the District of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii . . . to . . . the Navy."

76. File Memorandum dated Aug. 18, 1941, concerning proposed executive order "Suspension of Eight-Hour Law as to mechanics and laborers employed by the War Department in the construction of public works in the Territory of Hawaii necessary for the national defense."

77. File Memorandum dated Aug. 20, 1941 concerning Navy request for authority to acquire four purse seiners to be converted into patrol vessels, for the 14th Naval District, stating Hawaii lacks adequate patrol vessels.

78. Unsigned memorandum dated Aug. 16, 1941 addressed apparently to the Secretary of State by an employee in the Far East Division of the State Department.

79. Letter dated July 31, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President and the President's reply dated Aug. 23, 1941, and attached memoranda.

80. Information Bulletins dated Aug. 6, 7, 8, 11, and 12, 1941.

81. Memorandum dated August 28, 1941, from J. W. Ballantine for the Secretary of State.

82. Memorandum of dates of three lunches with President Roosevelt, on July 8 and 11, and October 8, 1940, attended by Admiral J. O. Richardson.

83. Memorandum for the President from W. R. Smedberg, III, concerning military forces in China.

84. Dispatch No. 1384 dated Sept. 4, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the State Department (six sections) concerning Japanese offer of suggestion for meeting between Japanese Prime Minister and President F. D. Roosevelt.

85. Memorandum dated Sept. 9, 1941 from Gen. G. C. Marshall for the President, quoting from letter from Gen. MacArthur on the mobilizing of Philippine army units.

86. Letter from the President dated Sept. 26, 1941 for President Quezon of the Philippines.

87. Letter dated September 26, 1941 from the President to Commissioner Sayre, Manila, in reply to Sayre's letter of September 15, 1941.

88. Letter dated Sept. 15, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President reporting on the political situation in the Philippines.

89. Memorandum from the President to the Director of the Budget, dated September 18, 1941.

90. Memorandum dated Sept. 18, 1941 for the President from the Director of the Budget concerning purchase of a 6 month food supply for Hawaii.

91. Memorandum dated Sept. 28, 1941 from the President to the Secretary of State concerning negotiations with the Japanese.

92. Letter dated Oct. 14, 1941 from the President to the Secretary of War, dictated by HLH, referring to the Secretary's letter of Sept. 22, suggesting that subsequent to February 1942 more 4-engine bombers be allocated to the British.

93. Memorandum for the President from Harry L. Hopkins dated October 14, 1941 referring to the above letter to the Secretary of War.

4246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

94. Letter dated Sept. 22, 1941 to the President from the Secretary of War in reply to the President's letter of Sept. 18, concerning production and distribution of 4-engine bombers.

95. Schedule of Presidential appointments for October 16, 1941.

96. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 25, 1941.

97. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 28, 1941.

98. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 27, 1941.

99. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 28, 1941.

100. Confidential Bulletin dated October 20, 1941.

101. Memorandum dated December 9, 1941 from Harry Hopkins to Miss Tully, concerning letter dated October 21, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the President, concerning the allocation of 4-motored bombers.

102. Memorandum dated October 25, 1941 from the President to Commissioner Sayre.

103. Memorandum dated October 22, 1941 from the Secretary of State to the President, concerning request of Commissioner Sayre to visit China.

104. Memorandum dated October 22, 1941 from the President to the Secretary of State concerning a letter dated October 8, 1941 to the President from Commissioner Sayre, regarding an invitation for him to visit China.

105. Proposed message from the President to Commissioner Sayre (not used).

106. Letter dated October 8, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President.

107. File memorandum concerning message from President Quezon to President Roosevelt, dated October 23, 1941.

108. Letter dated October 31, 1941 from the President to President Quezon.

109. Memorandum dated October 25, 1941 from the President for Secretary of the Interior, and copy of message from President Quezon to Commissioner Elizalde, on October 22, 1941.

110. Letter from Secretary of the Interior to the President dated October 23, 1941, transmitting message from President Quezon to Commissioner Elizalde on October 22, 1941.

111. Translation of radiogram dated October 22, 1941 from President Quezon to Commissioner Elizalde.

112. Letter dated October 31, 1941 from President Quezon to President Roosevelt, replying to the President's letter of September 28, 1941.

113. Letter dated November 1, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President.

114. Memorandum from Commissioner Sayre to General Watson.

115. Confidential Bulletin dated November 3, 1941.

116. Confidential Bulletin dated November 4, 1941.

117. Memorandum dated November 6, 1941 from the Secretary of State for the President.

118. Letter dated October 18, 1941 from President Quezon to the President.

119. Memorandum dated November 6, 1941 from Secretary of State for the President, and draft of suggested reply to message from British Prime Minister concerning Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid.

120. Message dated November 7, 1941 from the President to Prime Minister Churchill, in reply to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid.

121. Memorandum dated November 6, 1941 from the President for the Secretary of War.

122. Letter dated November 15, 1941 from the President to President Quezon.

123. Letter dated October 18, 1941 from President Quezon to the President.

124. Memorandum dated November 15, 1941 from the Secretary of State for the President.

125. Memorandum dated November 15, 1941 from State Department for the President, concerning proposed remarks to Japanese Ambassadors.

126. Letter dated November 17, 1941 from Stephen Early to David Sarnoff.

127. November 13, 1941 message from David Sarnoff to the President.

128. File memorandum dated November 19, 1941 concerning legislation affecting martial law in Puerto Rico and Hawaii.

129. Memorandum dated November 21, 1941 from the Secretary of State for the President, and attached memorandum dated November 13 from Colonel Donovan.

130. November 15, 1941 memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, transmitting memorandum from Colonel William J. Donovan dated November 13, 1941, concerning substance of remarks made by Hans Thomsen on November 6, 1941.

131. Memorandum dated November 22, 1941 concerning allocation of funds for calling up the military forces of the Philippines.
132. Memorandum dated November 24, 1941 from Admiral Stark for the President.
133. Memorandum dated November 25, 1941 from Owen Lattimore, Chungking, to Lauchlin Currie, concerning Chinese reaction to the proposed *modus vivendi*.
134. Confidential Bulletin dated November 25, 1941.
135. Confidential Bulletin dated November 26, 1941.
136. Letter dated November 26, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the President concerning Japanese movement to the south from Shanghai.
137. Memorandum dated November 26, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the President concerning Japanese convoy movements toward Indo-China.
138. Memorandum from the State Department for the President dated November 27, 1941 concerning proposed remarks during call of Japanese Ambassadors.
139. Undated message from Commissioner Sayre to the President.
140. Letter dated November 28, 1941 from Secretary Ickes to Mr. McIntyre concerning suggestions of candidate for governor of the Hawaiian Islands.
141. Memorandum for the President dated November 24, 1941, from Mr. McIntyre transmitting letter from Norman Littell, Assistant Attorney General, suggesting appointee for position of governor of the Hawaiian Islands.
142. Memorandum dated November 25, 1941 from Mr. McIntyre to Secretary Ickes transmitting the above letter of Mr. Littell.
143. Letter dated December 18, 1941 from Norman Littell to Mr. McIntyre enclosing an editorial from a Honolulu newspaper.
144. Letter dated November 28, 1941 from Admiral Stark to the President, concerning Pacific bases.
145. Letter dated November 24, 1941 from James Q. Newton to Admiral Stark.
146. Letter dated December 1, 1941 to the President from Secretary Stimson concerning exchange of land in the Hawaiian Islands.
147. Letter dated December 1, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President.
148. Confidential Bulletin dated December 3, 1941.
149. Confidential Bulletin dated December 5, 1941.
150. Teletype sheet reflecting news bulletins on December 5, 1941.
151. Memorandum dated December 5, 1941 from the Navy Department concerning Japanese forces in Indo-China.
152. Schedule of Presidential appointments for December 6, 1941.
153. Schedule of Presidential appointments for December 7, 1941.
154. Typewritten list of all Presidential appointments for December 7, 1941.
155. Memorandum dated December 7, 1941 from General G. C. Marshall for the President, concerning the Pearl Harbor attack.
156. Memorandum dated December 3, 1941 from Secretary Morgenthau for the President concerning representatives of the Bank of Japan in New York.
157. Memorandum dated December 8, 1941 from Ferdinand Mayer and F. L. Belin, relating to conversations with Ambassador Kurusu on December 6 and 7, 1941.
158. List of outside telephone calls through White House switchboard on Nov. 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1941.
159. Letter dated May 15, 1941 from the President to Lauchlin Currie, and attached memoranda relating to a tentative aircraft program for China. (See Exhibit No. 159 to which these documents were attached.)
160. Military reports dated July 25 and 27, October 12, December 2, 3 and 4, 1941 with transmittal letters to the President from the British Ambassador.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

400

Philippine

January 7, 1942

Dear Frank:

I have received your letter of December 15, 1940, and I am naturally distressed to learn further of the difficulties which you have encountered in dealing with President Quezon.

I am, of course, aware of President Quezon's somewhat impulsive disposition which can occasionally make him difficult, particularly in periods of considerable stress like the present, but I feel that everything within reason should be done to prevent head-on clashes. I am in complete agreement with you that until the completion of the program for Philippine independence American sovereignty must remain intact and unchallenged, and I find it difficult to believe that anyone interested in the Philippine problem could take a different view. If the attitude of the Philippine leaders becomes such as to make it necessary, I shall not hesitate to take any steps which seem suitable to make clear that as long as our flag flies in the Philippines all necessary and lawful authority will be retained by this Government and that we will not allow our sovereignty to be encroached upon. Except as a matter of last resort, however, it appears to me essential that every effort be made to avoid the direct posing of the issues as between American sovereignty on one hand and Philippine autonomy on the other. Neither threats nor direct action along that line can have any other effect than to intensify and to magnify the many troublesome questions which lie ahead of us in the next few years of Philippine-American relations. The resort to the ultimate upon assertion of American sovereignty could only signify the breakdown of the amicable relations which have existed up to the present time and would gravely endanger the success of the entire experiment which is being undertaken.

The large degree of autonomy extended to the Philippine Commonwealth by the Independence Act may be expected to give rise to an increasing series of questions the proper solution of which will require the most delicate and judicious handling on the part of all concerned with Philippine affairs. I realize that you as High Commissioner will meet with a constant succession of pitfalls which will be trying to the soul, and that I am asking a great deal of

*Copy of reply sent to Interior.
Original sent to Interior for delivery
1/7/42
J. M.*

you, but I hope that through the means of friendly cooperation and informal conference it may be possible for you to iron out many of the complications by which you are confronted. It is my earnest hope that we may be able to conclude the Philippine program without any controversies which it is hardly possible to avoid.

With warm personal regards to you and Mrs. Sayre.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

x400 Philippines - High Commissioner

Honorable Francis B. Sayre, *xpp7206*
United States High Commissioner
to the Philippine Islands,
Manila, P. I.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Note from Hon. Francis B. Sayre, U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Manila, 12/14/40 to Dep. Satow, with enclosed letter dated 12/13/40 to the President, with attached copy of his radio of 24/10/40 concerning President Mason's statements regarding the limitations of the power of the President of the U. S. to approve or disapprove Philippine constitutional amendments, in connection with which Mr. Sayre encloses copies of President Mason's original press statement of December 4, Mr. Sayre's press statement of 12/5 and President Mason's restricted statement of 12/9 at a press conference called specifically for the purpose. Mr. Sayre feels that the President should make a statement earlier than to President Mason that as long as he remains responsible for Philippine affairs and

NOTE—Reverse side of this memorandum not available.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILA

December 13, 1940.

Personal and
Strictly confidential.AD
12/14

My dear Mr. President:

With further reference to my radio of December tenth, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, concerning President Quezon's statements regarding the limitations of the powers of the President of the United States to approve or disapprove Philippine constitutional amendments, I am enclosing herewith copies of (1) President Quezon's original press statement of December fourth, (2) my press statement of December sixth, and (3) President Quezon's reported statement of December ninth at a press conference called specifically for the purpose. I think you will be particularly interested to glance at the latter statement of President Quezon's.

Up to now President Quezon has been entirely cordial and his attack came as a complete surprise to me. This attack was obviously motivated by something deeper than my statement of December sixth, which he had to torture out of its obvious meaning in order to find a vantage point for his assault.

President Quezon seems to be growing more and more dictatorial and arbitrary, and impatient of any restraint or of any criticism, no matter how well justified. Perhaps his basic attitude is best summed up in the remark which he made publicly a few months ago when, in speaking at the opening of a new bridge, he said:

"An American businessman had the nerve to criticize me, so I told the president of the Rotary Club to tell him to get out of the country if he did not like what I had done."

What

The President,
The White House.

- 2 -

What makes the situation particularly difficult is that, in these critical times when international complications are menacing in this quarter of the world, it is obviously of large importance to avoid unnecessary altercations. For this reason I have refrained from taking issue with President Quezon on innumerable occasions in spite of considerable pressure on the part of the American community who deeply resent President Quezon's attitude. On the other hand, when President Quezon presumes to dictate what the President of the United States can or cannot do and deliberately misstates the law, I feel that I cannot remain silent. If American official representatives do not resolutely defend American sovereignty here until the date of independence, I am confident that our difficulties will be greatly multiplied. The very fact of the critical nature of the international situation makes it all the more necessary to protect and uphold American sovereignty here.

Another complicating factor is the politicians who are constantly intriguing and plotting to secure additional Philippine powers and favors from the United States. One way of gaining their ends is to play off the American officials concerned in Philippine matters, one against the other.

For all these reasons it seems to me of the largest importance, if American interests are to be protected, that more than ever all of us stand firmly together, - particularly you and Secretary Ickes and myself. If the Filipino politicians are given any reason to believe that they can play one of us off against another there can be no resolute American policy here and we are in for trouble.

It may be that at some time or other in the future, when President Quezon again jumps the traces, you will desire yourself to make a public statement making clear to President Quezon that as long as America remains responsible for Philippine defense and until independence is achieved you intend to back up the enforcement of American sovereignty in the Islands. I believe that some such statement, if made public and coming from you, would have an exceedingly healthy effect throughout the Philippines.

My effort out here is faithfully and loyally to interpret and carry out the policies you desire. It would be a great help to me, as well as a tremendous encouragement, if I could

- have

have a personal line from you, letting me know if you see the situation as I do or giving me some idea as to the fundamental policy you desire to have followed.

Very sincerely yours,

Frank

Serial No. 966
DECEMBER 10, 1940.

Radio Sent: Navy
Code B
No. 901
HAMPTON,
Department of Interior, Washington, D. C.
Rush. Confidential for the President.

QUOTE See attached radio No. 884 December sixth from me to Hampton. I made statement of December sixth quoted therein in order to defend position and powers of President and because of the inappropriateness of President Quezon's undertaking to attempt to dictate the limits within which President of the United States may act. See my confidential letter to you of September 16, 1940.

President Quezon yesterday morning at a press conference called specifically for the purpose bitterly and with unconcealed emotion criticized and attacked my statement of December sixth, reiterating the view previously expressed in his press statement of December fourth. The issue of course is at present a purely academic one and I hope the incident will be closed with President Quezon's outburst. In answer to requests from the press for a further statement I have told the press I have nothing to add to my original statement.

Please refer to my radio No. 538 of August second to Department of Interior and my confidential letter to you of September twelfth in regard to emergency powers act. President Quezon is manifesting increasing irritation and impatience whenever anything is said or done which tends to impair his full freedom of action and resents restraints resulting from American sovereignty. I am doing my best to avoid difficulties but I believe that unless American sovereignty is resolutely upheld until the date when independence is granted we will be faced with increasing difficulties here. UNQUOTE

To Hampton. Please send to President with this message copy of my radio to you No. 884, December sixth concerning press statements. SAYRE.

[ENCLOSURE No. 1]

In proclaiming President's approval of Philippine Constitutional Amendments President Quezon on December 4 issued following statement:

"We should be, and in fact are, happy and grateful over the approval by President Roosevelt of the constitutional amendments. There should never have been any doubts in our minds as to what action the President would take. Under the Independence act, the President of the United States may only disapprove the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines if they do not conform with the provisions of the said Independence act. On no other ground may the President disapprove amendments to the Philippine constitution. Furthermore, President Roosevelt, being a progressive and a liberal, would naturally incline to let our people assume responsibility for our own government.

"I have telegraphed the President our thanks."

ENCLOSURE No. 2

At a press conference on December 6, when questioned in regard to President Quezon's statement of December 4, the High Commissioner read Section 7, paragraph 1 of the Tydings-McDuffie Act and said:

"It is clear from that language that it is exclusively for the President of the United States to approve or disapprove such amendments as may be proposed to the Constitution of the Philippines, and I know of nothing in the Independence Act or in the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution restricting his right or power to do either."

[Daily Bulletin—Manila, Dec. 10, 1940]

QUEZON HITS BACK AT HIGH COMMISSIONER

When questioned last night, Woodbury Willoughby, executive assistant to High Commissioner Sayre, stated that the Commissioner had nothing to add to what he had said at the press conference last Friday.

(By Cipriano Cld)

President Quezon, at a press conference yesterday morning, openly and vigorously criticized a statement attributed to United States High Commissioner

Francis B. Sayre that the President of the United States may veto any amendment to the Philippine constitution on any ground since his veto powers are not limited.

President Quezon declared that the view expressed by the High Commissioner at his press conference last Friday was a shock to him because, he intimated, it not only was not called for but it showed clearly that Mr. Sayre has failed to grasp the true philosophy of the Tydings-McDuffie independence law and the history of the progress of Philippine-American relations.

He expressed surprise over the High Commissioner's hearing on the constitutional amendments since in his opinion there was nothing in them which could have given cause for their disapproval by President Roosevelt. He reiterated his view that the American President may reject changes to the constitution of the Commonwealth government only upon the grounds specified in the Tydings-McDuffie law and upon no others unless, he said, the President wants to be arbitrary and ignore altogether those moral and political restraints which have made possible the smooth progress in the relationship between the United States and the Philippines.

For after all, the President confessed, the ultimate power in the relationship between any nations is that of physical force, and the United States, he stated, has all the power necessary to suppress every vestige of liberty in the Philippines.

President Quezon was commenting on a statement of High Commissioner Sayre reported in the Bulletin last Friday. The High Commissioner was quoted as having said that he knew of "nothing in the Tydings-McDuffie act which restricts the power of the President of the United States to approve or disapprove any amendments to the constitution as he sees fit."

High Commissioner Sayre was then commenting directly on a statement of President Quezon issued in connection with the approval by President Roosevelt of the Philippine constitutional amendments which was the object of a trip to the United States by Speaker Jose Yulo. The Quezon statement, in part, said: "There should never have been any doubt in our minds as to what action the President would take. Under the independence act, the President of the United States may only disapprove the proposed amendments to the constitution of the Philippines if they do not conform with the provisions of the independence act. On no other ground may the President disapprove the amendments to the Philippine constitution."

President Quezon told his press conference he objected to the construction by High Commissioner of the extent of the powers of the American President regarding the acts of the Commonwealth affecting their internal government and to the High Commissioner's using his press conferences as a means of expressing his disagreement over acts of the National Assembly and the views of the officials of the executive department of the Commonwealth.

He frankly stated that he called the conference yesterday for the purpose of replying to the High Commissioner, explaining that if the Commissioner, in contrast with his predecessors, is going to continue utilizing his press conferences to disagree with Commonwealth officials, he would find him a willing "cooperator" because he would love to argue with the High Commissioner or with anybody.

After stating the purpose of the conference and saying that he would not waste time by waiting for the reporters to ask him questions as usual, the President went on to say that although he has been aware for sometime of the position of the High Commissioner regarding the extent of the President's powers to veto or approve Philippine constitutional amendments, Mr. Sayre's public statement of them has been a painful surprise to him. "I have not recovered from the shock yet," he said.

Mr. Sayre's views, he said, surprised him because the High Commissioner is apparently such a lover of democracy. He said he writes and talks of democracy to lead people to believe he not only preaches democracy but would practice it.

But the views expressed by the High Commissioner regarding the legal and political aspects of Philippine-American relationship as reported in the press are wholly contrary and so at variance with the principles of a democratic government that to advocate them would be to advocate a reactionary policy.

The President undertook to show the High Commissioner's error by stating that he cited only Section 7 of the constitution to bolster his position that the American President's powers over rejection or approval of the amendments are

not restricted by law. He admitted that this section of the constitution placed no limitations upon the powers of the American President but asserted that it is not right to construe the scope and extent of the veto powers of the American President upon one section of the constitution.

In order to fully understand the limitations placed upon those powers, he argued, one must look to other provisions of the constitution and the law which gave power and authority to the Filipino people to draft their own constitution. He said it is elementary in law, as not only the lowest member of the judiciary but even the student of law knows, to interpret laws in their entirety, and not only so but to look to the spirit behind its enactment.

In the drafting of this constitution, congress, the President said, has placed only the following limitations upon the character of government that they would establish under it: (1) That it be republican in form; (2) that the constitution have a bill of rights, those same rights guarantee to American citizens, and (3) certain other limitations which must be appended to the constitution safeguarding the proper exercise of the sovereignty of the United States over the Islands.

Only upon an infringement of any or all these limitations placed upon the nature and power of the Philippine government may the President of the United States veto the constitutional amendments, President Quezon stated.

The Tydings-McDuffie law is the consummation of a series of acts and pronouncements of the United States government dealing with the Filipino people, the President said, the redemption of the pledge duly made by the United States government that the Americans had come to the Philippines not to subjugate its people but to teach them the art and science of self-government and to secure for them the blessings of liberty.

This law, he said, was enacted by congress in accordance with the promise made in the Jones Law that the Filipino would be granted their independence as soon as a stable government could be established by them. He added that congress found the Filipino people politically prepared for independence but due to economic policies which made the Philippines dependent upon the American market, the immediate severance of ties with the United States would result in serious consequences to the Philippines.

He said that it was for this reason that the Congress of the United States instead of enacting a law granting immediate independence—which should have been justified even then if the political ability of the Filipinos was to be considered alone—approved the Tydings-McDuffie independence act which provides for the granting of independence after a transition period of ten years.

Under this law, he said, the economic relations between the two countries would gradually change from Philippine dependence upon the United States market to that of ability to trade in the world market.

Congress had two ways of bringing about such a change, the President went on to explain. Congress could merely have continued with the Jones Law or it could have enacted laws to enable the Filipino people to readjust their economy to meet the new situation.

But congress wisely did not do so, he said, not only because there were minds in congress which were not reactionary but also because the sense of responsibility of congress counseled that the Filipino people be allowed to work out their own readjustment under a new law which vested in them the right to form a government of their own.

"They decided that the Filipinos should create their own government with sufficient powers to meet and solve the problems that should be solved in preparation for independence," he stated. "So ten years were given us by the United States government with powers which would not infringe upon the sovereignty of the United States so that we may look after our own affairs and save ourselves from ruin. That is the political philosophy behind the enactment of that law."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached despatch from our Naval
Attache at Tokyo is forwarded as being of
possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

4258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PM 1836 2 MOTH 160990 MUSH Q DART F5Q PLUG D GR 48

FROM: ALUSNA TOKYO
ACTION: ORNAV
INFO: ALUSNA SHANGHAI+ GINCAF+ COW 36

ROUTINE/1

COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S FIRESIDE CHAT WHICH NOT FULLY REPORTED IN
ENGLISH LANGUAGE OR VERNACULAR PAPERS INDICATE ATTEMPT MINIMIZE
IMPORTANCE MAKE JAPANESE PEOPLE BELIEVE PRESIDENT EXPRESSING
OWN OPINIONS NOT VIEWS AMERICAN PEOPLE X PRESIDENT ACCUSED MAKING
IRRESPONSIBLE REMARKS PRESUMPTIONS PREDICTIONS DISREGARDING ACTUAL
FACTS AND OF DRIVING AMERICA INTO WAR

EX-1174441

17 OCT 1941

17 OCT 1941 17 OCT 1941

BPM 2355

Z MOIN 114250 HUSK Q DART F50 PLUS D BR 58

FROM: ALUSNA TOKYO.

ATTN: OPNAV.

INFO: ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI -CINCAF-CONSIXTEEN.

NITE/JA

REPORTS CHANGED U S FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDERS CARRIED
LARGE HEADLINES ALL VERNACULAR PAPERS X TYPICAL COMMENT THAT U
PREPARING FOR WAR IN BOTH OCEANS BY ORGANIZING TWO OCEAN FLEET
AND REPLACING ~~WHENEVER~~ OLIER LESS ENERGETIC OFFICERS X YOMIURI
REMARKS THAT ADMIRAL RICHARDSON WHO ADVOCATED CAUTIONS POLICY
TOWARD JAPAN REPLACED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL WHO ADVOCATED STRONG
AGGRESSIVE POLICY

17AHMX13JAN

24 JAN 52

1911 12 14 85

SECRET

400

January 22, 1942.

Philippines

x335

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

It is desired to increase the present enlisted strength of the Philippine Scouts from 6,415 to the 12,000 authorized. This is to be accomplished by one year enlistments.

This increase will permit raising some existing units to war strength, and the formation of some new units.

It is believed that this step will increase the defense aspects of the Philippine Islands, and will materially affect the morale of the Philippine garrisons.

If this memo with your approval, the increase will be indicated at once.

HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

x25

HLS
OK
FOR

1-25-41

SECRET

*Original sent to State for delivery by
pouch 1/21/41
hms*

C. F. State

January 21, 1941

Dear Joe: *x204*

I have given careful consideration to your letter of December 14. *x3575*

First, I want to say how helpful it is to have your over-all estimates and reflections--based as they are upon a rare combination of first-hand observation, long experience with our Japanese relations, and masterly judgment. I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusions.

I also want you to know how much I appreciate your kind words of congratulation on my re-election and your expression of confidence in my conduct of our foreign affairs.

As to your very natural request for an indication of my views as to certain aspects of our future attitude toward developments in the Far East, I believe that the fundamental proposition is that we must recognize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. We must, consequently, recognize that our interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East. We are engaged in the task of defending our way of life and our vital national interests wherever they are seriously endangered. Our strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy which takes account of every front and takes advantage of every opportunity to contribute to our total security.

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem of our attitude toward Japan the question whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat. In this connection it seems to me that we must consider whether, if Japan should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the

*x197
X197-A
X463-6
C. F. State-European War
x48*

- 2 -

the chances of England's winning in her struggle with Germany would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in those Isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have prepared strong local defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve center of the British Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources for their sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies economic, military and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by importing goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas financial resources. They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out locally but also by distant and widespread economic, military, and naval activities which both contribute to the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply to their enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force of their armed power against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire. The British need assistance along the lines of our generally established policies at many points, assistance which in the case of the Far East is certainly well within the realm of "possibility" so far as the capacity of the United States is concerned. Their defense strategy must in the nature of things be global. Our strategy of giving them assistance toward ensuring our own security must envisage both sending of supplies to England and helping to prevent a closing of channels of communication to and from various parts of the world, so that other important sources of supply will not be denied to the British and be added to the assets of the other side.

You also suggest as chief factors in the problem the questions whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war. As I have indicated above, the conflict is world-wide, not merely a European war. I firmly believe, as I have recently declared publicly, that the British, with our help, will be victorious in this conflict. The conflict may well be long and we must bear in mind that when England is victorious she may not have left the strength that would be needed to bring about a rearrangement of such territorial changes in the western and southern Pacific as might occur

- 3 -

during the course of the conflict if Japan is not kept within bounds. I judge from the remarks which appear at the bottom of page 4 and at the top of page 5 of your letter that you, too, attach due importance to this aspect of the problem.

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems which we face are so vast and so interrelated that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I must emphasize that, our problem being one of defense, we can not lay down hard and fast plans. As each new development occurs we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.

With warmest regards, .

As ever
(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

January 21, 1941

Dear Joe:

I appreciate and I thank you for your thoughtful courtesy in sending me enclosed with your letter of December 14 four new Japanese stamps, including two commemorating the 2600th anniversary. I am, of course, delighted to have these stamps. Among other things, I have not failed to note the Imperial crest which appears on each of them.

x18757-84

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Joseph C. Grew, ^{x187164}
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Original sent to State for delivery by pouch
1/21/41
Jm

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1941


My dear Mr. President:

I have before me, by reference from you of January 3, Mr. Grew's letter to you of December 14, 1940.

I find attached to Mr. Grew's letter an envelope which is inscribed "New stamps". In order to avoid chance of that envelope and its contents being lost, I return the said envelope to you herewith, together with a draft of a letter in acknowledgment thereof.

I am sending to you separately a draft of a possible reply to Mr. Grew's letter under reference.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

1. Envelope containing four Japanese stamps.
2. Draft of letter to Mr. Grew.

The President,
The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

January 21, 1941

Memorandum for the President

In response to your memorandum of January 3, 1941, there is attached hereto a draft of a letter for your signature to Mr. Grew in reply to Mr. Grew's letter to you of December 14, 1940. Mr. Grew's letter is returned herewith.

C.H.

x20

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY
TOKYO

December 14, 1940.

*ackd.
11/21/41*

Dear Frank:

I would give a great deal to know your mind about Japan and all her works. It seems to me to be increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown someday, and the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle, to be:

- (1) whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war;
- (2) whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat; and
- (3) to what extent our own policy in the Far

The President,
The White House.

-2-

East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies now and later.

... Those are questions which, with our limited information here, I am not qualified even approximately to answer.

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows:

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United States stands for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from

-3-

pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward in a forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.

History has shown that the pendulum in Japan is always swinging between extremist and moderate policies, but as things stand today we believe that the pendulum is more likely to swing still further toward extremes than to reverse its direction. Konoye, and especially Matsuoka, will fall in due course, but under present circumstances no Japanese leader or group of leaders could reverse the expansionist program and hope to survive.

Our own policy of unhurried but of inexorable determination in meeting every Japanese step with some step of our own has been eminently wise, and that policy has sunk deep into Japanese conscious-

-4-

ness. But while important elements among the Japanese people deplore the course which their leaders are taking, those elements are nevertheless inarticulate and powerless and are likely to remain so. Meanwhile the Germans here are working overtime to push Japan into war with us. I have told Matsuoka point blank that his country is heading for disaster. He has at least seen that his efforts to intimidate us have fallen flat and have had an effect precisely the reverse of that intended.

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared, with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and baggage from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including the South Seas" (which God forbid), we are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

A progressively firm policy on our part will entail inevitable risks - especially risks of sudden uncalculated strokes such as the sinking of the PANAY which might enflame the

-5-

American people - but in my opinion those risks are less in degree than the far greater future dangers which we would face if we were to follow a policy of *laissez-faire*.

In other words, the risks of not taking positive measures to maintain our future security are likely to be much greater than the risks of taking positive measures as the southward advance proceeds. So far as I am aware, the great majority of the American people are in a mood for vigorous action. The principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program, but when.

It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that if we take measures "short of war" with no real intention to carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to

-5-

do so will our preliminary measures stand some chance of proving effective and of removing the necessity for war, - the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914.

If by such action we can bring about the eventual discrediting of Japan's present leaders, a regeneration of thought may ultimately take shape in this country, permitting the resumption of normal relations with us and leading to a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem.

In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. No doubt you have ^{seen} some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called "New Structure" is in an awful mess and the bickering and controversy that go on within


-7-

the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and loved.

If you are willing to give me even a cue to your thoughts, either in a personal ultra-confidential letter or orally by some trustworthy person coming out here, it will be of tremendous help.

I cabled you my enthusiastic and affectionate congratulations on your re-election. You are playing a masterly hand in our foreign affairs and I am profoundly thankful that the country is not to be deprived of your clear vision, determination and splendid courage in piloting the old ship of state.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Joseph P. Kamp", written in a cursive style with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

CONFIDENTIAL "PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL" MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
April 10, 1943

P
C. F. State

The President said: "What do you think I should answer to Joe Grant" - He transmitted (as per brief): Letter to CWF 4/7/43 from Mr. Joseph G. Crow enclosing copy of the President's letter to him of 1/21/41 (copy retained in file) which he wishes to publish in his forthcoming book "The Navy in Japan".

See G.P. - MEMO

42
Jan 22^d 1941
Lend Lease
Folder

"WOODLEY"
3000 CATHEDRAL AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dear Mr. President-

Here is the Sombor paper of which I spoke. While the composition and final suggestions and conclusions are entirely mine, both Marshall and Starks have read the paper and approved the factual statements as sound. A first draft of it was also read and approved by Knox.

Faithfully yours

I. H. S.

Jan. 22/43

Confidential

RESUME OF SITUATION RELATIVE TO RULL 1776

I.
~~immediate~~
The situation abroad.

1. The ocean supply situation of the British Isles has not been solved. It will probably grow worse during the spring and summer. New supply of ships either from here or Britain cannot relieve it for at least another ten months. Britain's American supply of munitions is constantly imperiled and her minimum food supply may be reached in a very few months. The strain on Britain for convoys is bearing harder and harder on her naval power elsewhere.

2. Britain's air situation is probably being slightly improved but she has yet no defense against a constant wearing attrition in the shape of sporadic bombardment which is diminishing her industrial capacity and straining her morale.

On the other hand, Germany undoubtedly has a large reserve of air power which she can draw upon for a heavy blow in support of an invasion. She is evidently planning such an attack possibly in the near future and probably by next summer.

3. While Britain has temporarily saved Egypt and the Canal and is probably knocking Italy out of her African possessions, she has not air control over the Central Mediterranean and her communications through the Mediterranean are likely to be interrupted by the German reinforcement of Italy. Germany is evidently reinforcing Italy and may be also planning to stop the Greek success. If she decides not to invade the British Isles, it is possible that she may move south into Egypt and Spain in furtherance of a plan to starve England, destroy her morale, and lower her prestige.

4. Japan is still pressing slowly down towards an attack on the Netherlands in which she would in all probability be successful as against the Dutch and British forces there.

II.

The situation in the United States.

1. The comparative power of our fleet has recently been presented by Secretary Knox. In case of loss of the British fleet, it would be far inferior to the combined German, Italian and Japanese fleets. The main fleet is still in the Pacific.

2. The Panama Canal is subject to the hazard of sabotage and air attacks either by a surprise approach from the sea or after land bases have been seized in the Western Hemisphere.

3. In case of the fall of Great Britain and elimination of its fleet, our Atlantic fleet supported by protective land and air garrisons would be confronted with the difficult task of simultaneously guarding against:

- a. The establishment of air bases in South America through Fifth Column assistance.
- b. Surprise air raids upon the populous cities of our eastern seaboard or upon the Panama Canal from ships operating in the Atlantic.
- c. The establishment of an airplane base in Newfoundland or Labrador.

4. In any event the defense against a and c above would have to be supported by expeditionary forces of land troops.

5. In the case of the establishment of an air base in either Newfoundland or Labrador, air attacks would be possible upon American cities on the eastern seaboard as far south as Wilmington, N.C., and as far west as Detroit, and Columbus, Ohio.

6. In case of the establishment of hostile bases north of Dutch Guiana, similar attacks by Heinkel bombers could be made upon the Panama Canal.

7. Our attache reports that Germany will probably have 1200 such bombers equal to or better than our B-17 by next September. We shall have nothing comparable to such a force by that time.

8. Our Protective Mobilization Forces will not be trained or fully armed until March 1942. Prior to November 1941 we would have much difficulty in providing the essential expeditionary forces for the defense of Newfoundland, the Caribbean area, north-eastern Brazil and the support of South American Republics without dangerously stripping our continental defense of materiel.

9. Our recently acquired British naval and air bases will not be fully equipped or armed until the summer of 1942.

10. Without reinforcements the permanent garrison in Newfoundland would be entirely insufficient to defend northern Newfoundland from a foreign attack, and the establishment of an air base there. Similarly the permanent garrisons in the Caribbean area will require heavy reinforcements in order to render them secure against a major attack.

11. If Japan simultaneously became an enemy, the hazards involved in reinforcing the Atlantic fleet from the main Pacific fleet would be much increased.

12. So long as the Panama Canal remained open, transfers to the Atlantic could be made which in all probability would meet the various dangers in the Atlantic which are enumerated above, while still leaving American interests in the Pacific sufficiently secure.

We must be prepared, however, against the possibility that the Canal may be blocked by a surprise operation for a period of a month or more, completely changing our defensive situation in the Atlantic until the arrival of the main fleet in those waters.

III.

The ultimate situation

In case of the loss of the British fleet accompanied by hostile action against us by all three Axis powers, while our immediate defensive position might be thus rendered temporarily secure by transfer of the main fleet to the Atlantic, this would probably not be true of our ultimate position. Not only would the aggregate present naval strength of the three Axis powers far exceed the present naval strength of this country, but those powers would be left in control of such superior facilities for shipbuilding as to make it probable that they could become and remain indefinitely a menace to this hemisphere — able to effect permanent hostile

-4.

lodgments upon its continents. Certainly we would have no ground for expecting either of those powers to develop a naval policy as compatible with our interests as has been shown by the British Empire during the past 125 years.

IV.

1. The above described immediate dangers to the United States arising from a defeat of Great Britain and a loss of the British fleet during the coming spring or summer cannot be entirely eliminated by anything which it is possible for us to do in respect to selling munitions to Britain between now and next September.

2. Whatever benefit Britain would derive during that period from the passage of Bill 1776 would be mainly in the increased morale which such passage would undoubtedly give to the British people. The enactment of the Bill would undoubtedly somewhat expedite the furnishing to her of American munitions owing to the centralization of purchasing and the flexibility of operations which it permits. But the immediate material advantages would, in my opinion, be far from sufficient to greatly increase her defensive power. For example, our production of the items of planes, guns (including aircraft guns, tank and anti-tank guns), and ammunition, will not be greatly increased until 1942.

3. By far the chief material benefit to be derived by Britain from the passage of that Bill will not come until 1942. By that time she will derive immense benefit from the law, and that benefit will continue through the period necessary for her recuperation after the war is over in case she wins a victory.

The present shortage of Britain's supply of American exchange which has resulted at present in all further orders for the purchase of munitions in this country being forbidden by the President will be remedied by the Bill's passage. No really important munitions, however, which may then be ordered could possibly be finished and delivered until after the coming 1941 emergency.

V.

Conclusions.

The prompt passage of Bill 1776 offers probably the last possible opportunity of, to any extent, contributing to the defense of this country by aid to Britain which is short of military action. That extent is mainly limited to the increase of British morale, which would be effected. In material the assistance rendered during the coming six months would be insignificant. And when a people are suffering from such strain and shortage of supplies, including food, as will soon be the case with the British people, preservation of morale is difficult. I therefore think that the President should consider whether the American government has not reached the time when it must realize that the policy it has thus far followed of limiting its aid to measures which are short of military action will not probably secure a British victory. It is my belief that consideration should be given to measures which will at the same time secure the life line of British supplies across the Atlantic and relieve their convoy duty units of her fleet which are sorely needed elsewhere.

18-b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

x16

I hear in a private letter that the Marine detachment at Guam, which went through the November third hurricane, has been from top to bottom magnificent in digging themselves out and repairing the damages. It is suggested, however, that after all they have been through it might be good for the morale to move them somewhere else and replace them with new personnel.

F.D.R.

Letter from Evans Carlson, Honolulu, T.H.,
1/23/41 to Miss LeHand, retained for our files.
No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum
to the Secretary of the Navy.

Honolulu,
23 January 1941.

Dear Miss LeHand:

I arrived here yesterday afternoon by the China Clipper. It hardly seems possible that I dined in Manila on Sunday night and arrived in Honolulu on Wednesday.

It was a tremendously interesting trip for me. I have crossed the Pacific nine times by ship, but this air voyage brought home in vivid manner how modern communications have shrunk distances.

I found Guam struggling to recover from the devastating typhoon of November 3d. It certainly wrecked the island. The Marine area was particularly hard hit. The Marines ~~was~~ are working hard to put their place in order again, but a catastrophe of the magnitude which they experienced takes something out of human beings. At Wake Island I learned that the PanAir people had changed their personnel who went through a recent typhoon, putting in an entirely new crew. It struck me that it wouldn't be a bad idea to do the same with the Marines at Guam. A new outfit would go in with fresh enthusiasm and without the terrifying memory of the ordeal through which they ~~presented~~ ~~presented~~ ~~presented~~ have passed.

Apparently I was wrong with my guess that the New Fourth Army problem would be solved without a resort to arms. When I was in Hongkong I was informed by the local Communist representative that the order had been issued by General Ho Ying-chia for the Central Government troops to move against the New Fourth. However, having only recently talked to Chow En-lai and heard his considered opinion that the matter would be settled peacefully I was inclined to think that the Hongkong man was trying to propagandize me, or was unduly alarmed. But apparently he was telling the truth, for when the news broke in the press at Manila the date of the movement against the New Fourth was placed at January 12th.

I am inclined to believe, though, that the affair will be localized. Chow En-lai, in his public statement following the clash, said as much. If the Communists, who are being attacked, are willing to localize it, the Central Government certainly should make every effort to do so. It is most unfortunate, though, that it should have occurred, for it cannot help but intensify the bitterness. Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador, will, I am sure, make a strong protest, and I hope that Mr. Johnson will also do so. It is imperative, it seems to me, that civil war be avoided at all cost. China must continue to resist so as to contain as large a proportion of Japan's military forces as possible.

253

x150-B
I have a suggestion to offer in connection with the China situation. The President may have considered it already, but I have been mulling the idea over in my mind since leaving Chungking and it seems to me to have some merit. It occurs to me that Admiral Yarnell would make an ideal Ambassador to China at this time. I wish in no way to cast any reflection on the work of Mr. Johnson, but for many reasons it seems to me that Admiral Yarnell might be better equipped to deal with problems which will arise in the near future. In the first place, he is admired and respected by all political groups. Then, he has a military-naval background which would be a distinct asset. His judgement is clear and sound. He can be depended on to carry out instructions to the letter, but he also has the courage and judgement to act on his own initiative when occasion demands. In this respect he would ably complement the British Ambassador.

Nelson T.
x1274
Mr. Johnson has had a long and distinguished record as chief of our diplomatic mission there, and I do not suggest that he lacks ability. It is simply that in the present situation it appears to me that Admiral Yarnell possesses certain qualifications which would enable him to get the desired results with greater ease.

This is rather a delicate matter for me to suggest and I do so only because I have given it considerable thought and feel that the idea should be submitted for consideration. I have heard the suggestion from no one else, and I do not know whether Admiral Yarnell would wish the appointment. He is a thorough patriot, though, and would serve in any capacity the President might wish.

I was glad to see that the work at Wake and Midway is well underway. My friends in the Fleet here tell me that the Fleet is in apple-pie order and ready for any call. In this connection I think I should say that I have noted with pleasure the inclination of officers, especially of senior officers, to consider new ideas. Apparently there has been some recent indoctrination from the top, for this has not always been so and the fact has worried me. Perhaps it is that Britain's experience is bearing fruit. Anyway it is a healthy sign for now is no time for complacency.

I leave for the mainland by the Matsonia tomorrow, and it will be good to be back.

With kind regards to all I am,

Sincerely,

Chas. Carlson

x150-A
x187-9851
x224

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 5, 1941.

Secret

Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

Please let me have your recommendation on this secret recommendation of the Secretaries of War and Navy.

F. D. R.

Letter dated Jan. 30, 1941 to the President from Secretaries Stimson and Knox in re request of President Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth that funds not yet appropriated but already authorized to be paid the Commonwealth from sums derived from sugar excise taxes and currency devaluation be provided at this time in order to permit improvement of the defenses of the Islands. The sum in question amounts to \$52,000,000.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 11, 1941.

Memorandum for General Watson.

Will you show this correspondence to the Postmaster General but don't give it to him?

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 3, 1941.

Private & Confidential

Memorandum for the Secretary of State.

What should I do next?

F. D. R.

Letter to Frank Walker from Father Walsh, Superior General at Maryknoll, dated January 27th, re cable sent stating that the ----- Governments are now ready to send a trusted representative to discuss the terms of a projected agreement.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

Referring to your memorandum of February 3, covering a letter from Bishop Walsh to the Postmaster General, and to the memorandum which I am sending to you, separately, in comment upon possible procedure suggested by the Bishop in regard to relations with Japan,—

In as much as the Japanese Government is sending a new Ambassador, who is due to arrive here shortly, would it not seem desirable to await arrival of and contact with that Ambassador before taking any action regarding any suggestions offered through indirect channels?

The letter from Bishop Walsh to the Postmaster General is returned herewith. Enclosure: From Bishop Walsh, January 27, 1941.



MARYKNOLL : NEW YORK

January 27th,
1941Mr. Frank C. Walker
Wardman Park Hotel
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Walker:

Today we received word by cable that the _____ Government are now ready to send a trusted representative to discuss the terms of a projected agreement.

The man selected is the one who acted for that Government previous to the Disarmament Conference of 1922. We, however, still think it would be better if a representative went from here.

Of even more significance is the fact that the most recent statements from _____ are exactly in accordance with the plan which we worked out with those people before leaving their country. Their very statements are intended to indicate their consent. The harsh talk is for home consumption, lest that Government be supplanted by a group of Extremists. A bid for friendly settlement is being clearly made.

Mr. Frank C. Walker - 1/21/41 - Page #2

I have thought it might be helpful if Father Drought were to spend a week or so in Washington to remain on call. That Government has now given clear indications that a quick move along the lines proposed would be successful. Father Drought knows their plan and could interpret the day-to-day developments accordingly; whereas, their moves may otherwise puzzle, or completely deceive, any one not previously informed of their true character.

These recent developments incline us to feel that we should at least stand ready to be of immediate assistance, if our cooperation is desired. But, for this, we will rely completely on your own judgment. I would be very grateful if, without taking the trouble to write, you would indicate your opinion by 'phone or telegram.

Very sincerely yours,

James E. Walsh

Superior General - Maryknoll

RECEIVING OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of January 26, forwarding the memorandum that was handed to you several days ago by Bishop Walsh on the subject of a possible procedure in relations with Japan, I have studied the matter carefully and I give detailed comments in the memorandum immediately hereunder.

I doubt the practicability of proceeding on any such line at this time. It seems to me that there is little or no likelihood that the Japanese Government and the Japanese people would in good faith accept any such arrangement -- at this stage. It also seems to me that, if through the good offices of this Government an arrangement were worked out which would extricate Japan from its present involvement in China, the likelihood would be that Japan would extend and accelerate her aggressions to the southward rather than that Japan would change

Mr. Frank C. Walker - 1/27/41 - Page #2

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Very sincerely yours,

John F. Baker

Superior Counsel - Maryland

ADVERTISE OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 5, 1941.

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-3-

change her present course of aggression to one of peaceful procedures. ~~At~~ At the same time, I feel that we should not discourage those Japanese who may be working toward bringing about a change in the course which their country is following. Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador-designate to the United States, is expected here soon. Upon his arrival he may have some proposals and suggestions to offer. We shall of course wish to listen carefully to what he has to say and we can try to convince him that Japan's own best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We should not, I think, resort to other agents and channels before we have even talked with the Ambassador and while we can work through Mr. Grew at Tokyo.

The memorandum left with you by the Bishop is returned herewith. I am also returning to you, separately, the letter sent by the Bishop to Mr. Walker.

Enclosure:

Memorandum giving
detailed comment
and memorandum by
Bishop Walsh.

CH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 5, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum for the President.

Referring to the strictly confidential memorandum relating to the Far Eastern situation which was left with you several days ago by Bishop Walsh, it seems to me that we can best approach the question presented in the memorandum by mentioning briefly certain facts fundamental in the Far Eastern situation and then examining the proposed plan of procedure in the light of those fundamentals.

The first fundamental is that since 1881 Japan has been dominated more and more by the military group—a group which finds adherents in all classes of Japanese society, the soldier, the sailor, the merchant, the industrialist, the farmer, et cetera, et cetera. This group sets a peculiarly high value on the use of force as an instrument both in national and in international [2] affairs. As Japan's military adventuring on the Asiatic mainland and southward has proceeded, the unmistakable trend in Japan has been toward an authoritarian control with the military group coming more and more to the front. During this process, there have been some elements in Japanese society which have felt that the course being followed by their country was a mistaken one. On the whole, these elements have had, up to the announcement on September 27, 1940, of the alignment by Japan with Germany and Italy in the tripartite alliance, less and less voice in Japan's affairs. The reaction of the United States to the three power alliance, the statements made by you in your fireside chat of December 29 and in your message of January 6 to Congress, the statements made by me on January 15 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and on January 27 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the increasing manifestations that this country is rearming at a steadily accelerating rate of speed and that this Government and this country are determined to assist Great Britain and other countries which are protecting themselves against aggression, and the British and Greek successes against the Italians,—all these have probably caused many Japanese to feel that their course of [3] action may bring them into conflict with the United States and that their course is more fraught with serious risk to Japan than had previously been estimated.

If events are permitted to take their course, it seems probable that Japan will for the time being become more and more authoritarian and more and more military-controlled. In view of the big strides already made by Japan in those directions, it would be extremely difficult to check or to change the direction at this time. It seems clear that Japan's military leaders are bent on conquest—just as are Germany's. They demand that this country make concessions: that we give up principles, rights, interests: that we stand aside while Japan proceeds by force to subjugate neighboring areas and, working in partnership with Germany, contributes to the establishing of a new "world order": even that we facilitate their efforts by promising to give them financial assistance for the exploitation of areas which they expect to conquer. Is there anything that can stop this aggressively moving force—other than the resistance of a stronger obstacle or the resistance of a greater force?

Another fundamental fact is that the Chinese are fighting for their existence, against forces of [4] aggression which, if successful, will probably increasingly menace the interests of the United States.

Ever since Japan's military leaders embarked on their present course in 1881, various efforts have been made by Japanese leaders to persuade the Government of the United States to conclude some sort of new political arrangement with the Japanese Government. This effort has been motivated largely by a desire on Japan's part to make it appear to the world, and especially to their own people and to the Chinese, that the United States was prepared to acquiesce in—and even to assent to—the results of Japan's program of conquest. Japanese leaders have undoubtedly hoped by the conclusion of such an arrangement to discourage the Chinese and cause the Chinese leaders to make peace with Japan on Japan's terms.

Many of Japan's leaders earnestly desire now to extricate Japan from its present involvement in China in order that Japan may be in better position than it is at this time to embark on conquest to the southward in areas which are richer in natural resources than is China and from which Japan might, if successful in conquering these areas, enrich herself more rapidly than she can in and from China. Any arrangement which would [5] help Japan to extricate herself

temporarily from her involvement in China would be of doubtful soundness from point of view of the best interests of the United—and of the world—unless it also made effective provision that Japan desist from her program of conquest.

Turning now to the plan suggested in the memorandum under reference: An effort has been made to consider the proposed plan in its broad aspects, to evaluate the ideas which underlie the plan, and to appraise the plan in perspective. There are a number of statements in the proposed plan which, as they stand, are definitely not practicable. Comments in regard to some of these are contained in an annex to this memorandum. As indicated, the discussion in this memorandum is restricted to comment upon the plan as a whole.

With regard to section "I. LEGAL", it might be feasible for the Japanese Government to make, as a unilateral action, a declaration somewhat along the lines of Article III of the three power alliance to the effect that in view of the agreement between the United States and Japan relating to various aspects of the Far Eastern situation the Japanese Government would agree, should the United States be attacked by a power at present involved in the European war, to assist the United States [6] with all political, economic, and military means. I doubt, however, that Japan would give such a unilateral commitment. I am sure that it would not be feasible for this Government to undertake to give Japan a reciprocal commitment.

With regard to section "II. POLITIC", subsection A, this Government would, it is assumed, be prepared to cooperate toward bringing about a settlement of the Chinese-Japanese conflict—were Japan and China both to indicate willingness to negotiate on a basis reasonably fair and just to all concerned.

Referring to the statement in this subsection that "China and Japan could . . . unite to fight Communism in China and in the Far East", it needs to be remembered that the Chinese have repeatedly rejected offers of the Japanese to assist in fighting communism in China and have declared such offers to be merely a mask for Japanese military operations of occupation. Experience shows that the working out of any arrangement on this matter which would be acceptable both to Japan and to China would be extremely difficult if not impossible under present circumstances.

With regard to subsection B—in which it is suggested that there be recognition of a Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" and that provision be made with regard to the [7] political status of the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, Malaya, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies—it might be feasible to work out something along the lines indicated. However, a Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" would be difficult to define either as to terms or as to area. As to terms, there would need be recognition of the legal equality of each of the areas (countries) included in the doctrine. As to area, the Far East is not readily delineated as a geographical area. For example, questions would arise whether countries such as India and Australia should or should not be included. There is also the question of Eastern Siberia. In one sense, such geographical questions are not important. In another sense, however, they raise further questions: whether the ties, historical, cultural, commercial, and racial, among the various regions of the Far Eastern area (Pacific area) are such as to make it feasible for there to be adopted with regard to the area any doctrine which is regional in character. We of course would not wish to be doctrinaire on this point, but at the same time it seems essential that thought be given to all important aspects of the matter.

With regard to subsections C and D, no comment would seem to be needed.

[8] With regard to section "III. ECONOMIC", we have long believed that there are many constructive lines open to Japan and to the United States in the realm of economic and financial matters *provided* that Japan desists from the course of conquest on which she has been engaged since 1931.

In general, I am skeptical whether the plan offered is a practicable one at this time. It seems to me that there is little or no likelihood that the Japanese Government and the Japanese people would in good faith accept any such arrangement at this stage. It also seems to me that, if through the good offices of this Government an arrangement were worked out which would extricate Japan from its present involvement in China, the *likelihood* would be that Japan would extend and accelerate her aggressions to the southward rather than that Japan would change her present course of aggression to one of peaceful procedures. At the same time, I feel that we should not discourage those Japanese who may be working toward bringing about a change in the course which their country is following. As I said in my statement before the Foreign

Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, this Government has, notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, made [9] repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that Japan's best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. You have worked hard at that. I have worked hard at it. Mr. Grew has worked hard at it.

Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador-designate to the United States, is expected here soon. Upon his arrival he may have some proposals and suggestions to offer. We shall of course wish to listen carefully to what he has to say and we can try to convince him that Japan's own best interest lie along lines other than that she is now pursuing. Should we succeed in convincing him, the next question will be can he convince his own Government and people?

Annex: Comments on Subordinate Aspects of the Proposed Plan.

Enclosure: Memorandum by Bishop Walsh returned.

ANNEX

COMMENTS ON SUBORDINATE ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED PLAN

One. The plan itself is not new. Various of its aspects have been presented at one time or another, sometimes by American, sometimes by Japanese.

Two. In section "II. POLITICAL", subsection B, there is a statement in regard to a "Japanese-American guarantee". It would be contrary to long-standing policy of the United States to undertake to give such "guarantee". However, in view of the fact that many Americans believe that this Government in the Washington Conference Nine Power Treaty gave a "guarantee" in regard to China's independence, whereas this Government in that treaty simply promised to *respect* China's independence, et cetera, it may be that the drafters of the phrase in question had in mind nothing more than some agreement whereby this Government and other governments would pledge themselves anew to respect the independence and the status of the areas mentioned.

In this same subsection there is reference to the establishment of autonomous governments in Indochina and in the Dutch East Indies, with the further statement that in the Dutch East Indies Queen Wilhelmina could be accepted as sovereign. The problem of working out arrangements in accordance with the statements made in the [2] proposed plan would present obvious difficulties. However, both French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies are at the present time operating in many respects as at least semi-autonomous regions.

Three. The Chinese, having in mind past Japanese failures to honor contractual obligations, have consistently insisted that they cannot and will not begin negotiations with Japan until, as evidence of Japan's good faith, Japanese troops have first been withdrawn from China. It may be assumed that this specification on the part of the Chinese need not be regarded as absolute: a complete withdrawal by Japan of her forces need not be regarded as the condition precedent; but some clear indication of a change of heart and of intention on Japan's part would seem to be a *sine qua non*.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MEMO FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

The Japanese Government cannot admit, through official channels, that American economic pressure and defense preparations under President Roosevelt have been so politically successful that the Japanese now would welcome an opportunity to change their international, and modify their China, positions.

The domestic position of the present Japanese Government is like that of the Bruening Government in Germany in 1931. The Japanese would rather lose the war in China than lose the domestic war to their own Extremists. But, the loss of the China War and the imminence of an American War, would put the radical nationalists, civil and military, in complete control. If the Conservative authorities, including Prince Konoye, Mr. Matsuoka, Count Arima, General Muto, etc. and the Emperor, can win, by diplomacy, a safe economic and international position, public opinion in Japan would restore the Conservatives to complete control.

For such a reversal, the Japanese majority needs, no less than China, the help of the United States. Failing this, they foresee the possibility of a union of their own Extremist elements with the Radical forces in China; a union comparable to, and an appendage of, the compact of Russia and Germany in Europe. They feel that if some constructive cooperation is not realized with the United States before March or April, the Fascist element will take control in both China and Japan, no matter whether England or Germany wins in the Spring offensive.

Such an eventuality would surely close the door for the Allied cause in the Far East-----, in his own words, "is riding the horses until he can stop them." -----, in his own words, said that "to call the present war in China a Holy War is a blasphemy," and "to call the Treaty with Wang-Ching-Wei an equal Treaty is a lie." -----said he would probably be killed if we revealed his statements to certain Japanese.

2. We found the Japanese officials virtually despairing of any possibility of reestablishing cordial relations with the United States. President Roosevelt's policy, and the Italian losses in the Mediterranean have created a remarkable opportunity for solidifying the Far Eastern situation in our own favor, and the Japanese are apparently now following a plan of procedure for cooperation with the United States. Mr. Matsuoka designed his speech of December 19th as an indication of this intention.

The Japanese feel that their alliance with the Axis will have to be nullified realistically before it can be broken legally and officially. The Japanese authorities are ready (though they dare not admit their readiness at the peril of their lives) to substitute the United States for Germany, by an agreement which would embrace the following aspects:

I. LEGAL (for Japanese public opinion)

A. The Japanese Government could maintain that as they accepted the Axis Alliance to maintain world peace by restricting the European War vis-a-vis the United States (but much more Russia) they could apply the same principle to Germany and threaten Germany with Japanese involvement if she extends the War beyond its present confines. (Germany then would be doubly hesitant to declare war on the United States.)

II. POLITIC

A. Acceptance of the cooperation of the United States in a settlement of the China War on the basis of the secret Truce Terms offered last October by Chiang Kai Chek. With some guarantee of politic-economic order in China, and the removal of China as an immediate military menace, or a political menace through a European 'sell-out', China and Japan could then unite to fight Communism in China and in the Far East. This would take Germany, now acting through Russia, out of China.

[3] B. A recognition of a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine based on the aforementioned China settlement, the Japanese-American guarantee to check any third power attempting to alter the political status of the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore or Malaya, and the establishment of autonomous Governments in Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, in order to remove these areas as potential war spoils, and in order to forestall the demand of Japanese Extremists for forcible action. (These autonomous Governments would agree to respect all existing investments, etc.) Actually, in the Dutch East Indies, Queen Wilhelmina could be accepted as a Sovereign.

C. Just prior to our abrogation of the Commercial Treaty, the Japanese and British had virtually agreed upon a Treaty reopening trade in the Yangtze Valley. The British, therefore, would have no objection.

D. No territorial aggrandizement in China proper.

III. ECONOMIC

A. Japan (and with her, the Far East) is drifting into a commodity economy which will produce a low standard of living which she does not like, but cannot avoid without American assistance. American assistance (cfr. additional memoranda) could be so given as to guarantee the political agreement and set up an economy in the Far East so totally variant from the German that the Germans could not do business with it. By ear-marking, but leaving in the United States,

a heavy gold credit, with interest payments, for substantiating the currencies of Japan and China, the United States would put the Far East on a money economy like our own, and hold over both China and Japan the threat of withdrawal for any failure to comply with the political provisions of the joint agreements.

[4] B. Japan would grant a complete Open Door provided she received similarly accepted and could actually be sought by both China and Japan under cal Trade Treaty with the United States allowing free entry of certain basic commodities, heavy machinery, etc. Cotton and agricultural surpluses would be similarly accepted and could actually be bought by both China and Japan under the monetary arrangement above mentioned.

Because of the domestic situations, any such arrangement would have to be presented to the Japanese and Chinese people as a fait accompli. Meantime, merely to indicate that such a settlement is possible is to put power in the hands of the Conservative element in Japan and give them confidence to proceed.

A representative of President Roosevelt could be introduced, with the full knowledge of Mr. Drew, to work out, with the utmost speed and secrecy, in co-operation with the controlling elements in Japan, including the Emperor, such an agreement as would bring some order in the Far East, and put within the power of President Roosevelt the opportunity to immunize the Pacific for at least three years.

The Japanese people who now despair of American friendship would welcome this as the greatest boon to their national life and security, for which the Japanese would sacrifice anything except their Far Eastern position. The representative of the President should be someone whom he knows and trusts intimately; someone who will be apprised fully of American aims in the Far East; someone who is keenly aware that the Germans will attempt ruthlessly to prevent any American-Japanese agreement; and someone who will not attract attention as an official member of our State Department.

If President Roosevelt acts to investigate this possibility, we would be willing to cooperate with his representatives for the safeguarding of the Japanese officials, and the verification of their statements.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 10, 1941.

Memorandum for,

The Secretary of the Interior.

The Director of the Budget.

Please talk this matter over and let me have final recommendation.

The whole matter should be treated as highly confidential.

F. D. R.

Letter of Feb. 7, 1941 from Acting Secretary Bell of the Treasury in re recommendation for the appropriation of certain moneys amounting to approximately \$52,000,000 to the Philippine Islands to be used for defense purposes.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
THE SECRETARY,
February 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a memorandum containing suggestions of statements which might be made orally to the Japanese Ambassador when he calls on you.

Attachment: Memorandum.

SUGGESTION FOR INTERVIEW WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

There is offered for consideration the suggestion that in the initial conversation with Admiral Nomura following presentation of his credentials the issues between the United States and Japan be not discussed in such a way as to cause Admiral Nomura to feel that this Government is closing the door to any diplomatic

efforts which he may make as Ambassador. Reference might, however, be made to the assumption that he, as a seafaring man, would welcome frank speaking, and the following points might then be touched upon:

1. There is no disguising the fact that relations between the United States and Japan are not good. These relations have deteriorated for the reason, as we see it, that Japan has embarked upon a course of expansion by force. There is no need at this time to dwell upon the fact that Japan's course has been attended by more than 250 instances of the bombing by Japanese planes of American mission and other properties in China, by the sinking of the *Panay* and the burning or sinking of three other American vessels with loss of American life, and by the disruption of the normal and legitimate activities of thousands of Americans.

2. With reference to the alliance entered into by Japan with Germany and Italy, some Japanese statesmen [2] say that Japan has retained freedom of action. Japan is aware of our policy of assisting those countries which are resisting aggression. In these circumstances, the question naturally arises whether Japan's actions will demonstrate that Japan in fact retains liberty of action or that Japan has pledged itself in alliance with Germany to oppose the things which this country is committed to support, things which it always has supported and which it forever will support.

3. The Government of the United States has noted repeated statements by Japanese leaders to the effect that the United States is moving toward involvement in the European war and that such involvement would constitute a world calamity. Do not these statements, in view of happenings in the Far East, give rise to the warrantable and corollary question whether Japan itself, through its military activities toward the south and through its commitments to Germany and Italy, is not drifting toward involvement in the European war and whether such involvement would not be, in the words of Japan's leaders, a "world calamity"? There comes to mind in connection with this question Japan's military occupation of or military activities in north China, central China, south China, the Hainan Island, the Spratly Islands, and, thus far, parts of French Indochina. It appears to those on [3] this side of the Pacific that there is in the public utterances of Japanese leaders and in the Japanese press undue emphasis upon the asserted responsibility of other nations and not sufficient consideration of the possible consequences of Japan's own presentation of constantly expanding aims at the expense of other countries.

4. Our two countries have drifted apart from that friendly and reciprocally advantageous attitude which in general had previously characterized their relations with one another. Some very acute questions are now presented to each country. Without going into these at the moment, it is suggested that, if Japan has a desire to examine the points of divergence with a view to talking over the situation fully and frankly, the time has arisen when that should be done. If the Japanese Ambassador feels that he would like to discuss such questions, the appropriate officers of this Government are of course available for such discussion. This does not mean a negotiation; it means a discussion attitudes, policies, objectives.

5. These are some of the thoughts which honesty and candor require to be frankly expressed. In expressing them, we are not unmindful of the circumstances attending the appointment of Admiral Nomura as Japanese Ambassador to the United States. The press has reported that he repeatedly declined this assignment. The fact that Admiral Nomura, [4] with his high character his statesmanship, and his well-known friendship for the United States, finally accepted the responsibilities of the position of Japanese Ambassador to the United States, indicates to us that there is still desire on the part of Japan that progress toward improving relations between the United States and Japan may be made.

Note: With reference to the question of "tone" in the opening stages of our contracts with the new Japanese Ambassador, it is believed that it may be advisable—in the light of indications from the Far East—to "speak softly" (carefully avoiding any word that might to a wishful thinker imply that we would consider offers of "compromise"), while simultaneously giving by our acts in the Pacific new glimpses of diplomatic, economic, and naval "big sticks."

FEBRUARY 12, 1941.

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FE: MMH: HES

[Hand written:]

(Original in State Folder)

(Copy in Japan Folder)

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FE: WAA:HES FE PA/H
2-12

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 15, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State.

In regard to the Spratley Islands, I thought it was perhaps better not to mention them in our talk with Nomura yesterday.

I suggest, in view of your message, that we use the routine method of asking Grew to question the Japanese claim to them by asking them how they justify their occupation.

They may come back and say that like Canton Island and Enderberry Island, the Spratley group was uninhabited, but we have a perfectly good answer in the fact that both Great Britain and the United States each claimed those islands by virtue of discovery and occasional guano use later, but also that the United States and Great Britain entered into a friendly agreement in regard to the future.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 14, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

The Secretary of State called to say that he and his associates do not think it is a good idea for us to lay claim to the Spratly Islands but rather to question the Japanese claim instead. If we are going to make a formal representation to the Japanese Government on this Spratly Island situation, my associates think it would be better to do it in a routine way through our Ambassador in Tokyo in a note.

The Secretary thinks it is all right to mention the Japanese occupation of these islands and question it without claiming it ourselves.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 20, 1941.

Private & Confidential.

Memorandum for Hon. Sumner Welles.

I have just read the purported instructions from Foreign Minister Matsuno to Ambassador Nomura dated February 14.

Please read them.

These instructions seem to me to be the product of a mind which is deeply disturbed and unable to think quietly or logically.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 11, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

The attached is a brief of Admiral Pratt's interview with Ambassador Nomura.

I thought the President would be interested.

Respectfully,

D. J. CALLAGHAN

Memo—March-7-41

INTERVIEW WITH NOMURA ON MARCH 4

At his own request, I met The Ambassador on March-4—He gave me a lunch at the Plaza, and we had a three hours conversation alone in his private quarters—I am returning the compliment by giving him a small dinner at the St. Regis tonight March 7.

My remarks followed, without my knowing it at the time, almost exactly the line indicated in the confidential report of the American Advisor for the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Moore.

I told the Ambassador that Japan's best promise for the future lay along economic lines, and not through military conquest.

That Japan being an island State, like Britain, her real interests, lay along the path of sea power, and not military power, and that her best promise for the future lay in connection with Britain and the United States, and not with the Axis. That sea power was not destructive as military power was—Sea power kept the trade lanes open—was liberal—and to succeed must be conciliatory and not aggressive. Military power was destructive—antagonized those it overran—was nonproductive—did not open trade lanes, but closed them—and ultimately defeated its own purpose.

I told him that joining the Axis was what turned American sentiment so definitely against Japan. I cited our Constitution, which puts no bars on naval strength, but definitely limits moneys to the Army for two years. This in itself showed the feeling at the time, that too great military strength was a menace, and that fear of too great military power in unscrupulous hands had become an enduring part of American life and thought.

I told him that we did not wish to see Japan destroyed—that her influence properly used could always be a strength in the Orient—that Russia is and always would be the main threat to Japan, as long as the present Communist influence lasted.

[2] I told him we were definitely out to see Britain win, and would go the limit if necessary, because it was essential in an economic sense, and for the purposes of an enduring peace, that sea power prevail over aggressive military power. That 6 or 7 years ago, when visited by members of the Japanese General Naval Staff, in Los Angeles, and asked for an opinion, I had told them then that the military domination of China would be a failure.

I told him that even if Japan won the first naval victory—we had the power to build and she had not—that she would be so weakened, that ultimately she would lose her influence in the Orient and be supplanted by Russia, and that her ideologies and not those of Japan would influence the Orient.

That the best way to combat communism in China, their great fear, was along the economic road, and not along the aggressive military path—that given the chance to live, and become stabilized along economic and peaceful lines, there was no fear of China becoming communist in the sense Russia is today—that China's natural socialism centered around the family and the guild—as far apart from the Russian brand as the two poles, and if given the chance to work out her own salvation, Japan need never fear the Russian brand fully penetrating China. That military domination in China would never put down the brand of communism Japan feared, but on the contrary would drive China closer to Russia.

I told him frankly that if a new war started in the Orient, it would be Japan's making—not ours—that the decision depended largely on the future course they adopted.

I advised him to exercise the Oriental talent for patience, and see if in the end the military conquests of Hitler in Europe, would not run the same course there that Japan's military venture in China did. That in effect it would be a failure.

Nomura was more than frank, and agreed thoroughly with all I said. He told me of his interviews with Lord Halifax and The President—I gathered that my views were in entire accord with those of the President.

[3.] I gathered that Japan does not wish war with us, and Britain, and that a southern drive against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, will not be undertaken, certainly not for the present, if wiser counsels can prevail—that the leading military and naval men were against it—that the economic path was the one they wished to pursue—that the Elder Statesmen had strongly advised against the China invasion, but had been overthrown by the military

clique, but that the failure of the China venture, *had* converted many of the leading military men.

That since the China invasion had been such a failure, leading naval and military thought had swung around, and was much more liberal now than it was then. He said Japan was full of German military men, and Gestapo agents, trying to induce Japan to act in conjunction with the Axis, but that after all Japan had a mind of her own, and the decision was hers and not Germany's—that there were few or no Nazi naval men in Japan.

His own personal secretary has just come from England, and has had considerable experience there—His naval and military attaches have much influence in the war office, and I gathered they were mostly in accord with his views. He admits he has a hard task, and only accepted the post from a sense of duty. He is extremely liberal—his views on the liberal influence of sea power vs. aggressive military influence, coincide with mine—and I judge he is infinitely more sympathetic to the liberal policies of Britain and the United States, than he is to those of the Nazis.

I gathered that if Japan were given a little chance to save face, so important to the Oriental, in Indo-China, along the economic path, it would do much to offset the smart of the China failure, and strengthen liberal influence in Japan itself, which though under a cloud was still fairly strong, and if I inferred correctly, was more apt to grow than to weaken.

I gathered that the main fear of military men were *the* spread of Communism in China—that they frankly admitted that military domination would not solve the problem—and that they didn't know how to solve it—Hence I made the remarks I [4.] did, as what appeared to me to be the only way out for a solution. This covers the main points, and I trust I said nothing counter to the general trend of our own policies—all I said was in the spirit of friendliness to Japan, and in the hope that she would do nothing rash which could only lead to her own ultimate defeat, which I did not wish. I wanted Japan to be strong, but a liberal generous Japan, not a militaristic Japan. In passing, I might add, that in the course of the years I have had many contacts with the Japanese, and contrary to the general opinion, I have never had one of the samurai class, deliberately lie to me.

W. V. PRATT.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 13, 1941.

Secret

Memorandum for the President

I thought the President would be interested in the attached copy of a report made by Rear Admiral Turner, re his conversation with Ambassador Nomura.

As the President will recall, Admiral (then Captain) Turner was the skipper of the U. S. S. ASTORIA which, in April '39, carried to Japan the remains of the Japanese Ambassador who died in Washington. Admiral Turner is very well known to, and very well liked by the Japanese.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

MARCH 13, 1941.

From: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. N.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.

1. On March 12th I met the Japanese Ambassador at a cocktail party given in his honor by the Japanese Naval Attache. In the course of a five minute chat he said he would like to converse with me at greater length. On March 12th he telephoned me to ask me to see him at 5 p. m., that day, either at the Embassy or at my home. I arranged to call at the Embassy at that hour. I shall hereafter refer to him as "Nomura." The words of the conversation are my own; I merely try to give the gist and impressions of the talk.

2. After an exchange of pleasantries, Nomura stated that his mission here was to prevent war between Japan and the United States, that he had undertaken the mission with a realization of the possibility of failure, and that he was even less hopeful of success after arrival here, but that he had undertaken the mission as a matter of duty to his government, and because of his conviction that the best interests of the two countries were to maintain peace. He referred

to his friendship with Admiral Pratt and other United States naval officers, and stated that he was exploring the ground, as best he could, in order to find a basis on which the two nations could agree. He said that he would value receiving my views as to the future.

3. I replied that naturally, as the War Plans Officer of the Navy, I could express no opinions as to military matters, and since military officers were not authorized to express the political views of the government, I could say nothing on that score. Therefore, I would confine my statements to the expression of my concept of the general attitude of the American people toward Japan, so far as I could determine it. [2] I had been to Japan four times, and had known Japanese there, in China, in Hawaii, and in California. I felt that I understood the Japanese better than the average American, and I admired their many excellent qualities. I would speak frankly, and he must assume that what I said was in no way to be construed as a criticism of the Japanese. Different peoples had different viewpoints; all have good qualities, and also have qualities that are not so good; and it is these inferior qualities, and the differences in culture, that often give rise to misunderstandings.

4. I stated I believed that, underneath, the Japanese and the American people liked and respected each other. Minor differences and disagreements had naturally appeared, but I believed the events of the past ten years were more ominous, and that they were deeply disturbing to Americans.

5. Nomura agreed that the feeling was worse than it had been in past years, but stated that the "New Order" in the Far East originally had not been intended as a military adventure, but was designed to be purely economic and cultural. Unfortunately, radicals had obtained a strong influence, and the execution of the New Order had been initiated by the force of arms. He was impressed by the views that he had received in this country, and he agreed with them, that the victor and the defeated in a war received almost equal losses, and that both suffered severely. He gave France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as examples.

6. He stated that he had talked, at various times, with high ranking Japanese army and naval officers as to whether Japan would be benefited by the war in China. Practically all of them were convinced that this adventure was a mistake. Certainly it had proved a terrible drain, and the task of controlling such a great territory by force seemed almost impossible to accomplish. When the project first came up, the high ranking army officers had opposed it, but the younger, radical element had been so strong that the older men had acquiesced. He believed now, on the contrary, that though the younger element was still in favor of strong measures, the older army officers in command would not give in to them. The Navy, on the contrary, had been and still are in favor of peace with the United States.

[8] 7. I replied that it was this use of force that had disturbed the United States. All thinking men recognized the necessity for outlets by an industrial country such as Japan had become, and recognized her need for sources of raw materials. Nevertheless, forceful expansion, such as Japan had undertaken, cuts across established national and personal interests, and naturally arouses antagonisms. The United States has difficulty in accommodating itself to the variations in Japanese policy which result in the shifts of power among the three quite different and antagonistic elements of Japanese political life. The question now was as to how much further Japanese Far Eastern conquests would extend. Japan never has had reason to fear a military expansion of the United States into the Far East; when Commodore Perry in 1853 recommended that the United States should seize the Bonin and the Loo Choo Islands, the American people had rejected the idea. They accepted the temporary care of the Philippines reluctantly. In my opinion, they have no wish to extend permanent military power into the Far East. They wish to remain at home and at peace. They believe that gradual changes of status, and not sudden changes accompanied by force, will in the long run prove the best. The deterioration of American and Japanese relations, I believed, was chiefly due to the use of forceful measures by Japan, and in particular to the Japanese adherence to the Axis. This had come as a disappointment and a shock to Americans, who believed it a weapon aimed at themselves and the British. Nomura's appointment as Ambassador had slightly relieved this feeling, as it was construed as a desire on the part of Japan for improved relations. Nomura is respected by Americans, and is known for his desire to maintain peace with the United States. However, since the beginning of the affair in Indo-China, I felt that opinion here had become worse than before.

8. Nomura recognized the value of a peaceful conquest. Relations of the United States with Mexico and Central America now under the Good Neighbor Policy were far better than when he was here in 1921, and the peaceful policy appeared very effective. Japan has not now, and never has had, any desire to extend control over the Philippines. With regard to adherence to the axis, it was his opinion that Matsuoka, whom he knew well, had been sincere in his opinion that this action actually would be conducive to peace in the Pacific.

[4] Nomura had not agreed to this, but Matsuoka had been much surprised by the severe reaction of the United States. As to the Indo-China affair: Japan is in need of rice and other supplies; Indo-China had been even more uncooperative than had the Netherlands East Indies; furthermore, Thailand is a friend. These influences had determined Japan's course.

9. I stated that, of course, different peoples had difficulty in understanding the point of view of others. Their culture, habits of thought, and customs are different, and they fail to allow for inevitable mistakes. That is doubtless one of the reasons that the United States and Japan began to fall apart. It is necessary to understand a people's background before its point of view can be appreciated. From my reading of translations from Japanese newspapers, and talking to Japanese, I feared that they might fail to appreciate the extremely close cultural and political relationship that exists between Great Britain and the United States. We both have the same origins, our economy is closely tied together, and though we have fought two wars and have had many quarrels, it should be understood that the United States would not stand aside and see Great Britain fall. The United States had intervened in her favor in the last war, and it must be clearly apparent that the American people are now determined to do all that lies within their power to save Great Britain now. This principle of common interest applies to British holdings in the Far East as well as in the Atlantic. I wished there were a way to make the Japanese understand this important relationship.

10. Nomura said all Japanese naval officers understood this thoroughly, but, unfortunately, Japanese army officers did not. He tried to explain this to them, but they would not believe him. He emphasized this point by several repetitions.

11. Nomura was convinced that the American people were slow to make up their minds, but thereafter were very determined to carry out their decision to the full. He believed that they would help the British to the best of their ability, with material alone, if possible; but that when the very severe German submarine and air attacks would nullify this help, the United States would enter the war against Germany. He did not believe German invasion plans were certain to succeed, but he believed it possible that in a few months the British people might be starving because of air and submarine action against the convoys.


Secret

[5] 12. Nomura is no longer active in the Navy, but, in his opinion, the presence of the United States Fleet in Hawaii, particularly in combination with the British, forms a stabilizing influence for affairs in the Pacific. This fleet would be less potent if many of the American destroyers and other light forces should move to the Atlantic to help the British. Battleships might be left in the Pacific, but their influence alone would not be great without other forces of adequate strength. (This was the only time he seemed to want to "pump" me).

13. I agreed that the submarine and air menace placed Great Britain in a very bad position. Their danger is grave. We can not be sure how the matter will end. I intimated, however, that ways are available for defeating the German submarines and aircraft which have not been fully exploited. I had no idea whether the American people would make war in the Atlantic, the Pacific, or remain neutral. I pointed out that American warships are now being turned out rapidly, and that many of these would be available for the Atlantic without reducing our strength in the Pacific. In any case, it was my opinion that if war occurred in the Pacific, it would be because of events in the Far East, and not because of any decision by the United States to attack Japan, even though many persons were now advocating this step, and Gallup polls indicated strong support for such a move.

14. Nomura was very cordial. I believe he is fully sincere, and that he will use his influence against further aggressive moves by the military forces of Japan. He seemed desirous for support of the more liberal Japanese elements.

R. K. TURNER.



4302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY JOSEPH E. DAVIES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEBRUARY 18, 1941

For the information of the Department, and for such value as it may have, I submit the following:

Last week, at my law office, I was offered a retainer by a group representing Japanese interests who desired advice and counsel, in connection with the betterment of relations between the United States and Japan. They submitted responsible references as to their reliability.

I told them that if they wished to tell me about their problem, with the understanding that I incurred no fiduciary or other obligations by listening to them, that I would consider the facts and advise them as to my attitude thereafter. To this they agreed.

They stated that they represented certain big business groups in Japan, who were in close relationship with practically all of the Japanese Cabinet, except Matsuoka, the leaders of the Navy and many of the leaders of the Army. They also stated that the internal, political and economic situation in Japan had deteriorated so rapidly in the past four or five months, that the group which they represented had become convinced that there was no escape from complete internal disaster, communism, and confiscation of all property rights, except thru ending the Sino-Japanese war, and by coming to a complete agreement with the United States.

They confidently asserted that, if the President and Secretary of State would "take hold of" this situation vigorously, a rapprochement between the two countries could be effected in which the United States could "write its own ticket".

This they recognized involved a complete "volte face" on the part of the Japanese Government. In the face of that fact, they nevertheless confidently maintained that if negotiations were had, the following could be effected:

- (a) That Japan would get out of the Rome-Berlin axis.
- (b) That Japan would withdraw from China upon terms which the United States would determine.
- (c) That Japan would modify its policy with reference to the Orient; and would return to the "status quo ante" in accord with the concepts of the United States Government as to what constituted fairness in the Pacific and the Orient.
- (d) That even as to Manchukuo a settlement could be had satisfactory to the United States.

The foregoing contained only one qualification and that was that it was expected that the United States, while insisting upon the foregoing results, would exercise amelioration in the manner of doing the job; so that the Japanese government responsible for the new policy could measurably "save face" before its own people.

[2] The specific proposal suggested was; that the President and Secretary of State should send to Japan, by air and immediately, someone who could verify their representations by direct contact with their principals, and report the facts to the President. They suggested that if the Under Secretary of State or Mr. Hopkins were to go to Japan; they could and would place themselves at their disposal to have them meet, unofficially, the leaders of these various groups, and see for themselves that their representations as to what could be done were well founded.

They stated that they made this suggestion because they could secure greater frankness thru unofficial contacts which they could arrange, rather than thru official contacts made thru the American Embassy; and that in this suggestion there was no reflection upon the ability or effectiveness of Ambassador Grew.

My reply to these gentlemen was that neither I nor my firm would accept any retainer or employment in this situation. I stated, however, that if they could make these representations with sufficient weight behind them to the Department of State; and could make good on their representations, that they would be rendering a great service not only to the Japanese interests they serve but to the cause of peace in the world.

In connection with their suggestion that in my private capacity I go to Japan to verify their representations, I replied positively and unequivocally that under no circumstances would I do so.

The foregoing is reported to the Department in the belief that it might be of some value in connection with the situation.

My own judgment, from what I gathered in these discussions, is that there is a "possibility" that it might be well worth the Department's while to explore and consider the matter. There might be just a chance that this might be "the moment" for the "break" in the war situation, which the defection of Japan from the axis would undoubtedly afford. If there is nothing to it, still a valuable side light might be afforded in the situation and nothing would be lost.

JOSEPH E. DAVIES

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., March 13, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum for the President.

In accordance with the President's instructions, I have written a letter to Dr. Nelson, copy attached.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan.
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

MARCH 13, 1941.

Confidential

Dr. WILBUR A. NELSON,
Corcoran Professor of Geology,
University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia.

DEAR DR. NELSON: The President has considered your memorandum written over date of February 17th, and has asked me to reply for him.

The President is intensely interested in the area mentioned in your memorandum, is fully aware of your study of the region—and remembers, of course, with regret, that your projected expedition had to be postponed because of the international situation.

I have been asked to convey to you that the President appreciates your reminder of our interest in that area, and the necessity of obtaining all possible information, hydrographic and geographic. To this end we have sought and are obtaining from certain friendly sources, information which is vital to our store of knowledge of particular regions in the area.

In the present state of international relations, the President feels that, for many reasons, it would be unwise to disclose our particular interest in certain regions in the South Seas, by sending an expedition or a Presidential envoy for study in the area. It is certain that the presence of such an expedition or envoy would become known shortly, and, possibly, would have a deleterious effect on projected plans.

The President has asked me to express his regret that, for the reasons given above, he feels that he cannot give favorable consideration to your suggestion at the present time.

With my own personal good wishes, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

D. J. CALLAGHAN,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 7, 1941.

Memorandum for Captain Callaghan.

Will you break this news to Professor Nelson in your best manner?

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 3, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum for the President

In re the proposal made by Dr. Nelson, the Navy Department feels as follows:

(a) There is on hand a considerable amount of confidential information on the islands in question, contained in Pacific Airpilot, in confidential monographs, and in sailing directions.

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(b) War Plans is in the process of obtaining additional needed information from Australia and New Zealand.

(c) That sending an expedition to these islands *now*, would inevitably become known to ORANGE, would disclose our hand, and destroy the element of future surprise, in any contemplated use.

While it is true that one can *never* have *enough* hydrographic and other pertinent information on hand, re particular areas, it is felt that the thought contained in paragraph (c) above it of paramount importance, as indicating the undesirability of undertaking such an expedition at the present time.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan,
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

It is suggested that a study be made of the little known island region of the South Pacific between Hawaii and New Zealand, much of which region is under mandate to New Zealand and Great Britain, to acquire comprehensive data on this region which will be of immediate benefit to the United States and to New Zealand in the present emergency.

A number of these islands, which were first discovered and claimed for the United States by the captains of American clipper ships, are now uninhabited or have only a small remnant of their former population.

As the leader of the temporarily postponed National Geographic Society-University of Virginia Pacific Islands Scientific Expedition, with the cooperation of the United States Coast Guard, and as one who has been studying this area rather intensively in preparation for this important Expedition, the necessity for such an immediate study by a special Presidential envoy is considered to be of utmost importance in this time of emergency.

Wilbur A. Nelson,
WILBUR A. NELSON,
Corcoran Professor of Geology,
University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia.

FEBRUARY 17, 1941.

Hayden folder
1-41 *S*

March 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the call which the Japanese Ambassador is to make on you this afternoon, suggestions are offered as follows:

One. Should the Ambassador bring up the question of Mr. Matsushita's visiting the United States, you might state to this effect: We of course welcome visits to this country by persons occupying responsible positions in other countries. Visits at the present time by any such persons may be especially informative both to them and to us, in view of the current complexity of problems of international relations and of the tremendous changes which have occurred in the United States during recent months. If Mr. Matsushita chooses to visit this country while proceeding from Europe to Japan, he will of course be welcomed.

Two. Should the Ambassador mention his conversations and are there and are apparently desiring to have this Government enter into discussions with them on the question

-3-

of improving relations between Japan and the United States, you may care to say -- as I did to the Ambassador on March 6 -- that you very much appreciate the purpose of the Ambassador's compatriots and that of course officials of this Government charged with the conduct of foreign relations could not center with them individually in regard to matters pending between our two Governments unless the Japanese Ambassador should assume the responsibility and the initiative to that end.

Third. Occasion or opportunity may develop, on the course of the conversation, of which you might care to take advantage for the offering of observations on lines as follows:

In view of Japan's position in the tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy, there arises question whether Japan has retained freedom of action and whether her actions will be demonstrative, or whether Japan has committed herself in alliance with Germany to oppose the things -- principles, policies and objectives -- to the support of which this country is obligated and is committed. On the military ground in general of the Japanese Government's respect important countries like the United States to maintain alliance and remain inactive while two or three nations engage in tremendous progress

-3-

of military and naval expansion and move toward conquest of the rest of the earth? As long as Hitler continues his avowed course of unlimited conquest and tyrannical rule and as long as the Japanese army and navy extend their occupation by force of other and distant areas on both land and sea, the apprehensions and the concern of this country will be very real and our reactions be increasingly realistic. This country is proceeding with a program of rearmament with ever increasing speed and effectiveness, and our national effort, directed in no way toward any program of aggression, is more and more being concentrated upon the problem of perfecting our defense and supporting the resistance of other nations to movements of conquest. We wish to be friends, we are ready to be friends, with every nation in the world -- but in our concept real friendship and real cooperation can prevail only between and among nations each and all of which want peace and security for all.

justice

CX

FE:MMH:HEB

FE

PA/H

PA/H:SKH

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas,
 Manila, Philippine Islands
 March 21, 1941

Writes to Mr. Early stating that he understands there may be a vacancy in the office of High Commissioner of the Philippines. Makes application for appointment to this post.--Under date of 4/15/41, Gen. Watson replied to Gen. MacArthur re the above stating that the President has asked him to say that he has been currently informed about the Far Eastern situation and, frankly, that he wants Gen. MacArthur there in his military capacity rather than any other. Gen. Watson adds that the President believes that Gen. MacArthur's service is most important in the role he now has.

See 400-Philippines - High Commissioner

400-Philippines

COPY

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1941.

The President

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Our Military Adviser to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur, has recently recommended the strengthening of the seacoast defenses of the Philippines against possible invasion.

He has requested that seven 8-inch railway guns (old model) and twenty-four 155 mm guns, together with the necessary auxiliary equipment and ammunition, be placed at the disposal of the Philippine Government for this purpose.

Title to equipment made available under this proposed transfer would remain with the United States pending final adjudication of all accounts between the two governments prior to 1946 as specified in the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

The amount of equipment involved is relatively small. It does not affect our present commitments to the British Government and cannot materially affect future arrangements.

The War Department is of the opinion that the proposed transfer would both strengthen the defense of the Philippine Islands and improve the position of the United States in that area without impairment to more important defense objectives.

Your approve of this transfer is recommended.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

H. L. S.

O. K.

F. D. R.

SECRET

G. N. I. No. 107

Japan Folder
1-41

*file
confidential*

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 3, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR the Director

16-12038 GPO

Subject: Japanese Government and its obligation
to the Axis.

The DIO 3ND reported today that the Mitsui Bank of New York has been instructed by its London office to conduct business on the premise that the Japanese Government is not going to fulfill its obligations to the Axis Powers. Source of this information is of doubtful reliability, he stated.

*This from
heirall*

B-7-J

WSD

400
Philippines
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE *100*
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR *x6*

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

x3460

Letter from Hon. J. M. Elizalde, Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the U.S., Washington, D. C., to the Secretary of the Interior, 4/4/42, quoting telegram he received from President Queson, directing him to submit it to the Secretary of the Interior, which quotes letter which President Queson sent to the High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands, 4/3/42, in re issuance of Executive Order by President Queson creating the Civilian Emergency Administration, sent to the Secretary of State; copy of memo, with explanation of enclosure sent to the Secy. Interior.

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

7 4/21/41

April 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the attached letter from Mr. J. M. Elizalde, the Philippine Resident Commissioner, to Secretary Ickes, which you transmitted to me under cover of a memorandum dated April 7, 1941, it would appear that this letter was probably given to you by the Secretary of the Interior only for your information and that since a reply to the Philippine Resident Commissioner will presumably be made by the Secretary of the Interior, it does not call for any reply from you. This view is submitted for your consideration. Should you wish a reply drafted for your signature, the Department will be glad to collaborate in its preparation.

Accompaniment:

Letter from Mr. Elizalde
to Secretary Ickes, dated
April 4, 1941.

C H

1000 Philippine High Commission

THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 4th, 1941

The Honorable
Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have today received a telegram from President Quezon with instructions to submit it to you personally. The radiogram reads as follows:

"Commissioner Elizalde
Washington DC

"I am quoting below text of letter which I have today sent to High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre with the request that you personally submit copy thereof to Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, as indicated in the last paragraph:

'Baguio, April 3, 1941.

'My dear High Commissioner Sayre:

'Secretary Vargas has conveyed to me your message with reference to the promise made by me to President Roosevelt not to exercise any of the powers vested in me by the Emergency Power Act without first advising him of contemplated action. According to Secretary Vargas, this matter came up in connection with the Executive Order I have issued creating the Civilian Emergency Administration. The creation of this body through that Executive Order has been done pursuant to the recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board which you and I created after discussing the matter with Admiral Smeallie and Major General Grunert. The recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board have not only received your complete approval but you have personally urged me to act promptly on them. The first of these recommendations is the creation of the Civilian Emergency Administration.

'Considering the broad and extraordinary powers to be exercised by the proposed organization if and when the emergency should arise, I assumed that you knew that I

The Honorable, Harold L. Ickes -- #2

4/4/1941.

could not act favorably on the recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board without making use of the powers vested in me by the Emergency Power Act. I also assumed that since you are the representative of the President of the United States in the Philippines you would not ask me to take measures in accordance with the recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board unless you knew that the President of the United States was or would be agreeable to the action suggested by you for you were ^{making} awarding my commitments to President Roosevelt. It is to be observed that until the emergency arises the civilian emergency administration will not exercise any of the powers granted the President by the Emergency Power Act so that as a matter of fact the reference to the said act in my Executive Order is for the present purely technical.

'I desire to make it clear that in my opinion the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines is as much the primary responsibility of the government of the United States as is the military defence of the Islands. Indeed the protection of the civilian population is by the very nature of modern warfare an essential part of the military defenses of the country.

'In gladly assuming (that) the responsibility as far as the resources of the Commonwealth permit it of carrying out the measures recommended by the Civilian Emergency Planning Board for the protection of the civilian population, the Commonwealth Government merely desires to show by deeds our loyalty and our determination to do all we can in support of the United States. But if my action in this respect, instead of being presented in the proper light to the President of the United States is to be interpreted by you as a violation of my commitments to President Roosevelt, then I shall revoke my Executive Order and do nothing in connection with the recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board.

'I am instructing Secretary Sison not to call a meeting of this Civilian Emergency Administration, or do anything until I hear from you.

'I am sending copy of this letter to Secretary Ickes for his information and that of the President as well as to the successor of Admiral Smeallie and to General Grunert.

'Sincerely yours,


'MANUEL L. QUEZON'

The Honorable, Harold L. Ickes -- #3

4/4/1941.

There are one or two errors in the text and I am endeavoring to get a repetition from the cable company. I will send you the corrected one at the earliest possible moment. I shall also be at your disposal at any time for whatever personal inquiry you may wish to make in this matter.

Sincerely yours



J. M. ELIZALDE

Resident Commissioner of the Philippines
to the United States

400

Philippines

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

APR 10 1941

MEMORANDUM for the President:

I have received your memorandum of February 10 forwarding the secret recommendations of the Secretaries of War and the Navy submitted to you on January 30 and the comment of the Secretary of the Treasury on these recommendations.

In accordance with your instructions, I have taken this up with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and I submit the following draft of a radiogram to be sent to the United States High Commissioner in lieu of the message proposed by the Secretaries of War and the Navy. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget concurs in this message which does not depart in any essential way from the general tenor of the message proposed by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, but is more informative as to the: (a) measures under consideration by the War and Navy Departments; (b) the use of future appropriations, if any, of sugar excise taxes; (c) method of appropriation, i.e. not a procedure analogous to the present appropriations of the coconut oil excise taxes. It seems desirable to give President Quezon this additional information now. This proposed message would read as follows:

"U.S. High Commissioner
Manila, Philippine Islands.

"Will you please inform President Quezon that his desire to cooperate with the United States in preparing the Philippine Islands for defense, and his suggestions that the necessary expenditures be made from funds collected from sugar excise taxes and moneys that may be due the Philippines as a result of currency devaluation, are gratifying to the Government of the United States.

"The security of the Philippine Islands has been under serious consideration by the War and Navy Departments, and steps are being taken to strengthen their defenses. Certain of the measures contemplated may appropriately be charged to the funds in question and it might be desirable to make any future appropriations available for the same purpose.

"United States military authorities have suggested measures to strengthen and enlarge existing defense installations which facilitate operations and defensive capabilities of the present garrison, and which would include calling the Philippine Army into active service for training under Section 2(a)(12) of the Independence

4000 Philippines - High Commissioner

Act. Any installations would eventually become available to the Philippine Government in 1946. Funds would remain in the United States Treasury to be expended under the supervision and control of the appropriate officials of the United States Government.

"Estimates will be prepared in accordance with the foregoing and an appropriation will be sought from the Congress to be expended for the improvement of the defense of the Philippine Islands.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT."

I am in complete accord with the general terms of the recommendations outlined in the joint letter of January 30 to make available these authorized appropriations for the improvement of the defenses of the Philippine Islands. I wish to point out, however, that the Philippine Independence Act establishes the United States High Commissioner as your representative in the Islands and provides that he shall be recognized as such by the commanding officers of the military forces of the United States in the Islands. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the High Commissioner is the logical official of this Government to supervise the expenditure of these funds and that the legislation making the funds available should specifically so provide. The High Commissioner is on the ground and would have the benefit of the technical advice of the Commanding General, Philippine Department, United States Army, and the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. As your representative he should be in the best position to coordinate the activities of the Commonwealth Government with the military and naval requirements of this Government. However, the above proposed radiogram does not necessarily commit you to this procedure if it is found later to be impractical.

The United States High Commissioner was advised as to the general position taken by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and this Department, and there has now been received in the Department a message from him (radiogram No. 275), dated April 3, setting forth his further views. A copy of this message is attached.

The above proposed message was drafted after consultation with the Bureau of the Budget ~~but~~ prior to the receipt of this message from the United States High Commissioner; however, I see nothing in his communication which would make this message inappropriate. He seems to be concerned primarily that power to initiate action should be retained by American officials, and recommends that no communication should be sent to the Commonwealth authorities that could be interpreted as an actual or implied commitment by you as to the method of expenditure, use or control of these funds. The proposed message says: "Funds would remain

in the United States Treasury to be expended under the supervision and control of the appropriate officials of the United States Government". The High Commissioner suggests the use of some such phrase: "To be expended by the military and naval authorities of the United States in accordance with the approved recommendations of the Joint Board." The first phrase seems sufficiently clear that control of these funds will be maintained by this Government. I do not think that this question has been studied sufficiently yet to attempt to make this language more specific by reference to a Joint Board such as contemplated by the High Commissioner. Such a Board might be desirable, but at first glance it looks involved and would give only nominal participation to representatives of the Commonwealth Government. You may wish to amend the proposed message by eliminating the reference to future appropriations, but as written it commits you in no way on that point.

I am firmly convinced that it is desirable to retain control in our hands, but to the fullest possible extent permit participation by representatives of the Commonwealth Government; but to do this and secure the cooperation of the Commonwealth officials will require delicate handling.

The recommendations of the High Commissioner will be helpful in working out final details of this matter, but in view of the long period of time which has elapsed since this question was first raised I believe that President Quisenberry is entitled now to a statement as to what he may reasonably expect. I think the proposed message clearly sets forth a sound general policy and goes into as much detail as is advisable at this time.

If you approve transmission of this radiogram, it is suggested that you return it to this Department to be sent in cipher.

(Sgd.) HAROLD L. ICKES
Secretary of the Interior.

Enclosure 2776625.

THE WHITE HOUSE

April 11, 1941.

Approved:

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Translation of Radiogram in Code Received April 4, 1941.
(Manila, P. I.)

deb

EMERSON.
Interior Department.
Washington.
April 3—No. 275.

Your ordinary mail letter February 19 concerning sugar excise and dollar devaluation funds received March 29. Appreciate your informing me as to proposed action and your solicitude as to position of High Commissioner.

With regard to substance of proposed action see my radio to you No. 548, August 6, 1940. If President decides to recommend to Congress that it appropriate funds covering sugar excise taxes under Sugar Act of 1937 and dollar devaluation under Act of June 19, 1934, to be devoted to the military defense of the Philippines, I should like to urge following considerations:

1. The Commonwealth Government is responsible for the "passive defense" of civilians in the Philippines, namely the organization of adequate measures for civilian welfare and protection such as insuring adequate supplies of food stuffs and fuel, preparing shelters and protection against air raids, strengthening and training the Constabulary, organizing a home guard and the like. The United States Government is responsible for the "active defense" of the Philippines up to 1946. Therefore, since power should go with responsibility, United States Army and Navy should have full power to determine the ways and means of such active defense and to control expenditures therefore.

2. It is clear that Philippine defense is not something separate and apart from general defense of the United States. Philippine defense is an intimate part of and should be closely coordinated with United States general defense.

3. Therefore, the absolute control of expenditures for "active defense" of Philippines should be in the hands of those responsible for general defense of the United States, namely United States Army and Navy authorities. It is not sufficient that they have power merely to approve expenditures proposed or initiated by others.

4. It would be particularly unfortunate to limit American control to approval of measures and of appropriations initiated by the Commonwealth Government, as this might easily prevent the United States military authorities from effectively planning in advance for defense of Commonwealth or from a necessary coordination of policy. While the phrase "under the supervision and control * * *" as used in proposed message from President Roosevelt to President Quezon seems less objectionable than the phrase "with the approval of * * *" the former phraseology seems not sufficiently exact and might give rise to argumentation and possible friction between United States Military and Naval authorities and Commonwealth Government to the possible detriment of a coherent plan for defense. It would [2] seem preferable to use some such phrase as "to be expected by the Military and Naval authorities of the United States in accordance with the approved recommendations of the Joint Board" mentioned below.

5. However, I believe that the Commonwealth Government should have a part and be asked to collaborate in the formulation of plans for the expenditure of these funds as considered most beneficial to Philippine defense. Such collaboration might take the form of a Joint Board to recommend the purposes and projects in order of priority for the expenditure of funds, such Board to be composed of representatives of the United States Army, of the United States Navy, of the High Commissioner, and of the Commonwealth Government. It would seem a logical function of High Commissioner to attempt to reconcile opposing views and to coordinate action. It should be provided, however, that in case of possible disagreement in Board's conclusions, the representatives of the United States Army and Navy should have the power to cast the deciding vote. All procurement of materials and personal services and all disbursements should be effected by the United States Army or Navy. The recommendations of Joint Board in Manila when approved or acted upon by the Commanding General of Philippine Department and Commandant of Sixteenth Naval District to be referred to War and Navy Departments in Washington for final action.

6. In order to avoid unnecessary friction or delay appropriations should be made directly to the United States Army and Navy with some such provision as above for collaboration by Commonwealth Government.

7. Until legislation is actually passed I recommend that no communication to Commonwealth authorities and no release in Washington should be made that could be interpreted as an actual or implied commitment by the President of the United States as to the method of expenditure, use or control of these funds.

8. If any communication is sent from the President of United States for President Quezon, it should be addressed to the United States High Commissioner as recommended specifically by the Secretary of the Interior. In communications between officials of the United States and Commonwealth Governments it will avoid embarrassment and facilitate our efforts if the following opening form is used:

"Please inform President Quezon (or even better, The Commonwealth Government)".

9. The legislation making appropriations of sugar excise funds should presumably not apply to future collections and should provide that the appropriations made do not imply any obligation to appropriate future collections or future dollar devaluation funds. (End tabulation.)

Nothing in foregoing should be considered as disapproval on my part of desirable expenditures for training, equipment or extension of Philippine army or for improvement and extension of fixed fortifications which might eventually become the property of an independent Philippines, provided [3] that such expenditures are deemed desirable by military authorities of the United States.

I have discussed whole problem with Commanding General of Philippine Department and with Commandant Sixteenth Naval District. The conclusions and recommendations here set forth are theirs as well as mine.

I have as yet seen no text of proposed legislation. If and when this is formulated I should appreciate text being transmitted by radio and my being given opportunity to comment on it before its submission to Congress.

Please furnish copies of this radio to the President and the Secretaries of War, Navy and State.

SAYRE.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, April 15, 1941

Memorandum for the President

Honorable Cordell Hull
Admiral Emory S. Land
Honorable Harry Hopkins

May I advise, as a matter of information, that Frank Kluckhohn of the New York Times Washington Staff, gives me the following statement:

"The Domei official Japanese correspondent tells me that the Japanese intend to halt and delay for a month American merchant ships on their way to the Red Sea."

S. T. E.

4/15/41

Memo for the files.

Return to Admiral Stark his Secret memo to FDR 3/28/41 enclosing copy of let to him from Admiral Thomas Hart 4/4/41 re situation at Manila, P. I.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, May 1, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am returning to you herewith the memorandum, with enclosures, transmitted to you under date of April 28 by the Secretary of the Navy which you were good enough to send me for my information with your memorandum of April 30. I have given it to Murphy to read. The latter should be in Casablanca Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

Admiral Pratt's memorandum in particular has been most helpful to me.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLS

Enc.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Please read and return.
You can show it to Bob Murphy.

F. D. R.



4322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, April 30, 1941.

Memorandum for the Under Secretary of State.

Please read and return. You can show it to Bob Murphy.

F. D. R.

Memorandum from Admiral Pratt to the Secretary of the Navy and another memorandum from Joseph B. Phillips, the Foreign Editor of Newsweek.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, April 28, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

I am enclosing herewith a couple of papers which you might find interesting reading. One is by Admiral Pratt and the other by Joseph B. Phillips, the Foreign Editor of Newsweek. I know in what high esteem you hold Admiral Pratt and I found them both very interesting.

F. K.

Enclosures—2

MEMO FOR ADMIRAL PRATT

(1)—The need to protect our flank in the South Atlantic is pressing. Sierra Leone is the best base. In addition however there are numerous smaller islands in this region, which are worth consideration. Two weeks ago Newsweek had a story, based on a report by a French geographer, saying that Germany had established bases and stored fuel on some small islands off Bathurst. Nothing has been heard of this so far in the war. In addition I would like to point out that in my opinion, the French situation is deteriorating rapidly. The immediate German purpose may be to secure the French fleet and North Africa, but the influence will certainly extend to Dakar, and possibly to the Cameroons, and the present Free French Equatorial Africa. Contrary to the opinion often expressed, I am doubtful that the policy of the Petain Government, will be guided by French public opinion. The hold of Germany is too strong. There are too many men ambitious of power around Petain, or such as Laval. Consequently I submit that your memorandum might include a suggestion that within the immediate future, every possible pressure should be brought on France, through such things as the food question, and publicizing our own armaments effort and our determination to prevent a British defeat, to forestall a German success in France. To this end propaganda for the French public will do some good, but not enough. The important thing is to impress a few individuals, such as Admiral Darlan and General Huntzinger. I have recently heard you express an opinion on General Weygand with which I concur, nevertheless he is important in Africa, and I think it would be well to be certain that someone in our consular or diplomatic service has access to him with the ability to exert the desired pressure. To express a purely personal opinion, I believe that the next big break will come in France. Even such a thing as an American effort to secure the release of certain French war prisoners—say those needed for the Spring planting and harvest—while it would probably be fruitless, nevertheless would create a favorable impression.

While Sierra Leone would serve us well and could be acquired from Britain, nevertheless I feel that the acquisition of Dakar would make a much greater impression upon Europe. I do not have enough military information on the situation there to know whether this is possible. If it is say, by a landing of marines, I would consider it an important step to convince both Europe and South America of our determination.

(2)—You and I have recently heard some interesting but uninformed discussions of our possible influence in the acquisition of Irish Bases. I have no special information on this subject, but would like to make the following suggestions—First that the influence we can exert on this problem must be secondary to the English-Irish problem. Second that one definite contribution we can make is to analyze Irish-American opinion in this country and to influence it as much as possible. Although my contact with these political groups is too slight to be of much use, it had been enough to give me the opinion that a serious study of such groups would be worth the while of the State Department or of the Navy Department. The divisions in Ireland are reflected here, and I have myself been present at meetings of persons who were con-

tributing to the Irish Republican Army. My impression is that most Irishmen in the United States, are anti-English, and I feel that many of them have been influenced by such organizations as the Silver Shirts and Father Coughlins followers. This however is only a suggestion that a more serious study should be made of these groups, with the idea that they cannot be influenced unless they feel that the final peace settlement is to be determined more by the United States [3] than by Britain.

(3)—As regards our position in the Far East, it definitely is not my opinion that we are doing enough if we merely leave Japan a way out from the Axis alliance by such devices as convoying ships defensively to the limit of the Neutrality zone. Japan is a nation on the prowl without resources and anxious for whatever she can get. The keys here are primarily Russia, and secondarily a bold front on our part and that of the British. This is true because for several years Japan has feared Russia more than it has us or Britain. I am of the opinion that unless we act immediately—Russia will sell out China and force Chiang-Kai-shek to make a peace with Japan. Everything in Chiangs past record points to the probability that he will consent to this. You know there is a very serious division in the Japanese government over the Axis alliance, and that it has been accentuated by the new neutrality treaty with Russia, because there are a number of Japanese of influence who still think their main enemy is Russia. Consequently I have two suggestions to make, first that the State Department, and also Navy men, who often have more effective contacts with the Japanese should impress upon them that we are as determined to keep up our aid to China as we are to Britain, and second that we should make a very special effort to impress Russia. As you know I am of the opinion that this physically weak power is pursuing a policy designed to secure a compromise peace in Europe and in Asia, or a German or Japanese victory after an exhausting war. Nevertheless from first hand experience I am convinced that the primary objective of the Stalin regime is to survive among a growing host of enemies. I have what I consider to be reliable information that Germany has promised survival to this regime, which naturally has great influence in the Kremlin. It is within the bounds of possibility that [4] that Russia can force China to make peace with Japan, thereby freeing Japan for an attack on ourselves and British interests in the Far East—To offset this we can take three lines of action—1—as said above impress Russia that our aid to China will continue regardless of events in Europe—2—Make it clear to Russia that we are interested in the war in the Balkans and North Africa, and that we are anxious to prevent a German domination of the Straits of the Dardanelles which is a matter of old and vital interest to Russia, in spite of all the present talk about a possible substitute outlet through the Persian Gulf, and—3—to make every effort to impress Russia by our industrial war effort. This country for a variety of reasons, is more apt than any other to be impressed by the figures on the American war industrial effort. From two conferences which you and I have attended recently, I have the impression that the extent of this effort has not been fully publicized. Moreover it is to the advantage of Russian policy at the moment to encourage this effort and to lessen sabotage. This war is a struggle for power, in which ideologies are only the instrument of power groups, and I see no reason why given our true position in the world we should not be capable of playing upon the obvious weaknesses of both Russia and Japan to emasculate the danger to ourselves in the Pacific.

(4)—As regards the specific recommendations in your memorandum, I have only two suggestions to make—(a)—that the headquarters of a joint American-British strategy board might better be in Canada than in Washington—(b)—that such a Board should have its own press relations bureau, quite separate from the notoriously inadequate Ministry of Information in London, and that in the selection of such an organization the British Dominions and ourselves should have more weight than the British.

[5] Note—As an addenda, I submit that all my information as a Foreign News Editor, is to the effect that in the case of defeat, the remnants of the British Fleet would be quite as apt to retreat to Singapore as to Canada.

JOSEPH B. PHILLIPS

MEMO ON SIERRA LEONE

We should have a base at Freetown on the south side of the Sierra Leone river. It is a British possession, having an excellent harbor, with an anchorage

space over 9 miles long and 1 mile wide, for ships of the deepest draught. It is protected from the seas on the north, by shoals extending well to seaward, over which heavy seas break, and by low flat land. There are Government docks at which ships drawing 30 feet of water could berth, discharge, and take on cargo. There is a nice little town with churches, hospitals, barracks, and a sanitorium in the hills. It should be reasonably cool and healthy, for it is open to the breezes from the north and west, and some of the quarters and barracks are in the hills.

It could not be attacked from the north, for the land on the north side is low and open to gunfire, and the flats extend well to seaward. The sea guards it on the west, and the river extends into the interior on the east. On the south it is protected by a series of hills and knolls, ranging from over 2,500 feet down, beginning about four and a half miles from the town and almost surrounding it. Any attack from the south would have to storm these hills and take them, before entry to the harbor could be made. It lies 450 miles south of Dakar, 2,760 miles from our base at Trinidad, and is 1590 miles from the nearest point in South America, approximately the same distance that Dakar is. It is a better spot for a base than Bathurst on the Cambia river, also a British holding, though Bathurst is nearer Dakar being 120 miles away.

IRISH BASES

The best bases to secure and use in Ireland would probably be, if such a move is practicable—Cobh—Lough Swilly—Berehaven in Bantry Bar. Berehaven was used as a destroyer base in the last war. It covers the air and sea approaches from the west and south—Cobh is the natural port [2] for the discharge of cargo—Lough Swilly is an extensive bay on the north coast of Ireland. It is the sea approach to Londonderry. A base in this vicinity would cover the northern and western approaches to Scotland and the Irish sea.

POINTS SUGGESTED FOR CONSIDERATION

Since the Lend Lease Bill has given the authority, and the \$7,000,000.00 the power to start the wheels of production rolling, the most important factors to consider in the Aid to Britain program, are (a)—systematic and efficient planning between ourselves and Great Britain, and (b)—efficient and quick action in the matter of getting our production in the safest way to the localities where Britain can best use it. The need of speedy action in the case of—(b)—is evident since the successful solution of the Campaign of the Atlantic, is the most serious problem facing Britain now, and during the summer months, and transport across the sea is the weakest link in our aid to Britain scheme. In attacking this problem of shipping, there are two points to consider—(c)—the replacement of tonnage sunk, by the most rapid methods of construction, regardless of the size of the carriers—(d)—the safe transit of ships and their cargoes, with a minimum of loss, irrespective of any particular method by which ships cross the seas. In other words speed in transit and a reasonable degree of security are the key notes. If we attempt to safeguard shipping by escort, our own political position at home has to be considered, and the risk of involvement of a war in two oceans. Yet if we are not willing to assume some of the risks of defending the shipments regardless of what ships carry them, we might as well throw our money down the sink, and Britain may fall. If she does the logical spot for the British Government to move to is Canada, though the fleet might move to Singapore. Then we are in the war, for it has very definitely reached the Western Hemisphere, for we have defense commitments with Canada which we cannot [3] dodge. It would seem to be wiser policy to attempt to confine the fighting to Europe than have it come over here. A risk of our involvement in war, which is confined to sea and long range air activity, is a minimum risk, compared to what we would probably face if Britain fell. If the steps we take are in defense of our own rights as we view them, and we escort cargoes for the present no further than 30 degrees west longitude, which is within the limits of the western hemisphere, this might give Japan an out, in that the real aggressor might be termed the one who fired the first gun or torpedo, and Japan might be glad of an excuse not to go to war with us.

In general, in the matter of our sea and air aid to Britain, there are three courses we may pursue—(e)—we may turn over to Britain all the sea and air craft she needs, and which are at our disposal, with the promise of having them returned later. In the matter of aircraft, this presents no operational diff-

culties, and the speed up in our own production should give us a good safety margin, in case we had to look more closely to our own defense needs. The case of our war craft is different, though the difficulties attendant to turning over regular men of war, does not apply to smaller craft, such as Coast Guard ships—yachts—patrol boats—tugs—mine sweepers. If we turn over too many men of war at one time, there is the problem for Britain to find trained crews to man them—there is a training period for British crews to learn how to run them without breakdowns—and there is the matter of additions and changes in material to make our ships fit to war specifications. Away from gunfire and air attack we should be able to make a better and quicker job of it—(f)—there is the course of conduct where we hold fast to all our sea and air craft, expecting to use them later. This is a negative effort, productive of no aid to Britain, and extremely wasteful of time—(g)—there is the com- [4] promise plan and this seems to me to be the one offering the most promise. This plan would be to turn over to Britain, all the sea and air craft she could use immediately, and which we could spare, having in mind our Pacific commitment, and that we should start convoy immediately.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

(1)—That a Board be appointed, composed of competent British and American naval and military men, to study the war, plan a joint strategy and determine upon the proper tactics for its execution, if and when the time comes, that joint action is required. The seat of this Board would best be in Washington—(possibly Canada)—removed from the center of strife, where quiet thinking is possible, with all information given it.

(2)—That steps be taken toward locating suitable bases in Labrador and Greenland, for the purpose of establishing across the narrow waters separating them, direct air flights for all types of planes, from the U. S. to Newfoundland—Newfoundland to Labrador—Labrador to Greenland—Greenland to Iceland—Iceland to the British Isles.

(3)—That steps toward the acquirement of temporary bases in Ireland and Sierra Leone be started.

(4)—That direct sailings between our own ports and the Res sea be started. Turkey the key spot in the Eastern Mediterranean has not given in yet, and if she fights, air power—(the lack of which was one of the main reasons Greece fell)—in quantity will be needed. Our ships not to be convoyed on this route, by ourselves or the British. Nor should we endeavor to protect them yet on this route against raiders. The effort to do this would cause a dispersal of our naval force more urgently needed elsewhere now. If raiders sink or capture one this is an act of aggression.

[5] (5)—Turn over to the British, exclusive of the needs of the Pacific fleet, all sea and air craft they can use immediately, and which we will not need in the convoys we escort. This is a practical measure since every war craft and aircraft we so turn over, goes into full war use immediately, while those we retain will not get into full war use until we get into the war.

(6)—Since British shipping is much tied up, if quick plane deliveries, are needed to West Coast African ports, in order to be flown to North Africa for immediate use, make the deliveries in our own fast ships, by direct sailings to West Coast African ports.

(7)—Fit out immediately more ships of the C-type, similar to the one now being fitted out—that is the convoy, cargo aircraft carrier type.

(8)—Since the rapid transit of cargo is more efficient by direct sailings than by convoy, the principle should be established, that each individual cargo carrier, as far as practicable should be made as immune to the submarine and aircraft as possible. In new construction this would put a limit on size, and the account on speed, both in construction and in transit. Older ships of slow speed must be escorted in convoy, and all means of defense used, even with the autogyro and blimp if it is found possible to use them.

(9)—That ships of 15 knots and over should not go in convoy.

(10)—That slow ships of 10 knots and under, should go in convoy.

(11)—That between 10 and 15 knots discretion should be used whether to send ships in convoy or not.

(12)—That convoys should be small.

(13)—That the Neutrality Zone be extended to 30 degrees longitude west, which is within the limits of the western hemisphere.

(14)—That we start to escort convoys to longitude 30 degrees west, and then turn them over to the British.

[6] (15)—That as soon as practicable, we start an air patrol, by sea planes, conducted from those bases we have acquired or may acquire, which from their location in the Atlantic can give shipping important information.

(16)—That the convoys we escort may be composed of ships of all nationalities, and form in our ports.

(17)—That when British war craft enter our ports for repair, the matter is taken under consideration, can we swap for the time being, an undamaged ship of the same type for the one damaged. If not then train the crews of the damaged ships, so that in time they can handle one of our own without much further training.

(18)—That as our heavier battleships come along, they go to the Pacific, to relieve one or two of the older battleships, which may then be put in the Atlantic service as deemed advisable.

(19)—Should it develop later that we become an active belligerent and found that in turning over too many of our warships and aircraft, while as a non belligerent, we have stripped ourselves of the means to conduct a joint war efficiently, we have an agreement with the British that such of our air craft as we had loaned, be returned, or that a new realignment of forces, their distribution and operational tasks be assigned, in order to conduct efficiently the joint war, in whatever world areas war operations are conducted.

(20)—That as soon as we decide to convoy, even to long. 30, a state of National Emergency be declared.

(21)—That when a State of National Emergency is declared, or before steps be taken to insure the safety of our merchant ships against acts of sabotage, or those inimical to our interests.

(22)—If the present political crisis in Australia, leads to a diminution of their active aid to Britain, for their own defense purposes [7] we may have to exert more pressure on Australia, to reassure them of our active support, in case their island is threatened by a southern Japanese move.

W. V. PRATT

Memo—April 30—41

Report of a very interesting conversation, I had with the Japanese Ambassador on April 28—The interview was private—held in the Hotel Plaza—He and I were the only ones present during the entire interview—it was held at his request, and lasted two and a half hours. In the main the conversation was general, but always stuck to the main theme—the war—However, there were certain definite statements, Nomura made, to wit—that Japan definitely wanted a peace with China—would ask no indemnities—did not desire the military occupation of China—that now, though at first military occupation had been a purpose, this idea had been given up, by most of the influential leaders—including most of the higher military men—nearly all of the naval men—and as I gathered by practically all of the leading business and financial heads—What opposition existed rested entirely in the younger group—that Japan's aim vis-a-vis China was the rehabilitation along economic lines of China and Japan in order to create a stable economic situation through which both Countries would profit, along the lines of cooperation.

With regard to the southward expansion—Japan's aims there were in line with the policy adopted in China—that a military move directed at Singapore and the Dutch East Indies was not intended, but economic stability, and a free flow of trade in which Japan could participate—and I gathered on equal and not on preferential terms—He distinctly did not want war to creep into the Pacific—and I gathered this was the general sentiment in Japan—as it would tend to disturb Japan's policy of economic rehabilitation and stability in the Orient. In spite of the Russo-Japanese agreement, the great fear is and will continue to be Russia—not that they fear Russia in a military sense [2] but that in a long war, with Britain and Germany exhausted—Stalin would be the only winner—then Communist influence would dominate the Orient, much to Japan's undoing—that he, and I judged most of Japan's informed military authority regarded Russia as a weak country, with Stalin under the thumb of Berlin—that Russia was not sincere and could not be trusted.

Nomura stated that of all foreigners in his country the Americans were the best liked.

He stated that the capitalist group in Japan were distinctly opposed to the Axis economic system—that Japan's system was the growth of one patterned after ours and that of Britain, and that the supremacy of the Nazi system would distinctly disrupt their own, and as I gathered would interfere much with Japan's economic policy in the Orient, as it was fundamentally different from the one Japan visualized.

The immediate purpose of the discussion with me, was in connection with a visit he hoped Matsuoka would be able to make to this country in the near future—When Matsuoka went to Berlin—he, Nomura had cabled him, asking that he return via the United States—Matsuoka could not do it then, as he had to complete arrangements with Russia—I gathered that the feeling was, if an atmosphere was created in this country, which was not hostile to him, since Japan was an Axis partner, that he, Matsuoka, might be glad to come to this country to talk things over.

I told Nomura then, if the suspicion was aroused in this country that Matsuoka came as an Axis agent prepared to spread the Nazi doctrine of a conqueror's peace, it would in my opinion be futile, and would only result in a greater antagonism in this country, for we would feel then that Japan had been sold lock, stock [3] and barrel to the Nazis—But that if Matsuoka came with the purpose of establishing friendly relations with this country on the basis of limiting the war to Europe—establishing a condition of peace in the Orient, not to be broken by further military conquests there, and keeping the peace so that war could not spread to the Orient, there might be a possibility—I was not a statesman, nor in a position to make statement which carry any weight, but it was my opinion that the one successful approach to this country, and the only one giving any promise might be along the lines I suggested.

I asked him about Matsuoka, stating that I heard he was in sentiment hostile to this country—The Ambassadors reply was to this effect—That Matsuoka must not be judged entirely by what he says—that he is a disciple of the American political method of saying a great many things to see their effect—but what he has in his heart may be quite another matter.

I gathered, however, from the whole conversation, that there was a growing fear in Japan, that ultimately, if the Axis were the victors Japan might have to fear Hitler, about as much as they do Stalin—that he, Nomura, looks forward to a long war, and in the end he did not see how Hitler could prevail over Britain and the United States with their great reserve power.

This represents the gist of the conversation.

W. V. PRATT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 6, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

Will you speak to me about this?

F. D. R.

Letter from The United States High Commissioner giving a report on the Philippines, dated April 23, 1941.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

MAY - 7 1941

The President,

The White House. MAY 8 9 37 AM '41

My dear Mr. President:

RECEIVED

In connection with a message which you authorized to be sent on April 12, through the United States High Commissioner to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth, with regard to the appropriation of certain funds for defense purposes in the Philippines, I enclose a copy of a radiogram which has been received from the United States High Commissioner containing a further message for you from Mr. Quezon on this subject.

This correspondence and other information indicate a difference of opinion between Mr. Sayre and Mr. Quezon on this question. Mr. Sayre believes that all of this \$52,000,000 should be used for direct military and naval purposes and that expenditures for civilian welfare and protection should be borne by the Commonwealth Government from other funds, having in mind the coconut oil excise tax funds now being collected in the United States and credited to the Commonwealth Government at the rate of approximately \$17,000,000 annually.

Mr. Quezon is on record as stating that he believes that the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines is as much the primary responsibility of this Government as the military defense of the Islands. He desires to use the coconut oil taxes for other purposes and therefore requests that \$15,000,000 of these additional funds be set aside for civilian defense.

From 1934 to March 1, 1941, approximately \$110,000,000 have accrued to the credit of the Philippine Government as a result of the coconut oil taxes. When it is considered that these extraordinary receipts annually approximate one-third of the revenues from ordinary sources, it is perhaps not unreasonable to feel that a part at least of such revenues might be used in the present emergency as suggested by the High Commissioner. He intimates that you might make such a suggestion. However, the Commonwealth authorities have under consideration the expenditure of a part of the coconut oil money for the purpose of increasing the Philippine Constabulary and the construction of an airport. I doubt the advisability, until we know how far they are prepared to go voluntarily, of attempting to put more pressure on them at this time.

1000 Philippines High Commissioner
-249 official

Inasmuch as I understand that estimates for the appropriation of this money are to be prepared by the War and Navy Departments, I am sending copies of all this correspondence to the Secretaries of War and the Navy for their information. Until their recommendations are received, therefore, I do not believe that any further action is necessary.

Sincerely yours,

Harold C. Parker

Secretary of the Interior.

Enclosures.

x4

Translation of Radiogram in Code Received April 3, 1941.
(Manila, P. I.)

MEMORANDUM.
Interior Department.
Washington.
April 3 - No. 285.

Commonwealth proposes to include in fiscal year 1942 Budget of account oil excise tax fund items for Constabulary and Manila Air Force. United States Army would like to see both approved as aid to defense. Civilian Emergency Planning Board has strongly recommended that Philippine Constabulary should be strengthened as a measure of civilian defense. See copy of report of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board forwarded you on March 26, 1941 by air express. Would appreciate views of Interior as to whether these items conform to requirements Section 6 Public No. 300, 76th Congress. In view of suggestion by Commonwealth to use account oil funds for strengthening Constabulary it is evident Commonwealth considers Section 6 broad enough to include National Defense items. This view was expressed by Secretary Finance Bureau last year. My legal Adviser is of opinion these funds can be used for National Defense items including civilian defense measures, basing his opinion upon assumption word "and" used in a disjunctive sense in Section 6 of Act August 7, 1939 requiring funds to be used for "meeting new or additional expenditures which will be necessary in adjusting Philippine economy to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States and in preparing the Philippines for the assumption of responsibilities of an independent state." In this connection see also page 13 mimeographed undated strictly confidential memorandum entitled "Drafts of Proposed Legislation to Effectuate the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Philippine Affairs" transmitted by letter December 1938 from me as Assistant Secretary of State to High Commissioner Hildt. In view of possible emergency it is highly desirable that account oil fund be available for both active military defense and passive civilian defense. See my No. 275, April 3, 1941. Commonwealth is desirous of presenting as soon as possible Budget to Assembly which adjourns its regular session on May 22, 1941. Please expedite reply.

END.

Translation of Radiogram in Code Received April 23, 1941. deb
(Manila, P. I.)

EMERSON.
Interior Department.
Washington.
April 22 - No. 314.

Confidential for the President. In letter dated April 21, 1941, President Queson requests me to forward following radio to you:

"In reference to your contemplated action of asking Congress to appropriate the funds collected from excise tax on sugar as well as the funds authorized from the gold devaluation for the defense of the Philippines as requested by me, I recommend that you include the setting aside of \$15,000,000.00 for the carrying out of the civilian defense plans and \$5,000,000.00 for the construction of a proposed dry dock in Manila harbor, plans for which the Navy Department is familiar with." <

635-

In considering this recommendation you will doubtless wish to secure the opinion of War and Navy Departments as to question of whether entire sum derived from both sugar excise tax and dollar devaluation funds of approximately \$52,000,000.00 is more than sufficient for expenditures necessary for "active" military defense of Philippines. If entire sum of \$52,000,000.00 is necessary for "active defense" you may wish to consider possibility of allowing Commonwealth Government to use coconut oil excise tax funds to supplement other Commonwealth funds available for financing cost of "passive" civilian defense, as recommended in my radio No. 285 of April 5 to Interior. Also see my confidential radio to Emerson No. 275 of April 3, 1941 regarding responsibilities of United States and Commonwealth Governments with respect to defense and pointing out distinction between "active" and "passive" defense.

SAYRE.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File
Confidential*

May 14, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF STATE:

For your information and
return.

F. D. R.

*Given attention
CH*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Clarence Dillon, of Dillon and Reid, 'phoned the following:

"The Japanese have in this country two insurance companies, one of which is the Standard Insurance Company of New York, an excellent little company doing a good business. Mr. McCain of my office happens to be on the board of these companies, and has been for a good many years.

"The Japanese were over here last December exploring the possibility of selling the companies, or something, and to see what the situation was. The other day we got a cable from them asking if we could arrange for the sale of these companies in sixty days. Then, a few days later, their manager over here asked us if we could make them an immediate bid: so we spoke to the Aetna in Hartford, and we cabled them on Friday, making them a bid, and a very low bid for immediate reply. We got a cable from them this morning, accepting the offer.

"I thought that this might be of real interest to the President, as it looks like the Japanese are selling out their assets over here in a hurry. We had purposely cabled them a low offer for immediate acceptance, to see what would happen, and they accepted immediately.

"If the President wants any details on this, McCain can be in Washington today to give details to anybody designated."

EPM.W.

C. F. State
European War

CH
OK *Send it*
F.D.R.

Original to State
5/14/41

May 10, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I return herewith a radiogram of April 1, 1941 from the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines in which he communicates, with his approval, a recommendation by Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, that a proclamation be issued declaring that "all interior waters of the Philippines and passages thereto, including the Sulu Sea, constitute territorial waters under United States jurisdiction and in which full enforcement of United States neutrality is undertaken". The Admiral's recommendation is based particularly on his desire "to be in a position to prevent any belligerent fleet from entering the Sulu Sea with the ostensible or real purpose of attacking the Netherlands Indies in the event of belligerency involving them".

The President,

The White House.

463-6
 100 Philippines
 100 Philippines-High Commissioner

-2-

The Admiral's recommendation has been the subject of discussions with officers of the Navy Department and this Department is informally advised that the Navy Department does not consider it advisable to approve the recommendation. Aside from the question of policy, this Department is convinced that any claim by this Government to territorial jurisdiction over the Sulu Sea would not be tenable. It would be strongly opposed by other governments, particularly by those interested in the navigation of the Sulu Sea, and would constitute a precedent which might prove to be very embarrassing.

Moreover, it is not necessary for this Government to claim territorial jurisdiction over the Sulu Sea in order to prevent its use in any manner which might be deemed inimical to the safety of the United States.

I suggest for your consideration the following draft of a reply to Commissioner Sayre:

JK (For the High Commissioner from the President. Your 120, April first, 9 a.m. For various reasons I do not feel that we should assert jurisdiction. This decision would not, of course, preclude us from taking such measures as may be necessary and appropriate to safeguard our interests.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

Enclosure:
Radiogram of
April 1, 1941
from the U.S. High
Commissioner to
the Philippines.

x18

x1561

-S. F. State

x246

x99

on
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Manila

Dated April 1, 1941

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

120, April 1, 9 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander in Chief

United States Asiatic Fleet, referring to the
Neutrality Act of 1939, Section 16, Executive Order
8233 and Proclamation 2348, both September 5, 1939,
recommends that it be proclaimed that all interior
water of Philippines and passages thereto, including
the Sulu Sea, constitute territorial waters under
United States jurisdiction and in which full enforce-
ment of United States neutrality is undertaken. The
presence of vessels of foreign belligerents in such
waters obviously would constitute a danger to the
safety of the Philippines and no vessels should be
permitted to enter such waters which would not be
permitted to enter other United States territorial
waters. The Admiral desires particularly to be in
position to prevent any belligerent fleet from
entering the Sulu Sea with the ostensible or real
purpose

- 2 - 120, April 1, 9 a.m. from Manila.

purpose of attacking the Netherlands Indies in the event of belligerency involving them. In view of practical exigencies of the situation here I concur in Admiral Hart's recommendation and consider it feasible under general principle of international law as applied under present world conditions to such waters. Please immediately bring matter to the attention of the President.

SAYRE

GW

4338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
THE SECRETARY,
May 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter from the High Commissioner, dated April 23, 1941, which you sent me with your memorandum of May 6, has been read with much interest and I appreciate the opportunity of reading it. For your consideration I suggest a reply somewhat along the following lines:

"Your letter of April 23, 1941 has just reached me and the several items of information given in it, as well as your comments, are found illuminating and useful.

"It is gratifying to learn that you are working in such close harmony with General Grunert, Admiral Hart and Admiral Bemis; also, that the strengthening of our armed forces in the Philippines has resulted in a more satisfactory trend in Filipino public opinion.

"Your comments upon the health of President Quezon and the consequent increase in his irascibility are very interesting. I am sure that in view of this tendency on his part you have kept [2] in mind the importance of exercising even more than usual tact in all of your relations with him. I am fully aware that in the tense atmosphere of the present situation it is not easy to collaborate without misunderstandings with a man of his proud and sensitive nature who is in a weakened condition consequent upon his illness, and that you will find it necessary to be more than ordinarily patient as well as wise. I am counting upon you to exercise just such wisdom, patience and tact, since the maintenance of harmonious relations is essential to obtaining the maximum degree of cooperation.

"Your remarks as to your desire to continue in the High Commissionership for not more than another year, and in regard to the various rumors which have reached Manila as to your replacement, have been given my careful attention. Since I have no ideas as to making any change at the present time, you should not permit yourself to be disturbed by rumors and press comments. I am carefully considering your suggestion that some statement be made in a press conference. Your desire to be relieved after another year will also be kept in mind."

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, Baguio, April 23, 1941.

Via Airmail
Personal and confidential
BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWIN M. WATSON.
*The White House,
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: Will you be good enough to see that the President is given personally the enclosed very confidential letter which is for his eyes alone? I shall greatly appreciate your kindness.

What a tragic world this is becoming! I often wonder how the President and all of you in the White House can keep up the pace. I do hope that his health continues good.

With warmest personal wishes, believe me,
Ever sincerely yours,

FRANCIS B. SAYRE.

Enclosure.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, Baguio, April 23, 1941.

Via airmail
Personal and confidential
The PRESIDENT.
*The White House,
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have not written you for some time because I realize the tremendous burdens which you are carrying and do not want to bother you with too frequent letters. However, the trend of affairs in the Far East at this time would seem to call for a brief report from the Philippines.

President Quezon has recently recovered from what seemed at one time a very serious illness—a recurrence of lung trouble. There was a period when he saw almost no one. He is now in the summer capital at Baguio and still moves about in a wheel chair; but when I talked with him a few days ago he seemed in good spirits and looked quite well. He told me that the spot on his lung had completely healed.

His illness has not improved his irascibility. Fortunately this irascibility has not led to any further public utterances criticizing the High Commissioner, but I am more or less prepared for such an eventuality as President Quezon bitterly resents any opposition or difference of opinion and, in the natural course of events, such differences are bound to arise unless the High Commissioner makes himself entirely subservient to President Quezon's desires.

We were delighted to see Mr. Currie who stopped over here on his way to Chungking and again on his way back. I found him keen and intelligent and I was glad of the chance to talk with him and give him a picture of our situation here. I hope that he has had an opportunity to discuss with you some of the difficulties which confront us.

Last month we had another interesting visitor, Mr. van Kleffens, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, whom I had known some fifteen years before at The Hague, Mr. van [2] Kleffens spoke with delight of his talk with you in Washington. It chanced that the British Air Marshal from Singapore, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, was passing through Manila at the same time. Naturally we all talked together although, as you know, there was nothing whatever official in our joint talks. The newspapers as usual made much of our conferences. Perhaps the news of our joint meeting, exaggerated as it was, had a not unhealthy effect upon opinion in the Far East.

For the past several months I have been wrestling with defense problems. I have been working in the closest cooperation with General Grunert, Admiral Hart and Admiral Bemis. Frequent conferences have established close coordination in our various fields of work. Our country is fortunate to have at this time men of such outstanding good judgment and ability in their field as they. All of us here feel glad that you have decided to recommend to Congress the appropriation of the sugar excise taxes and dollar devaluation funds for Philippine defense.

I have been doing my best to urge and stimulate the Commonwealth Government to build up civilian defense. Last October, with President Quezon's cooperation, I organized a joint committee composed of both Americans and Filipinos to study the problem of civilian defense and make concrete recommendations. The committee rendered an excellent report covering such matters as strengthening the Constabulary, building up home guard units, securing adequate supplies of food and fuel, building air-raid shelters, and the like. I urged President Quezon and the Commonwealth authorities vigorously to push forward this work; and they are now pushing it as best they can. The question of financing it is still an unsettled question. They are naturally eager to finance it with American money if they can.

There is considerable uneasiness here over a possible Japanese invasion. Public opinion, at times jittery, was gratified as a result of the increased strength of the United States Army and Navy forces here. I believe that the steps taken were timely and necessary. Although the general trend of Filipino utterances is loyally to uphold America in her struggle for democracy, occasionally one runs into undercurrents of opinion among the Filipinos that their country is being dragged into an imperialistic war and will be sacrificed like many other small countries. The strengthening of our armed forces here is the most effective reply.

May I in closing speak of a matter which may appear [3] merely personal but which because of the delicate situation in the Far East importantly affects the work of our Government at a most critical time. I refer to the rumors emanating from Washington which have appeared in the newspapers here as to the appointment of someone to succeed me as High Commissioner. I have tried to ignore such reports and when questioned as to them have of course disclaimed knowledge of any foundation for them. This morning headlines in the Manila papers blazoned the rumor afresh. It now has the appearance not of mere idle rumor but of forces actively at work to secure my return to Washington. The persistence of the rumor cannot but be detrimental to the morale of my staff and to the effectiveness of our work among the American and Filipino communities. I should warmly appreciate a confidential word from you whether these reports have any foundation. My single desire is to uphold your hands in the great work which you are doing and to further the interests of our country.

In any event, I think I should not remain here more than one year longer. After that, if events run their natural course, I hope I might be assigned to some other post, for I believe that from health considerations three years in the tropics are sufficient.

If you do not desire to retain me here for another year, I am sure it would materially strengthen our Government's work and prestige in the Philippines if you or Secretary Early, perhaps in reply to a question planted in a press conference, could publicly express confidence in me and thus put a definite end to the persistent rumor of my recall to Washington.

This letter has already become longer than I intended. But I believe you want to be kept informed in a personal way of the highlights of the situation in the Philippines.

With admiration and affection, believe me,

Ever sincerely yours,

FRANK

197-A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ^{x6}

* Edwin Pauley's telegram about
going to war with Japan over the
Dutch East Indies, if necessary, is
* wholly proper for him to send.
Confidentially, however, I know
that you realize that that kind of
snap judgment foreign policy
determination is something we get
a lot of every day. ^{x3570}

x220-A For instance, if I could spend
a week with Pauley -- eight hours
a day -- giving him the history and
the present facts relating to the
pros and cons of the Far East and
their relationship to the pros and
cons of the Atlantic -- and now
Russia -- he then might be beginning
to graduate from the ranks of the
amateurs.

F. D. R.

Telegram from Edwin W. Pauley, Los Angeles,
Calif., 6/17/41 to the Hon. Harold L. Ickes,
suggesting action to prevent Japan from going
into the Netherlands East Indies.

x246-A



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a telegram which has just reached
me from Edwin W. Pauley.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Philbrick

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

400 Philippines

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 18
File
Personal

June 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON

I want to take this up
with Frank Murphy when he comes in
to see me. Will you give it to me
at that time?

x41-A

F. D. R.

x400 Philippines High Commissioner



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

For your information I am sending you a copy of a radiogram from President Quezon to Commissioner Elizalde, in which he expresses the hope that Mr. Sayre will be retained as High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. I also send you letters addressed to me under date of June 6 and June 9 respectively, by Commissioner Elizalde. Will you be good enough to return these to me?

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior.

x6

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM REC'D IN CODE JUNE 6

Commissioner Elizalde
Washington, D. C.

This is to confirm what I told you over the long-distance telephone.

During the last two or three months there have appeared in the local papers reports from the United States, to the effect that the recall of High Commissioner, Francis B. Sayre, is being contemplated in Washington, D. C. because High Commissioner Sayre and the Commonwealth Government cannot work in harmony and cooperation. While, in a few occasions, High Commissioner Sayre and I have held different views on certain public matters, as naturally happens between persons of independent mind, I am able to say that High Commissioner Sayre and I are able to overcome such differences of opinion and cooperate with each other in the common task of promoting and protecting the best interests of the United States and the Philippines. There exists complete harmony and cooperation between his office and mine, and our personal relations are most friendly. Unless, therefore, the President needs the services of High Commissioner Sayre in the United States in some other capacity, I hope he will be kept here as long as possible. I am writing a letter to the President of the United States along these lines.

In any event, I hope it will be possible for Governor Murphy to come on some mission, for we want to see him again and give him a good time. Please give him my best regards.

Sincerely,
W. A. R. R.

THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 9, 1941

RECEIVED
JUN 10 1941
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY

The Honorable

Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:


I desire to inform you that, in my recent conferences with certain Members of the Maritime Commission, I was advised that, in view of the withdrawal of approximately 45 per cent of American tonnage from commercial shipping and the increased demands in the United States for strategic commodities, the American ships remaining in private operation, probably including ships of Philippine registry, will be required to curtail and in some instances completely eliminate Philippine sugar.

Some of the lines which have been carrying sugar, such as Waterman, Lykes and Pioneer, have thus been prompted to discontinue calling their vessels at Philippine ports.

As you well know, unless some relief can be secured, this will have a serious effect upon our finances and economy and it may precipitate a chaotic situation in the Philippines.

I know you will do everything possible to protect our interests and I assure you of our sincere appreciation for all the efforts you have exerted in our behalf.

Sincerely yours,


J. M. ELIZALDE
Resident Commissioner of the Philippines
to the United States

11700-
499

THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 6, 1941

INTERIOR DEPT.
RECEIVED
JUN 10 1941
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY

The Honorable
Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In connection with the movement of Philippine sugar to the United States, I desire to call your attention to the following information which was cabled to me today from the Philippines:

On June 6, 1941, the Philippines had already shipped 567,328 long tons of sugar out of its duty-free quota of 800,000 long tons. Another 35,400 long tons was loaded and ready for clearance from Philippine ports -- a total of 602,728 long tons definitely shipped or about to leave the Philippines.


Of the remainder, 133,528 long tons was booked for shipment. American vessels have contracted for 109,728 tons; Japanese, 19,800; and Norwegian, 4,000.

This leaves only 63,744 long tons still unbooked. However, ten vessels are due to arrive in the Philippines with 64,000 tons uncontracted for, sufficient space to take care of the balance of our 1941 quota.

Of our quota of 50,000 long tons of refined sugar, 22,000 tons had been shipped on June 6, and another 16,000 tons was booked or loading. Thus, 38,000 long tons have left Philippine ports or are about to be cleared, leaving only 12,000 tons to be booked for shipment.

It is believed in Manila that unless shipping in the Pacific is disrupted or more drastic requisitioning of vessels is made, there will be no deficiency in our quota this year.

Sincerely yours,


J. M. ELIZALDE
Resident Commissioner of the Philippines
to the United States

June 17

2. Justice Murphy is standing by awaiting an appointment at the President's convenience.

CONFIDENTIAL

Navy Department, 17 June 1941

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Total Enlisted Strength, 14 June.....	239,387
Fleet Reservists (enlisted) on active duty	8,596
Other Reservists (enlisted) on active duty	26,451
Retired Men (enlisted) on active duty.....	766
Total	85,813
Aggregate Enlistments (last 24 hours)	234
Aggregate Discharges (last 24 hours)	131
Gain	108

Admiral Towers stated today that Air Marshall Harris, R. A. F., has arrived in Washington for duty as direct representative of the Chief of Air Staff. The present Air Attaché, Air Commodore G. C. Pirie, R. A. F., will serve under Air Marshall Harris as his Chief of Staff. Air Chief Marshall Bowhill until recently in command of aircraft of the Coastal Defense of the United Kingdom, is due to arrive in the United States this week to take direct charge of the problem of overseas ferrying of aircraft built in the United States for Great Britain. It is believed that these two details will be of great assistance to our part of aircraft aid to Great Britain.

Admiral Kimmel today warned Naval families to be wary of anonymous telephone calls since they are used to obtain information about ship movements and to create suspicion and discord in families.

[2.] *Paymaster General of the Navy*, to leave the 23rd of June for visit to the First and Third Naval Districts, making an address on June 28th at the new Navy Supply School at Harvard University where there are about 440 student Naval Reserve Officers of the Supply Corps.

Bureau of Ships. The Carrier Ship Maintenance Desk has been consolidated with the Battleship Maintenance Desk. All minesweepers and all Bird Class minesweepers converted to other purposes, which had been under the Carrier Desk, were transferred to the Auxiliaries Ship Maintenance Desk.

Captain Sheldon advises contractors are expected to complete work on the Bethesda Medical Center in October. It is expected the Center will be ready for occupancy around January 1, 1942. Partial occupancy will begin as soon as possible.

Hawthorne, Nevada ammunition depot expected to be expanded to provide additional storage space. A contract involving \$1,999,500.00 is under consideration as authorized in the 41-41 Building Program.

UAW, (CIO), and A. F. of L. production workers of Electric Auto Lite Company, Port Huron, Michigan, threaten to strike over a wage increase. This company has a Navy contract [c] for electric cable and magnetic wire.

Hipper and Scheer drydocked at Kiel on June 12 according to reliable reports.

Admiral Leahy advised on June 13 that the CAPTAIN DAMIANI and ALBERT (French tankers) were sent to CONSTANZA in order to test the possibility of supplying France (by sea) with some of the oil that the Rumanians agreed to deliver to France. This scheme may be given up since the CAPTAIN DAMIANI was torpedoed and badly damaged on June 14.

Twenty-one Japanese warships and transports heading South from Wenchow at midnight June 12 and 13. Effective midnight June 16 and 17 Japan closed waters in Swatow area to shipping according to reports.

Dakar's inner harbor is protected by a submarine net according to reliable reports. One of the ships recently arrived at DAKAR from CASABLANCA brought ten light and ten medium tanks. The rains are now getting underway and most of the roads will be useless until October or November.

Sun Shipbuilding Company employees, Chester, Pa., received twelve cents an hour pay increase and have accepted a pact banning strikes and lockouts for two years.

[4] *Perkins* advises German naval units, including some heavy types, have been concentrating in and around Copenhagen the last few days, perhaps because of desire to obtain better facilities and greater security or for possible naval demonstration in the Baltic.

Germany pressing Russia to turn over warships to Japan according to unconfirmed reports—50 Soviet destroyers, 20 submarines, 14 minelayers, and 300 military planes reported involved.

4350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Inland Steel Company, East Chicago, Ill., experiencing continuing series of minor slow-downs and department strikes. Possibility of major trouble indicated.

Italian submarine believed to be shadowing convoy NE of Azores on June 14.

London is full of conjectures on the Russian-German situation. There was a tendency to believe Russia would give in to Hitler's demands, both economic and military, if they have not yielded already.

French trucks and automotive equipment in Algeria being taken over by the Germans will prove worthless when it arrives in Libya.

Port of Lagos, Nigeria, was swept with magnetic gear on June 15 and it was expected to be open on June 16th.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 18 June 1941

<i>Total Enlisted Strength</i> , 16 June -----	239, 722	
<i>Fleet Reservists</i> (enlisted) on active duty-----		8, 506
<i>Other Reservists</i> (enlisted) on active duty-----		28, 685
<i>Retired men</i> (enlisted) on active duty-----		706
Total -----		85, 907
<i>Aggregate Enlistments</i> (last 24 hours) -----		204
<i>Aggregate Discharges</i> (last 24 hours) -----		65
Gain -----		139

Admiral Moreell reports out of a total of 14,293 housing units completed by all Government housing agencies, 44 percent has been built by the Navy according to June 7 Weekly summary sheet of Defense Housing Coordinator. The first funds for the construction of low-cost defense housing became available to the Navy on August 12, 1940. The first contract was awarded October 2, 1940, the intervening 50 days being required to prepare plans and specifications as none were available. By February 7, 1941, all but 120 out of a total of 17,110 housing units for which funds were available were under contract. The remaining 120 were placed under contract by May 4, 1941. The first houses were occupied March 1, 1941, and as of June 16th the total occupied is 6,325 in various localities. In addition to the 17,110 units previously mentioned, 548 more units are being built with savings made in the construction cost under the [2] \$3500.00 limit determined by Congress.

Richard R. Adams, Ex. V-P, Grace Lines, advises confidentially continually worried of sabotage by members of crews. Has asked Navy cooperation to prevent sabotage. This confirms concern by certain officers about possible trouble from seamen in merchant marine.

Merchant Marine reserve officers may now be ordered to active duty without their consent. The Secretary of the Navy instructed in exercising this authority it is intended to conflict with the functions of the Merchant Marine to the minimum extent consistent with the urgent needs of the Navy.

Naval censorship has been established for the Island of Guam through a notice sent to the Governor.

A *Naval Air Station* has been established at Kodiak, Alaska.

Proposed bridge across the Columbia River from Port of Astoria Docks to Point Ellice, Washington is in most undesirable location since it would seriously jeopardize Navy patrol plane operations and approaches in bad weather when visibility is poor during routine operations from Naval Air Station at Tongue Point four miles away. Army Engineer holding hearings at Portland during next 2 weeks.

[3] *General Vandergrift* reports 2nd Defense Battalion USMC ready to move to Parris Island. Move will start on June 23rd, and will continue one train a day for approximately four days.

Royal Norwegian Navy is requesting cooperation of British Admiralty and U. S. Navy in sending relief expedition of 2 small ships to the East Coast of Greenland the middle of July for party of 7 Norwegians and 22 Danes collecting meteorological data. Party needs supplies; has radio station capable of reaching Copenhagen and probably would be in position to operate another in McKenzie Bay capable of supplying meteorological data to Iceland.

Suva (Fiji Island).—Hawaii radio link was discontinued on June 15th in order to prevent shipping agents in Suva announcing arrivals and departures of allied shipping to West Coast—U. S.—Western Union has discontinued their arrival and departures services.

Leaves have not been cancelled by general order in the Marine Corps as rumored. Some leaves may be curtailed from time to time due to special training operations it is reported.

Acting Secretary of the Navy Forrestal announced on June 17 establishment of the U. S. Naval Reserve [4] Aviation Base at New Orleans, La., effective as of July 15, 1941 thereby completing the Navy's program for establishing 16 Naval Reserve bases throughout the country.

Temporary appointment of Naval Warrant Officers or enlisted men as commissioned officers required by the Naval expansion program is provided in the bill passed by the House and sent to the Senate yesterday.

Japanese government has allotted seven million dollars for spreading propaganda in the U. S. during 1941, it is reliably reported.

Axis submarine refueling in West African waters possible from mother ship designed as freighter, from Canary Islands, bases on uninhabited coasts, or from BISSAGOS ISLANDS. DAKAR not being used. WASSON wants permission from State Department to investigate.

Japanese Naval Concentration reported still steaming South.

Japanese bombing of U. S. S. TUTUILA either criminal carelessness or a deliberate attempt to bomb the American Embassy and TUTUILA is indicated from military study.

Axis seamen (460) reportedly leaving Tampico on June 19 for GUADALAJARA.

Schoenfeld (Helsinki) advises German military circles reported to believe that Soviet army must be eliminated in 1941. *Phillips* reports Vatican believes Soviet will not compromise with Nazis.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 2 July 1941

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, chief of Bureau of Aeronautics stated: There are indications that the Germans have constructed, recently, a large number of airplanes designed specifically for sweeping for magnetic mines. Inasmuch as it is known that the British have sown a large number of such mines for protection against invasion, this program may have special significance.

Admiral McIntire reports hospital dispensary plans for Bermuda. Argentina and Trinidad have been approved and sent to Yards and Docks and that Quantico Hospital went into Commission 1 July.

Fort Schuyler taken over by Navy last week. 150 reserve college men arriving there 7 July for Navy Ordnance indoctrination. Fort Schuyler will now become receiving ship for all Ordnance Ensigns. From there they will be taken for instruction at gun factories. While there they will be shown all major industrial plants in New York Area.

System of Battle Signal Lights being changed from horizontal to vertical. Involves Emergency purchases of certain materials through the Bureau of Supplies and [2] Accounts for forwarding to Portsmouth.

Traffic between Sweden and Germany now temporarily established through Denmark it is reported.

Two Portuguese trawlers SANTA PRINCESA and SANTA JOANNA, a number of two and three masted schooners all equipped with radio or radio telephone and 12 French Schooners of three or four masts but without radio are reported fishing on the BANK OF BANKS. Convoy data could be communicated by enemy vessels to ST. PIERRE for transmission to Germany but it is not known whether this is done, it is reported. *Turks* appear utterly amazed at Vichy request for right of transit to Syria and for war material it is reported from a reliable source.

German Armistice Commission criticizes Weygand as impeding and sabotaging work of Commission in North Africa it is reliably reported.

British and Chinese military staffs will meet in Burma during first week in July to conclude agreements on Mutual Co-operation in case Japanese attack

British. Plans are laid for use by British planes of Chinese airbases and British assistance to Chinese guerillas it is reported from a reliable source.

Russians continue to suspect and mistrust the British and [3] are tolerating the British Military Mission instead of keeping it fully informed and making use of it according to impressions reported by Steinhardt.

Admiral Nyes reports that consideration has been given to a request from the Radio Club of America asking if various Government Departments approved the use of this Organization's facilities and mailing lists to assist in securing technicians for the British Civilian Technical Corp. State, War and Navy saw no objection.

French and Germans appear to be attaching great importance to LATAKIA, Syria it is reported.

BORDEAUX and NOZIMA MARU each with a cargo of chrome ore (total 9,600 tons)—from Philippines to United States, reported requisitioned by the Japanese Government. It is pointed out this is a method of blocking movement of the United States strategics without actual overt act.

Japanese Extremists including the Army and Navy groups urging immediate action in support of Berlin it is reported. Greig reports Prince Konoye said Japan could reconcile U. S. S. R. neutrality treaty and Tripartite Pact, Germans expected to be successful and will control Western portion of U. S. S. R., but did not believe German influence would reach the East and that the Soviet Union may not collapse. [4]

2 British Destroyers sunk 1 July, a third badly damaged in Axis Air and Submarine Attack in East Mediterranean it is reported.

13 German Ships in Orient ports reported loading wartime supplies preparatory to sailing halfway around the world in an effort to run the British blockade.

Finland now has 13 divisions fully mobilized and three more are being mobilized it is reported.

Portuguese Trawler believed to have been taken over by the Germans, found to have fuel oil concealed below salt when seized by Canadians at St. Johns.

FORT de FRANCE departed from Martinique for Cayenne under escort by Naval auxiliary cruiser BARFLEUR, carrying cargo of 1233 tons consisting mainly of flour of American origin.

KOKUYU MARU a special service vessel under charter to the Japanese Navy, is reported to have sailed from the Naval Station at Kure to load oil and gasoline at Los Angeles.

Italian Vessels departed South American ports as follows: from Para towards open sea the MON BALDA 27 June. From Recife 28 June "Twentyfour Maggio" for Hamburg it is reported.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 3 July, 1941

Japanese general opinion is that Nazis will gain quick victory; if so Japan may occupy maritime provinces it is reported from a reliable source. American Officials at Mukden and Harbin have noted no indications that Japan is preparing to attack Russia. Reports from Third Naval District from a reliable informant close to Japanese industrial interests states they expect Japan to move against Russia about 20 July. Japanese vessels of one Japanese steamship company have received orders to be west of Panama by 25 July regardless of passengers or cargo. The vessels of another Japanese company are ordered to discharge all cargoes on the Pacific coast for the present, it is reported from a reliable source. 5 Japanese vessels due New York first half of July. Axis shipping losses up to 17 June as follows: 102 freighters 469,000 tons taken or seized; 198 freighters 1,060,000 tons sunk by British or scuttled by own crews; 345 ships 1,725,000 tons unidentified total 645 ships 3,254,000 tons—additional 47 freighters 84,000 tons under Axis control or in their service were sunk; 53 vessels 320,000 tons seized in South American or [2] United States Harbors it is reported from a reliable source in London.

Ships reported sunk include: MALAYA II (British.) MAASDAM (Dutch) 8812 tons. GRAYBURN (British) 6342 tons. AURIS (British Tanker) 8080 tons. BARRHILL (British) 4972 tons. MONTERLAND (British) 6790 tons. RABOUL (British) 5618 tons. TRAFALGAR (British) 5542 tons.

Possible torpedo attack on Panama Canal between 1st and 15th of July is reported from a reliable source "in spite of the fact it sounds fantastic."

Rumors are current in the Iberian peninsula which alleges that the United States is considering early action against the CANARIES the AZORES, CAPE VERDE and ICELAND. On the other hand the Italians, Germans and French in Spain are very much afraid that the United States will move against West Africa and Dakar while the Germans are busy with Russia: all West Africa is considered to be vulnerable by German High Command which considers that an American attack would prove disastrous to the future plans of the Reich according to reliable reports from Madrid.

Russian Air Forces is reported from a reliable source as follows: 5552 first line planes in 346 squadrons divided as follows:

[3.]

Type	Number of squadrons		Number of aircraft	
	Army	Navy	Army	Navy
Pursuit	100	18	2,000	292
Light bombers*	160	20	2,270	292
Heavy bombers	20	None	320	None
Patrol	None	30	None	378
	280	66	4,590	962

*Includes reconnaissance and dive bombers. The above are first line planes—estimated reserves are 30 percent. Personnel includes 10,000 officer pilots, 10,000 nonflying officers, 9,000 officer observers, 6,000 cadets, 75,000 enlisted men from all ranks, 100,000 parachutists and airborne troops (reported.) Air force is poorly organized, trained, equipped and has poor morale. Planes copied from 1st class power's models 3 or 4 years old. Relative Russian strength to German in ratio 2:3, Japan 5:3 (in Far East). Twelve hundred aircraft in Far East cannot be withdrawn without yielding air superiority. Aircraft industry will not function in war time. Anticipate large numbers of Soviet planes to be shot down in combat or destroyed on ground.

Germans will reach Moscow in 5 days according to British informant it is reported from a reliable source.

British Admiralty is printing ten thousand copies of a booklet on the identification of German, Japanese, Italian and French merchant ships. It is designed for use by [4] ships and planes and contains among other things scaled aerial silhouettes. Wide unrestricted distribution is intended and copies will be made available to U. S. N.

General Weygand is reported to have earnestly requested that American radio broadcasts accord less prominence to his name because his relations with the Germans have been made far more difficult by this practice.

Gunther reports from a reliable source, a dummy city of Ploesti has been constructed a few miles from the real city. It is said to have been based on aerial photographs. It is possible that the fires which were reported to have been ignited, according to Russian communiques, were fires set in the dummy city to deceive the enemy.

Barrage balloons are proving effective in England and Germany for defense purposes. Army has about three thousand on order now. U. S. M. C. planning for their use in connection with outlying possessions it is reported. Balloon barrage defense against aircraft in Moscow indicated abandoned it is reported from a reliable source in Moscow. No coordinated planning of air raid protection in Moscow.

Nazi troops withdraw during the past week 15th, 52nd and 86th German divisions from France and official estimates place not over 35 divisions now in Holland, Belgium and France it is reported from a reliable source.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 7 July, 1941

Expansion of Axis commercial air activities in Natal region has seemingly opened a relatively safe steamship traffic between Europe and South America and possible domination of an invasion route from Africa to Brazil, inimical to United States interests. Italian and German commercial planes apparently

carry out air reconnaissance against British ships and afford protection for sailings of own vessels it is reported from a reliable source.

Shortages are reported by the Director of the Navy Budget and Reports as follows: **STEEL**—The shortage of mild and alloy steel in the defense effort is acute and is becoming more so every day. All bureaus using steel report delays. These delays are occurring regardless of preference ratings and notwithstanding the fact that steel has been placed on the critical list; **ALUMINUM** and **MAGNESIUM**—Both Aluminum and Magnesium are now under mandatory priority. Even so and with numerous substitutions delays caused by lack of these materials are becoming worse each day. As an example, the Adapti Company [2] a subcontractor for Dravo cannot get a promise of delivery from the Aluminum Company even though this item carried a priority of A-1-A. It is reported; **MACHINE TOOLS**—All Bureaus report delays due to lack of machine tools. Estimated delays in vital machine tools vary from a few months to one year. Of the 5,723 machine tools of various descriptions due during the period January 1, 1941 to May 31, 1941, 3,414 or about 60% are overdue; **TIN**—is causing delay in the delivery of tinned provisions ordered by the bureau of Supplies and Accounts; **OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS**—Shortage of Optical instruments in cameras, binoculars, fire control instruments, etc. continue due to lack of optical glass and personnel qualified to produce lenses; **INSTRUMENTS**—At present the shortage in this category is being felt chiefly by the aircraft industry and for certain anti-aircraft instruments. The shortage in this field will not be felt until the ships now being laid down approach completion; **FACILITIES**—Many projects under the cognizance of Yards and Docks have no priority ratings, **CLOSE-RANGE ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT**—the obtaining of these guns, mounts, ammunition and fire control equipment remains critical. Progress is being made but the obtaining of machine tools, cartridge case brass, steel and powder remains very critical; **OTHER** [3] **MATERIALS**—Forged armor for Battleships is now running 8 to 15 months behind schedule.

Japanese developments reported include: abrogation of Russian Neutrality Pact in the near future is predicted to be followed simultaneously or soon afterwards by an attack on Siberia; consideration of an extension of the limits of Japan's territorial waters which would cut off Vladivostok from normal trade and hamper any shipments of United States materials to Russia is reported; *Japanese ships* continue to expedite loading, unloading and departure direct to Japan from the East Coast ports of North and South America; *concern* is reported over attempts made by the Japanese to extend their influence among various Moslem peoples in regions as distant as Iraq; *Russians* evacuating women and children from Japanese territory; 2 air craft carriers at YOKOSUKA; and the next Japanese move is to be complete occupation of French Indo-China to begin within one week according to German sources in Tokyo.

Bismarck Survivors verify the *British suspicion* that the vessel displaced over 45,000 tons it is reported from a reliable source. Secret report on Bismarck sinking by Navy expert to be available by end of week.

[4] *Mail* for United States ships now routed and sorted in New York and San Francisco. A plan is being considered to sort official mail in Navy Post Office for trans-shipment by pouch thereby reducing the number of people knowing where ships are located in the interest of security.

Soviet Commissariats are busy moving their offices, presumably toward the East, Steinhart reports.

Nazis have 200 rigs ready to operate in Soviet oil fields a reliable source reports.

Religious fervor among the masses of Russia is re-awakening on a large scale and the Army has been permeated by this sentiment is the *interesting* report of the Father General of the Society of Jesus who suggests rejecting atheistic Communism in Russia and emphasizing the religious and nationalistic character of the defenses of Russia to have emerge something resembling the old "Holy Russia", Phillips reports.

Leahy reports Mechin's Mission to Turkey to obtain transit of troops and war material "a complete failure."

Reinforcements for Dakar are reported from 3 French ships arriving from Morocco carrying several hundred native troops (to be demobilized), military trucks and 600 tons of rubber.

CONFIDENTIAL.

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 8 July, 1941

Leahy reports *Henry* (French Ambassador to Japan) indicates the Japanese Imperial Council probably reached a decision in favor of action against U.S.S.R. in the basis of the following motives (1) Obvious military reasons (2) The hopes of producing a collusion between Japan and United States and (3) Nazis have plans of their own for Dutch East Indies.

Partial mobilization of all forces has been ordered in Japan it is reported reliably.

Chiang Kai-shek predicted (5 July) that Japan would abrogate the Neutrality Pact with Russia and would attack Siberia it is reported from a reliable source.

Assistant Secretary Bard is to inspect shore Naval activities at Boston and Newport and will open Naval Air station at Quonset Point on Saturday. Admirals Towers, Hepburn and Moreell will join him at Quonset Point.

Appearance of United States Blue Jackets in United Kingdom causes many questions of number of Naval observers in London. Winant asks if there is any objection to releasing these figures.

Bureau of Ordnance expects delivery of the first [2] American made 20 mm Anti Aircraft (AERLIKON) gun this week from the British Production Line at Providence, Rhode Island; future production from this plant will be furnished the British and USN on percentage basis. This gun will be successor to the 50 calibre gun for anti air craft and probably in time will be used on Merchant ships as well as on battle ships. Ordnance has its own exclusive production of this gun from other sources including the Hudson Motor Car Company.

Wholesale price index for all commodities for week ending 28 June 1941: 87.7.

For the purpose of cooperating in every way possible with the spirit of the President's executive order 8802. Assistant Secretary Bard reports the formation of a committee to investigate the extent to which their enlisted personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps is representative of all American citizens. In case there should be evidence of discrimination because of race, creed, color or national origin, the committee is to suggest corrective measures.

German instructions apparently have been given to advise Berlin of all information concerning shipping and cargo from the United States to the Red Sea.

If United States enters the war all northern South American countries will follow suit according to opinion of important German Secret Agent "Greif" in South America.

Marked departure in the past 36 hours from usual routine by Japanese Merchant Marine units in communications practice has been reported.

French Government is negotiating with the Government of Brazil for purchase of 60,000 bales of Sao Paulo cotton it is reported.

Cape Verde Islands now have 1,600 of troops on the Island it is reliably reported.

Communist strike activities in the United States being held in almost absolute abatement it is reliably reported.

"It is hoped" a new spirit will be injected into the personnel and that lack of direction, initiative, and coordination will be replaced by accelerated action in the war effort in the Middle East with the appointments of Generals Haining and Auchinleck, it is reported.

In YOKOHAMA BAY ships of the following classes are reported: *Battleships*: 2 HYUGA, 1 FUSO; *Cruisers*: 3 KAKO, 1 CATORI, 1 JINTSU; *Destroyers*: 8; *Submarines*: KAIJUN TYPE; *Gunboats*: 1 SAGA; *Tenders*: 3; *Tankers*: 2 SHIRIYA and SARUTO.

Miniature Mass X-Ray is being used by Navy Medical Corps [4] to detect early tuberculosis among recruits. This is a Navy development which already has demonstrated its value. It is an inexpensive method.

Heavy armour piercing bombs again dropped on berths of German warships SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU and PRINZ EUGEN at Brest, where bomb dropped from altitude of 50 feet also hit stern of 10,000 ton liner. 43 Wellingtons in air attack on Brest dropped 128,000 pounds of bombs. One stick possibly straddled the SCHARNHORST it is reported.

S. S. ANTINOUS is the first American ship that has arrived at Suez, it is reported.

LARAMIE expects to arrive BAHIA, Brazil 22 July for duty, under Comtask force 8.

Underwater obstacles, probably antisubmarine nets have been placed in areas in Hiroshima Bay off Kure the Japanese have notified mariners.

Commanding General of Fort Richardson, Alaska, has sent a fine letter of commendation to Com Thirteen regarding the splendid cooperative spirit of the Army, Navy and Marine forces and their civilian assistants in Alaska.

Italian Gun Cruiser (8 inch) thought to be the GORIZIA was sunk on 29 June by a submarine of the Mediterranean fleet.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

16 July, 1941

Facilities of More than 20 large corporations are not now being used in Defense Production Mr. Batt has reported. Investigation in Navy shows there is considerable plant capacity not now being used and more is becoming available as priorities begin to take hold. The difficulty today is to find work for these Companies to do. There is a marked increase in the desire to take part in Defense Production, probably resulting from necessity because of scarcity of material, etc. Navy is concentrating on this problem and is cooperating fully with OPM, particularly with the Defense Contract Service and the Federal Reserve Board activities in both the country-wide and local efforts to utilize all productive capacity as fully and as quickly as possible. A Navy order of 14 July has been distributed to further the expedition and prosecution of work-subcontracting. Naval Liaison Officers will appraise the Defense Contract Service of (1) "so called bottlenecks" (2) necessities for "speed ups" of production (3) necessity for more sub-contracting (4) inefficient management or operation. (5) unsuccessful attempts to contact sub-contractors and (6) expansion needs. Every effort will be made to remedy these situations locally and reports will be sent to the Navy Department on each case. Mr. Mehornays Defense Contract Service may be being by-passed in OPM it is reported.

Status of Section Bases is that all but two of the thirty are under construction; 17 are in use although the construction work has not been completed. The two bases not started are being held up pending the acquisition of the necessary land, and it is anticipated that they will be started in the near future. It is tentatively proposed to construct 16 additional Bases and add to the facilities of at least 5 of the existing Bases, it is reported.

Entrance to Manila Bay and the nearby Subic Bay area are being mined for "General defense purposes." The Navy Hydrographic Office reports that the areas "will be dangerous after daylight 17 July." The Hydrographic Office also reports a restricted Pilot Chart of the Northern North Atlantic Ocean embracing the waters surrounding Greenland and Iceland has been evolved and has appeared regularly since June 1941.

The Suez Canal is closed to through traffic as a consequence [3] of recent air bombings it is reported from a reliable source. *Increased air activity* over Malta is reported.

Invasion of England temporarily abandoned by Germans because of slowness of Russian campaign, effectiveness of RAF raids on Nazi war industry and severe losses in Russian War it is reported from a reliable source in Berlin.

Plans have been made and are being carried out for the evacuation of many Commissariats and institutions from Moscow" Steinhardt reports as of 13 July 5 P. M. This, in spite of official statement to the contrary reported 13 July. Kazan (Soviet Russia) might be sent of Government or at least for the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Chinese G-2 is uncertain whether Japan will move North or South but believes the appointment of Okamura to command in North China and Itagaki in Korea is significant since they are Manchurian and Russian experts. A Chinese member of North China puppet regime states Japan will attack Siberia when Moscow falls it is reported.

Complete disruption of Portugal banking and commercial system has resulted from sudden blocking of port accounts causing hardship, financial loss and creation of ill will toward the U. S. at a most critical time it is reported.

Morris reports continued attention of German press to the [4] occupation of Iceland may be to prepare the German Public for a possible "call" for help from Portugal in order to protect some of her outlying possessions from President Roosevelt's "aggression."

Portuguese vessel CARVALHO ARAUJO (1,210 tons full load) arrived 13 July noon from Terceira where it is reported to have discharged a special cargo of military supplies and about 1,000 troops it is reported from Ponta Delgada (Azores on Sao Miguel Island.)

JOAO BELO (Portuguese SS 6,365 tons) carrying large quantities "of war materials" arrived from Lisbon on 13 July. One full infantry (1,200 men) battalion (fully equipped) was landed. The JOAO BELO was expected to depart for Fayal, Azores—chief town of Horta) and Terceira (Azores) 15 July with about 1,000 troops for these islands it is reported from a reliable source.

Sprinkler systems are not relied on in London against incendiary bombs.

The Secretary of the Navy has ordered that enlisted men of Naval Reserve on active duty be not discharged or reenlisted or their enlistments extended. This order is the result of a decision of the Comptroller General of the United States dated 9 July, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

22 July, 1941

Rumors, at variance with one another, in Japan makes reporting developments difficult, *Grew reports*. Many of these rumors have German origin. He believes "efforts by Japan to secure a privileged position in Indo-China should be taken with gravity;" however, he thinks "the chief preoccupation for Japan remains China."

Japan will take military and economic control of Indo-China in the near future is the opinion of important Thai Government officials it is reported by a reliable source.

Japanese Naval Units reported maneuvering in VAN DIEMEN Strait (Japan) south of KYUSHU (Southernmost of main islands of Japan) on 16 July included: 3 carriers, 7 battleships and between 52 and 57 destroyers and submarines it is reported from a reliable source.

No decision has as yet been reached in connection with the Department's request to send two American Naval Observers to Vladivostok and American Military Attaches are not to be granted permission to visit the Russian-German front it is reported from a reliable source.

10 *Nazis divisions* are at present concentrated on the [2] Spanish border and the Hendaye-Irun Bridge has been reinforced to carry heavy traffic it is reported from a reliable source. Informant "apprehends" these developments presage a Nazis attempt to occupy the coasts of Portugal and Spain in order to obtain submarine and air bases lying beyond the range of the British bombers and simultaneously neutralize Gibraltar as a naval base and close the straights.

Sea and air landing equipment is being assembled by the Nazis at Constanza (Rumania) and in the Danube Delta in preparation for a possible invasion of the southern U. S. S. R. it is reported.

A *Peruvian* land and sea attack on 27 July is indicated by the latest *alleged* intercept, the sea attack to be at SALINAS and southward, with bombardment of SALINAS and GUAYQUIL (Ecuador) it is reported.

Intercepted messages from German Secret Agents in Mexico and South America show the following has been reported to Berlin: (1) Plans of the Curtiss-Wright Model 22 Falcon All-Metal Bomber have been copied. (2) there is a Ferro Vanadium shortage in connection with construction of submarines at Manitowoc, Wisc. (3) German Agent OTIC has been offered a new bomb sight by an Argentine Officer. (4) 9 [3] Boelings have been flown, presumably to England with a British American crew, and that 20 more will follow in coming weeks.

Mr. Batt has called attention to the difficulty involved in securing reliable statistical estimates on the future requirements of the War and Navy Departments of aluminum and magnesium. Army, Navy and OPM officials are consulting on the methods of estimating these requirements. This is most difficult to do with any degree of accuracy because of changing requirements and the decentralization of purchasing. Apparently OPM wants this information by the 20th of

each month by the pound for the various uses so as to allocate certain amounts to various groups. It is felt here by some, this cannot be done and that it is not necessary because it would set up another priority system on top of the present one which will work if allowed to adjust needs either by increased production, reallocation, substitutes, elimination or waiting.

O. P. M. is reported to believe Army is giving better information than Navy; however a representative of Bethlehem Steel Company has advised Navy that this Company can get all the information it wants from Navy but can get [4] nothing from the Army. This applied especially to heavy forgings 8" howitzers and 155 mm guns. This probably is due to the fact that Navy is operating many things on a project basis while Army is on a fiscal year basis.

Approximately 5,000 man days are estimated to have been lost during the past week in strikes affecting Naval Defense contracts, making a total for this month of July to date of approximately 26,500 man days. Two million man days are estimated to have been lost in plants at which Naval Defense contracts have been involved, of which 90% have been lost since 1 January, 1941. Last week, in strike cases involving Naval Defense contracts 7 were settled, 21 are still open and 7 strikes are pending in which information relative to Naval Defense contracts is not available. The slowdown technique is being used in the strikes at the Federal Mogul Corporation, Detroit, Michigan, and the Mitchell Metal Products Company Cleveland, it is reported.

All new Bases have been surveyed except Great Exuma (Bahama Islands) which survey will be completed in July. Arrangements will be made to have some survey made in Greenland. New charts will be made up as the information becomes available to the Hydrographic Office.

197-A

July 11, 1941

My dear Mr. Haight:

Please let me acknowledge, on behalf of the President the receipt of your letter of June twenty-fifth. Your interest in giving the President the benefit of your views regarding the present world situation is indeed appreciated.

I am

Very sincerely yours,

EDWIN M. HATSON
Secretary to the President

Raymond Haight, Esq., *
152 South Spring Street,
Los Angeles, California.

LD/EAK

HAIGHT, TRIPPET & SYVERTSON

ARTHUR HADLEY
RICHARD L. TRIPPET
WILLIAM L. SYVERTSON
ALICE C. SYVERTSON JR.
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

400 SOUTH SPRING STREET
LOS ANGELES

June 25, 1941

HON. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Much has occurred since I last talked with you and I would not press on your time now except for the super emergency that has imposed itself upon the nation due to the happenings over the week-end, and to make sure that West Coast sentiment on this has not escaped you I am taking the liberty of sending this through Miss L'Hart as per your suggestion.

I refer to the attitude toward Imperial Japan; the probability of Japan striking at Russia from the East very quickly, and the situation which will present itself should Russia collapse at an early date and present us with a spectacle of having German armed and air forces bolstering Japan in eastern Siberia, threatening Alaska and assisting Japan in her drive to the East Indies.

For almost one year now the Gallup polls have shown that there are three citizens willing that we risk a war with Japan to every one willing that we should undertake a war in Europe. The reasons are several. Even middle West-erners see in Japan a constant menace to our rear should any involvement develop from Europe. Many feel that China did nothing to bring her present plight upon herself, whereas there is and always will be considerable debate (however misguided) as to the extent that the intrigues of Europe have been responsible for the present plight of France and Great Britain.

Others argue that from a moral viewpoint China was the first nation devastated after the nine-power pact was signed. We, together with Europe, let China down at that time. Few overlook the practical viewpoint - even the most timid know we cannot adequately defend ourselves or maintain our standard of living should we lose access to the tin, rubber, and other resources of the East Indies.

Finally, four hundred million grateful Chinese would be an advantage of no mean proportions during the coming hectic generation. Recently I have heard argued many times

445-2
4150-6

HAIGHT, TRIPPET & SVERTSON

-2-

that the reason we are failing to take action in the Orient is not so much because it would slow down our all out help to Britain as because Great Britain is looking beyond the war and does not care to have us establish a commercial and trading foothold in the Far East.


Superimposed on all this is the much graver reality of the moment, namely, that Japan will, if Russia begins to collapse, drive into her rear. Within months, not years, Japan and Germany together may have air bases scattered along north-eastern Siberia, perhaps within a two mile puddle jump of Alaska. Moreover, such a collapse will doubly assure Japan's proposed drive on the East Indies and strengthen her ability to conquer China.

I need not tell you of your own ability to crystallize public sentiment; in fact sentiment will crystallize itself if it is correctly informed. Should we miss the opportunity now of crystallizing and determining the Oriental picture we may later on find ourselves to be unable to give support to Great Britain at all because of joint Japanese-German operations in eastern Siberia, Alaska, and the Indies; - it may be our Munich.

I do sincerely hope, Mr. President, that in your conferences of the next few days while revamping the international approach, you may give careful consideration to this rising national sentiment which, in spite of little being said of it and in spite of it being "pooh-poohed" by such hokum artists as Hugh Johnson, has caused a majority of our people to feel we have a more acute menace facing us in the Orient than we have facing us in Europe at this moment, serious though the latter is admitted to be. Japan alone is probably afraid to fight; Japan with the German Luftwaffe would be something else again.

With personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,



Raymond Haight

RH:K

WRIGHT TRIMPET & SYVERTSON

-3-

P. S. No doubt you are aware that part of Britain's island defense has been made up of laying off lines from pumping stations along the English Channel, so that a sea of fire might meet attacking Nazis along with other defenses. Mayor Sorenson, of Los Angeles, indicated to me the other day that possibly a similar idea might be suggested to our own War Department to protect the Southern California coast. It may sound like a Jules Verne idea - the subject was discussed in an article in June Esquire, page 38, entitled "Hell Fire for National Defense", but the idea must have some merit or the British wouldn't have used it. I trust our own War Department isn't overlooking it.

R. R.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM for The President:

A long "magic" has just been decoded but has not yet been put in shape for distribution. It covers the following:

Japan, through Vichy, is issuing an ultimatum to Indo-China for the occupation of eight air bases and two naval ports (Cameroon and Sign) for the avowed reason of preventing further encirclement by Britain and the United States. No time limit is stated.


The Chief of Naval Operations in Japan to the Naval Attache in Washington states that on account of the shortage of ship tonnage in the Sea of Japan, the requirements by the Army, the inability to charter ships at the present time, and the fact that many foreign ships no longer make Japan a port of call, the following re-scheduling of shipping will be effected:

Japanese ships will be removed from the run between the Philippines and the east United States coast.

The run to the east coast of South America will be continued through August but it will be impossible after September 1st. However, nine ships will serve the east coast of South America via Cape Horn. (This may signify their anticipation of inability to use the Panama Canal.)

Their shipping will continue to the west coast of South America.

A full copy of this "magic" will be sent you as soon as it can be prepared.


Chief of Staff.

SECRET

C O P Y

WAR DEPARTMENT

Secretary, General Staff

July 1941

GENERAL DOUGLAS MAC ARTHUR
Manila, P.I.

Effective this date there is hereby constituted a command designated as the United States Army forces in the Far East STOP This command will include the Philippine Department command forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines called and ordered into the service of the Army forces of the U. S. for the period of the existing emergency COMMA and such other forces as may be assited to it STOP Headquarter United States Army forces in the Far East will be established in Manila Philippine Islands STOP You are hereby designated as the Commanding General United States Army forces in the Far East STOP you are also designated as the General Officer United States Army referred to in a Military Order calling into the service of the armed forces of the United States the organized military forces of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines dated July 1921 STOP Orders calling you to active duty are being issued effective July 1941 STOP report assumption of command by radio END

G. C. MARSHALL *x25-7*Secret

OK
JDR
7/26

Cable prepared to be
sent by Chief of Staff
if when order of
allatment are approved



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

July 25, 1941.

400

Philippines

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am herewith transmitting a revised draft of a proposed military order forwarded for my consideration by the Assistant ^{N.C.} Director of the Bureau of the Budget this date. This order is in substitution for the proposed Executive order entitled "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines" transmitted to you with my approval by letter of July 21, 1941.

The proposed order, which has been revised in this Department as to form only, has my approval as to form and legality.

Respectfully,

Francis Biddle
Acting Attorney General.

x335
x468-6

x25

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

SECRET

JUL 21

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Due to the situation in the Far East, all practical steps should be taken to increase the defensive strength of the Philippine Islands. To that end, you recently approved the submission of legislation to Congress authorizing the appropriation of approximately \$52,000,000 from sugar excise tax and currency devaluation funds for general defensive purposes recommended by the Army, the Navy, and the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

One of the more urgent measures recommended to augment the present inadequate defenses of the Philippine Islands is the calling into active service of the military forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The 75,000 officers and men involved can be mobilized and trained over a period of about one year at an estimated cost of \$32,000,000. Pending the enactment of enabling legislation and the appropriation of moneys in accordance therewith, no funds in the hands of the War Department are available for initiating the mobilization and training of the Philippine Army. In view of the urgency, it is suggested that approximately \$10,000,000 be allotted from the President's Emergency Fund for this purpose, with the understanding that repayment of such amount will be made from any appropriations received from sugar excise tax and currency devaluation funds.

Draft of an Executive Order calling into the service of the armed forces of the United States the organized military forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is attached. This draft, now being processed through the Bureau of the Budget, differs from one previously approved by you in that provision is made for flexibility in its administration.

I strongly recommend that this Executive Order be now promulgated, and that you authorize the allocation of \$10,000,000 from the Emergency Fund for the purpose of initiating the mobilization and training of the Philippine Army.

Respectfully yours,



Secretary of War.

Inclosure

Draft of Executive Order.

SECRET

Approved 7/26/41

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
Washington, D. C.

July 25, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

There is transmitted herewith a proposed letter, prepared for your signature, and addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, allocating the sum of \$10,000,000 from the "Emergency Fund for the President," to be expended by the Secretary of War, in his discretion, for the calling into active service of the Armed Forces of the United States, the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and for the emergent mobilization and training of such forces.

The request for this allocation by the Secretary of War is contained in his letter to you dated July 25, 1941, recommending the issuance by you of a Military Order calling into the service of the Armed Forces of the United States the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

Reimbursement of the \$10,000,000 proposed to be allotted from the "Emergency Fund for the President" is to be requested of Congress by the War Department in connection with legislation to be submitted recommending the appropriation of certain sugar excise tax and currency devaluation funds.

/s/ John B. Blandford, Jr.

Assistant Director.

Enclosure.

*Letter dated 7/25/41
Filed 7/25/41
Bureau
Handwritten letter*

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., July 21, 1941.

THROUGH DIVISION OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am herewith transmitting a proposed Executive order entitled "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines."

The proposed order, presented by the Acting Secretary of War and forwarded for my consideration by the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget this date, has my approval as to form and legality.

Your attention is invited to the fact that this order is presented by the Acting Secretary of War as a substitute for a proposed order, bearing the same title, transmitted to you by the Attorney General under date of November 25, 1940, which you have held pending developments making issuance thereof advisable.

Respectfully,

FRANCIS BIDDLE
Acting Attorney General.

[Stamped:] Received. Jul 25 10 28 AM '41, Bureau of the Budget.

JULY 25, 1941.

The Honorable, The ATTORNEY GENERAL.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: This has reference to my letter of July 21, 1941, transmitting draft of a proposed Executive Order entitled, "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines".

Pursuant to suggestion of the President that the form thereof be a Military Order rather than an Executive Order, the War Department has prepared and there is transmitted herewith a revised draft, similar in substance and entitled "Military Order".

The revised form of the Order has my approval.

It has been requested that action upon the proposed order be expedited.

Very truly yours,

Assistant Director.

Enclosures.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

CALLING INTO THE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES THE ORGANIZED MILITARY FORCES OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES

*This was changed to a
military order.*

Under and by virtue of the authority in me vested by the Constitution of the United States, by section 2(a)(12) of the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934 (48 Stat. 457), and by the corresponding provision of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of a General Officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines: Provided, that all naval components thereof shall be placed under the command of the Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District, United States Navy.

This order shall take effect with relation to all units and personnel of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, from and after the dates and hours, respectively, indicated in orders to be issued from time to time by the General Officer, United States Army, designated by the Secretary of War.



THE WHITE HOUSE,

4370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 18, 1941.

HONORABLE HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SMITH: Request that the inclosed draft of a proposed Executive Order to call into service all military forces organized by the Philippine Government, authorized by Section 2 (a) (12) Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, be processed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in paragraph 2, Executive Order No. 7298. If approved, it is requested further that this draft be substituted for a similar proposed Executive Order which, as stated in your letter dated December 11, 1940, to the Secretary of War, was approved by the President as to form and is now being retained at the White House for signature if and when issuance shall be found advisable.

The revision requested does not change basically the draft of the Executive Order previously approved. The purpose of the revision is to provide for latitude in calling units and personnel into service and to vest command authority in a general officer to be designated by the Secretary of War, rather than in the Commanding General, Philippine Department, as stipulated in the original draft.

It is requested that the processing of this revised draft be expedited so that prompt action can be initiated in the event of an emergency situation arising in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Acting Secretary of War.

Secret

Dec. 11, 1940.

The Honorable, The SECRETARY OF WAR.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This has reference to letter of October 31, 1940 signed jointly by yourself and the Secretary of the Navy, transmitting memorandum dated September 27, 1940, (file J. B. No. 305 (Serial 655) secret) addressed to the Joint Board by the Joint Planning Committee, and drafts of a proposed Executive Order and a proposed Executive Proclamation relating to the Philippine Islands.

The proposed Executive Order and proposed Executive Proclamation, as revised by this office and by the Attorney General, have been submitted to the President and have received his approval as to the form thereof. The unsigned originals are being retained at the White House for later signature if and when their issuance shall be found advisable. Meanwhile, there are enclosed herewith five copies of this form of the order and of the Proclamation for your information and for distribution confidentially to the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Interior (for transmittal to the High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands), and the Commanding General, Philippine Department.

By direction of the President.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director.

Enclosures.

JUL 21 1941.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Reference is made to my letter of November 16, 1940 transmitting drafts of a proposed Executive Order and of a proposed Executive Proclamation relating to the Philippine Islands, which were presented by joint letter of the Secretaries of War and Navy, for the purpose of securing informal approval of the President as to the form thereof, and for the retention of the unsigned originals at the White House where they would be available for immediate issuance if necessary.

The proposed Executive Order transmitted under that date, which was entitled "Calling Into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of

the Philippines", provided, among other things, that Philippine military forces therein ordered into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, should be placed under the command of the Commanding General, Philippine Department, United States Army.

There is transmitted herewith a revised draft of the proposed Executive Order, presented by the Acting Secretary of War under date of July 18, 1941, which the Department desires be substituted for the draft of order referred to above. The Acting Secretary points out that the revised draft of order does not change basically the draft previously acted upon, and that the purpose of the revision is to provide for latitude in calling units and personnel into service and to vest command authority in a general officer to be designated by the Secretary of War, rather than in the Commanding General, Philippine Department, as stipulated in the original draft.

[2] While the original draft of the (unsigned) Executive Order was cleared with the State and Interior Departments, (who indicated a desire to be again consulted just prior to the formal issuance thereof) the revision presently proposed has not been referred to these Departments for comment since the proposed changes concern only certain military features rather than the basic policy involved. It is contemplated, however, that upon the informal approval by the President of the form of the proposed revised order, that copies thereof will be forwarded, as in the case of the original drafts, to the Secretary of War for his confidential information and distribution to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior (to be transmitted to the High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands).

This order has my approval.

Very truly yours,

[Signed] JOHN B. BLANDFORD, JR.
Assistant Director.

The Honorable, The ATTORNEY GENERAL.
Enclosures.

MILITARY ORDER

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, by the Constitution of the United States, by section 2 (a) (12) of the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, (48 Stat. 457), and by the corresponding provision of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of a General Officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; Provided, that all naval components thereof shall be placed under the command of the Commander of the Sixteenth Naval District, United States Navy.

This order shall take effect with relation to all units and personnel of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, from and after the dates and hours, respectively, indicated in orders to be issued from time to time by the General Officer, United States Army, designated by the Secretary of War.

This order shall become effective on July 1, 1941.

The White House,
July 1, 1941.

Hopkins

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1941.

SECRET VIA NAVY

with 5 430 pm PST

HOPKINS
LONDON

Welles and I highly approve Moscow trip and assume you would go in a few days. Possibly you could get back to North America by August eighth. I will send you tonight a message for Stalin.

All well here. Tell Former Naval Person our concurrent action in regard to Japan is, I think, bearing fruit. I hear their Government much upset and no conclusive future policy has been determined on. Tell him also in great confidence that I have suggested to Nomura that Indo-China be neutralized by Britain, Dutch, Chinese, Japan and ourselves, placing Indo-China somewhat in status of Switzerland. Japan to get rice and fertilizer but all on condition that Japan withdraw armed forces from Indo-China in toto. I have had no answer yet. When it comes it will probably be unfavorable but we have at least made one more effort to avoid Japanese expansion to South Pacific

ROOSEVELT

400
Philippines

Nelson House

July 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR R.F.:

The President has signed Military Order re Philippines military forces, and has approved ten million dollar allotment as well as text of proposed cable from Marshall to McArthur.

Shall give out text of Military Order here, but nothing else. Regards.

W. D. H.

425-T
K25
K330
K119

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


In accordance with your memorandum of July 25, 1941 transmitting a letter of July 18 addressed to you by Ambassador Daniels at Mexico City, there is enclosed for your consideration a draft reply to Ambassador Daniels.

Ambassador Daniels' letter and its enclosure are returned herewith.

Enclosure:

1. To the Honorable Josephus Daniels.
2. From the Honorable Josephus Daniels, July 18, with enclosure.

*file personal**Mexico Folder 1941*



PERSONAL

Mexico, July 18, 1941

Dear Franklin:

Dr. Stanley Jones, one of the greatest preachers in the world, has been in Mexico attending a religious gathering of more than five hundred religious leaders, mostly from Mexico and the United States. You know his history. As a young Methodist preacher he went as a missionary to India where he has made a place as the leader of American missionaries. A few years ago he declined to accept the office of Bishop to which he had been elected, saying his call was to preach the gospel in India. He knows that country as no other preacher. His long residence in Asia has made him familiar with conditions in China and Japan and he is deeply interested in seeing the war between these two countries brought to a close, as all of us are.

Talking with Dr. Jones yesterday, he told me of recent conversations he had had with Dr. Hsiao, Secretary of the National Council of China, and Dr. Kagawa, a well-known author of Japan, regarding a possible basis for peace between China and Japan, he became convinced that the situation may be ripe for the United States to mediate between the two countries. He said that "it appears to be the one possible door to peace in the world situation," and added: "If it begins there it may spread."

I know that your heart's desire is to see an end of the tragic wars and would welcome an opportunity to bring about an honorable peace. Because of this I am enclosing for your confidential review the memorandum which Dr. Jones prepared at my request.

I am not familiar enough with the international situation, or the possible influence of the persons quoted by Dr. Jones, to give advice. I wish I knew more

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House, Washington, D.C.

-2-

more of the inside situation in these countries. I am passing on this memorandum from a great soul, a friend of long standing, for such consideration as conditions in the Far East may justify. I pray daily that you may find a way to lead the world to peace and permanent ending of war.

In your last letter you expressed the hope that my health was good and I was "not working too hard." As to the first, I was never so well as now. As to the second, though I give myself freely to my duties here, when I think of the heavy burden you bear and strain upon time and mind and heart, I feel that in comparison I am almost only a part-time worker.

My wife joins in love to you and Eleanor.

Affectionately yours,

Josephine Sarah

Enclosure.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE PEACE BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA

In informal conversations between Dr. Miao, Secretary of the National Christian Council of China, and Dr. Kagawa, well-known author of Japan, regarding a possible basis for peace between China and Japan, I found the following:

1. They both agree that the time is ripe for a consideration of a possible peace if a basis could be found. They were both speaking individually, of course, and were not representing in any way anyone officially. But each thought that he was expressing the opinions of a large number in each country and possibly on some points the official attitude.

2. Dr. Kagawa said that he thought Japan was prepared to make peace on the basis of four points:

- a. The recognition of Manchukuo.
- b. The suppression of Communism in China.
- c. The elimination of anti-Japanese agitation in China.
- d. The recognition of the territorial and political integrity of China by Japan.

He suggested that there might be other points raised by some, such as (a) a creation of a joint defense system in Mongolia against Russian Communism, (b) the port of Shanghai under Japanese control, (c) a concession between Hongkong and Indo-China for immigration. But these were subsidiary—the four points above were the main bases of peace from the Japanese viewpoint.

Dr. Miao said that if the intention of the peace between China and Japan is that Japan's hands may be freed to carry out aggressive intentions elsewhere, then the peace would not be a real peace. China wants real peace. He said that if China could get two things nailed down she would be prepared to negotiate the rest:

- a. The territorial and political integrity and sovereignty of China.
- b. The recognition of Chang Kai Shek as the head of China.

If these two things were agreed upon, China would feel that there is a basis on which peace could be considered, not that she recognizes that the other points raised are necessarily legitimate, but they might be made subjects for negotiation. Dr. Miao suggested, for instance, that some agreement might be worked out for joint control of Manchuria.

[2] It will be noted that there is one area of agreement between the two suggestions, namely the territorial and political integrity of China. This is important for this area of agreement is not a marginal matter, it is central.

As to the recognition of Chang Kai Shek, Dr. Kagawa thought it might be brought about in time, but Japan's face would have to be saved in the matter, for Wang Ching Wei had been recognized. He thought it might be possible to solve the matter if Wang Ching Wei should agree to give away to Chang Kai Shek for the sake of peace and the unifying of China. Dr. Miao thought that Wang Ching Wei would have to give way entirely and that there could be no place for him in the government after what he had done. Dr. Kagawa said that the recognition of Chang Kai Shek is not impossible as many Japanese considered him as a great man. Both agreed that peace could be scarcely hoped for if Chang Kai Shek were left out, for he represents China in a way that no one else does.

It was suggested by Dr. Kagawa that if I want to get the official viewpoint it might be well for me to see the Japanese Ambassador. Accordingly, I endeavored to see both the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Ambassador during a short visit to Washington. The Chinese Ambassador was absent speaking at the University of Michigan and the Japanese Ambassador was tied up with engagements and could not give me the time during the period at my disposal. But the Japanese Minister invited me to see him instead. Apparently the Japanese Minister is the diplomatic advisor to the Ambassador.

I made it plain to the Minister that I did not represent anything official, that I was only there in the capacity of one who desires to see these two nations come together on a just basis, and that it was also clear that the opinions I was interpreting from Dr. Miao and Dr. Kagawa were entirely unofficial and were elicited by my own initiative. In other words, they did not raise the matter with me—I raised it with them. I also suggested that I knew the Minister's situation as a diplomatic official and that he need not give anything on the matters raised, but that I would put the matter before him and he could comment on it or not, and I would understand. After I had placed the conversations I had before him, he replied that he would comment on the matter, but in an unofficial capacity.

He said that Dr. Kagawa left out one important point, namely, the economic cooperation of Japan and China. When I asked if the economic cooperation meant [3] the political dominance of the country by economic control, as many Chinese and others thought it would, he replied that it need not necessarily mean this. He further stated that although the territorial and political integrity of China was not specifically stated in the government statements regarding a basis of peace, it was implied in the other three points, because these points inferred a sovereign and independent China. He also added that the government of Japan had stated that there would be no indemnities and no territory demanded of China. This, too, he said implied the political and territorial integrity of China.

He suggested that Japan would desire a joint defense in Mongolia and North China against possible Russian aggression in these sections. When I pointed out that in the minds of the Chinese this planting of Japanese soldiers in North China and Mongolia would cancel the point about the territorial and political integrity of China, he replied that on the face of it it would, and that the demand might seem to be harsh, but in international law a nation might still be sovereign if she requested another nation to help her in the joint defense of territory.

In regard to the recognition of Chang Kai Shek as the head of China, he stated that the Japanese government recognized Wang Ching Wei because he was willing to accept Japan's basis of cooperation and that if Chang Kai Shek would be willing to do so then Japan would not mind who it was at the head of the government.

It seems to me that this left open the possibility of Japan's recognition of Chang Kai Shek if a new basis could be worked out which the latter could accept.

At the close of my talk one thing seemed to be intact in both viewpoints, namely, the territorial and political integrity of China. Of course, there was the possibility of this being threatened by the proposal of joint action in North China and Mongolia. But on the whole it remained. There was also the possibility of the recognition of Chang Kai Shek under certain conditions—conditions held by both sides. It was not ruled out.

When I came to the point of the possible mediation of the United States to bring peace in the Far East, I again urged on the Minister that he need not answer if he did not see fit. He replied that he would comment, not as giving an official but a personal view, that if my suggestions meant that America was to interfere in the Far East and try to impose her own terms, then the reply is, No. But if she should offer her good offices to help China and Japan to settle their own differences, then, Yes.

[4] When I asked if I might express the substance of our conversations to anyone of my friends who might be in a position to pass it on to those who would be in a position to do something, he replied that I might, provided it was understood that all of these opinions were simply explorative and were personal and private and not official. He added that the world must have peace and that America is in a position to help toward peace. When I suggested if America offered her good offices to help bring peace between China and Japan it might mean that she would thereby be led to straighten out her own differences with Japan, he agreed.

It seems therefor that the situation may be ripe for America to mediate between China and Japan. It appears to be the one possible door to peace in the world situation. If it begins there it may spread.

E. STANLEY JONES.

Dear Chief:

I much appreciate your thoughtfulness in forwarding with your letter of July 12, 1941 a memorandum prepared by Dr. Stanley Jones suggesting a possibility of peace between Japan and China and of American mediation between these two countries. Dr. Jones is well known to me by reputation and I admire his fine character and high purpose.

Just a week previous to the date of your letter, Representative John E. Tamm of Ohio wrote to me and enclosed a copy of a similar memorandum written by Dr. Jones. Mr. Tamm at the same time sent a copy of Dr. Jones' memorandum to Mr. Dean Acheson. As both Mr. Tamm's letter and Dr. Jones' memorandum were given careful study by officers of the Department of State, I am enclosing a copy of the reply which Mr. Acheson sent to Mr. Tamm.

As you may imagine, the Japanese action in reference to French Indochina has created new problems with far-reaching implications in the Far Eastern situation. You have doubtless read Mr. Welles' statement, as contained in Radio Bulletin No. 176 of July 24, in regard to our attitude toward that development, and the White House press release, contained in Radio Bulletin No. 177, July 26, in regard to the freeing of Japanese assets in this country.

12

It is good to know that you are enjoying excellent health. Eleanor joins me in sending affectionate regards to you and Mrs. Daniels.

~~Respectfully,~~

Affectionately,
JDR

Enclosure:

From Mr. Johnson to
Mr. Vorys, July 22.

The Honorable
Josephine Daniels,
American Ambassador,
Mexico, D. F.

JULY 23, 1946.

The Honorable JOHN M. VORYS,
House of Representatives.

DEAN JOHN: I referred your letters of July 11, 1941 to me and to the President and their enclosures in regard to the question of possible mediation by this Government in the conflict between China and Japan to the appropriate officers of the Department for study and comment.

We have studied with care the contents of your letters and of Dr. Jones' memorandum, and we are very glad to have the benefit of your views and those of Dr. Jones who is well-known to the Department. The various points and considerations mentioned in Dr. Jones' memorandum have been brought to our attention from time to time from various quarters and we have been and are keeping them constantly in mind. In addition to the broad general factors mentioned in Dr. Jones' memorandum, the Department must take into account the fundamental national policies of the various nations concerned, especially as manifested in the acts of those nations and in the statements of responsible officials thereof.

In past public statements and utterances by Japanese officials there has been considerable emphasis placed on terms similar to those referred to in Dr. Jones' memorandum. In this connection it may be observed that the contents of the agreements which the Japanese Government has made with the régime of Wang Ching-wei at Nanking afford some concrete indication of the nature of the settlement with China which the Japanese Government has thus far had in mind.

This Government has during recent years been making earnest efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that the real interests of Japan lie in adopting policies in regard to international relations and conduct which are in line with the thought and procedures in which this country believes.

[2] Should you feel, in the light of the foregoing comment, that you would still like to discuss this subject with an appropriate officer of the Department, such an officer will be glad at any time at your convenience to place himself at your disposal.

If Dr. Jones should have occasion to visit Washington, officers of the Department would welcome an opportunity to see him and to obtain the benefits through personal conversation of his observations and views.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN G. ACHESON,
Assistant Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

25 July 1941

Japanese military preparation in Manchuria continues at accelerated rate is indicated by a report from a reliable source. This "seems to portend he (Japs) is preparing in North for Major efforts". On the other hand, *Grew* reports "there has been a gradual weakening of the ties binding Japan to the Axis over a substantial period of time" and "the Government of Japan is expecting overtures from the Government of the U. S. S. R. designed to produce "a general agreement."

British Members of Parliament have invited some American Senators and Representatives to visit Britain shortly. *Germans* are returning to their French owners, all small boats (less than 300 tons) seized at time of the occupation it is reported.

German losses during first two weeks of Russo-German campaign were 640,000 to 700,000 men; 1100 to 1200 tanks; a Navy source reports.

The strike on oil tankers, Great Lakes Area, "is Communist influenced for the purpose of preventing production in the steel industry".

[2] *Admiral Tovey's reports* Navy's aviation training program for pilots, flight crews and maintenance personnel, is "ship-shape" and under way ahead of schedule. Today the Navy has four main pilot training stations with a combined student entry of 800 a month—Pensacola 300, Jacksonville 200, Corpus Christi 300—The Naval Station at Miami is providing the advanced carrier type train-

ing. The Navy including the Marine Corps had 40,521 aviators and 3,657 under training, 1 July, being 276 more aviators and 981 more students than the 1 January 1941 estimates. The *shortage of airplanes* of the type required for advanced training is becoming *critical*. Training capacity now is available for 9,095 aviation enlisted men every four months; by 1 January 1942 this will be increased to 12,000.

Information from an Official source on the Statement by the Carnegie Institution expert (in the 18 July Bulletin) shows that for some months weather reports to the fleet have been transmitted in confidential cipher; that all reports of weather observations made by Naval vessels are confidential. *Sabotage* of a torpedo has been reported to Bureau of Ordnance. *Considerable has been learned* about Italian espionage activities in the United States during the past week.

[3] *Secretary Knox* has appointed Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker, of M. I. T. as Coordinator of Research and Development for the Navy Department, Chairman of the Naval Research and Development Board and Member of the National Defense Research Committee. Dr. Hunsaker reports he is surveying Navy's research projects in order to determine the extent of the present program.

Approximately 36 Public Relations Officers from the Naval Districts and the two Fleets will be in Washington Monday for a four-day conference and school on Public Relations.

Secretary Knox reports expansion of facilities of the Naval Communications to meet the increased load placed on the system by demands of Navy Department operations under the National Emergency.

The Senate has passed a bill authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to establish a secret detective force to investigate any existing or threatened espionage or sabotage in United States Naval establishments. USN makes a careful check of requests for the dismissal of aliens working in plants having defense production. Before any dismissal is requested, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mill- [4] tary Intelligence and Naval Intelligence's central and field files are checked. 40% of the requests received are "washed out" because no cause for action is found.

The Navy's program for supplying Diesel engines for small boats, together with the special power-plant requirements for the newly developed landing boats, has resulted in the development of a more modern type of Diesel for these small craft. This engine is manufactured by the National Supply Company at the Superior Diesel Engine Plant and has been installed in both the 30-foot Bureau Type Steel and the 36-foot Higgins Type landing boats.

Voluntary Spanish and Portuguese language instruction is progressing both in Washington and the Naval Air Stations at Pensacola, Florida, Jacksonville, Florida and Corpus Christi, Texas. Arrangements are being made to expand the language instruction during the coming year, by using the facilities of a WPA project. It is anticipated that over 5,000 officers and enlisted men of Navy and USMC will undergo special instructions during the current fiscal year. *Puget Sound* Naval Hospital is expanding. It has almost reached its limit for the area it serves. For the present, however, it is adequate, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery reports.

25 July, 1941

SECRET

F. H. secret
look bly

For the President only:

When I was in Canada the Government officials stated they hoped that you could go to Ottawa on the seventh of August. I wanted to phone you from Gander but there were no communications there. I am going to remain here a day or two longer for conference with Commander Middle East. His visit here very secret. I am wondering whether you would think it important and useful for me to go to Moscow. Air transportation good and can reach there in twenty-four hours. I have a feeling that everything possible should be done to make certain the Russians maintain a permanent front even though they be defeated in this immediate battle. If Stalin could in any way be influenced at a critical time I think it would be worth doing by a direct communication from you through a personal envoy. I think the stakes are so great that it should be done. Stalin would then know in an unmistakable way that we mean business on a long-term supply job. I of course have said no more in regard to this and will wait your advice. If you think Moscow trip inadvisable I will leave here not later than Wednesday. No contact weekend with Prime Minister but message through Navy will reach me quickly. There is no news here about Russia or Japan that should be sent to the Prime Minister but not tell me Japan with war. American Embassy told me this morning he did not tell me in detail. I am sure you will act immediately. Hope you agree Navy will handle this. I am sure you will have military representatives on the strategic position of the Pacific. She will be sent. They are determined to fight it out in that way.

Page 2 of 2.

SECRET

and it seems to me they have every convincing reason to all of us for that determination. I do hope you are well and am sorry my mission has taken longer than I anticipated. We had news this morning that the Schoerhorst is out. British making very powerful air attacks but bomber losses substantial. Everybody here in good spirits but realize that the Russian business gives them only a temporary brother. Every one here asks about you and are delighted to know that you are in good health.

HARRY.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, July 29, 1941.

Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State.

I note in a number of dispatches during the past week or ten days that Japanese troop or plane withdrawals are reported from several sectors on the Chinese front.

I think we should relay these reports to Gauss and the Military Attaché in Chungking for the information of the Chinese Government, with the suggestion that one or two powerful attacks on weakened Japanese positions might do real good at this time. Possibly you have done this already.

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 31, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference your memorandum of July 29, 1941 in regard to reports of withdrawals of Japanese troops and planes from certain occupied places in China.

The messages to which you refer were repeated to the Embassy at Chungking via naval radio by the sending offices. We have brought these reports orally to the attention of the Chinese Ambassador here and are today conveying to Ambassador Gauss by telegraph the suggestion that he and the Naval and Military Attachés inform appropriate Chinese officials at Chungking of the reports in question.

SUMNER WELLES.

Luck box

TK

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

Tokyo

Dated July 30, 1941

Rec'd 7:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1131, July 30, 10 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

Your 436, July 29, 3 p.m., is greatly appreciated.

The eventual way out of the present situation would appear to lie in the third provision of the Franco-Japanese protocol of July 29 to the effect that the validity of the stipulations of the agreement shall cease when the situation motivating their adoption no longer exists. The President's proposal, if accepted and carried through, would effectively remove the alleged threat to the security of Indochina set forth in the preamble of the protocol as the fundamental purpose of the agreement. If Japan should reject the proposal or should avoid giving positive authorization to the President to proceed to carry out the proposal, Japan's good faith would be brought into question, the honesty of her announced purpose and incentives would come before the tribunal of public opinion,

-2- #1131, July 30, 10 p.m., from Tokyo.

opinion, and her position before the world and in the light of history would become doubly unenviable.

This, of course, assumes that the President's proposal will eventually and inevitably be made known to the public, a point which might discreetly but helpfully be conveyed to Admiral Nomura in case the reply of the Japanese Government should be unduly delayed or should prove to be of a negative or evasive character. No progress can be made toward the adjustment of international relations without mutual confidence, and were the Japanese Government to withhold confidence in the helpful efforts of the President to find a way out of the impasse and in such eventual international assurances with regard to the security of Indochina as the President might be in a position to present, such an attitude on the part of Japan would oblige the United States completely to discount any expressed desire on the part of Japan for a restoration of good relations with the United States.

I know of no other way of possibly preventing the Japanese forces from "digging in" in Indochina than to bring the foregoing thoughts through Admiral Nomura squarely to the attention of the Japanese Government.

KLP

GREW

SEN. FRANKS
Acting Attorney General
8-6-32

Submitted a revised draft of proposed Executive order entitled "Establishing Franklin Bay Defensive Sea Area." The proposed order was presented by the Secretary of the Navy July 25, with the concurrence of the Acting Secretary of State July 26 and forwarded for the consideration of the Attorney General by Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget July 25. - - The Executive Order was signed by the President August 15, 1932.

See 15

23

WHELAN, Francis
Acting Attorney General
8-12-41

Boardman

Transmitted a proposed Executive order entitled "Transferring the United States Coast Guard for the District of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, together with its Organization, Personnel, and Equipment, to the Service and Jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Navy". The proposed order was presented by the Acting Secretary of the Navy August 8 and forwarded for the consideration of the Attorney General by the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget under date of Aug. 8, 1941. The Executive Order was signed by the President 8-16-41. -- Attached in copy of letter dated 7-22 from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of the Navy indicating that he is willing to have the Honolulu District of the Coast Guard operate as a part of the Navy "during the present unlimited emergency". Letter was approved by the President 7-24-41.

See 21-41

10

ATTORNEY GENERAL, Acting
August 18, 1941

Wrote to the President transmitting a revised draft of a proposed Executive order entitled "Suspension of High-Sea Law as to submarines and aircraft employed by the Department in the construction of public works in the Territory of Hawaii necessary for the national defense." Proposed order, presented by the Sec. of War, August 11, 1941, and forwarded for consideration of Attorney General by the Act's Sec. of the Budget Bureau, August 14, 1941, has approval of Attorney General as to form and language. -- Mr. McIntyre wrote to the Secretary of War on August 21, 1941, advising that the President signed the Executive order on August 22, 1941.

1913 - 1914

400 Hawaii

MEMO. FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: 4-20-41

Re: to the President requesting authority to acquire four West Coast patrol cutters to be converted into small patrol vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District. States that patrol vessels now available in Hawaii are not adequate for that area. Refers to information he has from the Chief of the Bureau of Ships as action taken in the Supplemental 1942 Appropriation Request by the Bureau of the Budget in directing that the allocation from that appropriation for 'district craft and small boats' not be increased above \$30,000,000--that this allocation is entirely obligated for items of high priority. Asks that authority for above be granted even though it will require a grant allocation in excess of \$30,000,000--says if this is approved, funds can be made available by allocation from items of somewhat lesser urgency. -- Relation to copy of letter: 'U.S. OF F.B.I.'

See 79 Authorization, Navy

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

August 16, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL


Mr. Secretary:

The present Japanese Foreign Minister is evidently of the impression, which earlier Japanese reports from Washington undertook to give, that the initiative in regard to conversations came from the American Government.

Apparently the Japanese Foreign Minister has been holding back as regards new conversations while awaiting (since August 7) a report by Nomura on the subject of "rumors of Hull's resignation and of the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan".

In the Imperial conference of July 2, the Japanese Government apparently decided to adhere to its "new order" policy "regardless of how the world situation may change"; to "take measures with a view to advancing southward"; to increase its pressure upon Chiang Kai-shek "from various points in the south"; to continue diplomatic negotiations; to carry out previous decisions regarding French Indochina and Thailand; to use "every means available" in order "to prevent the United States from joining the war"; to act in accordance with the Three Power Pact, but deciding for itself "when and how force will be employed".

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL




DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

August 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter from the High Commissioner, dated July 31, 1941, which you sent me with your memorandum of August 21, has been read with interest and I appreciate the opportunity of seeing it. I enclose a suggested draft for your reply to Dr. Sayre.

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely of Cordell Hull, is written in dark ink. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the top and a long, sweeping underline.

X 20

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILA

Personal and confidential

July 31, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I wish so much that I knew your mind and your desire about my remaining in Manila. The absence of any reply from you to my letter of April twenty-third makes me wonder whether I still retain your confidence. I feel sure that you know that without your full confidence and support there is little point in my staying on; without your whole-hearted backing the job here, difficult and delicate at best, becomes well nigh impossible. My only reason for being here is service to my country and to you; and, if you feel that under present war conditions a different type of man should be serving in this post, I should be grateful to you for giving me some other worthwhile assignment or relieving me of the command here. I do not want to remain here merely on sufferance.

Perhaps you would like to talk over personally with me these and other matters. The situation in Manila and the Far East bristles with problems of extreme delicacy which cannot be discussed by letter. If you so desire, I could fly to Washington and back and be absent from my post for only a few weeks.

I should deeply appreciate a word of guidance from you.

The situation here keeps changing with kaleidoscopic rapidity. During the present week Japan, as you know, has been advancing in force into Indo-China. That will upset the present balances and the threat of further advance becomes very real now to Singapore, to Thailand, to the Netherlands East Indies, to the Philippines. Stiffening resistance must be the answer.

The Commonwealth Government holds its elections next November. These include the election of a President and Vice President and would be of extreme importance, - except that the result is a foregone conclusion. Everyone

knows

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

- 2 -

knows that Quezon will be elected President and Osmena Vice President. No other candidate for those offices has the ghost of a chance. Quezon holds everything in the Commonwealth within his grasp. But I believe there is no question of his loyalty to the United States and his genuine desire to cooperate with the United States in defense activities. I think you can count on this. His health is not yet entirely restored. He tells me that the doctors promise that he will be fit again in November. He has made rather a remarkable recovery from a bad attack of tuberculosis.

Almost the only organized political opposition in Luzon comes from the Socialists headed by Pedro Abad Santos, the brother of Jesse Santos, recently advanced from Minister of Justice to a Justice of the Supreme Court. The main strength of the Socialist party is in the province of Pampanga, a rice-growing district in Central Luzon. I had a long talk with Pedro Santos last week and he tells me that his party are thoroughly loyal to the United States and are opposed to effecting political changes by force.

Our office staff have been working like Trojans on export control and on "frozen assets". Each of these has come to assume large importance and to involve an infinite amount of work.

During the past months general economic and financial conditions in the Philippines have been quite satisfactory. Prices of major export commodities have improved materially over last year and foreign trade has been well maintained. Considerable apprehension, however, exists as to the future as a result of the growing scarcity of ships available for Philippine-American trade. The sugar situation here may become critical. Because of the increasing scarcity of bottoms, there is danger that the sugar crop cannot be exported from the Philippines to continental United States. If it cannot be exported it cannot be marketed, and the sugar centrals and growers here cannot finance continued sugar production. That would mean field laborers out of work, labor unrest and one of the most important of Philippine activities disrupted and threatened. What to be done? I believe the Commonwealth Government will shortly ask for a heavy loan from the United States to help finance the sugar crop. But the United States cannot carry on a program of indefinitely piling up huge surplus sugar stocks in the Philippines which probably never could be marketed. I'm studying this problem at the present moment. I suspect that the

Commonwealth


- 3 -

Commonwealth Government may not be able to swing the problem alone and that if a serious shipping shortage develops the United States will have to give serious consideration to affording financial assistance but should doubtless couple whatever assistance is given with a program of careful diversion of sugar land to rice and other crops needed in the Philippines.

Perhaps still more pressing at the moment is the problem of maintaining Philippine stocks of food supplies and other necessities. If the shortage of bottoms becomes acute we will be extremely limited in what supplies we can get from the United States. Yet there is imminent danger that what we have will be drained away by being exported to neighboring Far Eastern countries where prices of supplies may be higher. We ought to control such exports; but how? The Export Control Act apparently is not broad enough to include foodstuffs and a number of other necessary commodities. Just now I'm wrestling with this problem also. It looks as if the only thoroughly satisfactory answer will be an Act of the United States Congress amending the Export Control Act so as to give control over the export from the Philippines of foodstuffs and articles of necessity for Philippine domestic needs.

It is heartening to see how our country is responding to your leadership and we are doing our best to uphold your hands in this far outpost.

Ever sincerely yours,



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S

August 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Francis B. Sayre, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Manila, 7/31/41 to the President, marked "Personal and confidential". Wishes to know the President's mind and his desire about Mr. Sayre's remaining in Manila. Original letter sent to the Secretary of State. Copy of President's memorandum and explanation of enclosure sent to the Under Secretary of State.

4400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

6 August 1941

Materials are being accumulated and plans for a big German offensive against the Soviet or or about August 10, it is reported.

Morris reports the German people are not "cheered" by the silence which covers German losses particularly in view of the slow progress on the Eastern Front.

Precarious position of Axis forces in Libya has been confirmed by reports received by the Consul at Tunis.

A large number of Nazi Marines are in Constanta and preparations are being made to recondition various Rumanian Ships which are to be used either as troop transports or as auxiliary cruisers in the Black Sea it is reported.

The Japanese mobilized 500,000 men during the period June and July it is reported. The majority of this force is believed to have been sent to Manchuria. (Russians reported to have 500,000 in Far East.)

Troops defending Tobruk have 30 days food supply, 60 days ammunition supply and very limited water supply. The fleet is unable to continue supplying this force. [2] 40 ships sunk in the port and 5 destroyers sunk outside the port show the extent of Axis air control over Tobruk. Relief must be effected by fall or Tobruk will have to surrender it is reported.

British sources do not believe that the Russians will undertake an offensive on the Finnish Front.

Stalin's Decree that civilian population be armed has been followed effectively. Irregulars also reported cooperating with OGPU in laying waste to the country in the path of the invaders it is reported.

Two Hundred Officers of the Colombian Army have been arrested and are being held incommunicado on charge of conspiracy against the Government.

Ecuador political situation is very delicate and an imminent change of Government is possible, it is reported.

Recruiting activities for week ending 25 July, 1941.

Accepted for first enlistment.....	228
First enlistments.....	1423
Reenlistments, continuous service.....	42
Reenlistments, under broken service.....	17
Total.....	1482

While violation of the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Authority by Naval aircraft occurs at such infrequent intervals as to occasion an infinitesimal portion [3] of the total hazards to commercial operations, the importance of this problem is recognized. The Civil Aeronautics Authority has not approved the recommendations of the Navy (and Army?) to establish a permanent board to participate in planning to control violations of Civil Aeronautics Authority regulations which are caused by lack of segregation, zoning of airports, communication facilities between aircraft and aircraft to ground, and of authority of any agency—Army, Navy or commercial—to ascertain its own priority in a given area.

The Bureau of Ordnance appreciates the cooperation that is being given by the Army in furnishing machine gun ammunition. For the first half of the year, about 40% of the Navy's allotment was received and all special tasks were taken care of. At present, if necessary, the Bureau will be supplied with sufficient ammunition for any special task and up to 60% of its allotment. By September or October, the War Department will have sufficient small arms ammunition capacity available to take care of the Bureau 100%.

Typhoon damage in Guam is \$20,000 according to reported preliminary estimates.

[4] *Solicitation by Jehorah's Witnesses* in Independence, Kansas, effectively stopped by joint police and American Legion plan to send a policeman with the solicitor to open each interview by saying the canvasser represented "this organization that does not believe in saluting the American Flag, and I am just along to help prevent riots such as this organization has precipitated in other communities", Navy Domestic Intelligence reports.

Permission for news correspondents to proceed from London to Iceland has been withheld and no stories on Iceland are to be released without Navy Department approval except press stories by approved correspondents when these stories are authorized by Comtaskfor nineteen and reference to following items has been deleted: Identification of units participating, strength of force, ships involved, defenses, names of individuals, future plans or movements, amount and type of equipment.

Contract has been awarded the Naval Reserve Training School at Navy Pier, Chicago, Illinois, of \$222,000.00 by Bureau of Yards and Docks.

The Navy ration "shall" include canned, powdered, or concentrated fruit juices under the terms of HR4757.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

7 August, 1941

Only a very determined attitude by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies can now deter Japanese military from pushing things to extremes, the British Ambassador at Tokyo reports.

"An expected triumph over the Red Army by October and an invasion of the Persian Gulf Area and India by Spring are two events on Hitler's calendar" reports to the British indicate.

Eden reports Turkish friendship still affords huge advantages to the British and "desires" the United States to aid Britain in supplying military supplies and equipment to Turkey as promptly as possible.

MacMurray (Ankara, Turkey) reports "The opinion that there is no military threat to Turkey is shared by the British Military Officials here but they feel that it is not impossible or even unlikely that in time the situation may change abruptly."

Ships laden with Nazi soldiers reported transiting Swedish territorial waters.

Port Said (Suez Canal) now handling a great volume of [2] tonnage with speed and dispatch and ships of United States Registry and British Troop transports are not using Suez at present a reliable source reports.

Situation in Ecuador reported to be rapidly deteriorating: Anti-American sentiment is increasing; faith in Pan-Americanism is lost and Ecuadorans feel that the days of their country's life as an independent nation are numbered unless prompt action is taken by the United States.

Canary Islands Garrison increased from 12,000 to 53,050 in past three months. Because of topography, bad roads and fortifications built or to be built, an attack and seizure of the Canary Islands would be a difficult task in the face of the Garrison as reinforced it is reported.

Germans continue to evince interest in the Sabana Bay and the Sabana del Guabatico Area, Dominica, a natural air landing area 50 miles from the Bay, it is reported.

Nazi planes flying over Iceland 30 July made a detailed reconnaissance, a reliable source reports.

All future sailings of Japanese ships for United States will be postponed indefinitely, the Japanese Foreign [3] Office "admitted", it is reported.

Production of synthetic gasoline in Italy is at a minimum due to the lack of coal. Italians now using oil reserves and are having great difficulty in getting replenishments it is reported. German synthetic gasoline factories reported seriously damaged by the R. A. F. but new ones have been built are operating near Berlin.

WPA Projects in the Navy program. Emergency Relief Act for the fiscal year 1942 was approved 1 July 1941. In contrast to the 1941 act, new bill does not earmark a sum of money for use on Federal Agency projects of the type approved in previous years. Instead the \$5,000,000 set aside for all federal agencies will be retained by WPA and allocated to specific projects, that cannot be operated in the state program, when those projects are individually approved by the WPA. Therefore, with but few exceptions, Navy projects that are put in operation will be in state programs under the direction of the State Administrators. The new act authorizes the operation of federal construction projects in the fiscal year 1942 approved under the act of the fiscal year 1941.

4402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[4] *Director of Personnel* reports a survey of civilian supervisory positions in the Navy Department looking toward obtaining higher grades is just being completed and a large number of new allocations have been secured.

Price of red salmon is up 10 cents a pound over last year so the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts is ordering an increased amount of medium-reds which have advanced about 2 cents a pound for the same period. The demand for salmon from the Army and under lease-lend is heavy but 20% of this year's pack will be used for these purposes without undue dislocation of the civilian market.

Bureau of Ordnance reports 23,280,000 rounds of 40 mm Bofors and 57,200,000 rounds of 20 mm Oerlikon Ammunition have been ordered. The present program contemplates increasing the orders to a total of 30,480,000 40 mm and 72,200,000 20 mm all for production within the next twelve months. The steel brass, gilding metal and aluminum required presents a serious problem. This is just a start as the contemplated production of Oerlikon guns practically decided upon is 31,000 guns requiring 360,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

Eire Government reported considering seeking U. S. Protection of Ireland.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

8 August 1941

Japanese Officers in civilian clothes are arriving in Thai accompanied by a flood of "tourists" a reliable source reports. Thai officials feel their nation is in serious immediate peril from Japan.

Japanese call up more retired Japanese personnel.

Several large groups of transports were observed off Kojo (Korea) heading North during the latter part of July.

Japanese ships reported to be purchasing large amounts of petroleum products in Rio de Janeiro.

The Japanese Naval Inspector's Office New York City was officially closed 7 August.

Fighting on the Eastern Front is characterized by an increased use of flame throwers and radio as a means of communication. Nightly bombing of Moscow reported "light but accurate".

Occupied Thrace has been completely stripped, even to removal of windows and doors it is reported.

All Spanish military leave in the Tangier (North Morocco) Zone was cancelled 4 August, it is reported.

[2] *Aranha* is "most indignant" over British demands concerning Ships Warrant Agreement and declares it will be necessary to close the ports of Brazil to British ships.

Evidence that operations will be undertaken against Iran no matter what answer is given to the British ultimatum (in re: tourists) is reported. However, United States Minister at Bagdad reports British for the time being at least will not move into Iran since it is intimated that their forces there are inadequate.

Greek refugees fleeing into Turkey because of "onset of famine conditions" causing Turks to feel the democracies have left Greece to her fate after serving their purposes. Some are asking what the Turkish people might expect in similar circumstances it is reported.

Threat against Egypt has been removed by Russian War and consequent change of Nazi plans a reliable source reports. Relief of Tobruk (Libya) may be possible if 300 tanks above scheduled deliveries can be attained by 15 September. Australian Troops are in Tobruk.

Crude oil is Germany's real need it is reported. That's why they want Baku (City on Caspian Sea). They are reported to have enough oil refined and in production to carry them through until next year.

[3] *Acting Secretary Bard* stated today it is hoped the strike at the Kearney, New Jersey, Shipbuilding plant can be settled at once, but if management and labor cannot arrive at a settlement, steps must be taken which will in one way or another put this huge shipbuilding plant back into production at the earliest possible moment.

The Judge Advocate General is being asked to secure legislation to enable Navy personnel to use taxis on Official business between the Navy and other Governmental Departments.

25 Officers and 72 Enlisted men have been ordered to a course of RADAR instruction in Canada, beginning 16 August, 1941.

Deliveries of propellers are not satisfactory to meet the needs of airplane production. At the present time, a quantity of completed fighting airplanes are awaiting propeller deliveries. The Navy has on contract 100 training airplanes which are to be equipped with wooden propellers. In addition, the Navy contemplated securing 100 additional wooden propellers from the Army, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports.

The Bureau of Ordnance is making special efforts to con- [4] serve aluminum and other critical raw materials without interfering with the military efficiency of the product.

The manufacture of torpedoes is being delayed by inability to obtain required quantities of steel as soon as needed. Practically all needed steel is under contract with various firms, and deliveries can only be improved by obtaining higher priority, which has been requested. Requisitions were originally made and proposals advertised for this steel late in 1940 in the usual form. Owing to the fact that most quantities required were small, no bids were received under then existing conditions. When necessity for the material was explained to various companies, bids were finally obtained, the Steel Section of OPM being particularly helpful in this matter, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

A meeting of a select committee to investigate air accidents, headed by Mr. Nichols of the Office of Production Management, held on 7 August, was attended by Army, Navy, OPM, CAA, and Commerce Officials, for a discussion of measures to be taken to insure the general health and prospects of the commercial air carriers of the United States. The subject will be gone into in greater detail later.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

11 August, 1941

The Nazi time-table for defeating the Russian Army and occupying European Russia has been upset by stubborn Russian resistance. The new time-table of the German Army calls for breaking Russian resistance in the area the Germans expect to occupy during the coming winter, this includes territory west of the Volga River, it is reported.

Considerable uneasiness is reported among the German people. Attempts are being made to direct public opinion to the West by an attack on the United States in the Press.

Hitler and his henchmen greatly apprehend a British attack on their unprotected Norwegian flank and Western rear because they are unable at the present time to withdraw either material or men from the Eastern Front, it is reported.

German high command is reported proposing to resume offensive operation in North Africa during the month of September, if the British don't attack before then.

Combined Nazi and Spanish drive on Gibraltar "and else- [2] where" is reported temporarily abandoned because of the situation on the Eastern Front.

Clashes between German and Italian forces in Russia are reported.

Germans are said to be pleased with the 5 August Decree for Weygand to deal directly with Admiral Darlan since they suspect the motives of Weygand.

Nazi Activities in Brazil are being intensified. "Something is brewing" in the Southern part of Brazil and it is believed Argentina is connected with it, it is reported.

Germans are taking active steps to prevent Dakar from falling into the hands of the United States. Measures are under consideration to forestall an Anglo-United States attempt to get Portuguese Bases it is reported.

The Japanese do not expect the Thais to resist occupation it is reported. It is reported Burma will be attacked by combined French and Japanese forces when enough Japanese forces arrive in Indo-China.

Japanese ships are reported to have orders to avoid United States ports and to paint out their flags.

4404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Wholesale Price Index for all Commodities for the week ending 2 August, 1941,—89.2.

Naval strength of:	Germany	Italy	France	Total
Old battleships.....	2	-----	1	1
Battleships.....	2	5	1	1
Heavy cruisers.....	4	4	4	12
Light cruisers.....	4	12	10	26
Destroyers.....	56	97	46	299
Submarines.....	150	76	50	276
Aircraft carriers.....	1	-----	1	2

Approximately 100,000 man days were lost last week in strikes affecting Naval Defense contracts. 6 cases affecting 2810 workers were settled. 28 cases are still open and 16 strikes are pending in which Navy production may be involved. Conferences on the Kearney strike were held over the week end—no change has been reported. An early settlement is hoped for.

AA preference ratings are being given material and machinery necessary for RADAR manufacture.

Typical substitution and conservation of materials which may be necessary include: (1) 10% reduction in chlorine for bleaching paper; (2) palmetto fibre for palmyra fibre used in deck scrubbers; (3) paint cans of terne instead of tin plate; (4) various substitutes for corrosion resisting steel; (5) fibre stock tags instead of zinc.

Research is under way on plane-to-plane gun-fire. The problem is to secure effective fire control in order to take advantage of the full-range of the guns carried. [4] Complete coordination and cooperation is being secured from all Government, British and Private Agencies, it is reported.

The obvious logical uses for lighter-than-air ships are in the detection of—and attack on—mines and submarines, and in the escort, when desirable, of convoys through the coastal shipping lanes. Steps are being taken to determine the value of under-water photography from airships; this would appear to hold potentialities at least under some conditions. Another important project now underway is the development of sweeping equipment to be towed by airships for the destruction of magnetic mines. Corresponding equipment to be used against acoustic mines is also in the picture. This equipment tows on the surface and is energized from the airship. It has been necessary to start from scratch in the design and construction of this equipment but the project is considered to have good prospects for successful achievement.

The average number of Naval Military personnel on the rolls during June 1941 and the payments to retired and reserve personnel are estimated to have been as follows:

	Number	Cost
Personnel, regular—active.....	216,904	\$18,646,682
Personnel, regular—retired.....	17,561	2,520,263
Personnel, reserve—all categories.....	51,807	6,846,117
Total.....	286,272	28,013,062

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

12 August, 1941

Communist Party in the United States reported split with a militant group, believing Russia will be defeated, wanting to "headquarter" the party in United States or South America.

Leahy reports Marshall Petain as saying "that Europe would suffer from famine and plague was already in evidence" and that the United States "was quick to criticize but slow to act."

Leahy reports that the French do not believe Japan will attack Russia.

Reports of big Japanese troop concentrations on Siberian front coincide with a statement by Japanese military quarters that Japan expects a "decisive turn" in Russo-German war within the next two weeks.

There is no clear evidence that the Russians intend to weaken their Far Eastern Forces by transfer of troops to the West, it is reported from Harbin (Manchuria).

Between 18 and 24 Nazi submarines are reported to have recently reached Japan.

Underwater objects dangerous to navigation probably [2] mines have been placed in the Bako Harbor (Pescadores) area, Japan.

Japanese Naval vessels reported at Cape St. Jacques, Saigon (Cochin-China) "or in the river between" are: 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, 1 aircraft carrier, 8 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats and 9 small minelayers or sweepers.

Japanese aircraft factories in the Tokyo-Nagoya areas now working 24 hours per day, seven days a week, estimated total of 500 per month plane production.

Nazis Circles are reported losing faith in ultimate victory.

Finland will be rewarded by Germans with strips of Sweden and Norway, it is reported.

100 light armored scouting cars and about 2,000 Nazi "tourists" are reported near or in Algiers.

The Vatican "apparently believes" that the tension between Ecuador and Peru is only temporarily relaxed and that hostilities "must" be expected to be resumed unless outside economic or military pressure is employed in order to enforce peace.

British reported to have taken 10 or 12 Finnish ships (totaling about 30,000 tons) detained in British ports.

[3] *Advanced* progress is reported on a research project involving the use of properly colored lights on bridges and exposed gun-mounts which do not create "light-blindness" and which are not discernible from a distance.

In addition to contracts awarded for the Fiscal Year 1941, amounting to \$2,196,969,630.45, Letters of Intent have been issued to a total of \$950,026,300.00. These letters of Intent ultimately will be superseded by contracts it is reported by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

The raw material situation continues to become more critical and it may be that the problem may be more serious than has been the case with machine tools. The Office of Production Management is following the problem very closely and has been of considerable assistance to the Bureau of Ordnance in making distribution to more important contractors, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

A survey of airplane plants covering the segregation of magnesium and aluminum scrap, is reported under way.

A special mission has been sent to London to study for the Navy and Maritime Commission, all matters relating to navigation, storage and distribution of petroleum products in the United Kingdom.

Modern influence mines and degaussing are new. At one [4] time during World War II until countermeasures were perfected, mines were accounting for more shipping losses than submarines or aircraft. Constant application to countermeasures is necessary to deal with existing types and new types as they appear. Studies now are under way on offensive and defensive operations including (1) various ship influences that can be used to fire a mine (2) surveying technique (3) mine recovery (4) degaussing (5) mine, firing mechanism. A proving ground (Magic Carpet) will be completed shortly. Survey ranges, deepening stations and wiping and flashing stations are in operation. Temporary degaussing now is giving way to permanent degaussing under instructions from the Bureaus of Ordnance and Ships and while the major studies of degaussing are expected to be completed by the end of this year, "degaussing will be with us always".

A Coordinator and Supervisor for all duplicating in the Navy Department is under consideration. Savings in cost and amount of space are expected.

Admiral Towers reports as far as the Navy is concerned there is no shortage of high octane gasoline.

800,000 men are estimated to be in the Turkish Army.

August 28, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

8

Mr. Secretary:

In connection with your proposed call upon the President to discuss with him the proposal of the Japanese Government which the Japanese Ambassador desires to present to him on August 28 in regard to a meeting of the heads of the American and Japanese Governments for the purpose of endeavoring to reach a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area, observations are offered as follows:

It seems apparent from the character of the document which the Japanese Ambassador proposes to hand to the President, a copy of which he handed you last night, and various other indications that the Japanese Government will adopt a strategy designed to put through an agreement couched in general terms which will leave the application of those terms wide open. The Japanese will probably argue that the situation calls for speedy action on the ground that only in this way can there be averted the danger of control of the Japanese Government passing into the hands of the extremists, which would result in the opportunity being lost for a peaceful adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan. (Our Embassy has reported that the internal situation in Japan is serious and there may

-2-

may be a sound basis for this argument.) The Japanese will probably also argue that for this reason it is essential that points of agreement be confined to broad questions leaving specific details to be dealt with subsequently.

It will be recalled that these are the very tactics which the Japanese Government has employed in connection with the proposals for an understanding which were presented to our Government last spring. It will be recalled too that our deliberate careful study of their proposals revealed inconsistencies between their professions of acceptance of the principles of respect for China's territorial integrity and of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations on the one hand and their reluctance on the other hand to agree to withdrawing troops from north China and Inner Mongolia and to relinquish in practice special economic principles which they have asserted in China.

Should we accede to Japan's desire to conclude an agreement first covering only broad principles, there is a danger that we shall not have in fact reached a meeting of minds on what is implied in the actual application of those principles to concrete cases.

We have consistently informed the Japanese that, in
the

-3-

the light of the many evidences which have come to our attention that the Japanese Government is pursuing courses diametrically opposed to the spirit underlying the conversations which you have held with the Japanese Ambassador, we must await some clear indication of the Japanese Government's intention to pursue peaceful courses before we could profitably continue to pursue our conversations. It is thought that the President may wish to reemphasize to the Japanese Ambassador that our views in this respect remain unchanged. He may wish to recall to the Ambassador that in addition we found during the course of our conversations difficulties arising from (1) the disposition of the Japanese Government to stress its alignment with the Axis; (2) the intention of the Japanese Government to retain troops in Chinese territory for defense against communistic activities; and (3) lack of adequate clarification of the application to Japan's proposed program of economic cooperation with China of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. The President may wish to suggest that these points would need to be satisfactorily disposed of as a condition precedent to a general peaceful settlement.

The President might then go on to offer the suggestion that in the light of all developments which have taken

place,

-4-

place, it would be helpful at this time if the Japanese Government could give some practical evidence of its intention to readjust its position and to pursue courses of peace; the giving of such practical evidence would not only contribute toward convincing the American people and the world at large of the earnestness of the Japanese Government's intentions, but would also serve, it is believed, to make easier the task of bringing about reconciliation between Japan and China, in accordance with Japan's earnestly professed desire. He might say that as the Japanese Government is in a far better position to know than is the Government of the United States what Japan is prepared to do by way of giving practical evidence of its intentions, this Government hesitates to suggest concrete measures which the Japanese Government might take.

The President might then in conclusion say that he is glad to learn from the Ambassador of the Japanese Government's desire to pursue peaceful courses; that he will be glad to give careful study to the paper which the Japanese Ambassador has given him; and that with regard to the Japanese Government's proposal for a meeting between himself and Prince Kono, while the President will be glad to try

-5-

to try and arrange such a meeting, he feels that precedent to the taking place of such a meeting there should be a meeting of minds between the two Governments on fundamental principles, as it would be most unfortunate from the point of view of both Governments if when such a meeting takes place there should ensue a failure to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement.

Sm New
FE:Ballantine:MHP

Admiral Richardson lunched with President Roosevelt on July 8, 1940 at one o'clock.

Admiral Richardson had an appointment with President Roosevelt on July 11, 1940 at twelve o'clock noon.

Admiral Richardson and Gov. Leahy lunched with President Roosevelt on October 8, 1940 at one o'clock.

SECRETMemo for The President:

The Commanding Officer of the 4th Regiment of U.S. Marines believes that Japan will soon act toward the removal of French and British forces from Shanghai basing their action on an enforcement of neutrality. They are planning on seizing the French and British areas and specifically plan to prevent any extension of our sector.

The CinCAF suggests that a complete revision of the Settlement defense plan is necessary between the Japanese and Americans and possibly the Italians. He does not believe that we can entrust the safety of our Nationals, in the present British and French concessions to the Japanese protection, for several reasons: i.e.

- (1) the Japanese Commander at Shanghai has submitted a comprehensive plan to Tokyo for entering the French and British Settlements, taking over the defense areas by the Japanese Army and Navy and disarming the French and British troops, if not evacuated.
- (2) A similar plan has been proposed for the French Settlement at Hankow.
- (3) These Japanese plans are to be executed under the guise of neutrality enforcement and the Japanese then plan on proposing a revised defense plan.
- (4) The Japanese are engaged in extensive hostilities on two fronts which might require the withdrawal of their forces at any time; thereby leaving the Settlements unprotected.

In view of these reasons and to effect true neutrality the CinCAF intends to propose that the United States take over the defense of all evacuated sectors, with possibly a certain amount of small adjustments on departures from the proposed. The CinCAF has talked this matter over with the American Consul General.

This information is highly secret.

W. R. Smedley
W. R. Smedley

By direction

MEV This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Tokyo
Dated December 8, 1941.
Rec'd 6:23 a. m., 10th

SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington.
1910, December 8, 1 p. m.
Confidential

Embassy's 1906 December 8, 1 a. m.

One. The Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock this morning asked me to call on him at his official residence.

Two. He handed me a 13 page Memorandum, dated today, which he said had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present to you this morning (evening of December 7th Washington time). He said that he had already been in touch with the Emperor who desired that the aforesaid Memorandum be regarded as his reply to the President's message.

Three. The Foreign Minister thereupon made to me the following oral statement:

"His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President. He has graciously let known his [2] wishes to the Foreign Minister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the latter's message:

Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the circumstances of the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina to which His Majesty has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indochina constitutes one of the subject matters of the Japanese-American negotiations. His Majesty has commanded the Government to state its views to the American Government also on this question. It is, therefore desired that the President will kindly refer to this reply.

Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact".

GREW.

HPD

TRB This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 12:17 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush.

1384. September 4, 9 p. m. (Section One). Strictly Confidential for the Secretary and Under-Secretary only.

One. The Foreign Minister asked me to call this afternoon and in a long conversation he emphasized the desire of the Prime Minister and himself to make every effort to bring about the proposed early meeting between the representative heads of the two governments and to make that meeting successful because if it should fail in achieving its fundamental object he feared that further efforts would be futile. With these ends in view the Japanese Government is prepared to place its cards face up on the table and provisionally to enter into certain commitments as well as provisionally to specify certain reciprocal commitments which it would expect on the part of the United States, these points to serve as a basis for the proposed discussions [2] between the President and the Prime Minister. The Minister said that he had cabled these points this afternoon to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington but he asked me also to cable them to my Government because he feared the risk of inaccurate reporting through possible misunderstandings in the English language.

Two. The Minister pointed out the readiness of the Japanese Government to concur in the points already tentatively.

GREW

ALC

4414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TRB This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

Tokyo.
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 1:45 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush.
1384, September 4, 9 p. m., (Section Two).

agreed upon in the preliminary informal conversations which have taken place in Washington and furthermore that points C, D, and E below provide solution for three of the principal matters left unsolved in those conversations. He particularly emphasized the importance of point C because it envisages an interpretation of article three of the Tri-Partite Pact other than the interpretation placed upon that article by Mr. Matsuoka. Admiral Toyoda spoke of this point several times in our conversation indicating the importance that he attaches to it.

Three. While the Minister gave me the Japanese points in writing he urged me to cable them in our most secret code and I have therefore paraphrased them without altering the sense, as follows.

Four. The Japanese Government undertakes the [2] following provisional commitments:

(A) Readiness to express concurrence in such matters as were already tentatively agreed upon in the informal preliminary conversations in Washington: no (repeat no) military advance will be made by Japan from French Indochina against any areas adjoining Indochina and no military action will be undertaken by Japan against any regions lying north of Japan without justifiable reasons.

GREW.

RR

NWN This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 3:30 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush
1384, September 4, 9 p. m. (Section three).

C. The attitude of both the United States and Japan toward the war in Europe will be determined by concepts of self-defense and protection and in the event that the United States should come to participate in that war, Japan will independently (repeat independently) determine the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and its implementation of the pact by virtue of that independent interpretation

D. It will be Japan's endeavor to bring Sino-Japanese relations to a normal and general rehabilitation, and once this rehabilitation is realized, Japan is prepared to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with such agreements as may be reached between China and Japan.

E. So long as the economic activities of the United States in China are carried out on [2] an equitable basis, such activities will not be restricted.

F. Activities by Japan in the region of the Southwestern Pacific will be pursued only by peaceful means and the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce will be reserved; furthermore the production and procurement by the United States of such natural resources as it may need in that region will be accorded Japanese cooperation;

LMS

GREW

PM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 10:35 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush.

1384, September 4, 9 p. m. (Section Four).

(G) Measures will be taken by Japan such as may become necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between the United States and Japan, and on the basis of reciprocity Japan is prepared, as soon as a settlement is reached, to discontinue immediately application to the United States of the regulations applying to the control of transactions by foreigners.

The American Government provisionally undertakes that:

(A) In response to Japan's commitment set forth in point (D) above, no actions or measures will be taken by the United States which would prejudice Japan's efforts to settle the China affair; (the Minister said that this point referred to American aid to Chiang Kai-Shek);

(B) Japan's commitment set forth in point (F) above will be reciprocated by the United States;

[2] (C) Any military measures by the United States in the area of the southwestern Pacific or the Far East will be suspended;

(D) As soon as a settlement is reached between the two countries, Japan's commitment set forth in point (D) above will immediately be reciprocated by the United States both by discontinuing application to Japan of the so-called freezing order and by withdrawing the prohibition against the use of the Panama Canal by Japanese ships.

GREW.

KLP

PM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 9:25 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

RUSH.

1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

Five. After examining briefly the foregoing points, I expressed to the Minister the personal opinion that some of the points as set forth would appear to be open to very wide interpretation, to which he replied that the proposed commitments would of course be subject to discussion at the forthcoming conference. I gather that they have been put forward by the Japanese Government at this time chiefly as a gauge of Japan's good faith in seeking a general settlement. The Minister suggested that the reciprocal commitments as finally adopted should be formulated in a secret agreement and that after the meeting of the representative heads of the two governments, a press release couched in general terms should be issued after mutual agreement. I pointed out the difficulty if not the impossibility under our democratic system of withholding from the [2] American public such concrete results as the proposed conference might achieve but the subject was not pursued.

Six. In this connection, it seems to me that the specifications and stipulations which must be agreed upon with regard to each one of the points making up the provisional agreement put forward by the Japanese Government before any report of a concrete character could be laid before the American public could not be formulated in detail within the necessarily brief time available for the proposed conference of heads of governments. It occurs to me

GREW.

HTM

4416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 10:50 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

RUSH.
1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

That the problem of publicity might be met for the time being, at the termination of the conference, by an announcement that the Japanese Government had expressed concurrence with the principles of policy governing relations between nations which have been enunciated by the Secretary of State and that a broad plan of adjustment of Pacific problems which would give effect to those principles of policy, was in process of formulation. The suggested announcement might further refer to the efforts of both Governments to contribute toward the establishment of a world of freedom (as put forward by the President) and conclude with an expression of gratification that progress toward such an end had been achieved without sacrifice by either nation of its just and legitimate aims and aspirations.

Seven. The Minister said he understood that [2] Admiral Nomura had seen the President again yesterday but that the Ambassador's report of the conversation had not yet been received. I replied that I also was without information of that conversation.

Eight. The difference in the tone and substance of the Foreign Minister's statement to me as conveyed by Mr. Terasaki on August 29, as reported in my 1347, August 29, 9 p.m., and his statement today, is manifest and is significant of the earnest desire of the Japanese Government to reach a general settlement with our country. (END OF MESSAGE).

GREW.

KLP

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, September 9, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

The following extract from a personal letter from General MacArthur to me may be of interest to you:

"The Philippine Army units that have been called are now (August 30) mobilizing in a most satisfactory manner and the whole program is progressing by leaps and bounds. President Roosevelt's proclamation had a most momentous effect throughout the Far East. Locally it changed a feeling of defeatism to the highest state of morale I have ever seen. It was hailed with the utmost enthusiasm by all classes. You, Secretary Stimson, and the President may congratulate yourselves on the excellent timing of the action.

"I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you and the entire War Department have given me along every line since the formation of this command. With such backing the development of a completely adequate defense force will be rapid."

By commercial vessels from San Francisco on August 26th and September 8th, the following personnel and matériel have been shipped to Manila.

One antiaircraft regiment

One tank battalion (less one company) with 50 tanks

Fifty latest model P-forty pursuit planes, along with ammunition, and some other items of matériel.

The departure of the Flying Fortress squadron from Hawaii was delayed because of the run-way at Wake Island. It is now en route and arrived at New Britain this morning. It should be in Manila tomorrow, or the next day.

GENERAL MACARTHUR,
Chief of Staff.

Private

1984

September 26, 1941.

My dear President Quason:

I am, indeed, sorry to hear from Frank Sayre that you have had another slight setback in your complete recovery. I have been greatly concerned by your illness and I do hope that you are taking care of yourself and that you will soon regain your old-time vigor.

I cannot, of course, say so officially, but I send you my very good wishes for success in the election in November. Frank Sayre tells me that there seems to be little question that you and Mr. Quason will be returned by a large vote.

X 1125745

May I also tell you how happy I am in the reports of the success of the defense preparations. I wish I could tell you at length of the increased belief that the Philippines can be adequately defended. You in the Philippines have a great unanimity among the people and we here are becoming increasingly unified in our policy and determination.

With my sincere regards to you and to Mrs. Quason,

Faithfully yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Manuel L. Quason,
President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
Manila, P. I.

1000 Philippines

September 26, 1941.

Dear Frank:-

Many thanks for yours of September fifteenth. I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have just sent to President Quason.

Things here are definitely better insofar as public opinion goes.

As ever yours,

FDR

xPP7206

Honorable Frank B. Sayre,
The United States High Commissioner,
Manila,
P. I.

(Enclosure)

x 400 Philippines High Commissioner

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILAVia airmail

September 15, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your letter of August twenty-third. To know that I have your "full confidence" in these critical times means everything to me and enables us to go forward under full steam to carry out your policies in this far part of the world.

Your speech of September eleventh stirred our souls. I pray that our country may be united 100% behind you. No other course seems to me possible. America cannot surrender to lawless German aggression on the high seas in 1941 any more than in 1917. My profound admiration goes out to you as the leader who has forced American public opinion to face this issue and to face it before it is too late.

In this part of the world I believe our policy of firmness and fairness is bearing fruit. From all I can learn Japan's march Southward is halted at least for the present; and I believe that if an open break with us and with England can be avoided she will ultimately hang herself. Her ill-chosen policies are placing her in a more and more impossible position. Indeed the danger is that she has left herself no face-saving way out.

Here in the Philippines all at present is going well. General MacArthur is progressively incorporating Filipino troops into the American Army. President Quezon and other Commonwealth officials are loyally cooperating. I think there is no question as to the sincere loyalty of almost all elements of the Filipino people to the American flag. The realization is being forced home to them every day that without the protection of America they have no chance either of independence or autonomy.

President Quezon has had another setback in his long and slow recovery. He has to limit himself strictly in

his

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

x 174-A

Radio Address of 9/11/41 "2"

- 2 -


his activities and has lost the vigor and fire that goes with robust health. I fear that he may never recover them.

August twenty-eighth was the deadline for nominations of candidates for the election on November eleventh of President, Vice President, 24 Senators and 96 Representatives. The election of Mr. Quezon as President and of Mr. Osmena as Vice President are foregone conclusions. To all intents and purposes there is only a single political party here and unless Mr. Quezon's health should fail his election will be almost undisputed. The list of 24 Senators to be elected under the new Constitutional amendments was virtually made up by Mr. Quezon himself, with the aid of his principal associates, before the convention met. The 500 delegates meeting in convention approved the list without a dissenting voice. The result will be a further strengthening of Mr. Quezon's political power.

During the past two months our office has been working hard on export control and foreign funds control. Each of these has been functioning smoothly and well and we have received full cooperation from the Commonwealth Government officials. Through them we have been enabled to build up effective economic armament in this part of the world.

With continuing admiration, believe me,

Ever sincerely yours,



400
Hawaii

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET x77

I wholeheartedly agree that
the request for a six months'
food reserve for the Hawaiian
Islands should be disapproved.
Under existing military, naval
and economic conditions such a
reserve is unnecessary. x892

F. D. R. x4403

x119
Memorandum for the President from the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
9/18/41, in re submission to the Budget
Bureau by the OPACS, a proposal that
\$3,400,000 be allocated by the President
to that agency, from the "Emergency Fund for
the President", for the purchase and maintenance
(on a revolving basis) in the Island of
Oahu, T.H., of a six months' reserve
(Over)

NOTE—Reverse side of this memorandum not available.

SEPT. 18, 1941

Memorandum for the President:

There has been submitted to this office by the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, Office for Emergency Management, a proposal that \$3,400,000 be allocated by you to that agency, from the "Emergency Fund for the President", for the purchase and maintenance (on a revolving basis) in the Island of Oahu, T. H., of a six months' reserve (approximately 35,000 tons) of basic foodstuffs and feedstuffs for the civilian population, poultry, and livestock of that island. In brief, this proposal is based (1) upon the fact that the Island of Oahu, under existing conditions, imports approximately sixty per centum of all its food requirements, and (2) the fear that conditions may arise in the Pacific during the present emergency which would cut off or seriously curtail such imports. While losses through deterioration is to be expected, it is the contention that the bulk of the capital investment would be recovered at the end of the emergency.

The question at issue has been investigated by this office and a conference held with representatives of the agencies concerned, as a result of which the following facts and opinions have been obtained:

1. A representative of the War Department (Colonel Russell, War Plans Division, General Staff) advises that, while that Department would not be opposed to the carrying out of the proposal in question, since it might relieve the Army of the possible necessity of aiding in the feeding of citizens of the Island of Oahu, that the Department would not assign a very high priority to such a proposal, nor, if such funds were applicable, divert any part of its National Defense funds thereto. He was of the opinion that the probability of a situation arising which would seriously interrupt the flow of necessary food supplies from the West Coast of the Continental United States to the Island of Oahu was remote.

2. A representative of the Navy Department (Captain Lowe, Office of Chief of Naval Operations) expressed the view that his Department did not look upon the building up of a six months' food reserve in the Island of Oahu as an emergency matter and had no fear that the importation of the necessary food supplies for that island would be cut off or curtailed by enemy action.

[2] 3. A representative of the State Department (Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations) was of the opinion that action on the part of the United States Government in building up a reserve food supply in Hawaii would have a bad political effect, and give the impression that this Government was uneasy regarding the security of Hawaii and the further impression that it had in contemplation some offensive move, which might create a war situation in the Pacific; that creation of either or both of these impressions would be to our disadvantage; that he did not believe Hawaii was in any danger; that we are not contemplating a movement which would bring that region in danger; and that even if a war situation developed in the Pacific it would be a long time, if ever, before the line of communication between our coast and Hawaii would be cut.

4. As previously indicated, the proposal of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply for the creation of a food reserve in the Island of Oahu is deemed by that agency to be a necessary precautionary measure, which should be undertaken at this time by the Federal Government. It is stated that this proposal is considered by the Governor of Hawaii and his Emergency Committee as the best and only sure method of preventing unnecessary hardships to the civilian population in that Territory.

5. This question of a reserve food supply in Hawaii was submitted to you in May 1941, by Mr. Wayne Coy, Liaison Officer, Office for Production Management, and you advised him that he might speak to the Secretaries of War and Navy about it, but that your own feeling was that it would be a mistake to build up a food reserve in Hawaii at the present time, especially because it would, in all probability, be possible to send food to Hawaii.

6. In the fall of 1939 there was a shipping strike on the Pacific Coast. Being forewarned, the importers of the Territory of Hawaii took steps to increase the volume of imports of foodstuffs. As an indication that the importers of Hawaii are presently looking ahead, because of existing world conditions, statistics of the Department of Commerce show that for a five months' period, January-May, 1941, Hawaiian imports of only 8 basic food commodities for civilian consumption were increased over a similar period of 1940 by 8,130 tons

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

1. A review of import statistics would indicate that the merchants of Hawaii are capable of building up a substantial reserve of basic food supplies. Cooperation of the Governor and his Emergency Committee might reasonably be expected to insure the creation of a reasonable reserve.

[S] 2. It would appear, from views expressed by representatives of the War, Navy, and State Departments, that it would not be a difficult task to provide adequate food supplies for the civilian population and our armed forces in Hawaii in the event of an emergency in the Pacific.

3. In the opinion of the representative of the State Department the creation of a food reserve in Hawaii at this time by the Federal Government, under existing conditions in the Pacific, would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.

4. If conditions should so change as to make it necessary for the Federal Government to provide for the food requirements of the civilian population of Hawaii, it is believed that, with funds immediately available from the "Emergency Fund for the President", no difficulty should be experienced. It does not appear that existing conditions warrant such action at this time.

5. It is recommended that the request of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies for an allotment of \$3,400,000 from the "Emergency Fund for the President", for the purpose hereinbefore outlined, be disapproved, at least for the time being.

(Signed) HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director.

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

HYDE PARK, N. Y., September 28, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

I wholly agree with your pencilled note—to recite the more liberal original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting, point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement in principle, and re-emphasize my hope for a meeting.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

My suggestion
on Jap. situation -
for you to read later.
CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

When the Jap. Prime Minister
requested a meeting with you
he indicated a fairly basic
program in generalities, but
left open such questions as
pulling troops out of China,
Tripartite pact, non-discrim-
ination in trade in Pacific.
We indicated desire for
meeting, but suggested

2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

first an agreement in principle on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success of the Conference.

Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic questions, and now continue to urge the meeting at Juman.

My suggestion is to recall their more liberal attitude when they first sought the

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3

meeting with you, with their
much narrowed position now,
and earnestly ask if they can-
not go back to their orig-
inal liberal attitude.
So we can start discussions
again on agreement in
principle before the meeting
and emphasizing your
desire for a meeting.

C.F.
Haw

October 14, 1941.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of September 22, and particularly with reference to the 4-engine bombers, may I say that I am in complete agreement about the necessity for the 4-engine bombers in the Philippine Islands and Hawaii and I realize that all of our production of the two new types of bomber would be pretty well tied up for this purpose through February.

I think, however, that the total distribution of these new bombers between February 1942 and July 1942, as concerns our own needs and the British, is not a proper strategic distribution. It seems to me that after February more of these planes than have now been allocated should go to the British.

I believe it is more important strategically to have the British flying these planes in combat than it is to strengthen our Newfoundland unit with 4-engine bombers.

I wish you would examine again with particular reference to the 4-engine bomber - and I refer now exclusively to the two new types of bomber with superchargers - as to whether or not there can not be a distribution which would give 100 to 150 more of these 4-engine bombers to the British after February next but prior to July 1 than you now recommend.

I think it is important to make this decision at as early a date as possible because of the necessity of equipping them with Sperry equipment.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of War. ^{x25}

HLE/lmb
10/13/41

24/93
1249 Official
KMG

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1941

Dear Mr. President:

There is attached a suggested letter to Secretary Stimson.


There will be a minimum of 675 of these new 4-engine bombers made prior to July 1 and the schedule provides for the British to receive only about 124 of these.

You can readily see that we could handle the Philippine and Hawaii business, as well as other important strategic centers, and still give the British 100 to 150 more than is now planned. I think the Philippines require 101 more planes and, as I recall, Hawaii about 50.

The Army plans to use the balance in Panama, the Caribbean, Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland, et cetera.

I have no doubt that these big planes are needed in all of these places but it is simply a question of relative importance.

Very sincerely yours,



HARRY D. HOPKINS

Enclosure.

The President,
The White House.*W. F. Lind Lease*

[173]

SECRETWAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1941

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your letter of September 18 an estimate has been made to indicate the total number of American built aircraft produced between October 1, 1941 and July 1, 1942 which, in my opinion, could be given up for export to other nations without too dangerously reducing the defensive strength of our vital outposts and task forces. That estimate is presented in the form of a table, and is attached as Tab A. It is based upon minimum allocations to the Army and Navy to fulfill their most urgent needs.

It will be seen from this table that the exports granted in each class except that of four-engine bombers, as well as in the total of all classes, far exceeds the rule of thumb of 50 percent mentioned in your letter. After most careful consideration, I have concluded that I can not approve of the application of that rule to the four-engine bomber class on which we have already taken such heavy deferments. The following table shows these deferments, including the further contributions which we feel we can make now.

To go further would, in my opinion, impose a risk upon the defense of our vital outposts which would be excessive.

<u>Normal Re-</u> <u>quirements</u>	<u>Reduced Allotment</u> <u>Agreed to 9/18/41</u>	<u>Status After Exports</u> <u>Now Contemplated</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
4	2	2	Philippine Islands
3	2	2	Hawaii
2	1	1	Panama
1	1	1	Newfoundland
2	1	1	Alaska
2	1	1	Iceland-Greenland
1	0	0	Puerto Rico
5	1	1	U. S.
6	2	1	South America
1	0	0	Mexico
3	0	0	ABC-1 (England)
<u>30 Groups</u>	<u>11 Groups</u>	<u>10 Groups</u>	

SECRET


SECRET

No airplanes are available for training of four-engine pilots, for reserve, for ABC-1, or for Puerto Rico, under the proposed Army allotment.

I invite your particular attention to Tab B and Tab C which indicate, respectively, the basis for the Army's requirements and the comparison of production with requirements.

The majority of all bombers, heavy and medium, available for export, cannot be equipped with Sperry bomb sights or automatic flight control equipment. There are on order, for the Army, less than one hundred and fifty sets of this equipment. Bombardment airplanes in addition to this number must be delivered without bomb sights and automatic flight equipment unless the Norden equipment, which is standard on our planes, is released for export.

Respectfully yours,



Secretary of War

SECRET

ESTIMATED TOTAL AIRPLANE PRODUCTION, ARMY AND NAVY ALLOCATIONS, AND AIRPLANES FOR EXPORT (October, 1941 through June, 1942)

TYPE AND MODEL	1941										1942										TOTAL	
	Q1					Q2					Q3					Q4					TOTAL	TOTAL
	ACTUAL PRODUCTION	ACTUAL EXPORT	ACTUAL ALLOCATIONS	ACTUAL REPORT	ACTUAL TOTAL	ACTUAL PRODUCTION	ACTUAL EXPORT	ACTUAL ALLOCATIONS	ACTUAL REPORT	ACTUAL TOTAL	ACTUAL PRODUCTION	ACTUAL EXPORT	ACTUAL ALLOCATIONS	ACTUAL REPORT	ACTUAL TOTAL	ACTUAL PRODUCTION	ACTUAL EXPORT	ACTUAL ALLOCATIONS	ACTUAL REPORT	ACTUAL TOTAL		
ARMY AIRCRAFT																						
B-17	3	25	44	13	24	49	33	24	34	27	70	37	100	45	15	118	120	12	12	107	19	107
B-24	3	25	44	13	24	49	33	24	34	27	70	37	100	45	15	118	120	12	12	107	19	107
NAVY AIRCRAFT																						
F4U	16	15	11	10	14	45	20	15	14	14	45	100	120	11	11	118	120	12	12	107	19	107
TBF	10	6	20	21	4	25	15	47	24	24	24	13	26	25	11	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
SB	10	55	20	40	24	44	156	77	79	79	65	113	200	96	170	254	117	212	212	212	212	212
EXPORT AIRCRAFT																						
EXPORT	179	14	205	470	1	406	255	2	209	204	9	353	285	28	280	313	43	271	370	75	205	205
EXPORT	179	14	205	470	1	406	255	2	209	204	9	353	285	28	280	313	43	271	370	75	205	205
TOTAL AIRCRAFT																						
TOTAL	195	115	163	514	25	554	480	51	453	448	104	450	513	128	485	526	86	542	740	180	410	410
ARMY AND NAVY AIRCRAFT																						
ARMY	180	100	150	500	25	555	480	51	453	448	104	450	513	128	485	526	86	542	740	180	410	410
NAVY	15	15	13	14	1	54	100	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
EXPORT	179	14	205	470	1	406	255	2	209	204	9	353	285	28	280	313	43	271	370	75	205	205
ARMY AND NAVY AIRCRAFT																						
ARMY	180	100	150	500	25	555	480	51	453	448	104	450	513	128	485	526	86	542	740	180	410	410
NAVY	15	15	13	14	1	54	100	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
EXPORT	179	14	205	470	1	406	255	2	209	204	9	353	285	28	280	313	43	271	370	75	205	205

TABLE 3 BANTS FOR THE ARMY'S ALLOCATION FOR HEAVY BOMBERS

Requirements in Heavy Bombers are most critical. An immediate minimum requirement of 11 groups (748 airplanes) exists. After de-escalating 51 of Army Production, the heavy bombers allotted to the Army between October 1941, and July 1941 will only provide 597 airplanes. These, together with 100 on hand October 1st will make possible activation of the following units:

136	(2 Groups)	for the Philippine Islands
68	(1 Group)	Newfoundland
68	(1 Group)	Iceland or Greenland
68	(1 Group)	Panama
136	(2 Groups)	Hawaii
68	(1 Group)	Alaska
68	(1 Group)	United States
68	(1 Group)	British Columbia and Brazil
500	(10 Groups)	with a small reserve of 17 airplanes to provide for normal attrition.

The need for long range land based bombers in the critical North Atlantic theater is imperative due to the fact that water based patrol planes may not be able to operate in that area in the winter.

The two groups in the Philippines is the smallest force that can have any real influence in that theatre. A larger force is needed if Japanese aggression in the Far East is to be retarded.

Attention is invited to the fact that, in the above allotment, no heavy bombers have been provided for AEC 1 although in the Joint Staff Conversations it was specifically agreed to have available three full groups with reserves (255 airplanes) for employment in England.

The other requirements have been reduced to a single group at such vital points as Panama, Alaska, and the South American Theater.

This allotment does not meet the minimum requirements of the Army.

TAB. C
COMPARISON OF PRODUCTION, REPORT, REQUIREMENTS
OF
COMBAT TYPE AIRCRAFT
October 1, 1941 to July 1, 1942

Types	Total Production Schedule 10/1/41 to 7/1/42	Recom- mended for Ex- port	Balance Retained & Navy	Army & Navy Re- quire- ments	Defi- ciencies in Army & Navy Require- ments	Army & Navy In- mediate Require- ments	Deficiency in Army & Navy Immediate Require- ments
(A) Heavy Bomber	810	219	591	2550 (2)	2160	728 (3)	358
(B) Patrol Bomber	6	0	6	6	0	6	0
(A) Medium Bomber	1814	939	875	85 (2)	0	1360 (3)	485
(B) Patrol Bomber 2 Eng.	407	205	202	202	0	202	0
(A) Light & Dive Bomber	2765	2367	398	837	439	770 (3)	372
(B) Torpedo Bomber	118	0	118	118	0	118	0
(B) Dive Bomber	1067	647	420	450	0	420	0
(A) Pursuit	9177	4372	2804	6662 (2)	3858	3510 (3)	704
(B) Fighter	641	217	424	424	0	424	0
(A) Observation	711	317	394	2043	1649	1695 (3)	1241
(B) Scout	1071	18	1013	1013	0	1013	0
Totals	16547	9902	7245	14340	8606	10206	3162
Army Requirements	-	-	-	12177	8106	8023	3162
Army on hand 10/1/41	-	-	-	72	2220	2220	2220
Net Army Deficiency	-	-	-	11	3856	3856	3856

Notes: (1) No allowances have been made for attrition.

(2) Includes ABC 1 commitments of: 3 Heavy Bomb Groups
1 Medium Bomb Group plus 1 Squadron
3 Pursuit Groups plus 1 Squadron

(3) Do not include ABC 1 commitments or Depot Reserve

(A) Army

(B) Navy

TAB D

BASIS OF COMPUTATION OF ARMY
AND NAVY REQUIREMENTS

Strategic Defense in Asia
Hemisphere Defense
Provision of Initial Units for ABC 1

Column A

ARMY - REQUIREMENTS

	Groups	Airplanes with reserves
Heavy Bombers		
Hemisphere Defense	23	1955
U.S. Possessions in Asia	4	340
ABC 1 (England)	<u>3</u>	<u>255</u>
	30	2550
Medium Bombers		
ABC 1	1 + 1 squadron	85
Pursuit		
Hemisphere Defense	36	5850
Strategic Defense in Asia	2	325
ABC 1	<u>3 + 1 squadron</u>	<u>487</u>
	41 + 1 squadron	6662

NAVY

Same as shown in Tab A

Column B

ARMY IMMEDIATE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

	Groups	Airplanes
Heavy Bombers		
Hemisphere Defense	9	612
U.S. Possessions in Asia	2	136
ABC 1 (England)		<u>0</u>
		748
Medium Bombers		
Hemisphere Defense	20	1360
Pursuit		
Hemisphere Defense	27	3510
U.S. Possessions in Asia	4	<u>424</u>
		3934

This immediate minimum requirement does not provide for our commitments under ABC 1, nor does it provide for any reserves.

OCTOBER 16		398
		Thurs.
APPOINTMENTS		APPOINTMENTS
8.00		2.15 Gen. Geo. C. Marshall
8.15		2.30 Adm. Harold R. Stark
8.30		Hon. Harry Hopkins
8.45		2.45
9.00		3.00 Marshall Field
9.15		3.15
9.30		3.30
9.45		3.45
10.00		4.00
10.15		4.15
10.30		4.30
10.45		4.45
11.00		5.00 The Chief Justice and
11.15	Sen. Carl A. Hatch	Associate Justices
11.30	Sen. Charles Glass	5.30
11.45	Cong. Ted Johnson	5.45
12.00	Sen. Hull	6.00
12.15		6.15
12.30		6.30
12.45		6.45
1.00		7.00
1.15	(Lunch) Mr. Keith Moffatt	7.15
1.30		7.30
1.45		7.45
2.00		8.00
2.15	The Socy. State	8.15
2.30	Sen. War	
2.45	Sen. War	

NOVEMBER 23

100-61

APPOINTMENTS

APPOINTMENTS

8.00	2.15
8.15	2.30 The Solicitor General
8.30	2.45 Hon. David J. Lewis
8.45	3.00 Hon. J. Estlin
9.00	3.15 John J. Kelley
9.15	3.30 Judge R. V. Fletcher
9.30	3.45 Mr. George Harrison
9.45	4.00 Mr. A. Johnston
10.00	4.15 Mr. A. F. Whitney
10.15	4.30
10.30	4.45
10.45	5.00
11.00	5.15
11.15	5.30
11.30	5.45
11.45	6.00
12.00	6.15
12.15	6.30
12.30	6.45
12.45	7.00
1.00	7.15
1.15	7.30
1.30	7.45
1.45	8.00
2.00	8.15

The Solicitor General
 Sec. Jas. M. Mead
 Hon. David J. Lewis
 Hon. J. Estlin
 John J. Kelley
 Judge R. V. Fletcher
 Mr. George Harrison
 Mr. A. Johnston
 Mr. A. F. Whitney

The Secy. of State
 The Secy. of War
 The Secy. of Navy
 Gen. Geo. O. Marshall
 Adm. Harold R. Stark

Church Adm. Emory S. Land

Wed.		NOVEMBER 20	
APPOINTMENTS		APPOINTMENTS	
8.00		2.15	
8.15		2.30	The Chinese Ambassador
8.30		2.45	Dr. T. V. Surge
8.45		3.00	
9.00		3.15	
9.15		3.30	
9.30		3.45	
9.45		4.00	
10.00		4.15	
10.15		4.30	
10.30		4.45	
10.45		5.00	
11.00		5.15	
11.15	Hon. Foy Allen Des Moines	5.30	
11.30	Hon. Delfino Sanchez Latour	5.45	
11.45	Hon. Sidney Hillman	6.00	
12.00	Gov. Chas. Edison	6.15	
12.15		6.30	
12.30		6.45	
12.45	Mr. Wm. Green	7.00	
1.00	Mr. Matthew Wall	7.15	
1.15	(Lunch) Sen. Geo. Norris	7.30	
1.30		7.45	
1.45		8.00	
2.00		8.15	

NOVEMBER 27	
Tues	
APPOINTMENTS	APPOINTMENTS
2.00	2.15
8.15	2.30
8.30	2.45
8.45	3.00
9.00	3.15
9.15	3.30
9.30	3.45
9.45	4.00
10.00	4.15
10.15	4.30
10.30	4.45
10.45	5.00
11.00	5.15
11.15	5.30
11.30	5.45
11.45	6.00
11.55	6.15
12.00	6.30
12.15	6.45
12.30	7.00
12.45	7.15
1.00	7.30
1.15	7.45
1.30	8.00
1.45	8.15
2.00	

Saj. Hull

Saj. Hull

Japanese Ambassador (Horn)

Hon. Saburo Kuroki

Gov. Matthew M. Neely

Adm. Ernest J. King

Houston Thompson

Dr. Wayne Lynett Morse

Prof. Theo. Reed

Prof. James Amos Conbright

Hon. James Henry Millitt

Saj. of Agriculture

Amb. Laurence A. Steinhardt

Hon. John Mack

(Lunch) Wayne Coy

Cong. Fritz G. Lanham

Don Nelson

833

NOVEMBER 28

Fri

APPOINTMENTS

APPOINTMENTS

2.00	3.15
3.15	2.30
3.30	2.45
3.45	3.00
3.00	3.15
3.15	3.30
3.30	3.45
3.45	4.00
10.00	4.15
10.15	4.30
10.30 Press	4.45
10.45	5.00
11.00 Hon. Paul McNutt	5.15
11.15 (Pictures - Bill of Rights)	5.30
11.30 Gov. Chas. Harwood	5.45
11.45 Hon. Harold D. Smith	6.00
12.00 Secy. of State	6.15
12.15 Secy. of War	6.30
12.30 Secy. of the Navy	6.45
12.45 Gen. Marshall	7.00
1.00 Admiral Stark	7.15
1.15	7.30
1.30	7.45
1.45	8.00
2.00	8.15

Lv. for Warm Springs

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

20 October 1941

Ships in the North Atlantic are beginning to suffer the inevitable minor damage that operations in very severe weather brings. So far the trouble has been limited to minor items such as loss of bolts, damage to deck storage lockers and minor cracks in nonstrength structure. Steps are being taken to avoid overloading ships which are to operate in that area during the winter months. Winter North Atlantic is tough seagoing. It is the worst area—based on the International Load Line Convention, it is reported.

Individual and personal attention is being given to requests from friends and relatives of men who may or may not have been aboard the KEARNY, it is reported.

Quite a few calls are being received from Congressmen on the number of armed Merchant Ships sunk in World War I. The Library of Congress also has called a number of times for this information, it is reported.

Newspapers are pressing for information about "Naval Control" of ship sailings from the West Coast, reports that all leaves have been canceled by the Navy and Army and for permission for reporters to board the KEARNY.

[2] Scheduled deliveries reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
Coastal Minesweeper—AGRESSOR	Greenport Basin & Construction Co.	10/20/41
Coastal Minesweeper—STALWART	Snow Shipyards Incorporated	10/20/41
Coastal Minesweeper—ENERGY	W. A. Robinson, Incorporated	10/24/41
Coastal Minesweeper—CARACARA	Bristol Yacht Building Company	10/25/41
Submarine Tender—FULTON	Navy Yard, Mare Island	10/25/41
Aircraft Carrier—HORNET	Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co.	10/20/41
Destroyer—BRISTOL	Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.	10/21/41
Submarine Chaser	Defoe Boat and Motor Works	10/20/41
Submarine Chaser	Westergard Boat Works, Incorporated	10/20/41
Submarine Chaser	Defoe Boat and Motor Works	10/23/41

Re-enlistment, under continuous service, for the year is running 76.67 per cent to 18 October, 1941; for the month of October, 1941, to 18 October, it is 74.62 per cent, the Bureau of Navigation reports.

Winter quarters being prepared for German Armies in N. W. Russia, indicating High Command reckons possibility of no great advance in that area but Ukraine and Caucasus armies are to fight on, it is reported.

General Rommel again preparing Axis offensive in Libya. Scheduled for end of October, it is reported.

5 submarines belonging to the Finns are reported still [3] at Helsinki in need of repair. Presumably, it is impossible to obtain spare parts from Germany.

Russian Naval losses suffered from June 22 to 6 October in Baltic Sea reported:

	Sunk or severely damaged	Damaged
Battleships	2	
Cruisers	1	3
Flotilla Leaders		3
Submarines	4	27
Torpedo Boats	6	6
Gunboats and Guard Boats	13	31
Destroyers	16	16
Minesweepers	39	3
Motor Torpedo boats	27	7
Transports (ships)	151	96
Barges	13	9
Transport (boats)	23	
Tugs	9	3
Sailing vessels	22	
V. M. Boats	22	

In addition 16 destroyers, 7 motor torpedo boats, 3 mine sweepers, 3 tugs, 2 transports (ships), 31 gunboats and guard boats and 6 torpedo boats are reported foundered. 34 guard boats and gun boats and 28 motor boats and small guard boats are reported lost on the Svir and Lake Ladoga. Likewise 15 barges, 14 tugs and 28 transports of which 21 were motor boats also have been sunk. 73 different Russian ships have been seized by the Finns "in the archipelago" and in ports along the coast of Finland.

[4] *Nazi military chieftains* "quite confident" campaign against Soviets "is finished" and that they will at an early date devote full attention to invading the British Isles, it is reported.

Chinese reportedly expect Japan to launch an assault upon Siberia in the near future. Unconfirmed reports, indicate U. S. S. R. has reduced its Far Eastern forces to a substantial extent, the air arm is included in this reduction.

Thailand, apprehensive "to the point of conviction", that an invasion is planned by Japan in the near future, is reported earnestly requesting twenty-four airplanes of the United States. This invasion may be launched in 15 days. It was reported 15 October.

Eight ships reported sunk by a submarine attack on a convoy night of 17-18 October. Germans claim ten ships and two destroyers.

SS WARRIOR (United States 7,551 tons) reported overdue Capetown from Trinidad since 2 October. Believed Master may have proceeded direct without call at Capetown: if so, will have disobeyed routing instructions from Port Director Commandant Third Naval District. Ship is en route Rangoon, cargo China defense supplies.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 9, 1941.

Memorandum for Miss Tully:

In the light of what has happened in the last day or two this letter may be filed. It is not important for the President to take any further action on this matter at this time.

H. L. H

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 21, 1941.

Strictly personal and Confidential.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 14th in which you raise the question of the "proper strategic distribution" of our new four engine bombers. In order to answer as carefully as possible the questions you raise, I have consulted the Chief of Staff, the head of the Air Forces and the head of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. I have also been assisted in forming my views by the conferences which I recently had with these gentlemen and their subordinates in which we have gone over these same problems of strategy for the purpose of answering your inquiry of last July as to the means necessary to bring this war to a successful conclusion. All of these labors have had a direct bearing upon the problem raised in your present letter. I hope that you will discuss this question fully with your military advisers before you make up your own mind upon this question. But pending such a conference I shall try to give you a brief epitome of my own views in answer to your letter of October 14th. I do not think that they vary in any substantial particular from those of the gentlemen with whom I have consulted.

1. Essentially, this question of the distribution of these planes is really not a static but a dynamic question. It is not to be solved by taking a map and computing how many planes shall be allocated to certain geographical positions. These new four-engine bombers now coming off the assembly line should constitute a great pool of American power applicable with speed and mobility to the respective spots where in the interests of our national strategy of defense it is important that such power should be applied.

These planes themselves are not individually a finished element of such power. They must be manned with crews, trained first in individual operation and then in group operation, before they become the vital elements of this pool of power. The process of commissioning a plane is not unlike the process of commissioning a battleship, and you know how long that takes. The melancholy list of casualties which have recently occurred to our planes in the hands of British pilots is a reminder of the danger of trying to shorten this time and to use such planes with hastily trained crews.

[2] Again, the panorama of the theatres of action for our defense is constantly and rapidly changing. The relative importance of the different theatres of action varies greatly at different moments. This precludes static allocations or conceptions. The number of our planes at strategic points must be susceptible of rapid reenforcement and change. The ability thus to throw great massed power upon a given place at a given time is one of the essential elements of an effective use of air power. Germany in her use of air power has shown thus far supreme skill in her ability to mass her air force at different places at different times. The fate of the war conceivably may hang upon the length of time within which we can throw an overpowering force of these planes into a given theatre.

The center of all of these operations is the United States. There the planes are manufactured. There their combat crews are trained. There their group formations are organized and tactically instructed. From that as a center it should be possible in times of opportunity or necessity to send these trained combat units out as reserves to such theatres of action as need them. At present you will remember from my letter of September 22nd that the minimum number of ten groups of these planes, to which we have been reduced by the exigencies of the demands of outside nations, does not permit the retention of any such pool as I have described above within the continental United States. Nor does it provide the absolute essential of enough equipment in the shape of four-engine bombers to train the large number of combat pilots and crews which will be needed to maintain our air forces in the various theatres of defense of the United States. This in itself shows the fundamental error of a static conception and the results which will follow from a merely geographic allotment of the planes.

What is happening today in the Pacific exemplifies the importance of the foregoing principles. A strategic opportunity of the utmost importance has suddenly arisen in the southwestern Pacific. Our whole strategic possibilities of the past twenty years have been revolutionized by the events in the world in the past six months. From being impotent to influence events in that area, we suddenly find ourselves vested with the possibility of great effective power. Indeed we hardly yet realize our opportunities in that respect. We are rushing planes and other preparations to the Philippines from a base in the United States which has not yet in existence the number of the planes necessary for our immediate minimum requirements in that southwestern Pacific theatre. This is a result of our deferments to the British of last year. From nowhere but the United States can come the needed planes, the crews, the equipment, and the training. Yet even this imperfect threat, if not promptly called by the Japanese, bids fair to stop Japan's march to the south and secure the safety of Singapore, with all the revolutionary consequences of such action. As you well know, however, the final success of the operation lies on the knees of the gods and we cannot tell what explosion may momentarily come from Japan. If we had the reserve necessary in the United States, we should not be in this present period of uncertainty.

Simultaneously with this southwestern Pacific opportunity, another such chance is opening in the northwestern Pacific. Vladivostok is one of three gateways to Russia. The Archangel gate may be closed at any moment. The Persian Gulf gate is insignificant in capacity. The propinquity of Alaska to Siberia and the Kamchatka Peninsula and the facilities which we believe (although we have not yet had opportunity for testing them) exist in that neighborhood, present us with the opportunity for another use of these bombers supplementary to the one I have just described in the south. That locality can possibly form the base of a northern pincer movement of American influence and power, this time not only to protect against aggression of Japan but to preserve the defensive power of Russia in Europe. Its operation would fit into and supplement the operation from the south by permitting a circular sweep of these bombers which would greatly increase their safety by permitting those in the south, after passing over Japan and stopping at Vladivostok, to proceed to safety in the north in a way similar to the sweeps which Germany is now employing through the North Atlantic from Norway to France. The power of such a completed north and south operation can hardly be over-estimated. The control over the Western Pacific which it would open could hardly fail to have immense powers of warning to Japan as well as of assurance to Russia. It might well remove Japan from the Axis powers. But it will require the existence of an adequate force of these bombers—even greater I believe than the minimum requirements stated in my letter to you of September 22nd. At present under the system of allocation we are planning but one group for Alaska. That I believe would be quite inadequate. And my feeling is strongly reenforced by information which I have just received from General

DeWitt who is responsible for the Alaska station. Today there are not more than two four-engine bombers in the whole of Alaska.

2. I have dwelt thus far on the Pacific front of our national peril because that is the one in which the threatened danger from Japan and the counter opportunity for us to take the initiative has first ripened. Our northeastern front in the northern Atlantic is, however, the main theatre of the present war. There we are already in actual naval combat with Germany. The four-engine bombers which we have proposed to place in Newfoundland are not designed to repose idly in the hangars of that outpost during the present emergency. They are to form the reserve component of a team of such four-engine bombers of which the advance unit is to be in Iceland, only seven hours away by air. This takes on an added importance with the approach of the coming winter during which [4] time the long range flying boats of the Navy now engaged in the North Atlantic and based on Iceland may be restricted by ice conditions in the harbors where they ordinarily land. In other words, we contemplate the possibility of sweeping operations by these long range bombing planes and have planned to place them in these separated bases to facilitate that purpose as well as to protect against air attack on either base. Our past deferments to Great Britain of the B-24 bombers have contributed to the delay in the establishment of these two bases. Six of these four-engine bombers have just been sent to Newfoundland. None is yet at Iceland.

The daily increasing peril of the northeastern Atlantic is evidenced only too clearly by the recent incident of the Kearny. As you know from our talk the other day when General Embick was present, I am much concerned that steps should be taken as promptly as possible to secure the defense of our principal bastion in the northeast, namely the British Islands. That safety will not be secured by a comparatively insignificant trickle of planes, unequipped, unmanned, and unorganized for battle formation. The situation requires far more radical treatment than that. It requires treatment which will make safe beyond peradventure a favorable decision of the battle of the Atlantic as well as the defense against invasion of the British Isles. I have already stated my views to you on that subject and I shall not repeat them here, except to say that I think the time is coming rapidly when these radical steps should be taken. Otherwise I fear lest some morning we be caught napping by a surprise German attack. All that is germane for me to say in respect to my present letter is that I believe, in the light of the situation and of Britain's safety alone, that it is better for her to have in the world a potent, well-armed, friendly American air force than a few additional planes.

Quite apart from that, there remains the question of the possible impairment of the defensive power of our own country which it is always our first duty to secure. Giving full tribute to the enormous service which has been rendered and will continue to be rendered to our own defense by our furnishing weapons to hard-pressed nations already fighting in a cause common to us all, I believe that the moment has now come when we should give our primary attention to the *prompt* development of a well-armed, well-rounded, and well-trained American air force. And I have, after using the most careful consideration and study, reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to divert further production from the Army air forces until such time as the minimum requirements stated in my letter of September 22nd are fully completed.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 25, 1941.

Cable to Sayre

(To go through Interior Dept.)

State Department feels Manila such focal point at this time it is preferable postpone proposed visit. Also that when you make the trip you go to visit Gauss instead of as guest. Sumner suggests we ask Gauss to make brief visit to you for consultation in order to establish closer liaison in defensive preparations.

Furthermore I think you should be at Manila on account problems export and freezing controls in addition to general Far East activities.

The original of this message sent to the Secretary of the Interior.

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In view of the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet and general developments relating to the Far East, it is believed that Manila has at this time special significance as a focal point. It is therefore suggested that it would be preferable that Mr. Sayre postpone his proposed visit to Chungking. It is suggested further that when he makes a trip to Chungking he go to visit Ambassador Gauss rather than go as the guest of General Chiang Kai-shek.

In the meanwhile, might it not be well for me to suggest to Ambassador Gauss that he make a brief visit to Manila for purposes of consultation with Mr. Sayre? Such a visit at this time would have, it seems to me, two advantages: (1) Such a visit would be generally interpreted as directed toward establishing closer liaison between American defensive preparations in the Philippine Islands and this country's interest in [2] China's defensive activities, and (2) Mr. Gauss has been going through a specially trying period at Chungking and would doubtless be considerably benefited by a brief change.

As you know, we now have a number of important problems relating to the Philippine Islands connected with our export and freezing controls. Also, there is the constant problem relating to coordination of our activities in the Far East and the activities of the British and the Dutch in that area. In reference to these problems the presence of Mr. Sayre at Manila seems advisable and, in view of their importance, there does not seem to be available a suitable replacement for Mr. Sayre at this particular juncture.

A proposed radio message to Mr. Sayre is attached for your consideration.

C. H.

Enclosure:

Proposed radio
message to
Mr. Sayre.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 22, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

For recommendation this afternoon or evening, if possible.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President, dated October 8, 1941, from United States High Commissioner Sayre, asking permission to accept invitation of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to visit China sometime in December, if approved by the President.

OCTOBER 22, 1941.

Radio message from the President to Mr. Sayre.

Referring to your personal and confidential letter of October 8.

In view of the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet and of developments in general in and relating to the Far East, I believe that Manila has at this time unusual significance as a focal point and your work there is especially important. I therefore believe that it would be inadvisable for you to be absent at this time. I am considering suggesting that Ambassador Gauss make a visit to you.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILA

Via airmail

October 5, 1941.

Personal and confidential

My dear Mr. President:

I have just received a letter from Mr. Owen Lattimore in Chungking dated September 21, 1941, saying:

"Now that the really bad bombing season in Chungking is over, and visitors need not feel that most of their time is likely to be spent in dugouts, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek would like very much to have you and Mrs. Sayre come to China for a visit.

"Before sending a formal invitation, the Generalissimo has asked me to find out what time would suit you best. *** If I may add a word for myself, I should like to say how eagerly I hope that you will be able to come. Your visit would have the very greatest constructive value in Chinese-American relations."

Such a visit would have so direct a bearing upon Chinese-American relations that I do not feel that I ought to act in the matter without the advice of yourself and perhaps the State Department. I, myself, believe that such a visit would be useful in marking still closer cordiality and cooperation between China and the United States and might have a very wholesome and happy effect. On the other hand, you may feel that the international situation in the Pacific is so tense that you do not want me to leave Manila even for a short visit. What is your desire? If you approve of my going, would it be preferable to accept the invitation of the Generalissimo and go as his guest, or to go perhaps as the guest of Ambassador Gauss on a private visit to him? I shall greatly appreciate a radio from you letting me know what answer you would like me to give to the invitation of the Generalissimo.

If

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

- 2 -


If I go, the timing might be of some importance from the international standpoint. I should suggest the month of December unless you prefer some different time.

Such a visit would mean my being away from Manila presumably about two weeks. In this event, do you desire the appointment of an Acting High Commissioner? If so, I should suggest the appointment of Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, my Financial Adviser, or, if he is here by that time, Mr. Stewart McDonald, about whom I have written you and who, I hope, will be appointed as my Legal Adviser.

Everything is going smoothly here and the ship is sailing on even keel. Manila is becoming a crossroads in this part of the world and we have a continual stream of important visitors with whom I am glad to have the chance of making contacts. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Air Marshal in command of the British Forces in the Far East, was here over Sunday and day before yesterday Sir Earle Page, Minister in the Australian Cabinet, stopped over on his way from Australia via the United States to London. Each of them came to dine with me and I much enjoyed the chance of talking with them. This afternoon Mr. Merle Cochran, Special Assistant in the Treasury Department, arrives by plane on his way to China and in a few more days I expect to see Henry Grady, representative of the Federal Loan Agency, who is now in Hong Kong bound back for America.

With warmest wishes, believe me,

Ever sincerely yours,



THE WHITE HOUSE

October 21, 1934
WASHINGTON

My dear Mr. Phillips:

Enclosed herewith are two copies of the message which you sent to the President. I am enclosing also a copy of the letter which I sent you on October 17, and I trust you will find it a satisfactory response to your letter. The letter is signed by the President, and I am sure that you will find it a satisfactory response to your letter. I am sure that you will find it a satisfactory response to your letter.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Mr. Phillips

Mr. Phillips is a member of

the Board of Directors of the

*Copy of the letter sent to the President
10/21/34*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 29, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR HAROLD ICKES:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY TO
QUESTON.

F.B.I.

Ltr. to the President from the Sec. of the Interior, 10/25/41, attaching copy of a radiogram received by Commissioner Elizalde from President Quezon on Oct. 22nd; re ltr. to the President, upon the sinking of the Kearny and the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, stating that they are ready to follow him, regardless of consequences, and reiterating to Sec. Ickes, as head of the Dept which is in charge of Philippine Affairs, that they are at his command.

*443-B

*443-B Linking of American Ships

*197-A



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1941

RECEIVED
OCT 24 9 03 AM '41
WHITE HOUSE

My dear Mr. President:

For your information, I append hereto a copy of
a radiogram received by Commissioner Elizalde from
President Queson on October 22.

Sincerely yours,

Donald T. Rhea

Secretary of the Interior.

46

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

Translation of Coded Radiogram Rec'd Oct. 21

Commissioner Elsalda
Washington, D. C.

Upon the arrival of Secretary Ickes, please inform him that on the occasion of the sinking of the Kearny, and the fall of the Kenoye Cabinet, and considering these events ominous, I wrote to the President a letter telling him that we are ready to follow him regardless of the consequences. Please reiterate to Secretary Ickes, as the head of the Department which is in charge of Philippine Affairs, that in these critical moments, I want him to feel that we are at his command.

QUEZON

x6-8

OCTOBER 31, 1941

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I was deeply moved by your letter of September 26, 1941, and all I can say is that, if elected, you can continue to depend upon my loyalty and support, both officially and personally.

Your information that there is a growing confidence that the Philippines can be adequately defended is particularly gratifying and encouraging. As I have assured you in my last letter, we, on our part, are doing everything within our resources to meet whatever situation may arise, especially after the news of the bombing of the "Kearny" and the fall of the Konoye Cabinet. From time to time, I shall take the liberty of writing you as to the progress that we are making here.

After that slight setback, I am regaining very rapidly my old health and strength.

Mrs. Quezon joins me in sending you and Mrs. Roosevelt highest regards and best wishes.

Devotedly yours,

(Sgd) MANUEL L. QUEZON.

MLQ/sc

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, November 1, 1941.

Via airmail

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you for your letter of September twenty-sixth enclosing a copy of the letter you wrote to President Quezon. I am so glad you wrote to President Quezon as you did. It flattered him greatly to receive your warm expressions of good will and he was as pleased as a child with what you said. I know that your note served a genuinely useful purpose in deepening his sense of loyalty to the United States and to yourself.

Out here on the firing line I feel distressed that you are being so hamstrung and impeded by a divided Congress and by refractory labor groups. The Neutrality Law should have been repealed weeks and months ago and the United States should today be forging armaments at a pace which would make the outcome of the war clear to everyone. As long as Germany pursues her civilization-wrecking policy a fight to the death between her and the United States is as inevitable as the rising of the sun, for Americans will not take the defeat of their most precious heritages lying down. This being true, the sooner America can whole-heartedly devote one hundred percent of her energies to the supreme effort necessary to crush Nazilism, the sooner the present wrecking of civilization can be stopped. The way you have led the American people step by step to understand and realize this fact has been one of the outstanding achievements of democracy during this time.

We feel much more reassured out here that Americans back home under your leadership have come to realize the importance of building up a strong Philippine defense. How greatly our defenses here have been strengthened Japan also knows; and that is the surest way of avoiding trouble in the Far East.

I have been building up a fine staff of workers in the High Commissioner's office. They are an outstanding group; and as the work has rapidly increased with export control functions, foreign funds control, priority problems and a [2] host of additional duties due to war conditions, they have jumped into the breach gallantly and have carried on with great ability and loyalty. I am hoping that my new Legal Adviser, Stewart McDonald, whom you appointed two weeks ago, will arrive by the end of this month.

Ever sincerely yours,

FRANK.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, November 1, 1941.

Via airmail
Major General EDWIN M. WATSON,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL WATSON: Will you be kind enough to give the enclosed letter to the President personally? I shall appreciate your kindness.

Ever sincerely yours,

FRANCIS B. SAYRE

Enclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

3 November 1941

Combined Japanese Fleet reported now in Kuresaeki area, near Yokohama according to fairly reliable information. Same source reports elaborate plans joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand complete. Invasion will follow lines of German Blitzkrieg in Belgium and Holland. 250 transport planes said assembled Taiwan (Formosa, Japan) Hainan (China) ready to begin move when ordered. Forces in Indo-China being strengthened to estimate total 100,000.

Japanese repatriation ship for Lisbon has been postponed. This ship will, however, leave Yokohama direct from Singapore on November 7 to bring back about 300 Japanese subjects in Malaya. It is expected to sail from Singapore on November 17 and to arrive in Manila about November 21, on its way to Japan.

Severest Gas Attack of China War reported occurred in Ichang fighting October 8, 9 and 10 in which total of 340 gas shells were fired into the city. About 1,350 gas casualties, of whom 750 died, are reported. (Unconfirmed as to use of gas.)

[2] *Soviet Army and Navy Officers* believe that the Russians will undertake intensive training behind the Ural Mountains throughout the winter, meanwhile holding Moscow and the Donets Basin at whatever cost. On the whole the morale of the Russian people is first rate and no despair is being shown as to Russia's position, it is reported by an observer recently arrived at Klubyshev after a tour to Archangel and back.

Seven unidentified units Red Baltic Fleet reported broke through the minefields in the Gulf of Finland and are now either operating in the Eastern Baltic or heading for Sweden to intern.

Germans reported to have warned Spanish Government that any ship sent to the United Kingdom will be torpedoed.

British Empire GUILLEMOT (INDEPENDENT) on Government Service attacked and sunk by torpedo plane on October 24 off Bona Algeria. A convoy was attacked thrice by planes off Southwold last night (November 1-October 31) when Greek NICOLAUS PIANGOS bombed, abandoned and wrecked and BRITISH FORTUNE sank, it is reported from London.

Australian Naval Board reports the shuttle service [3] by air between Thursday Island and Port Moresby has been established for Torres Strait pilots.

House flag of American Scantic Line reported washed ashore Pernambuco and fourth raft of similar type lately come ashore Pedras Point, South of Cabedello.

Senator Truman is reported pleased with the arrangements made by the Navy Clearing Office in connection with the activities of The Senate Committee to Investigate Contracts under the National Defense Program.

Rear Admiral Lyster, Royal Navy, Fifth Sea Lord, has made arrangement to return to England. As a result of his visit to this country the Bureau of Aeronautics has a more complete and up-to-date amount of information regarding the British naval aviation requirements for aircraft and for British pilot training in this country, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports.

The Bureau of the Budget held hearings on October 30 on the subject of early approval of the accelerated naval program of the production of 2020 airplanes, the most important items of which were recently set up in the regular 1943 estimate, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports.

5 strike cases affecting Naval Defense Contracts were [4] settled during the week ending November 1. 18 strike cases affecting Naval Defense Con-

tracts were still open and 9 strikes were continuing on which information relative to Naval Defense Contracts was not yet available as of November 1.

Pennants have been awarded to the following stations for outstanding performances in Public Works Construction Program during July, August and September. This is the 2nd quarterly award by Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Group 1—Over \$600,000 monthly expenditures:

First—Naval Fuel Depot, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Second—Roosevelt Base, Terminal Island, Calif.

Third—Naval Air Station, Bermuda.

Group 2—From \$300,000 to \$600,000 monthly expenditures:

First—Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Fla.

Second—Floating Drydock ARD-2, 12th Naval Dist.

Third—Destroyer Base San Diego, Calif.

Group 3—Less than \$300,000 monthly expenditures:

First—Naval Air Station, Cavite, P. I.

Second—Naval Air Station, Cape May, N. J.

Third—Naval Ammunition Depot, Fallbrook, Calif.

As of 28 October 247 reconditioned 3"/50 caliber low-angle broadside guns and mounts and 150 4"/50 caliber low-angle guns and mounts were transferred to the British, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

4 November 1941

Thailand's reaction to Japanese attack reported would depend on the assistance received from the United States and Great Britain. Thailand would have to have air support the moment invasion began; delay would be fatal. This air assistance should protect Bangkok (Siam) and Thai air bases and provide for bombing of Japanese communications. This then would employ their own air force until it no longer existed, is the reported opinion of Thai Intelligence Officer. If help was not immediately forthcoming and Japanese bombed cities and troops, he thought Thai leaders would capitulate although this action would be dangerous in view of anti-Japanese attitude of the army. Thai Government would hope to be set up again by the Democratic powers after the war.

Japanese invasion of China from Indo-China reported now a possibility. It would be most difficult in view of Japan's existing military over-extension. One to three months would be required to make the necessary concentrations of five to ten divisions. Successful Japanese expedition would be a serious blow to China's [2] power and will to resist.

Losses to date in Russian campaign estimated by ONI and MID as follows: German (1) Personnel, 800,000 to 1,000,000 killed, wounded or missing; (2) Material, 25% to 30%; Russian (1) Personnel, over 1,000,000 prisoners. Killed and wounded unknown but probably proportionately heavy; (2) Material, up to 80% of equipment on hand at start of campaign. *German relative strength vis-a-vis the Russians* is growing constantly. Since Germans have or are about to capture 75% of Russia's war industries, this trend will be accelerated in next six months unless Russian losses are made good by outside assistance.

Russian Black Sea Fleet reported to have left Sevastopol for Novorossisk (N. E. Shore of Black Sea). Fleet consisted of one old battleship, three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, two destroyer leaders, twenty-one destroyers, six old destroyers and thirty-eight submarines.

About 20,000 Russian soldiers reported to have gone through Kulbyshev from Siberia prior to October 20. These men were in good spirits but Soviet reserve outfits being activated have low morale. Spirit of the civilians in the Saratov region (E. Soviet Russia) is very low, much lower than that of the civilians east of there, it [3] is reported.

British figures for October show 103 enemy ships sunk or damaged in the Mediterranean. 25% of Axis convoys estimated to have been sunk. Press Association figures show about four hundred Axis ships sunk or damaged in Mediterranean in past four months.

Troops numbering 700,000 "judged" now in active service in Turkish Army. Twenty regiments reported not equipped with machine guns, either heavy or light, it is reported from a reliable source.

4456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HM ships HMS DEVONSHIRE, HMS COLOMBO and HMS CARTHAGE reported to have intercepted November 3, 450 miles south of Durban French convoy of five ships believed totaling 39,000 tons which left Tamatave (Madagascar) October 24 for France.

U-Boat situation November 3 report includes: (1) four or five in area 300 miles south or southeast Cape Race (Newfoundland) (2) one off Freetown (W. Africa) or southeast Cape Verde Islands (3) one south of St. Helena, (Island, South Atlantic Ocean).

A new Ordnance Plant is to be opened in Macon, Georgia on November 15. This plant will manufacture shell fuses. It is one of the six plants now being established in the [4] current expansion program of the Bureau of Ordnance. Admiral Blandy, Representative Vincent and representatives of the Naval Gun Factory, Washington Navy Yard, will open the plant, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

During an inspection trip which Admiral Moreell made to Norfolk, Virginia: November 2, to confer with the Commandant, Fifth Naval District, and the Commanding General, Fortress Monroe, with regard to taking over the Chamberlin Hotel, for the use of members of service families, it was brought out that it is a not infrequent occurrence for service families to spend the night sitting in chairs in the hotel lobbies of Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia. One of the hotels is reported to be making a practice of renting chairs at 25¢ per night, the Bureau of Yards and Docks reports.

Scheduled Keel Layings reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
Ocean-Going Tug APACHE.....	Charleston Shipbuilding and Drydock Company....	1126.
Destroyer CONWAY.....	Bath Iron Works Corp. Bath, Maine.....	1124.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 6, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State:

To prepare a very nice personal letter for my signature.

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Manuel L. Quezon, 10/18/41, to the President, a copy of which has been retained for our files. In re defense of the Philippines.

OCTOBER 18, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Today's press reports seem to point strongly to the possibility of actual involvement of the United States in the war on account of the torpedoing of the destroyer "*Kearny*". On the other hand, the course of recent events in Japan is far from encouraging to those who would hope that there may not be armed conflict between the United States and Japan. Should this unfortunate situation arise, it is but natural to expect that the Philippines will be the scene of such a conflict. I am, therefore, hastening to reiterate to you what on former occasions I have asserted, namely, that our government and people are absolutely and wholeheartedly for you and your policies, and that we are casting our lot with America no matter what sacrifices such determination may entail.

Mr. President, since at a time such as this it is of the utmost importance that the Government of the Philippines should have complete understanding and co-operation with the military and naval authorities of the United States, I believe you will be pleased to know that General MacArthur and I are in perfect accord, and that the government and people of the Philippines are placing at his disposal everything that he needs to accomplish the great task of defending the Philippines. I could almost say as much regarding my relations with Admiral Hart, although, owing to the nature of the Navy's work, our connections are not so close and our contacts so frequent as those I have with General MacArthur.

Mr. President, it is, of course, a dreadful thing to contemplate the horrors of war, but there is this consideration in which I almost find cause for rejoicing that such an awful situation should arise before the severance of the political ties now existing between the United States and the Philippines; and that is because the Filipino people are thereby afforded the opportunity to prove their supreme efforts and sacrifices not only our deep appreciation of the great things

which America has contributed in the upbuilding of this new nation of ours, but also the fact that the democratic ideals of the United States have become our sacred heritage, and that to preserve such a precious gift we are willing to pay the price in blood and treasure.

[2] With assurances of my deepest respect and highest regard, I beg to remain

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) MANUEL L. QUEZON.

President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
The White House, Washington D. C.

MLQ/sc

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 6, 1941.

Strictly confidential

Memorandum for the President

Herewith, as requested, the draft of a suggested reply to the message from the British Prime Minister in regard to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal.

C. H.

Enclosure:

Draft of a suggested reply to the British Prime Minister.

"SC"

NOVEMBER 7, 1941.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
London.

Your 5257, November 5, 5 p. m.

Personal and strictly confidential from the President to the former naval person.

QUOTE We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek's appeal is addressed. While we feel that it would be a serious error to underestimate the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we doubt whether preparations for a Japanese land campaign against Kunming have advanced to a point which would warrant an advance by the Japanese against Yunnan in the immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase and expedite lend-lease aid to China and to facilitate the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We have noted that you would be prepared to send pilots and some planes to China.

We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in mind along the lines we are [2] talking, together with continuing efforts to strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's hesitation, whereas in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal warning or remonstrances might have, with at least even chance, an opposite effect.

This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention, study and effort.

I shall probably not repeat not make express reply to Chiang Kai-shek before the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your close official circle what I have said above. UNQUOTE.

FE: JWB:HES FE PA/H

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 6, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.

For preparation of a personal reply to Francis Sayre for my signature.

F. D. R.

Note from Hon. Francis B. Sayre, U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Manila, 10/20/41, to the President, enclosing copies of his letter to Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, dated 9/30/41, with its enclosures (Marron reports), together with a copy of General MacArthur's reply to Mr. Sayre of 10/10/41, dealing with the organizing and stimulating of effective civilian defense preparation in the Philippines.

*Sent by Regular Mail**Philippines*

November 15, 1941

My dear President Queson:

It is with much pleasure and gratification that I have read your letter of October 18, 1941, assuring us of the wholehearted loyalty and support of the Philippine Government and people in whatever the immediate future may hold in store for the Philippines and the United States.

In times such as these it is particularly gratifying to learn of the cordial manner in which you, General MacArthur and Admiral Hart are collaborating in making preparations for the defense of the Philippines.

It is my earnest hope that the contingency for which preparations are being made will never arise. However, in the light of recent history

-2-

it would be worse than criminal not to be fully prepared for all eventualities, and I wish you to know that your expressions of loyalty and support and the manifestations of cooperation shown by your government and people are highly gratifying and helpful to me and to the American people in these times of uncertainty and danger.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Manuel L. Quezon,
President of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines,
Manila, Philippine Islands.

MALACANAN PALACE
MANILA

THE WHITE HOUSE
October 18, 1941

Nov 6 9 06 AM '41

My dear Mr. President:

RECEIVED

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Mr. President, since at a time such as this it is of the utmost importance that the Government of the Philippines should have complete understanding and cooperation with the military and naval authorities of the United States, I believe you will be pleased to know that General MacArthur and I are in perfect accord, and that the government and people of the Philippines are placing at his disposal everything that he needs to accomplish the great task of defending the Philippines. I could almost say as much regarding my relations with Admiral Hart, although, owing to the nature of the Navy's work, our connections are not so close and our contacts so frequent as those I have with General MacArthur.

Mr. President, it is, of course, a dreadful thing to contemplate the horrors of war, but there is this consideration in which I almost find cause for rejoicing that such an awful situation should arise before the severance of the political ties now existing between the United States and the Philippines; and that is, because the Filipino people are thereby afforded the opportunity to prove in supreme efforts and sacrifices not only our deep appreciation of the great things which America has contributed in the upbuilding of this new nation of ours, but also the fact that the democratic ideals of the United States have become our sacred heritage, and that to preserve such a precious gift we are willing to pay the price in blood and treasure.

- 2 -

With assurances of my deepest respect and
highest regard, I beg to remain

Faithfully yours,

Manuel L. Quezon

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D.C.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with the request contained in the memorandum which you attached to the enclosed letter, dated October 18, 1941, from the Honorable Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines assuring you of the loyalty and support of the Commonwealth, I am enclosing a suggested reply to President Quezon.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

1. From the Honorable Manuel L. Quezon, October 18, 1941.
2. Suggested reply to President Quezon.

The President,

The White House.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the call which Mr. Kurusu is to make upon you in company with the Japanese Ambassador on November 17, Mr. Kurusu may regard this first call as purely ceremonial and may not wish to initiate any discussion. Should the occasion appear opportune, however, you may wish to offer comments along lines as follows:

(1) We cannot afford to make light of the tremendous seriousness of the present world situation confronting us. I want to repeat and to emphasize what I said to Admiral Nomura on November 10. The entire world has been placed in a precarious position as a result of the havoc which has been wrought by the forces of aggression. Our common sense tells us of the extreme need that the world come back to ways of peace. It is the purpose of this Government to do its best in the spirit of fair play to contribute to establishing a basis for peace, stability, and order in the Pacific area. As a means of achieving these objectives it is essential that emphasis be laid upon giving practical effect to a sound philosophy of human welfare.

-2-

welfare. We have often and quite recently made clear publicly what we have in mind in this regard.

(2) We are fully aware that it may require time for Japan to turn to courses of peace. The American people and Government, especially the President and the Secretary of State, have been very patient. We are ready and willing to continue to be patient, to endeavor to work out a broad-gauge peaceful settlement, and to afford every practicable opportunity to Japan to turn to courses of peace.

(3) It is tremendously important that no statesman and no country miscalculate the attitude and the position of the American people and Government. The American people and Government are fully alive to the sinister menace which all peace-loving countries are facing from Hitlerism and courses of aggression. This country has been slow in arousing itself to the dangers of Hitlerism. Today we are fully aware of those dangers and are thoroughly aroused. Our national effort is primarily and in ever-increasing measure being devoted toward defeat of Hitlerism. We are determined to protect and preserve our national security against Hitlerism.

(4) A victorious Hitler would constitute a menace to all other nations, including Japan. Our opposition to courses of aggression and to the program of Hitlerism stands firm. We are entirely convinced that Hitlerism

will

-3-

will be defeated.

(5) We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek.

In view of the general character of these suggested comments no need is perceived of giving the Ambassador a written record of what you say to him.

November 17, 1941

400
Hawaii

Dear Dave:

The President has asked me to thank you for your telegram of November thirteenth sent from Honolulu. He greatly appreciates your action in giving him the benefit of your observations in the Hawaiian Islands and is particularly pleased with your report that the staffs of the Army and the Navy in Hawaii are so "well-informed and keenly alive to the latest developments in communications." The President was also glad to learn that the Army and Navy authorities maintain such a friendly basis of relationship with the civilian population of the Islands.

The President is greatly reassured to know that the picture as you find it in Hawaii is one that inspires confidence. He heartily reciprocates your personal regards.

Very sincerely yours,

STEWART EARLE
Secretary to the President

Mr. David Sarnoff,
44 East 71st Street,
New York, N. Y.

PP73812
1514

130-11000

November 17, 1941

HOO
Hawaii

Dear Dave:

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Very sincerely yours,

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the PresidentMr. David Sarnoff,
44 East 71st Street,
New York, N. Y.*PP73872
*1314

*136-Misc

TELEGRAM

COMM 224 VIA R34

5:50 PM

The White House

Washington

HONOLULU, November 13, 1941

THE PRESIDENT

REFERRING TO OUR LAST LUNCHEON CONVERSATION, I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT THROUGH THE COURTESY OF GENERAL SUGST AND ADMIRALS KIMBLE AND BLOCH HERE I HAVE BEEN AFFORDED EVERY FACILITY FOR INSPECTING THEIR COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS ON SHIP AND SHORE AND TO DISCUSS WITH THEM AND THEIR STAFF AND COMMUNICATION OFFICERS THE PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION IN THE PACIFIC. AS A RESULT OF MY OBSERVATIONS, I AM GLAD TO REPORT TO YOU THAT THE HEADS AND THE STAFFS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY HERE ARE WELL INFORMED AND KEENLY ALIVE TO THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS AND TO THEIR POSSIBLE POSSIBILITIES. I LEAVE HONOLULU TOMORROW ON STEAMER MATCONIA AND UPON MY ARRIVAL HERE SHALL REPORT MORE FULLY TO YOU AND THE SECRETARIES OF WAR AND NAVY UPON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THESE MATTERS. I AM ALSO PLEASED TO REPORT TO YOU MY IMPRESSIONS BASED ON OBSERVATIONS SINCE MY LAST VISIT HAWAIIAN ISLANDS THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN U. S. ARMY AND NAVY AUTHORITIES AND CIVILIAN POPULATION COMPOSED OF MANY ISLANDERS IS FAIRLY GOOD AND BEING IMPROVED MOST NOTICEABLY AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT. THE OTHER ISLANDERS ARE VERY FRATERNAL AND THE ARMY AND NAVY ARE WELL KNOWN TO THEM.

DAVID SUGST

REPORT OF THE HOUSE
11/19/41

On this date Mr. McChesney presented the report of the committee on the letter of 11/12/41 to the Hon. J. Edgar Hoover, Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, regarding the proposed legislation for the control of the U. S. in the production of defense articles in the United States of America. The committee on the letter of 11/12/41 to the Hon. J. Edgar Hoover, Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, regarding the proposed legislation for the control of the U. S. in the production of defense articles in the United States of America. The committee on the letter of 11/12/41 to the Hon. J. Edgar Hoover, Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, regarding the proposed legislation for the control of the U. S. in the production of defense articles in the United States of America.

See also H. R. 1110.

John F. Kennedy

*file
personal*

1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

November 21, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have read the attached
communication to you from
Colonel Donovan and return
it with thanks.

C.H.

CH

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 15, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State.
To read and return for my files.

F. D. R.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
Washington, D. C., November 13, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The following is the substance of statements made by Dr. Hans Thomsen on Thursday afternoon, November 6, to Mr. Malcolm R. Lovell:

If Japan goes to war with the United States, Germany will immediately follow suit. The United States has no effective way to wage war in the Pacific. It could not denude the Atlantic to place full fleet power in the Pacific.

If Tokio and Yokohama should be bombed, the Japanese would [2] surely bomb Manila.

When Russia collapses, the Japanese will occupy northern Sakhalin. This will alleviate the oil situation in Japan, as the oil supply in Sakhalin is substantial and can be more fully developed.

Japan is trying to gain time with the United States. In a way this effort works both ways, for the United States seems to be trying to gain time with Japan. In the last analysis, Japan knows that unless the United States agrees to some reasonable terms in the Far East, Japan must face the threat of [3] strangulation, now or later. Should Japan wait until later to prevent this strangulation by the United States, she will be less able to free herself than now, for Germany is now occupying the major attention of both the British Empire and the United States. If Japan waits, it will be comparatively easy for the United States to strangle Japan. Japan is therefore forced to strike now, whether she wishes to or not.

If the United States breaks diplomatic relations with Germany, most, if not all, of the South American countries will do the same.


[4] The new United States Charge d'Affaires is going to Berlin by boat, via Lisbon. Evidently the United States is in no hurry to get him to Berlin. This probably means that no immediate diplomatic rupture is planned. It is, of course, always possible that a diplomatic break may be postponed indefinitely. Japan and China so continued for two full years. Of course there is always the possibility that my government may tire of the undeclared war, and may itself break diplomatic relations. I think this is improbable, however.

I was amused at Stalin's [5] radio address. We have definitely taken prisoner, over 3,000,000 Russian soldiers, and these men are now actually working for Germany, building roads, winter barracks, for our soldiers, and other constructive work. We are sure that at least an equal number of Russian soldiers have been killed.

I am very tired. I need a vacation very much. For three years I have had no rest. I wish we two and our wives could go to Florida for a month to sit on the beach in the sunshine.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN.



SECRET

In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 24 November 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As I told you yesterday, we are constantly studying the situation in the Atlantic with a view to reduction of sinkings. We have certain thoughts now involving possible radical rerouting which to carry through would require our merchant ships going all the way into British ports, as well as our naval escort vessels. Involved in this would be the use of United States ports for the assembly of convoys, and the use of mixed escorts consisting of United States destroyers and Canadian corvettes. If this scheme were adopted, United States and Canadian escorts would be refuelled each trip in the United Kingdom, and British escort groups would probably have to come into United States ports for refuelling.

Of course we will put nothing of this sort into effect without your approval in principle.

BETTY.

P. S. The movement you spoke about for 10 December is shaping up and should be ready to sail on time. Here's hoping we can get it through before any open break with Japan.

Regarding escort from the Philippines to Hongkong, the matter is under study and I will give you a report later but my initial reaction is that it would too greatly complicate Tommy's Hart's problem, some of which I mentioned to you yesterday.

HRS.

CHUNGKING, November 25, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "Modus Vivendi" now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

LATTIMORE

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

25 November, 1941

General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of Polish forces in Russia, is reported to have expressed doubt of Moscow's ability to hold out and Russian officials in general are reported for the first time indicating worry over the situation.

Supplies for Russia are reported to have moved over a new Iran trucking route linking Persian Gulf port of Bushire with Tehran. A fleet of 250 trucks is available at Bushire. Other trucks, including some 15-tonners capable of carrying tanks, are expected soon from America.

Several U-boats are continuing their movement Westward. Operations close off American ports may be expected. Submarines have reappeared off the Cape Verde Islands and there are indications that operations are to be extended to the Southward as far as the Cape of Good Hope. The total number of U-boats at sea is gradually rising (27). There have been no attacks in the Western Atlantic for about three weeks.

A large part of German Naval Personnel now enroute to Italy wearing civilian clothing, it is rumored in Berlin.

[4] It is indicated that Axis forces in Libya are running dangerously short of airplane fuel, according to British reports.

The following estimate represents consensus of all British Intelligence services as to Japan on the basis of all information available up to November 18. The estimate concludes that: (1) In the event of failure of her last attempt to get America to come to a general agreement, Japan will have to make up her mind as to whether she should chance the war which would likely follow further aggressive action on her part (2) Japan will probably not attack Siberia at present; she will wait until Soviet strength is decreased (3) Japan will continue the war with China except in the event of a general agreement with the United States (4) Japan's movement of troops from Tongking to the south indicates that she does not intend at present to try cutting the Burma Road (5) From the Japanese viewpoint her best move, the one with least chance of bringing on a general war, would probably be occupation of Thailand. Securing bases in Siam would also pave the way for later movement against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, a Japanese drive into Thailand is indicated by her recent movements.

Five Japanese motor vessels, formerly merchantmen, armed with 10 to 16 anti-aircraft guns each arrived Shanghai to-day. Those with a lesser number of guns have mountings in place for 6 additional machine guns. Average seven 3" dual purpose, remainder are automatic which appear about 50 caliber. It concluded that the large number of anti-aircraft guns mounted on Japanese merchantmen taken over by the Navy makes of them virtual anti-aircraft ships and that this arming can have been made only with the air opposition of such powers as the United States and Britain in mind. Arrangements have been made to supply the SS. PRESIDENT MONROE with the necessary armament to make her the first United States Merchant Ship to be armed if present plans are put into effect. The President Monroe is owned by the Bethlehem Steel Atlantic Works and is loaned to the Maritime Commission, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

The British are reported pleased with the expeditious repair of the HMS INDOMITABLE, which was placed in commission twelve hours in advance of the scheduled completion time. Officers of the Bureau of Ships and [4] the Norfolk Navy Yard met the vessel to determine the extent of damage and expedite repair. Knowing of the anxiety of the British to have the ship in action, the Yard was able to proceed upon word of the grounding, with the fabrication of a section of the bow, due to the presence of the sister ship the HMS FORMIDABLE in the Yard. This coupled with the availability of the dock being used by the HMS FORMIDABLE expedited clearance in a few days.

Repairs for the ODENWALD are expected to be completed November 26. The ODENWALD is in the custody of the United States District Court of Puerto Rico and the Marshall. Investigation shows the ODENWALD was launched in Germany in 1923 over the name ODENWALD. About 1935 her name was changed to ASSUAN and in 1938 it was changed back to ODENWALD the Office of the Judge Advocate General reports.

Scheduled Completions reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
1 Coastal Minesweeper: INDUSTRY.....	F. L. Fulton.....	11, 25-41
2 Destroyers:		
ELLYSON.....	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co	11, 27-41
EMMONS.....	Bath Iron Works.....	11, 28-41

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

26 November, 1941

Approximately 24,000 troops sailed from Woosung from the 15th to 23rd with large quantity military equipment, including 184 landing boats plus others on 5 vessels, (accurate check could not be obtained). A number of outgoing trucks were observed newly camouflaged, predominantly green which is unusual in this area. Shipping at Shanghai now normal. Along coast either north or south, to date no large movements seen, it is reported by the Naval Attache at Shanghai. Although the destination of the 24,000 troops is not given, the green camouflaged trucks indicate a southern destination. The presence of the landing boats also indicate a destination from which an attack may be planned on United States, British or Netherlands territory, ONI states.

British islands western Pacific being photographed by Japanese planes, particularly the Gilberts. Observer is sending a detailed report. Joint photography is being proposed by British of all Japanese Mandates, French Indo-China coastline and Japanese occupied China and mutual exchange of this information by the United States, Dutch and British aviation.

[2] British Air Ministry reports 108 Japanese fighters recently transferred to Mandated Islands of which 18 are at Truk and 6 at Salpan. A new type of fighter is reported now in complement of KAGA (Japanese aircraft carrier, 28,900 tons), HIRYU (Japanese aircraft carrier 10,050 tons) and SORYU (Japanese aircraft carrier, 10,050 tons).

At Latitude 24° South, Longitude 111° East Naval ratings from German raider rescued. The R. A. N. SIDNEY (Light Cruiser) was in that area but no communications from her, it is reported by Naval Attache at Melbourne.

Russian Ambassador to England, Ivan Maisky emphasized at a luncheon meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Association in London that no naval or air operations will defeat the Germans, for, being a land power, they can only be beaten on land by an armed force that is capable of destroying the German army, MID reports. Maisky also asserted that the Russian losses, including killed, wounded and missing, number 1,750,000 (press states 2,120,000). Russian industry has been uprooted to such an extent that $\frac{2}{3}$ of it is now inoperative.

Unconfirmed reports from a Naval Observer state it is suspected that German submarines are now operating in [3] the Capetown area.

Turkey is reported to have forbidden her ships to go from Istanbul to Bulgarian Black Sea ports on account of "repeated torpedoings by Soviet submarines".

The RAF has been in control of the air from the start of the Libya campaign, MID reports from Cairo. The Observer's personal opinion is that the major portion of the Axis forces (consisting of some 35,000 Germans and 60,000 Italians) will be destroyed or captured.

Status of Naval Aircraft, 31 October, 1941, as reported by the Bureau of Aeronautics:

Naval Aircraft on hand	Combat	Training	Utility	Total
(Service, obsolete, obsolescent and experimental).....	2,734	2,194	273	5,191
Naval Aircraft on Order and undelivered.....	5,385	224	626	6,235

¹ Of this number, 238 are assigned to the Marine Corps.

The KITTY HAWK, one of the ex-Sea Trains now being converted into an air-plane transport has been fitted out, the Bureau of Ships reports. The second ex-Sea Train, the HAMMONDSPOUT is being completed at Teaching and Lang. It will go to the Yard to be fitted out next week. This is a two-week's job the Bureau of Ships reports.

[4] The "America First" Committee ran a large "ad" in the Roanoke Times recently which might have been equivalent to an anti-recruiting measure. Upon study, the Office of the Judge Advocate General decided that no action could be taken with respect to this "ad".

4476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

A fling system has been started in the Office of the Co-ordinator of Research that will protect the Government and save it millions of dollars in subsequent patent claims, the Office of the Judge Advocate General reports.

Scheduled Keel Layings reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
4 Destroyers:		
Jenkins.....	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.....	11/27/41
LaVallette.....	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.....	11/27/41
Howorth.....	N. Y. Puget Sound.....	11/24/41
Killen.....	N. Y. Puget Sound.....	11/24/41
1 Submarine Chaser.....	Peterson Boat Works.....	11/24/41

Scheduled Launchings reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
1 Destroyer: Woodworth.....	Bethlehem Steel Company, San Francisco.	11/26/41
1 Submarine Chaser.....	Defoe Boat & Motor Works.....	11/27/41

Personal and confidential

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 26, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending herewith

1. Another memo about the Japanese movement to the south from Shanghai. This is highly abbreviated from the verbal information given me but it will give you the substance.

2. The British estimate as to Japanese intentions of which I spoke to you and of which you asked me to send you a copy.

Will you kindly return this last paper when you have read it?

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 26, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement.

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.

I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Reference is made to the call which Admiral Nimitz and Mr. Garrison are to make on you this afternoon at 3:30. It is suggested that you may care to include in your comments mention of the following points:

(1) We have been very much disappointed that during the course of these very important conversations Japanese leaders have continued to express opposition to the fundamental principles of peace and order which constitute the abiding spirit of the conversations which we have been carrying on. This attitude on the part of Japanese leaders has naturally created an atmosphere both in this country and abroad which has added greatly to the difficulty of making mutually satisfactory progress in the conversations.

(2) We have been very patient in our dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation. We are prepared to continue to be patient if Japan's courses
of

of action permit continuance of that an attitude of our part. We still have hope that there may be worked out a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area of the character we have been discussing. The temper of public opinion in this country has become of such a character and the big issues at stake in the world today have become so sharply outlined that this country cannot bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gives this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurs, we can also take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation.

(3) We remain convinced that Japan's own best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression, and that Japan's own best interests lie along the courses which we have outlined in the current conversations. If, however, Japan should unfortunately decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate loser.

SECRET

C.R. 074B.

FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER SAYRE PERSONAL FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 26TH IS GREATLY
APPRECIATED.

I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT QUEZON TO INFORM
YOU THAT YOU MAY BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED THAT TO THE LAST MAN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE, WILL STAND BEHIND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA.

SECRET

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE....

88 FILE.....

*Returned
Contracts noted
LH*



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1941.

My dear Mr. McIntyre:

I have read Assistant Attorney General Littell's letter to you in which he suggests Judge Stainback of the United States District Court to succeed Governor Poindexter in Hawaii. I don't share Littell's volunteered enthusiasm about Judge Stainback, but I admit that the difficulty in obtaining the right kind of a man for Governor of Hawaii, if we have to restrict ourselves to a resident democrat, is a major one. Governor Poindexter has never been anything to cheer about, but at least he has been unobjectionable and, on the whole, during normal times, satisfactory. However, quite regardless of his health, we do need a strong man there now, and where to find the right man I do not know. The President, on one occasion, suggested that we might ask Congress to amend the fundamental law so as to permit the appointment of a mainland, but this did not seem politic at the time, and I don't know that it would now, although there would probably be less objection now than in normal times.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Parker
Secretary of the Interior.

x6

Mr. Marvin O. McIntyre,
Secretary to The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You may want to take the time
to read Norman's letter. It is interesting,
even though it is not entirely disinterested.

M. H. M.

Department of Justice

Washington

NORMAN M. LITTELL
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL21st and Mathers,
West Vancouver, B.C.,
November 14, 1941.Mr. Marvin O. McIntyre,
Secretary to the President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mac:

While concluding a period of convalescence with friends in British Columbia, information reached me that Governor Poindexter in Honolulu has unfortunately failed to recover from his operation while in Washington, D.C., a few months ago, and that his resignation is expected before the expiration of his term next March. This recalls my visit to Honolulu last August in connection with the heavy volume of condemnation work there for national defense purposes, and particularly certain impressions of the Federal Government's representation in various official posts in the Islands, and I am constrained to make certain observations to the President through you if you consider it worth while to pass them on to him.

Appointments in peace time to the "Paradise of the Pacific" are one thing, but with the Islands becoming a focal point of communications, supplies, and naval operations, in the increasing tensions of the Pacific, there must be able and fearless men in command, capable of making decisions and getting things done. I gained impressions of weakness on all sides. Governor Poindexter, who is well advanced in years to begin with, has been weakened by ill health which is reflected all the way down through the executive branch of the government, just as in other organizations always reflects the weakness of its appointed leader. The Admiral in command at Naval Headquarters was a fine and widely experienced old gentleman past sixty, who, in course of one of the most exciting naval posts under the American flag, goes to bed at 9:30 P.M., because, as he told me, he "could not stay awake after that". The General in command for the Army was also past sixty, an estimable man of great experience, whose attacking powers seemed to me well illustrated by his recommendation to the Secretary of War, who in turn wrote to the Attorney General, that the Department of Justice do not prosecute Japan in the Islands for failure to register under the Alien Registration Act, because this would interfere with a propaganda campaign of Americanization and friendship for the Japanese being conducted by the Commanding General. Men of wide experience with the

Islands. I gained the impression that Stainback would have the respect of all factions, and could muster the full force of the civil branch of the government behind whatever functions the Islands will play in the impending events of the Pacific.

It may be that the President has another man in mind as Foindexter's successor, but if he wants a man readily at hand who can slip into place with little friction and take hold of the Governor's responsibilities, which he has observed closely from the sidelines, without loss of time in getting acquainted and learning his way about in Hawaii, this opinion as to Stainback might conceivably be of interest to him. I trust this letter will either be destroyed or kept in your files after it has served any possible usefulness which it might have.

Katherine and I will leave here about December 4th or 5th, spend two or three days with John and Anna in Seattle, and return to Washington where I shall be on duty again December the 11th.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

Norman M. Littell
Norman M. Littell, *v10*
Assistant Attorney General.

ENCLOSURE

November 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY IOKES x 6

This is the letter about which I spoke to you on the phone this morning. Am sending it over just for your information.

Please return it so that I can acknowledge.

H. H. McINTIRE
Secretary to the President

Enclosure

Let to MMH 11/14/41 from Asst. A. G. Norman M. Little (written from 21st and Mathers, West Vancouver, B. C.) believes Judge Ingram M. Stainbeck, U. S. District Court Judge, Territory of Hawaii would be good man for appt. as Governor of Hawaii in event Poindexter resigns before expiration of his term next March. Memo for the President 11/24/41 "You may want to take the time to read Norman's letter. It is interesting, even though it is not entirely disinterested." MMH

HONORABLE MARVIN H. MCINTYBE,
Secretary to the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, December 18, 1941.

DEAR MAC: My letter of November 14 to you from Vancouver, B. C., referred to three gentlemen in primary positions of command for the Federal Government at Honolulu—Governor Poindexter, Admiral Bloch, in command at Pearl Harbor, and General Short, in command for the United States Army of the Hawaiian Department.

Enclosed is an editorial in regard to the Governor, published on December 4 in the Star Bulletin and, in my opinion, correctly representing the general attitude in Honolulu. This was three days before the Japanese attack, and I am afraid the sentiment may have precipitated to more bitter levels since then.

Kindest personal regards.

NORMAN M. LITTELL,

Assistant Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

By Messenger

DELAY AT THE TOP

DEC. 4, 1941.

Inaction on the Oahu food storage project, like inaction on the new M-Day law, is directly traceable to lethargy at Iolani palace.

In the face of a war emergency that has already arrived in Hawaii, urgent steps for full preparedness are intolerably slow and hesitating.

The territorial administration, to put it plainly, is keeping pace in defense preparation neither with the aggressive speed of the federal branches of government nor with the ready and willing spirit and energy of the civilian community.

Governor Poindexter has been, it is true, in the hospital for two weeks for a period of rest. There is no occasion or desire to impose upon him any unnecessary physical demands. But the governor has ample authority and scope to delegate some or nearly all of the immediately pressing duties of preparedness to others.

He can, for instance, give full authority to the emergency food commission to go ahead full speed on the Oahu food storage depot.

He can order the M-Day committee to move into action with something like real speed and scope on its own important lines of preparation.

He can instruct them to step up or step out—and the community will back him to the limit.

The delays daily revealed in civilian preparation for what at any terrible moment may become actual war in the Pacific are due to no lack of readiness to serve by the civilians of Hawaii.

At every call, Honolulu and other communities have responded.

Everywhere there is the keen desire, by men and women of every race who make up this American territory, to do whatever is necessary and requested of them individually and collectively.

This has been the spirit and this has been the determination for many months.

It has been concretely demonstrated by such organizations as the mayor's disaster council, the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, by the emergency food commission itself, and by many others.

It has been proved by the willingness and enthusiasm with which thousands of Hawaii's young men have met the call to active duty in the army, the navy or the marine corps.

It has been expressed in the proud bearing of the parents of those sons sent into service—the pride that comes with the realization that these youths of the islands are relied on to help in island defense.

Yes, the civilian community has responded promptly and loyally to the many and varied demands and requests made upon it—and properly made—in the name of national service.

The delays which it is a painful necessity to record are attributable to lack of aggressive leadership by the territorial administration at this critical time.

There seems slight realization that the necessary steps for preparedness MUST be taken quickly and decisively.

There seems scant realization that war on the Pacific is daily coming nearer

to a fact, and that many things which will have to be done in the event of war are not yet done or even well started.

* * * * *
Immediately the two most important tasks before the administration are action on the Oahu food storage reserve, and action on the M-Day law.

If these require night-and-day work—and we believe they do—then let the governor insist on night-and-day work and he will find no lack of support for such a policy.

Nor is there lack of competent citizens to do the big job ahead, and if he will call on them in the name of patriotic service, and give them authority to act on their own judgment and experience, he will not fail to find plenty of able helpers.

In reply refer to initials and No. HRS/Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 28 November 1941.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Just to follow up on the Madagascar scare. The British have called up and told us to disregard their message, that they had completely discredited it.

I won't bother you with anything else and hope that it is possible you can free your mind of most everything here. We will be on the job.

We are doing everything possible towards strengthening and making ready the bases in the Pacific, and I believe you will approve of the measures we are taking without much, if any, change.

Was glad you found such general concurrence with the paper Marshall and I sent to you. One of the holes we had plugged with the message I read you for Hart and Kimmel. The other with regard to specifically defining an area we will work on in connection with the messages you requested be prepared.

Am enclosing copy of a letter from Jim Newton who is from Denver, a great friend of Justice Douglas, and a member of a very well known family. You can guess he is quite a character and an independent thinker himself. I thought it might be of a little interest and you probably would not get a chance to read it except on a vacation.

I hope you have a fine vacation and that you can see it through.

All good wishes. Sincerely,

BETTY.

JAMES Q. NEWTON,
Denver, November 24, 1941.

DEAR HAROLD: Bill Douglas' dinner and your luncheon were a real treat to your country cousin. I do feel very often, as I told you, that my world is drifting away from me, but when I have a chance to talk to both of you and realize that after all we are thinking about the same thing, it is quite consoling to say the least.

I am more firmly convinced than ever that the middle income group is getting excited and should have leadership from the group that you and I think should be the leaders in America.

The multiplicity of government agencies and their intense desire to prove their worth and perpetuate their organizations has created a public feeling of confusion and maybe resentment against what is commonly called propaganda.

Organized minorities take advantage of that confusion and foster laws which seem to the middle group discriminatory and selfish. It is that feeling of confusion which will eventually turn our actions into a rout and some Hitler, under the guise of his protective government, will appear and be leader of the exploited middle group. It is a known fact that knowledge cannot be spoon fed and the objectives of these various so-called social advancements cannot be advanced by the propaganda methods of the various government agencies. Only resentment and confusion and a feeling of being "taken in" has been the result. The growing resentment against English propaganda should be proof enough.

It is immediately necessary for us to try and create unity in our nation and to do so it is necessary to help the people become dynamic in their action and thoughts and change their feeling of being "taken in" to their disadvantage. There is no such force as class consciousness in the United States. No person thinks any other person in the sense of class is better. All of us feel many other citizens are lower than we, but none of us believe any other person is better. But there is a class feeling based on money. We always seem to feel that the very low income group, meaning the subsidized underprivileged, and the very rich receive the good things in material life. Somehow the middle income group have lulled

themselves to sleep and it is only through a sudden change, such as [2] our present international policy that consciousness comes into that group. They have little and need little comparatively, and are docile to the extreme, but when aroused by fear are apt to be panicky and turn themselves over body and soul to any fearless leader. This group is composed of at least 60% to 70% of the able United States citizens and can be turned from their present trend of confusion and fears if we can some way, somehow restore to them their right and duty to think for themselves.

The *first* problem for them is that of physical preparedness, such as providing a place to meet and to talk to each other.

The *second* is leadership among themselves; the *third* cohesion and correlation of their groups; and the *fourth* form an organization competent to furnish their groups with honest, truthful data which they deem necessary to help their thinking and self expression.

My plan would be to divide the United States into regional districts. In each regional district, employ about three professional organizers who would appoint a general committee consisting of twelve extremely prominent citizens from the following groups: Three from religious organizations, three from public school system, three from university or higher education group and three from business.

These groups while essentially a symbol of honesty and community solidarity should be forced to become interested in filtering information which is to be presented by various specialized agencies to the community self interest groups formed under our plan.

I am never clear about explaining my objective nor my methods, but I believe that through this plan I am creating meeting places where the middle income group can express themselves when, as, and if they are seriously and mentally upset as to their government relationships and understandings.

Adult educational groups and all other university extension groups have attempted to serve education on a platter to the middle group. I am sure they do not want to be educated because our public school system has explained to almost each and every one of us that when we are through school, we are educated. A serious defect, in my opinion, in the system. The dullest man in the United States today is the Phi Beta Kappa at 21, who is the sedate citizen at 45. He never cracks a book after he leaves college because he feels he is educated and can prove it by his degree.

[3] To define what I mean by this middle income group, I am sure I mean almost all of the 'oi polloi in America. When you say middle income group you mean those individuals who presently earn their costs of living or use income derived from the investment of their savings. The people I exclude from this group are the so-called under-privileged and the so-called hereditary rich. In other words the dregs and the froth of society.

I propose that a committee be organized in each separate economic region of the United States, composed of the representatives of the church, the public school system, university system, and business. I firmly believe that President Roosevelt can get the leadership of this group through this method and I firmly believe he should make the attempt to regain the confidence of that group.

I am presenting this plan to you and Bill Douglas simply because I admire you both personally. I want you to understand that I have no ambition to be anything. Thank God, my philosophy has taught me that to try to be a somebody in the estimation of somebody else is futile and empty. I firmly believe my philosophy has told me that while there are very few values in the action of life, the one real value that counts is to have such control over yourself that you can enjoy life through the happiness of others. Maybe you think I have gone Pollyanna, but to live as I have just expressed is a thousand times harder than to stand out on the street corner and be a tub thumper and court public acclaim.


I am sending this letter to you and Bill Douglas and in case you care to suggest any future action by me to further these plans, I shall appreciate it, or if the event you think the idea should be dropped, let me know.

The costs of actually compiling the information and correlating necessary facts of the various agencies involved would be considerable but could be accomplished by the Social Security set up.

Sincerely,

JAMES Q. NEWTON.

Admiral HAROLD STARK,
Chief of U. S. Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.



The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the information received from the various sources mentioned in the above report, and to provide a summary of the information received from the various sources mentioned in the above report, and to provide a summary of the information received from the various sources mentioned in the above report.

The information of the report, and the information received from the various sources mentioned in the above report, and the information received from the various sources mentioned in the above report, and the information received from the various sources mentioned in the above report.

RECEIVED

DECEMBER 1, 1941

OFFICE OF THE



[Handwritten signature or initials]

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILA

Pls. Personal

Via airmail

Philippine folder 1-41

Dec 8 1941
RECEIVED

December 1, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my telegrams to you of November 29 and November 30 concerning President Quezon's address before the Philippine University of November 28, (see Enclosure No. 1), the exaggerated allegations in his speech oblige me at this time to submit to you this report on civilian emergency defense measures in the Philippine Islands and recommendations as to your clarification of the problem of responsibility for the continuance of this work.

President Quezon's chief allegations in his speech were:

1. If war were to come, the civilian population of the Philippines would be unprotected;
2. The inadequacy of preparations was due to President Quezon's being blocked in his efforts to provide for civilian defense by the President of the United States stopping him from exercising powers under the Emergency Powers Act;
3. President Roosevelt's action was due to a campaign based on ignorance and bad faith indulged in by civil liberties unions, peace-at-any-price societies, theorists, writers, liberals and American imperialists in the Philippines.

The issue presented by President Quezon's speech was the placement of responsibility for the inadequacy today of civilian defense measures in the Philippines. President Quezon gave credit to his own vision and far-sightedness for getting the National Assembly to pass the Emergency Powers Act of August 19, 1940 and he asserted that when you stopped him from exercising those powers he suffered the greatest humiliation and defeat he had received in his public life.

He

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

- 2 -

He said the present unpreparedness was due to his enforced inactivity during a seven-months period when his hands were tied. This period can refer only to the time prior to April 1, 1941 when by executive order he set up the Civilian Emergency Administration. (See Enclosure No. 2). As I pointed out in my telegram of November 30, 1941, during this period it was always open to him to secure such legislation as might be necessary, and also he might have proceeded under the ordinary police powers of the Commonwealth Government.

During that period I made unceasing effort to initiate and stimulate activity in civilian defense work. On September 9, 1940 General Grunert, Commanding General of the Philippine Department, in my office and at my request explained in detail to President Quezon the urgent need for joint collaboration in preparing for civilian defense. President Quezon thereupon appointed a committee including General MacArthur, then his military adviser, to represent him in conferring with General Grunert. On September 16, General Grunert presented to the committee a detailed memorandum outlining the need for civilian defense planning. After a month's study, on October 15, the committee reported that protective measures should not be prematurely practiced here but in anticipation of any emergency, the Emergency Powers Act gave to President Quezon complete control of civil functions, and that in time of emergency by converting land to food production the Philippines could be easily self-sustained. (See Enclosure No. 3). On October 16, President Quezon stated to the press that war was not imminent in the Orient and that he did not believe it was the duty of the Philippine Government to provide air-raid shelters but even if it were he was of the opinion they were not necessary.

On October 22, at my request, General Grunert submitted to me a plan for a General Planning Board; and on the next day President Quezon, General Grunert and Admiral Smeallie, then Commandant of the 16th Naval District, conferred with me and agreed to create such a Board to formulate concrete plans for civilian protection in the event of sudden emergency. On October 28, the Planning Board, with President Quezon himself in attendance, held its first meeting in my office under the chairmanship of my then liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Carswell, who is now in the United States. The Board made exhaustive surveys of resources and needs and submitted its report jointly to President Quezon and me on March 11, 1941. General Grunert stated the Board did an excellent job and that the future success or failure of this civil planning and its results appeared to depend upon what the Commonwealth government, particularly its President, could and would do in furtherance of the Board's recommendations.

President

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President Quizon agreed that the responsibility was his and he would go forward and on March 20 he joined me in issuing a press release (see Enclosure No. 4) pointing out conditions to be remedied and stating that an organization would be set up to function directly under the President of the Philippines. In accordance with this assurance President Quizon then established on April 1, 1941 the Civilian Emergency Administration by an Executive Order under the Emergency Powers Act. (See Enclosure No. 2)

It seems clear, therefore, that during the seven-months' period prior to April 1, 1941, due to the initiative of the American authorities and with the knowledge and cooperation of President Quizon, the groundwork was in fact prepared for the Civilian Emergency Administration.

After the creation of the CEA on April 1, 1941, actual progress in civilian defense preparations has been slow but continuous. It has been handicapped, however, by weaknesses in organization and administration, inadequacy of funds, vacillation in objectives, difficulties in maintaining close coordination with the military and ordinary inertia. I have consistently endeavored to stimulate the CEA by placing at its disposal all the facilities of my office and sending to its meetings my military liaison officer. On September 7, 1941 I sent Major Warren, my military liaison officer, to British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies to report on civilian defense preparations there. His excellent reports, copies of which are in Washington, disclosed glaring deficiencies here by comparison and although they caused much press comment and official efforts towards self-justification, they resulted in the acceleration in civilian defense measures for which I have constantly striven. Observations on the CEA are contained in the monthly reports by Mr. Laurence E. Salisbury, my former adviser on political affairs, who is now on duty at the State Department, and are on file in Washington.

The responsibility for the adequacy or inadequacy of the work of the CEA rests squarely upon President Quizon. The Executive Order creating it states that the directing commission of the CEA shall, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, formulate and execute policies and plans for the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions.

President Quizon, however, has not been always consistent in recognizing his responsibility. On May 5, 1941, in an address to the National Assembly, he stated that the duty of safeguarding inhabitants, both citizens and aliens, against hunger, pestilence, lawlessness and other dangers which the nature of modern warfare entails, rests mainly with the

government

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government of the Commonwealth and that consequently he created the OMA to advise and assist the government in the adoption and execution of such measures as may be necessary to protect its civilian population in case of emergency. (See Enclosure No. 5).

In a letter to me dated April 3, 1941, he said:

"I desire to make it clear that, in my opinion, the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines is as much the primary responsibility of the Government of the United States as is the military defense of the Islands."

Four days later, he wrote to me:

"the obligation which the Government of the Commonwealth attempted to assume by the approval of the Emergency Powers Act - that of protecting the Filipino people from the ravages of war - was, after all, primarily the obligation of the United States and not of the Commonwealth."

Because of these fluctuations in his attitude and the dire need for effective civilian defense preparations, I recommend that you clarify the problem of responsibility for the continuance of this work. Responsibility might conceivably rest upon either (1) the High Commissioner's office, (2) the United States Army, or (3) the Commonwealth government. To this problem for over a year I have given intensive study.

My conclusions and recommendations follow:

It is clear that the High Commissioner's office as at present constituted lacks both the funds and the necessary personnel which would warrant its being designated to assume responsibility for civilian defense. It also lacks jurisdiction due to the domestic autonomy granted the Philippines by the Independence Act.

Throwing upon the United States military forces responsibility for the work of civilian defense is a possibility. This matter has already been brought to the attention of the Commanding General of the United States Army in the Far East and he has taken the position that civilian defense should lie with the Commonwealth. As late as November 27, 1941 when President Quezon and General MacArthur conferred with me at my request to consider the effects of

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a letter dated October 7, 1941 addressed to me by Mr. LaGuardia as United States Director of Civilian Defense, appointing me Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands, it was again agreed by the three of us that the existing Civilian Emergency Administration should continue to operate under the direct control of the President of the Commonwealth, but of course with the constant observation and advice of the United States military authorities. (See Enclosures Nos. 6 and 7). I enclose herewith a copy of Mr. LaGuardia's letter to me and of my reply, explaining the reasons why I did not feel free to accept this appointment. (See Enclosures Nos. 8 and 9).

In view of the above it seems that responsibility for the work of civilian defense should rest squarely upon the Commonwealth Government. Two fundamental reasons form the basis for my opinion: first, the disturbance which I fear a shift at this time might cause and which might be construed both here and abroad as a disruption of Filipino-American relations; second, your announced policy, as given in your letter of March 1, 1937 to my predecessor, which I have continually borne in mind, not only to avoid unnecessary interference with the large measure of autonomy in the administration of domestic affairs entrusted to the Commonwealth Government, but also to give helpful encouragement to the new government.

Very sincerely yours,

Francis B. Sayre

Enclosures:

1. Speech of Pres. Quezon, Nov. 28, 1941;
2. Executive Order by Pres. Quezon, No. 335, April 1, 1941;
3. Letter from Sec. Vargas to Gen. Grunert, Oct. 15, 1940;
4. Joint press release by H.C. and Pres. Quezon, March 20, 1941;
5. Pres. Quezon's message to National Assembly, May 5, 1941;
6. Letter from H.C. to Gen. MacArthur, Nov. 27, 1941;
7. Letter from Gen. MacArthur to H.C., Nov. 28, 1941;
8. Letter from Mayor LaGuardia to H.C., Oct. 7, 1941;
9. Reply to Mayor LaGuardia by H.C., Dec. 1, 1941.

Enclosure No. 1

SPEECH OF HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRESIDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES ON THE OCCASION OF THE CELEBRATION OF NATIONAL HEROES DAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

President Gonzales, Members of the Faculty, Distinguished Guests, Students of the University of the Philippines, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Every time that I witness a parade of the ROTC, my heart beats fast for I am filled with almost unbounded pride and pleasure. Today, however, as I saw you pass before me, officers and men of the ROTC of the University of the Philippines, I felt that my heart was heavy and thoughts came to my mind that perhaps some of you may soon have to give your lives in defense of your country. Should such an occasion arise, I want you, young men, to remember that there is no death more glorious and more desirable than death in defense of the fatherland.

We are gathered here this afternoon to do honor, to pay homage, to the heroes of our race. You are celebrating National Heroes Day. Should you have to give your lives in defense of your country, those coming after you will revere you in their hearts just as we are revering today those who have gone before us. That should be the thought you must bear constantly in mind in these days that you may be ready to face any danger that may confront us.

A little while ago, at the Luneta, after that mammoth parade during the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the Commonwealth, I stated, with I think justifiable pride, that it was due to my vision, to my far-sightedness and to my determination that we have today a force capable of putting up a good fight should the occasion arise. In the course of my remarks, I stated that this achievement of my administration as accomplished despite the opposition of the so-called civil liberties unions, both here and in the United States, and the peace-at-any-price societies. I might have added that that was accomplished despite the opposition of liberty-loving theorists.

I come now to tell you of something of which I am not proud. I want to confess to you the greatest defeat and humiliation that I have received in my public life. And this defeat was caused by these theorists—these “defenders of liberty”, these civil liberties unions here and in the United States.

Perhaps I might have gone to my grave without making a public statement of this secret. No one likes to speak of his defeat. But soon after I made that statement at the Luneta the so-called Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines gave out a statement denying that they have ever opposed the national defense program of my administration, but asserting with evident satisfaction that what they have opposed is the emergency powers act. And the evidence that our stand was justified is the fact that for seven months, the powers granted to the President in that act have not been exercised.

[2] It is true—unfortunately true—and I hope it may not prove to be the most tragic truth in the history of the Philippines. Today if the war were to start and bombs fall on the University campus—don't laugh they may fall—thousands or hundreds of you will be killed for you have no air raid shelters here. If there was to be war our people may find themselves starving. Certainly, if there had been war two months ago, there would have been starvation in the Philippines.

If there was to be war now, we may find ourselves to be without fuel, without gasoline,—in one word, if there were to be war now, we would find ourselves unprepared. The civilian population of the Philippines unprotected. We are just beginning to practice blackouts—we are just starting to show our people how to evacuate crowded places.

And who is responsible for this neglect? Not the President of the Philippines not the National Assembly—but the “liberty loving” people of the Philippines the so-called “liberty loving” people of the Philippines.

No sooner did the war in Europe break and especially after the debacle of France, I asked the National Assembly to give the President emergency powers so that he might be able to take the measures necessary for the protection of our people. At that time nobody in the Philippines thought that war may ever come to our shores. These people who know so much, who are all the time telling us what to do—they never imagined, they could not imagine—a bunch of fools that they are—they could not imagine a war between Germany and England and France will ever reach our shores. But I did. I saw it coming. I saw it because I am spending my days and nights studying what is going on in the world, because it is my duty to you to be always alert so that I may be

in a position to render to you the service that is my duty to render that you may be protected.

As soon as I sent that message to the National Assembly asking for these powers, all these young writers of the Philippines with the Civil Liberties Union and all these so-called liberals—who have never done anything in their lives to fight for freedom and liberty—all these come out and denounced me as a would-be dictator and attacked the National Assembly, denouncing its men as weak and incompetent for granting me those powers. Seven months, the Civil Liberties Union said, had to elapse before I made use of those powers. Precisely the seven months that I needed to be ready at this time. If I had been able to do what we had to do during those seven months, I would not be afraid now that something, some cataclysm may happen here in the University campus. I will be certain that these students of the University of the Philippines for whose care I am responsible—I assert that no matter what happens nothing would occur to you. But I am humiliated and grieved to say that I am in no position to give that assurance now:

[3] How did this happen? Did these writers, these liberals, this Civil Liberties Union—did they ever succeed in stopping my hand? Never. Never by themselves alone. But at this time they found powerful allies—the American imperialists in the Philippines, as represented by the *Bulletin*. Now I am calling everything by its name. These imperialists who have never accepted defeat, who still believe that they can stop the Philippines from becoming independent, who all the time have been placing obstacles in our way in the hope that and perhaps in the belief that they may defeat our cause—these people have been all the time charging the Government of the Commonwealth of being incompetent or of being a dictatorship. They are the ones who started to oppose the national defense program. And they opposed the national defense program not because they did not believe that we could make a success out of it but because they wanted to make an argument when independence was to come, to say to the United States, "Are you going to let the Philippines alone when they are absolutely defenseless?" So when I was trying to arm the country they denounced me as a would-be military dictator with the idea of stopping that program. Fortunately I had occasion to go to the United States then and I fought them right before American public opinion and I had occasion to convince the President of the United States that what we are doing here was not only the right thing to do but the essential thing to do if we were going to become independent. And I defeated them, when, however, the fight against the Emergency Powers Act in the United States came, I was tied up in the Philippines. The war was going on; I could not leave the country for something might happen while I was away. It was my duty to be here. And so the cry that came to America coming from these American imperialists and these Filipinos (what shall I say about them?) made an impression in the United States. That had the effect of creating an opinion there unfavorable to the exercise of those powers by me. It was no strange. At that time nobody in America—no, I won't say nobody because President Roosevelt knew it—but very few in America knew that the war in Europe was going to affect them seriously. And these peace-at-any-price fellows—they could not understand why if America was not getting ready then—why should the Philippines get ready. Why? There is no doubt that this Quezon is getting to be a dictator. I had to fight both ignorance and bad faith. The campaign was so effective that I received a message from no less a personage than the President of the United States himself telling me that the enactment of this law had created great concern in the United States and asking me to give a public statement to the effect that I would not use those powers.

Ladies and Gentlemen, under the Tydings-McDuffie law, the President of the United States has the right to intervene in the Philippines if in his judgment the government here established has ceased to be democratic. And the matter, as presented to the President, seems to prove this has ceased to be a democracy. It was impossible for me to argue with the President over the phone or through radio, I could not send him a telegram so I simply bowed my head in deep sorrow. I gave the President of the [4] United States the assurance that I would not exercise these powers unless his representative in the Philippines himself asked me to do it. I was so certain that the day would come when I would be asked to exercise these powers that I preferred to bide my time. But seven months had gone by. During that time I had my hands tied. I don't know how.

but the fact that the Philippines might be involved in war before I was ready to protect my people haunted me day and night, and for several months I could not go to sleep until finally I broke down with another attack of tuberculosis. I could not stand it anymore. Finally, the commanding general of the United States Army wrote me a letter asking what this government was doing for the protection of the civilian population. My answer was, "I don't know. You ask the High Commissioner." And finally I was asked by the High Commissioner himself to constitute the Civilian Emergency Administration, to which body I gave all the powers that the Emergency Powers Act gave me. This is the reason why for seven months the powers of that Act were not exercised, not because they were not necessary but because thanks to the wisdom of the far-sightedness of these liberty-loving Filipinos, in conjunction with the American imperialists, the President stopped me from exercising these powers.

I am going to say something terrible—but that is what I feel. If war breaks out soon and our people die here unprotected by the bombs, those men who have stopped me from doing what I should have done ought to be hanged—everyone of them on the lamp post. And now I am addressing you—the youth of the land—and with you I am addressing your rectors, and your professors—for you are not alone responsible; they are primarily responsible too for what you are doing or failing to do.

Under the Constitution of the Philippines, the Government of the Commonwealth has supervision and control over all schools and colleges and universities. Even before the Commonwealth was inaugurated, we had laws here that gave the government the effective control over our educational institutions.

I have been President of the Philippines for six years now. The worst criticism against me and my administration has come either from professors or from university students. If there is anybody here who dares say publicly—be he a professor, a president of a university, a rector or student—is there anyone here who dares say in my presence that because he has taken the liberty to criticize me, even in denouncing me falsely, that I have done anything against him?

Nobody can say that. And yet if we were to read what you are writing and saying almost every day in public speeches and newspapers, you seem to be living in a country where you cannot move without someone hitting you in the head; that you cannot speak your mind; that this is a dictatorship.

[5] Fortunately the Filipino people do not agree with you for they have once more elected me to this high office with still greater majority than the first time I was elected. They know that I am not a dictator. They know it is beautiful oratory to accuse somebody of dictatorship. They know that it is easy for you to get applause from the public if you are brave and attack the present government from the President down to the policeman.

That is why every time you have an oratorical contest there the speeches are full of denunciation. My goodness, I don't know my own country. I don't know my own people when I read these speeches. I do not care what you say about that. It amuses me. I have no hesitancy in saying that since the first day that democracy has come to this earth there has never been a case of the chief of state whose position is elective, that he has been elected by his people without his asking for his election. I am the only one in history. And I want you to know that I did not want to be elected. I want you to know that the only thing that at last induced me to adopt a passive attitude about my reelection is that war in Europe, that I saw that the Philippines may sooner or later be involved.

And I saw that while the immense majority of our people were living in a fool's paradise, I was one of the few who was watching what was going on and knew what was coming. That was why as one of the reasons I permitted myself to be reelected once more.

But I have no hesitancy in saying that that provision in the Constitution which limits my reelection to two more years has been my own work, for I did not want to go beyond that. Is that the dictator? I am resigning my position at my own volition. There is nobody in this country who could have defeated me if I had wanted to continue for another four years.

Now, I am speaking to you with my heart in my hand because of what I am going to tell you now. This is no time for us to be engaged in foolish debates. This is the time when your mind—the mind of everyone of you, men and women,

old and young—should be devoted to but one problem: the problem that is confronting us and which may mean a terrible destruction and unbearable hardship. Talk of freedom and liberty. You have plenty of that. What you do not have enough of is duty. As least, you do not talk of duty. You need not learn from my lips. See what has happened to France. To France. Where is France today? At the feet of the conqueror, paying 8 million dollars—16 million pesos a day for the support of the German army, five billion and a half a year of pesos.

If France had spent that money in airplanes and tanks, France would not be giving that money now to her master. The Frenchman is working day and night, when he is told to work, with or without compensation. He is working for his master, Germany. He would not be doing that now if he had not been all the time wanting more [6] hours of rest, less hours of work and more salary and more good time. Strike upon strike. In every corner of the streets in Paris, you could hear nothing but freedom, liberty, while the Germans were getting ready to take that freedom and liberty from them.

I wonder. I wonder if my countrymen desire to have the same fate that befell France. That is the work of the Fronte Popular of Blum; the work of so many parties of the opposition, that whenever they wanted to have a government they had to get together five or six opposition parties. They never had a majority party; they never had a policy, a constant policy of government that had a majority and the confidence of the people. That is the fruit of doing nothing but singing the song of liberty without remembering that liberty without order is chaos.

I think that our universities and colleges ought to, occasionally at least, tell their students that men do not live on liberty alone. There is also duty. And that the man who knows how to do his duty knows how to fight for his right. There is no man in this country—I challenge every Filipino of the 16 million Filipinos—there is no man in this country, not even a woman, there is no man in this country who loves liberty more than I do. I have fought for liberty since I was a boy, and now that I am an old man I am still fighting for the liberty of our country. No man who is willing to give his life for that liberty is going to deny that liberty.

I am an old man, even though I do not want to confess it, especially when there are girls around—but I am an old man. At least in the Philippines very few men live more than 70 years. In another six years or seven I will be 70, and before I am 70 I know I will be dead. Why should I who have been raised to the position I am occupying today by my people, only because I have been their servant in the fight for their liberty and freedom—now that I am old about to die, deprive you of that freedom? Why should I deprive you, the men of tomorrow, of the opportunity to be free when my whole life has been dedicated to the cause of liberty so that you may live free. I am about to die but I want my country to live and I want my country to live eternally and to live with the blessings of liberty. But liberty can only be a blessing if it is accompanied with order. I am about to die but I am leaving children, children that are as young if not younger than you are. I could not face those pieces of my own soul and flesh if I were not devoting every day of my life for their happiness and freedom and security; and I cannot do that for them without doing it for you. They cannot be free if the rest of you are slaves.

My friends—for you are my friends regardless of whether you like me or not—please listen to me. I am talking to you on a very solemn occasion, on a very dangerous situation. You have been reading only of the dearth and destruction in Europe. You have seen it in the movies. You do not realize that you may see [7] it right here and you are not getting ready for it. Nobody is getting ready for it. I am not telling you that war will come. It may never come. I hope it will not come. But if it should come, it will be a good thing for all of us for we will learn to suffer and we will learn to die. I know people are not worthy unless they know how to suffer and how to die. I wish these educators of ours here will start telling you to write poems or speeches speaking of your duty to lay down your lives, your duty to work and your duty to suffer. That is life.

Enclosure No. 2

Malacañan Palace

Manila

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 335

Creating a civilian emergency administration, defining its powers and duties and providing for coordination and control of civilian organizations for the protection of the civil population in extraordinary and emergency conditions.

Whereas, the Civilian Emergency Planning Board has recommended immediate adoption of measures to control and coordinate civilian participation in meeting grave emergencies; and

Whereas, it appears necessary and desirable that comprehensive rules and regulations be issued to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants;

Now, therefore, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred, do hereby create and constitute a Civilian Emergency Administration, which shall function through and be administered by the following officials and organizations and those that may hereafter be designated;

1. The National Emergency Commission, composed of the Secretary of National Defense as Chairman and a representative of each Executive Department as members. This Commission shall, subject to the approval of the President, formulate and execute policies and plans for the protection and welfare of the civil population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions. It shall have general supervision and control over the officials and organizations as authorized herein, in so far as their duties pertain to said Administration, and shall function through (1) The Manager, Philippine Red Cross; (2) a Director of Publicity and Propaganda; (3) a Food Administrator; (4) an Industrial Production Administrator; (5) a Fuel and Transportation Administrator; (6) a National Air Raid Warden; (7) a Director of Communications and such other officials as may be appointed by the President from time to time.

2. A Provincial Emergency Committee in each province, composed of the Provincial Governor, as Chairman, and the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Fiscal, the District Engineer, the Division Superintendent of Schools, the Provincial Inspector of Constabulary, the District Health Officer, and the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, as members. This committee shall have general supervision and control over the Municipal Emergency Committees.

3. A Municipal Emergency Committee in each municipality or municipal district, composed of the Municipal Mayor, as Chairman, and the Municipal Treasurer, the ranking or Principal Teacher, the Chief of Police, the Sanitary Officer, the Municipal Agricultural Inspector, and a representative of the Municipal Council, as members. This Committee shall organize local units for emergency purposes in accordance with and subject to the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the National Emergency Commission. Such local units shall consist of (1) a Volunteer Guard, (2) Air Raid Protection, (3) protection of utilities and industries, (4) food administration, (5) evacuation, (6) public welfare and morale, (7) transportation and fuel administration, (8) medical and sanitary, (9) publicity and propaganda and such other services as may be authorized from time to time.

4. A City Emergency Committee in each chartered city, composed of the City Mayor, as Chairman, and the City Treasurer, the City Fiscal or Attorney, the City Engineer, the City Superintendent of Schools, the Chief of Police, the City Health Officer, the Chief of the Fire Department, and a representative of the Municipal Board, as members. This Committee shall organize local units for emergency purposes as prescribed for municipalities under paragraph (3) hereof.

5. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Order, the cooperation of all departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government is hereby enjoined and the whole-hearted support of the inhabitants of the Philippines earnestly requested.

Done at the City of Baguio, this 1st day of April, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the sixth.

(Sgd.) MANUEL L. QUEZON,
President of the Philippines.

By the President:
(Sgd.) JORGE B. VARGAS,
Secretary to the President.

Enclosure No. 3

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, October 15, 1940.

Confidential

DEAR GENERAL GRUNERT: The Committee appointed by His Excellency, the President, has carefully considered the statements contained in your memorandum of September 16th, presented in our recent conference, and I beg to submit the following comment and information, reference being made serialim to subheadings of paragraph 4 thereof:

a. Additional soldiers.

The Philippine Army is prepared to mobilize immediately its twelve divisions of approximately 120,000 men. The Department Commander has complete data as to the location, equipment, and training of these troops. As for their replacement in civil pursuits, the unemployed in the islands, including those that would be thrown out of employment by the war processes, would fill the vacancies in productive fields resulting from a mobilization.

b. Food supplies.

The Commonwealth at present imports a certain amount of its food requirement. In time of emergency, however, by converting to food production some portion of the agricultural land now devoted to cash exports it could easily be self-contained. The federal forces here, as you know, are supplied largely by imports; however, they could readily be supplied from local sources in time of war. The National Rice and Corn Corporation, a Commonwealth entity, imports those cereals and could, in emergency, increase its present supply. The continued importation of food supplies is an insignificant problem compared with the importation of military supplies. All ammunition, ordnance, gasoline, aviation supplies and what might be classed as munitions of war must be imported and the channels of communication constantly kept clear. This is a naval problem, not an interior one.

c. Other essential military supplies—transportation, medical, construction materials, utilities.

All transportation in the islands would be available to the military on demand. The supply would be far in excess of military needs. Complete studies have been made as to such facilities. Repair and maintenance facilities and operating personnel are available. Such demands as the military might make could readily be accommodated by the civil population. Gasoline stocks are very limited and the supply depends upon the maintenance of sea communications.

[2] Medical installations and facilities are limited and no funds are available to do more than is now being planned by the Commonwealth in its progressive program for improving conditions within its fiscal limitations.

Construction materials exist only in limited quantities. Timber and cement are available, but steel products and appurtenances are supplied from the United States or foreign countries, largely upon individual order. The road system hardly needs discussion, as it is shown on official road maps of the Bureau of Public Works.

Utilities, now adequately manned and administered, could be insured only by a proper military defense.

d. Communications.

All communications would naturally be at the disposal of the military. The present operating agencies could continue to function under such direction and supervision as the military might impose. No preparatory instructions are necessary to accomplish these ends.

e. Labor.

The demands of the military could be more than met by civil potentialities in this regard provided the United States Government pays the prevailing wage.

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The operation and administration of labor gangs engaged on military measures present problems that do not materially differ from similar operations in civil life.

f. Welfare.

This is a subject that receives the constant attention of Government. Its transition from a civil to a war-time basis will depend entirely upon the policies of the military as determined by the nature and course of military operations.

g. Publicity.

The dissemination of military propaganda is a problem that appertains not to the civil, but to the military headquarters. The usual publicity methods would continue subject to such restrictions as the military might impose. The application of such restrictions would be a simple matter in so far as civil authority is concerned.

h. Protection.

The protective features of municipalities and provinces would continue to function except as might be modified by military commanders. Any attempt to reorganize these civil agencies based not upon local civic needs but upon possible needs in time of war would be impracticable. The present organization represents a standard development which would have to await local necessity in order to be intelligently modified.

[3] Anti-sabotage measures are already in operation.

Blackouts, gas proof shelters, and all the many ramifications of a nation at war are of doubtful application to the local situation until a much more critical phase of the international situation develops. Such steps cannot be imposed without causing the gravest anxiety and concern on the part of the populace and great expense and effort on the part of Government. Such steps are not as yet current in the United States itself, and it is not believed that they should be prematurely practiced here.

The present police control of aliens in so far as is known, has proven entirely satisfactory. The efficiency of the current system unquestionably compares favorably with that of other parts of the United States.

In anticipation of any emergency the Commonwealth Government has recently enacted Commonwealth Act No. 600 authorizing its President to take the most comprehensive action with reference to complete control of its civic functions. The comprehensiveness of this law which was enacted as a measure of preparedness, exceeds anything of the kind as yet provided by the United States Government or any of its other integral parts.

Most of the data on the subject you have outlined are available from published annual reports of the different offices of the Commonwealth Government. If any further data are desired along any special line, I shall be very glad indeed to furnish such information as soon as it can be made available.

With expressions of cordial regard, I am

Sincerely yours,

JOSE B. VARGAS,
Secretary to the President.

Major General GEORGE GRUNERT,
Commanding General, U. S. Army, Philippine Department, Manila.

Enclosure No. 4

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, March 20, 1941.

Press Release

The report submitted to the United States High Commissioner and the President of the Philippines by the Civilian Emergency Planning Board on March 11th contains a resume of conditions as they exist at this time, as determined by surveys conducted by the Committees on Supply, Transportation, Medicine, Communications, Welfare, and Personnel and Labor. In addition to setting forth conditions as they exist, the report of each Committee points out specific conditions that need to be remedied and contains the recommendations of the committees as to the action to be taken by the Commonwealth authorities to remedy such defective conditions. For instance, definite shortages are known to exist in certain articles of food and other supply items. The Committee on Supply has recommended that the Commonwealth authorities immediately develop and put into effect a plan to increase the production of essential foodstuffs through

out the Philippines, and that special attention be paid to the development of self-sufficiency of food supply in each locality. It also recommended that the growing of short-time crops, and the raising of livestock and poultry to meet the requirements for meat, dairy and poultry products, be encouraged in every practicable manner. The acquisition of suitable and adequate reserve stocks of all imported items considered as essential, including fuels and foodstuffs, by the Commonwealth Government itself, or by suppliers of such items under an agreement with the Commonwealth Government, was recommended.

Concerning transportation, certain recommendations were made for the control of the operation of motor vehicles during an emergency in order that existing supplies of gasoline, lubricating oil, tires and spare parts might be conserved.

Among other recommendations made by the Board were those concerned with the establishment of adequate stocks of surgical instruments, X-ray apparatus and supplies, biological serums and apparatus for blood transfusions; the expansion of existing telephone and telegraph lines to meet emergency conditions; and the control and use of radio stations during an emergency.

During any emergency many organizations will be active in behalf of the civil population. In order to avoid duplication of effort, prevent waste and reduce expense, the work of these organizations should be controlled and coordinated by a central organization. To secure such coordination and control the Board has recommended that a Civilian Emergency Administration be created by the President of the Philippine composed of [2] one representative of each of the following Departments of the Commonwealth Government.

- Department of the Interior
- Department of Public Works and Communications
- Department of Agriculture and Commerce
- Department of Health and Public Welfare
- Department of Public Instruction
- Department of Finance
- Department of National Defense.

This organization would function directly under the President of the Philippines and be charged with the duty of formulating and executing policies and plans for the organization of certain units in all the provinces and chartered cities. Functioning directly under this national body would be the Philippine Red Cross, a Director of Publicity and Propaganda, a Fuel Administrator, a Food Administrator, a National Air Raid Warden, and a Director of Communications.

Among the units that would be organized and trained under the supervision of the National CEA if this plan is adopted are those belonging to the Air Raid Protective Service and Volunteer Guard Units.

The Board has prepared a complete and comprehensive Air Raid Protective Plan which contemplates the organization of:

- A Warning Service
- An Air Raid Wardens Service
- Auxiliary Fire Fighting Units
- First-Aid Units
- Rescue Units
- Demolition and Repair Units
- Decontamination Units.

This plan contains the necessary information to be given to the public as to what to do before, during and after an air raid. It contains information regarding air raid shelters and several designs of inexpensive shelters for family use. It even contains directions for making a cheap improvised type of gas mask which would afford temporary protection from poison gas.

MANUEL L. QUEZON,
President of the Philippines.

FRANCIS B. SAYRE,
*United States High Commissioner
to the Philippine Islands.*

MALACANAN PALACE

MANILA

Baguio, May 5, 1941

Gentlemen of the National Assembly:

The trend of events seems to point strongly to the possibility of America's entry into the present world war. If such a situation should arise, it goes without saying that the Philippines would also be involved directly in the war.

While the protection of the Philippines against external aggression is primarily the responsibility of the United States, the duty of safeguarding the inhabitants of our country, both citizens and aliens, against hunger, pestilence, lawlessness and other dangers which the nature of modern warfare entails, rests mainly with the Government of the Commonwealth. Consequently, and by virtue of the powers vested in me by Commonwealth Act No. 600, I have constituted a Civilian Emergency Administration to advise and assist the government in the adoption and execution of such measures as may be necessary to protect our civilian population in case of an emergency. This Administration is functioning through the following organizations:

1. The National Emergency Commission, composed of the Honorable Teofilo Sison, Secretary of National Defense, as Chairman, and a representative of each Executive Department, as members. This Commission, subject to the approval of the President, formulates and executes plans for the protection and welfare of the civil population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions. It operates through (1) The Manager, Philippine Red Cross; (2) a Director of Publicity and Propaganda; (3) a Food Administrator; (4) an Industrial Production Administrator; (5) a Fuel and Transportation Administrator; (6) a National Air Raid Warden; and (7) a Director of Communications.

2. A Provincial Emergency Committee in each province, composed of the Provincial Governor, as Chairman, and the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Fiscal, the District Engineer, the Division Superintendent of Schools, the Provincial Inspector

- 2 -

of Constabulary, the District Health Officer, and the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, as members. This Committee has general supervision and control over the municipal emergency committees.

3. A Municipal Emergency Committee in each municipality or municipal district, composed of the Municipal Mayor, as Chairman, and the Municipal Treasurer, the ranking or Principal Teacher, the Chief of Police, the Sanitary Officer, the Municipal Agricultural Inspector, and a representative of the Municipal Council, as members. This Committee organizes local units for emergency purposes, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the National Emergency Commission.

4. A City Emergency Committee in each chartered city, composed of the City Mayor, as Chairman, and the City Treasurer, the City Fiscal or Attorney, the City Engineer, the City Superintendent of Schools, the Chief of Police, the City Health Officer, the Chief of the Fire Department, and a representative of the Municipal Board, as members. This Committee organizes local units for emergency purposes, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the National Emergency Commission.

The Civilian Emergency Administration has been functioning for some time, and has already formulated comprehensive plans designed to effectuate the objectives of the Government in the event that our country is drawn into the conflict. Some of these plans are now in process of execution; others are being carefully studied by the Government with a view to final action.

In order to avert shortages in certain articles of food and other supply items, definite steps have been taken to increase the production of essential foodstuffs throughout the Philippines, particular attention being given to the development of self-sufficiency of food supply in each locality. The growing of short-term crops has been encouraged. Negotiations are under way for the acquisition of suitable and adequate reserve stocks of all imported items considered as essential -- including fuels, construction materials, and foodstuffs -- either by the Government itself or by the importers of such items under an agree-

ment

- 3 -

ment with the Government. In this connection, I have issued an executive order requiring all government entities to establish and maintain at least a four-month reserve supply of gasoline, lubricating oil, diesel oil, and other oil products. Public utility enterprises are being requested to take similar precautions.

To safeguard the health of the civilian population, negotiations are being made for the acquisition of an emergency reserve supply of medicines, and surgical instruments, including bacteriological serums and vaccines. These supplies will be distributed and stored throughout the country in eleven strategic locations. Artesian wells will be drilled in evacuation centers in order to insure adequate supply of drinking water.

The Civilian Emergency Administration has found that the construction of public air-raid shelters in Manila and in most other coastal cities and towns would be very expensive and impracticable on account of the low terrain. Furthermore, the supply of materials for the construction of suitable shelters is totally inadequate. For these reasons, the Commission has recommended the evacuation of children and unessential men and women from the danger areas in such cities and towns, as well as the transfer of some government offices from the City of Manila and surrounding municipalities to the provinces. There are, however, certain offices which, by the nature of their functions, must remain in Manila, and to afford protection, as far as possible, to the officers and employees whose duties require them to remain in such offices, air-raid shelters will be constructed in the buildings where those offices are located.

To enable private persons or entities to build their own air-raid shelters, plans for the construction of such shelters in privately owned concrete buildings will soon be ready for distribution. Because of the lack of sufficient supply in the local market, the National Coconut Corporation has been requested to have 1,000,000 sacks manufactured from coconut coir for use in building air-raid shelters.

Plans are being completed for the evacuation of such portions of the civilian population of Manila as may be found in danger areas which the proper authorities of the United States Army will specify in due time. These plans include the designation of places

in

- 4 -

in Manila where people will be expected to gather for their transportation to the different evacuation centers. A survey has been made of nearby towns in the provinces of Rizal and Laguna to determine their availability as evacuation centers from the standpoint of food and water supply, sanitation, construction materials, etc. A similar survey is being made for the purpose of taking care of the populations of other danger areas outside of the City of Manila, such as the cities of Cavite, Cebu, and Iloilo, and the towns of Batangas, Lingayen, and others.

In case of an emergency, our electrical communications are inadequate. Therefore, plans have been adopted for their improvement and for supplementing the usual facilities with mobile and portable radio sets. To carry out these plans, the amount of \$250,000 has for the present been allotted. The sum of \$100,000 has also been made available for immediate use by the Bureau of Posts for the purpose of maintaining 24-hour telegraphic service in all provincial capitals, for the employment of the necessary additional personnel, the training of operators, and the purchase of additional equipment and supplies.

With a view to avoiding confusion resulting from lack of organization and to provide organized emergency groups ready to function at any moment for the purpose of ministering to the needs of the population, the organization of Volunteer Guard units in all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts, is being undertaken by the provincial governors under the direction of the Chief of Constabulary. Rules and regulations for the organization and training of the Volunteer Guards and for the establishment of an Air Raid Warden Service have been issued and sent to all officials concerned. These rules and regulations, including directions for air-raid precaution, have been printed in pamphlet form for general distribution.

During great emergencies, the matter of police protection for the civil population assumes a vital importance. It is the primary duty of the Government to provide adequate police protection in such cases. The present strength of the Philippine Constabulary, while adequate in normal times, is insufficient to meet

emergency

- 5 -

emergency conditions. It is, therefore, necessary to provide the force with additional personnel in order to enable it to cope with the situation when an emergency occurs.

The execution of the plans and the effectuation of the objectives I have mentioned require the expenditure of considerable sums of money. I, therefore, recommend that the amount of P10,000,000 be appropriated for such purposes. I also recommend that the life of Commonwealth Act No. 600, commonly known as the Emergency Powers Act, be extended to the date of adjournment of the first regular session of the Congress of the Philippines, with such modifications and under such conditions as the National Assembly may deem proper to provide,

Respectfully,

(SGD) MANUEL L. QUEZON
President of the Philippines

The National Assembly
Manila

Enclosure No. 6

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,

Commanding U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, 1 Calle Victoria, Manila.

MY DEAR GENERAL MACARTHUR: In accordance with our conversation of this morning, I am enclosing a copy of a letter of October 7, 1941 from Mayor LaGuardia, the United States Director of Civilian Defense, in which he says:

"Confirming our recent conversation, I hereby appoint you Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands."

As I told you this morning, there must be some mistake, since I have had neither recent conversation nor correspondence with Mayor LaGuardia. It is apparent that he has not taken into consideration special circumstances obtaining in the Philippine Islands and the progress already achieved in emergency defense measures under the primary responsibility of the Commonwealth Government in conjunction with the advice and cooperation of the military authorities.

I shall appreciate having your views as to what reply should be made to Washington. So that Mayor LaGuardia and President Roosevelt may obtain a clear understanding of the situation here, I should appreciate your setting forth in [2] your letter the present status of civilian defense and plans for future activities.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

CAB:

FBS:abn

4510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Enclosure No. 7

[copy compared rap]

HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
Manila, P. I., November 28, 1941.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER TO THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

DEAR MR. HIGH COMMISSIONER: I have received your cordial note of November 27th and I concur fully with your thought that the communication from Mr. LaGuardia was sent through mistake. The executive power in the Philippine Islands for peacetime execution of measures involving extraordinary controls of the civil population are vested in the Commonwealth Government. With the Tydings-McDuffie Act as a basis it enacted emergency laws placing such authority in the hands of its Chief Executive. Accordingly local measures for civilian defense were initiated several months ago after coordinated discussion between the High Commissioner, the President of the Commonwealth, and the military authorities. A Civilian Emergency Administration for this purpose was constituted operating under the direct control of the President of the Commonwealth. This agency, while a responsibility of the Commonwealth Government, functions with the constant advice and observation of both the High Commissioner's office and the military authorities. It has operated successfully within the natural limitations imposed by local conditions. It would be most unfortunate if any attempt were made to change the present arrangement. The cooperation and complete understanding which now exists between all agencies involved should not be disturbed especially at this critical time.

Most sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

Enclosure No. 8

[copy compared rap]

OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE,
Washington, D. C., October 7, 1941.

Hon. FRANCIS B. SAYRE,
*United States High Commissioner,
Manila, Philippine Islands.*

MY DEAR COMMISSIONER: Confirming our recent conversation, I hereby appoint you Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands.

Instructional material has been sent to you, and you will receive from time to time such additional information as it becomes available. If there is any assistance this office can render you at any time, we will be only too glad to do so.

As Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands, it is understood that you will serve without remuneration.

Sincerely yours,

F. H. LA GUARDIA,
U. S. Director of Civilian Defense.

Enclosure No. 9

Via airmail

December 1, 1941.

The Honorable F. H. LA GUARDIA,
*United States Director of Civilian Defense,
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. LA GUARDIA: I have your letter of October 7, 1941, sent by ordinary mail and not received here until late in November, informing me that you have appointed me Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands. Inasmuch as I have had no previous conversations with you with regard to this matter as stated in your letter, I wonder whether the letter could have been sent possibly

under some misapprehension. As you know, the executive power in the Philippine Islands with certain exceptions has been placed by the Tydings-McDuffie Act in the hands of the President of the Commonwealth Government. Acting in accordance with that power, nearly eight months ago he set up the Civilian Emergency Administration, of which he is the directing head. In view of the delicacy of the existing international situation and of the political and jurisdictional complexities of the local situation, the problem of civilian defense in the Philippines has now been referred to President Roosevelt and it would be most unfortunate at this time to disturb the present arrangement without his specific instructions. I therefore do not feel free to accept the appointment tendered in your letter unless directed otherwise by the President, to whom I am today sending a full report on the situation.

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS B. SAYRE.

FBS: abn

CONFIDENTIAL.

BULLETIN

3 December 1941

Note: Heavy Japanese troop movements from Central China continue, probably to the South. ONI reports and a Naval Observer in Shanghai reports from November 28 to November 29, 14,000 Japanese troops plus others (accurate check not available), arrived there by rail. Equipment with arrivals included field artillery and tanks.

Vichy officials stated, December 1, that the French Government in case of war in the Far East would take all means in its power to defend Indo-China against any aggression, regardless of whence it comes. Should a Japanese attack on Thailand occur, the French Government would "examine the situation and determine its position in accordance with a realistic policy," it is reported from Vichy.

Through November 1, Germans killed and missing in Russian campaign are estimated to total 2,250,000. MID reports from Bern. Note: This figure considered excessive although Germans recently admitted 2,125,000 killed, wounded and missing.

[2] *SS NISHMAHA* (United States) picked up November 27, 72 men on rafts from the British cruiser *DUNEDIN* (4,850 tons), torpedoed and sunk on the 24th. Five died and buried informally. Proceeding Trinidad from S. E. ONI reports.

To date, the RAF has avoided night missions with fighters and light bombers due to the necessity that all take-offs be made during daylight, MID reports from Cairo. The reason for this is claimed to be the lack of experienced flyers, but in so doing much of the air attacks' effectiveness is lost. Most of the RAF losses during the early days of attack resulted from crashes by RAF planes landing on their own grounds. American-built aircraft are considered excellent. Adequate direct-support planes, to be used in conjunction with tank operations, are not available. RAF performance—except for the conduct of close-support missions—has been rated highly effective. The RAF transport shuttle, taking into account its lack of equipment, is considered good.

Japanese and Germans are meeting in Lima, Peru, to plan sabotage and embarrass the United States. Peru reports against, a Naval Observer, in Lima reports.

[3] *Future operation of the Federal Shipbuilding plant at Kearny, New Jersey, it reaching a showdown* in view of the fact the Mediation Board is about to make its recommendations on the cases of union maintenance referred to them. It is hoped that the company and the union may reach an agreement.

In reply to a request from the British Admiralty for nine additional converted aircraft carriers the Navy Department has asked the British to advise the locality in which the operations of such carriers would be anticipated. The thought behind this is that if the plan is to operate them in the North Atlantic it would be better for the United States to acquire them, man them, and operate them, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports.

• *Mr. Frederick Rentschler, Chairman of the Board,* and Mr. Eugene Willson, President of United Aircraft Corporation, conferred on the morning of December 3 with Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Artemus L. Gates and the Chief

4512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

of the Bureau of Aeronautics Admiral Towers concerning their corporation's plan of general refinancing, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports. *Special conferences are still being held* in regard to [4] the control of allocation of steel required for National Defense, the Bureau of Ordnance reports. In this connection, it is probable that special inventories of all Ordnance plants will be required to check any possible excessive inventory being kept on hand. Efforts are being made to avoid additional questionnaires being sent to Inspectors and contractors for information that appears to the Bureau to be unnecessary or that might be obtained direct from steel producers. Reports have been furnished to the Office of Budget and Reports as to the steel requirements for 1942 to produce all classes of projectiles.

Scheduled deliveries reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
2 Coastal Minesweepers:		
Paramount.....	Delaware Bay S. B. Co.....	12/ 1/41
Progress.....	Anderson & Cristofani.....	11/30/41
2 submarine chasers.....	Peterson Boat Works.....	12/1/41
	do.....	12/ 5/41

Representations have been made that there is a conspiracy in Philadelphia to gouge the Navy on the purchase of land. The Judge Advocate General has an attorney looking into this matter very carefully.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

5 December 1941

Hitler not shot, Naval Attache in Rome reports. German Embassy interpreted telephone message "Big Chief shot down" to mean Hitler. Later when interrupted communications were restored it was learned that General Von Paul: Major Bruning, Assistant Chief Luftwaffe, Rome; two colonels; two aides; two pilots and possibly others crashed and killed in Sicily en route Africa. Von Paul was to be Chief entire Axis Air Force Africa and was carrying complete plans for African campaign. Germans in Rome feared plane shot down.

Nazis have started a major offensive in the Kharkov region of the Donets river basin, 250 miles N.W. of Rostov, in order to ease pressure on retreating Germans to the South. The Russians are said to be resisting successfully, it is reported from London.

MID reports from Rome: (1) Defenses in South Italy and Sicily are to be set up under the control of the Germans from now on (2) Naples' defenses against air attack are much improved, however, industrial sections were severely damaged by recent bombing (3) The [2] central and southern portions of Italy are preparing to receive a large addition to the Luftwaffe forces already there.

Three German steamships were reported as sunk recently IN THE W. Mediterranean in the vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar, MID reports from Gibraltar.

Admiralty appreciates that one raider is still in Pacific and possibly another in Indian Ocean. Supply ship also possibly at sea, the Admiralty reports.

The Saigon radio announced December 3 that Tokyo had given a pledge to Governor General DeCoux to send no more troops into French Indo-China and to refrain from using Indo-China bases for attacks on Thailand or China's Burma Road, it is reported from Vichy. (Note: "Scrap of Paper?")

Naval Attache, Singapore reports British and allied merchant ships in that area advised by Commander-in-Chief, China (1) All ships north of Hongkong "beat it South thereof" (2) Crown Colonies and all ocean going ships to Singapore and bring such shipyard equipment as possible (3) Except for Coast of Malaya and West Borneo no vessels leave Singapore north-bound without permission (4) No Dutch ships shall go North their islands without authority orders issued by the Dutch.

[3] *Naval Observer in Mexico City reports:* Japanese Minister here has applied for United States visa for self and family to cross border about December 13 to depart from United States for Japan on TATUTA MARU. Two other legation officials have also requested United States visas for families and will leave for Japan from United States. Reported Japanese Legation Mexico City has requested TATUTA MARU call at Manzanillo (Cuba) and Canal Zone after leaving United States presumably to evacuate families. Such evacuations believed indicative of Japanese officials expectation of trouble.

The Army and Navy Munitions Board has granted the Navy Department the right to assign A-1-a priorities for all of its combatant ships which will be finished in 1943, the Secretary's Office reports. The Board has been requested to grant permission to establish the same priorities for airplane carriers to be completed in 1944.

USS SALINAS (5,375 tons) torpedoed oil tanker, now at Robins Dry Dock, Brooklyn, New York, will be placed in Dry Dock December 8 for examination and repairs, the Bureau of Ships reports.

[4] *Navy is taking steps to establish a branch of the Norfolk Navy Supply Depot, in Baltimore.* Commercial terminal space will be used. This is for the purpose of serving British Repair, conversions and other USN supply needs, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts reports.

Ordnance reports progress on the delivery of guns, including ammunition supplies, for Russia under Defense Aid with Russian ships currently being armed and armament for ice-breakers delivered or waiting to be picked up

Provision is being made by Bureau of Medicine and Surgery for a special first-aid box for Naval gun crews for merchant vessels, "armed guards". These boxes will be assembled at rendezvous points for distribution to each gun crew as it goes out. Boxes will be returned, overhauled and replenished. A "Medical Compend" (M and S) giving instructions on first-aid and medical treatment is contained in each box.

The Principles of Damage Control are being applied to the Auxiliary ships of the Navy. This includes provisions for water-tight integrity, fire and gun protection, repair of battle damage. The annual damage control practice is being conducted this year in the auxiliary class, Fleet Training reports.

[illegible]

In reply refer to No.

Op-16

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1941

SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: O.N.I. estimates of Japanese forces in
Indo-China, and adjacent areas.

25,000 men in Tonkin Province (North)
80,000 " " Southern Indo-China
105,000 men.....TOTAL

90 planes near Hanoi (North)
160 " " Southern Indo-China
250 planes...TOTAL

NAVAL FORCES

At Camranh Bay or vicinity	1 Heavy Cruiser 1 Converted Seaplane Tender 9 Submarines 21 Transports or supply vessels.
At Saigon	2 Destroyers
Indo-China Coast	1 Light Cruiser 1 Minelayer
In the general Hainan- Formosa area	1 Heavy Cruiser 3 Light Cruisers 24 Destroyers 10 Submarines 3 Aircraft Tenders 1 Submarine Tender 1 Minelayer 27 (approx.) transports or supply vessels.

In supporting distance are:

On Hainan	50,000 men and 200 planes.
On Formosa	45,000 " " 158 " "

W. H. H. H.
By Direction

The President's Appointments

Saturday, December 6, 1941

341		DECEMBER 6	
Saturday			
APPOINTMENTS		APPOINTMENTS	
8.00		9.15	
8.15		2.30	
8.30		2.45	
8.45		3.00	
8.00		3.15	
9.15		3.30	
9.30		3.45	
9.45	AI White House	4.00	
10.00	(Justice Wm. O. Douglas)	4.15	
10.15		4.30	
10.30		4.45	
10.45		5.00	
11.00		5.15	
11.15	(Director Harold Smith)	5.30	
11.30		5.45	
11.45		6.00	
12.00		6.15	
12.15		6.30	
12.30		6.45	
12.45		7.00	
1.00	(Lunch)	7.15	
1.15		7.30	
1.30		7.45	
1.45		8.00	
2.00		8.15	

342	
DECEMBER 7	
Sunday	
APPOINTMENTS	APPOINTMENTS
8.00	2.15
8.15 <i>At White House</i>	2.30
8.30	2.45
8.45	3.00 { Sec'y. Stimson
9.00	3.15 { Sec'y. Knox
9.15	3.30 { Harry Hopkins
9.30	3.45 { Gen. Geo. Marshall
9.45	4.00 { Sec'y. Hull
10.00	4.15
10.15	4.30
10.30	4.45
10.45	5.00
11.00	5.15
11.15	5.30
11.30	5.45
11.45	6.00
12.00	6.15
12.15	6.30
12.30 <i>Chinese Ambassador</i>	6.45
12.45	7.00 <i>The Solicitor General</i>
1.00	7.15
1.15	7.30 <i>Vice President & Cabinet</i>
1.30	7.45 { Sen. Berkley Sen. McVey
1.45	8.00 { Sen. Connally Sen. Austin
2.00	8.15 { Sen. Hiram Johnson Sen. Rayburn
	8.30 { Cong. Cooper Cong. Mackin
	8.45 { Cong. Bloom Cong. Eator
	9.00 { Hon. Sumner Welles
	9.15 { Mr. Ed. Morrow
	9.30 { Col. Wm. Donovan

4518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENTS—SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1941

12.30 P. M.—The Chinese Ambassador
3.05 P. M.—The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Captain John Beardall
Secretary Marvin McIntyre
Secretary Early
Miss Grace Tully
3.20 P. M.—Gen. George Marshall
The Secretary of State
7.00 P. M.—The Solicitor General
8.40 P. M.—The Vice President and entire Cabinet
9.45 P. M.—The Vice President
Senator Alben W. Barkley
Senator Charles McNary
Senator Connally
Senator Warren Austin
Senator Hiram Johnson
Speaker Rayburn
Congr. Jere Cooper
Congr. Joe Martin
Congr. Sol Bloom
Congr. Charles Eaton
10.45 P. M.—Under Secretary Sumner Welles
12.00 P. M.—Mr. Ed Murrow
Col. William Donovan

Will you get me that list of people who were at the house on Sunday, December 7th? I think I will list their names in the Engagement Book, just in case the list gets lost.

R.

*Copy of attached
list sent to Mrs
Barnes 12/11*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Check Request
Mrs. R. J.*

for Sunday

Dear Grace:

Here is the list as given me
by West, the secretary to Crim. Is
the 3.05 appointment right, or is it two
appointments, one of the secretaries and
one of the Cabinet Members?

Robey

*was Historic
folder*

4520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1941

Handwritten:
file
Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report from General Short, Commanding General in Hawaii.

3:34 p.m.
E.S.T. Japanese enemy dive bombers, estimated number - sixty, attacked Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor at 8:00 a.m. Extensive damage to at least three hangars at Wheeler Field, three at Hickam Field and two planes caught on ground. Details not yet known. Raid lasted over an hour. Unconfirmed that ships in Pearl Harbor badly damaged. Marine field HQ also badly damaged. More details later.

4:13 p.m.
E.S.T. Of the Japanese bombers, five are known to have been shot down. Enemy submarines off Oahu. Two American battle-ships sunk. Big fires along hangars still burning at Hickam Field. No Japanese bombers identified. Estimated from 60 to 100 dive bombers participated in attack on Oahu.

Later
Message Battle casualties reported 10:20 a.m. December 7, 1941. Known dead, 38; wounded, 366, of which 20 to 50 may die. One B-17 plane from mainland ran into attack. Three (presumably refers to crew) injured. (Note: 13 B-17 planes took off from Hamilton Field to arrive at Honolulu between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m., E.S.T. Evidently the first plane ran into the engagement. We have no data yet regarding the other planes.)

The first survey indicates that the following planes remain undamaged: Approximately 40 pursuit planes at Wheeler Field, plus 4 A-20's, 9 B-18's, and 4 B-17's. This is the result of the preliminary survey.

No time
Enemy air attack resumed 11:00 a.m., much less intense than former attacks. Manila reports no overt acts have yet occurred there.

This was received at 6:30 P.M.

Telephoned from Colonel Phillips, Hawaii at 6:30:

There are at present about 15 to 18 A-20 airplanes aboard the Transport Maigs. Those planes were being shipped to the Philippines and I would like to take them off here. *(This was authorized - M.W.)*

We have at present 13 B-17, 9 B-18, 4 A-20 planes, 25 to 30 pursuit planes and those are P-40 and P-36's. We have lost a number on the ground. We have shot down about 11. All planes arrived but one. 9 in fine condition. One plane crashed at Bellows Field and one was

caught in the air. We have a total of 12. We now have 13 available.

4 out of commission, 2 crashed on land, one caught in the air.

We have been unable to determine how many they lost. We have turned over bombers to the Navy. *A joint operation is being started against enemy carrier.*

We have a total of 104 dead and about 200 wounded. Honolulu power plant is not out. Some sabotage but are taking care of it. Not serious. Communications all right. We have captured one plane and shot down about 11.

Summary 12 noon seven December, Hickam Field known dead 80 wounded, 250; Wheeler Field known dead, 22; seriously wounded, 10; slightly wounded, 30; Ballou Field known dead, 2, wounded six.

SHORT

MARSHALL

M. M.

Notes taken of conversation hadh between Admiral Stark and
Admiral Block, on phone, 1910, Sunday December 8, 1941.

"Hello, this is Admiral Stark.

This is Block. I thought I would give you the last information I had.

"We would be glad to get it.

"Here in the harbor, as nearly as I can ascertain there are six battleships out of business. Six battleships, and three of them at least, look like they are salvage jobs. They are down and partially cap sized. The Nevada has been pushed over against *wings?*
(IPO) (?)

"That's in addition to the six?"

No, that is one of the six.

Now I'll let you know what I know about the damages

(Here there was an interruption)

"The Nevada was hit by a torpedo and set on fire and she was pushed over on the IPO. The Oklahoma was hit by three torpedoes, apparently while at mooring and she capsized. The Tennessee was hit by torpedoes and she is partially capsized. The California was set on fire and she is burning, and we are trying to get the fire under control. The Arizona was hit by torpedoes or aerial bombs and she I understand is capsized. The West Virginia was on fire but apparently is still afloat and all right, but pretty badly damaged by fire. The Maryland, as far as I can ascertain, is OK. The Pennsylvania is OK, although two destroyers at the same dry dock were destroyed. The Floating Dry Dock was holed (?) and there is a destroyer there and we are trying to get the destroyer out. The Colorado is not here. The Alabama has a crack under her water line and her fire rooms are flooded. We are trying to repair them.

"What did you say happened to her?"

I think a bomb hit her under the water line and cracked her and flooded her. The Raleigh was on the other side of the harbor, but I understand she had a fire and that they had to pump so much water into her that she is in bad shape.

There are two task forces at sea looking for these carriers. There are.-

"Did you say there are carriers, cruisers and destroyers?"

"Yes, there are two task forces at sea, consisting of carriers, cruisers and destroyers.

The Army bombers that are intact are gone out to look for these fellows in the positions we believe they are in. A pretty large number of patrol planes were destroyed by fire. I think they are pretty badly hit over there. The Army lost a lot of pursuit planes. I understand they lost a number over at Wheeler field. They lost one squadron, I heard. That's not as bad as it could be, since they have quite a number of pursuit planes. This morning there were twelve big bombers just came in.

The latest news from Guam: All Guam is being bombed by two squadrons of Japs. Eight casualties.

We have a man here named Curtis who is on his way to the East. I am issuing orders to hold him here. I think your dispatch asked for

We have sent you a dispatch asking for

all Naval salvage, etc.(?) to be sent out here as soon as possible. We have a lot of ships out, and we have diverted but cannot be sure whether we have sent them the right way or the wrong way. The _____'s position is about 300 miles out of Midway on her way to Wake. I don't know which is the least dangerous, whether to bring her back or not.

The fires in the Navy Yard are very well under control. We have had reports of parachute troops landing but I have not been able to verify those. We have sunk some submarines. One has been sunk in the harbor here. I don't know whose it was, but it was fired on by the ships in the harbor and sunk.

"A submarine sunk in our harbor?"

Yes, one was sunk in our harbor, and we believe there have been three sunk outside near here. One by airplane and two by destroyers. Several enemy aircraft were shot down. Two that I ~~see~~ personally were shot down in the harbor. Some were shot down on the _____ and I understand they captured some papers from him but not yet been able to translate them.

"The submarine sunk in the harbor, is it German?"

We don't know what it is as yet.

I don't know whether there will be another raid tonight or not.

I had to hold everything in readiness so I would be ready to go.

HAN "I prophesied that there might be a raid in the morning, that there might be some of them come back at daylight again in the morning?" I don't know but if the attacks we set out to make occur, - the Lexington, and the cruisers and the destroyers if they can locate these fellows, they ought to make it pretty hot for them.

The only information I got from Kimmel. He told me that seven combatant ships, two carriers and three transports, - seven combat ships, three transports and two carriers about forty miles south of Niahu. That's over by Hawaii. (?)

I am expecting attacks on Wake and Midway when these fellows start back. My great problem now is about this convoy leaving California now, whether we can get those through or not.

HAN "I turned them back."

I think that's the best for the time being until the situation has clarified here. It's a pretty bad mess here. Of course they came in with no warning at all. They did their job very efficiently.

"Well, we are all with you and I hope the country gets fighting mad over this. Anything we can do of course, all you have to do is tell us. I will look out for you salvage material right away."

SEAN The last report I had there were thirty people dead and about 400 patients. That doesn't take into account these ships down in the harbor.

I got a report the Utah had been bombed and capsized and about 100 men trapped in her.

HAN "You didn't mention her before, is that in addition?"

Yes, that's the Utah. There are a lot of cruisers and destroyers that were in the harbor that have left and gone out. There is nothing much I can tell you what to do, but I know Kimmel will welcome the addition of PRY's right away.

Those ^{men}planes that went to Wake are there. The ones that went to Midway have been cancelled.

That's about all the information. I don't know how many people are listening on this line. If they are listening, I hope they will keep their mouths shut.

"I will do everything I can to help, and of course you know just how we feel about it here. You have no further knowledge of the situation. No.

"We will count on getting word from you if anything further comes. As soon as I have anything definite I will call.

"Were there any bombings of non military objectives in Honolulu itself?

Yes sir, I understand one bomb dropped in Honolulu and killed one man. One officer told me some bombs dropped up in the hills where he lives but he didn't know what damage was done.

As far as the Oil tanks are concerned, they have not been affected. And the gas too, it is intact.

Goodbye.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Returned with many
thanks.

CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1941. *S*

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Thanks

CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 3, 1941.

Memo. for The President:

By telephone from Secretary Morgenthau:

"At five forty-five this evening I received word that the representative of the Bank of Japan in New York is closing their office tomorrow under instructions from Japan. The representative will leave New York on December tenth for Japan."

* * *

h.m.jr/mc
7:10 P.M.

4528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Japan file
1-4

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

file

MEMORANDUM:

On finding through Mr. Belin that I knew Mr. Kurusu, the Japanese Special Envoy, who was an old friend, Colonel Donovan asked me to come to Washington to get into contact with him. Colonel Donovan spoke to the Secretary of State and obtained his approval.

I called at the Japanese Embassy at eleven o'clock the morning of December 6th. Mr. Kurusu, whom I have not seen for eleven years, was very cordial and we resumed our old friendship at once.

After a few personal inquiries and some reminiscences of our days together in Peru, Mr. Kurusu launched forth into a lengthy conversation regarding his mission here, seeming to be extremely anxious to talk about it with an old friend and with someone in whom he had entire confidence. Constantly, throughout the whole hour-and-a-half conversation, Mr. Kurusu seemed very apprehensive of being overheard by members of the Embassy staff, repeatedly turning his head to see if anyone were approaching.

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Mr. Kurusu said right off: "Fred, we are in an awful mess. In the first place, I was delayed two months in coming on this mission, through an attack of conjunctivitis when I could neither read nor write. This complicated the situation because time was running out, from the point of view of restraining the military element, and it had been planned that I should have left for the United States in August or September. This had an immediate bearing on my negotiations with the Secretary of State because I found, just prior to my departure, that the Civil Government was up against it to know how to ^{control} ~~manage~~ the military effervescence so that it would do the least harm to American and English relations; that the Civil Government had decided that the least harmful alternative was to allow the military to move into Indo-China since that neither directly threatened Siberia and the United States nor Singapore and Britain."

Nevertheless, Kurusu recognized that any troop movement would be regarded with great suspicion in the United States and would, inevitably, jeopardize the success of his mission. The best he could do, however, was to be allowed three weeks' time for his negotiations to bring some concrete result with which the Civil Government would feel able to hold off the military. With this background, Kurusu said, he had had to initiate his discussions with the

Secretary of State. In the first place, he could not explain this to the Secretary, who seemed to feel suspicious at once, not only at the troop movement but of the evident desire of Kurusu to arrive at results speedily. In fact, Kurusu said that the Secretary had queried several times why he was in such a rush to get something concrete effected.

Kurusu said that he would appreciate it greatly if I, as his old friend, would explain this to the Secretary, which I, of course, promised to do.

Turning then to the general problem, Kurusu said that he felt the principal difficulties could be said, in a nut-shell, to be the State Department and the national sentimentality with regard to China on the one hand and a "lack of humor" on the part of the Japanese militarists on the other hand. The real problem, however, was "how to get the Japanese out of China!" Kurusu was extremely frank on this subject on which he dealt and to which he returned most of the time. He stated that the show was up in China, that the militarists knew this as well, or perhaps better, than anyone else and that they were all looking for a way out to save their faces.

To illustrate the present situation, Kurusu said that it was similar to that existing at the end of the Russo-Japanese War when the Japanese won the great victory of Mukden; namely, that while Japan was the

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victor, she was exhausted and could not have gone on. This, he said, was the situation attained today; only in the present case they arrive at no victory, just the occupation of certain hotly contested localities in China. "So", he kept repeating and repeating, "we must find a way out and we believe that President Roosevelt as arbiter between ourselves and the Chinese is the best move from our point of view, as well as everyone else's."

I repeatedly asked Kurusu if he was absolutely sure of his ground in these statements, with particular reference to the remarks on the part of the militarists that the show was up in China and the conditions were extremely bad. Kurusu said he was absolutely certain of it, not only by his own observations but from conversations he had had with important military authorities just prior to his departure from Tokyo a few weeks ago. He added that the country was absolutely war-weary, had no enthusiasm for this or any other conflict, but must be restored to peaceful conditions where normal trade could be resumed. I got the distinct impression that the ^{oil} ~~whole~~ situation was especially bad. Commenting further on this particular subject, Kurusu said that, naturally, the militarists continued to bluster and roar, but that this was merely normal face-saving, particularly in the *Army* and in no way contradicted the things he had just stated, which, in brief, was that the militarists' power in Japan had definitely passed.

its high point and was definitely on the down-grade.

Likewise, Kurusu said, it was his definite opinion that pro-Axis sentiment was now on the down-grade. He, himself, and the thinking people of the country had always realized that a German victory in the West would be perhaps more dangerous for them in the East than for the United States; that Germany had no intention of assisting or even permitting Japan to retain any benefits that she might derive from her Axis victory. Furthermore, the increased number of German officers in Tokyo and the large German refugee colony had soured the situation greatly, the Japanese resenting German arrogance and manners, and were increasingly saying: "Is this the people to whom we have allied ourselves and for whom we ~~had~~ expected to go to war with the United States and Britain!"

At this point I said that, while I had not been in touch with the State Department for at least a year and had no knowledge of what was in their minds, I felt that the best way to approach better relations between Japan and the United States was through a definite demonstration by Japan of her change of heart with regard to the Axis and a throwing-in of her lot with the British and the Americans.

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Kurusu heartily agreed, but reminded me of the Anti-Comintern agreement and the military alliance which he, himself, had signed as Japanese Ambassador in Berlin. Kurusu said this most ruefully, adding, however, that he had resigned as Ambassador to Germany the next day.

We then discussed for sometime ways and means whereby Japan could show her change of heart with regard to the Axis and yet not have to break her treaties, which, Kurusu humourously said, would offend our Government's great interest in the maintenance and sanctity of treaties.

Among the expedients suggested by Kurusu was the use to which industry could be put to aid in supplying Britain and ourselves with war materiel which would help Japan to restore her own apparently desperate economic and industrial condition. I countered this with the thought that unless something of a strikingly pro-anti-Axis and pro-American and -British character were done, we would consider this manufacturing expedient, for which ~~he~~^{we} would forego our present embargo, only a ruse on the part of Japan.

This brought up the question of Confidence, which, I said quite bluntly, was perhaps the crux of the whole matter, that there was no trust in Japan here, quite understandable from our point of view, that quite possibly the Japanese might feel the same way about us, and that

the important thing to work for, therefore, was a restoration of confidence between the two countries on which the future could be built. Kurusu was emphatically in agreement with this idea. He said he had been working along exactly the same line, that he had been most disappointed at the failure of the effort to have the President and Prince Komei meet, as such a spectacular example of Japanese change of heart, and that he was still seeking some means of effecting a meeting.

Returning again to the question of how the Japanese could withdraw from China, he mentioned the time element which would require a certain "garrisoning" of Japanese troops in China for a period of years. Apparently, ~~the~~ ^{our} Government officials had viewed this with much disfavor which he said he, of course, understood because it looked suspicious, but the United States, itself, had taken considerable time to withdraw from Nicaragua, Haiti and Cuba. These things could not be done over-night, much as it might be desired.

Speaking again of the question of confidence, I reminded him that unquestionably he labored under the same difficulty in which I remember Debuchi was in the early days of the Manchurian affair when he was making statements in the morning to the Secretary of State which the militarists would repudiate in the afternoon, that, naturally, there could be no trust or confidence in such a situation

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which, unfortunately, still ^{attended} ~~attended~~. Kurusu appeared only too tragically aware of this truth, but asserted with considerable confidence that he believed the militarists were so much on the run and in such a difficult situation that, unless hot-heads among them upset the applecart - which might be done at any time - he felt that the better element in Japan was really on its way to control the situation.

At the end of our long conversation, I asked Kurusu to come and dine with Mr. Belin and myself that night at Mr. Belin's house. He said he would be only too delighted to do so, that he had not been out of the Embassy, practically since his arrival, and that he would be so happy to have this opportunity.

As agreed, Mr. Kurusu came to dinner at eight o'clock and we were just sitting down at the table when the telephone rang and he was called to it. He came back and immediately told us that the State Department had announced that President Roosevelt had sent a personal message to Emperor Hirohito, hoping that a peaceful solution could be found. Kurusu stated that he thought this was a very clever move on the part of the Government; that ~~the Government~~ could hardly say "no", nor could he say "yes", and that this would cause many headaches in Tokyo and give much food for thought.

During the course of the evening, he reiterated in the presence of Mr. Belin - whom he had never met before and who was a complete stranger to him - practically everything he had told me in the morning. He spoke with a frankness, which astonished Mr. Belin beyond measure, but with evident sincerity.

Mr. Belin, carrying the ball, followed the line taken in the morning's conversation with regard to the question of confidence and especially Kurusu's firm opinion that the pig was up in China, the military position extremely bad, and the militarists' influence, itself, on the wane. Mr. Belin stated that, in his opinion, the one step which would completely reverse things in the United States and restore confidence between the two countries would be a renouncement by Japan of the pro-Axis pact. This, Kurusu seemed to find a difficult procedure although agreeing entirely in principle.

Kurusu expressed the opinion at this juncture that he and others in Japan realized perfectly that Germany was trying to make of Japan an Italy in the Pacific, and that he hoped and prayed that they would not be successful. He had no illusions that, in the event of a German victory, the Germans would take the Netherlands East Indies for themselves and give nothing to Japan. He also repeated to Mr. Belin his Mukden analogy to describe the present exhausted military state of Japan.

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'Mr. Kurusu stayed for four hours although he had ordered his car for ten o'clock and the chauffeur sent word in that he was expected back at the Embassy.

* * * * *

In spite of what happened on Sunday, Mr. Belin and I are of the firm conviction that Kurusu knew nothing of the events which were going to take place the next day.

This feeling was confirmed by a telephone conversation which I had with Kurusu Sunday evening at the suggestion of Colonel Donovan, who believed it would be advantageous for me to try to have a talk with Kurusu. When I called Kurusu on the telephone to say that I would be glad to see him if he cared to see me, his voice sounded like that of a broken man. Calling me by my first name and expressing his deep appreciation for my having telephoned, he said that he would hate to inconvenience me because there was a big crowd in front of the Embassy and many policemen. I gave him my telephone number and said that, if at any time he wished to talk with me, he could call me as I might be here several days.

Kurusu seemed quite overwhelmed and in the deepest sort of despair, both by the tone of his voice and his expressions of keenest disappointment.

Naturally, this conversation had to be guarded as he was speaking from the Japanese Embassy.

J. L. Belin

Frederick M. Meyer

Nov. 14.

LOVETT

JUDGE PATTERSON CLD BOB SWEET LWC 9:59AM
 JUDGE PATTERSON CLD BOB LOVETT OK 12:32 PM
 LORD BEAVERBROOK LONDON CLD AVERTILL HARRIMAN OK 145PM
 ADML STARK CLD GENL MARSHALL OK 350PM
 SECTY WELLES CLD A.G. OK D.A. 4:45PM

Nov. 15.

JUDGE PATTERSON CLD FORRESTAL OK 9:10AM
 THURMAN ARNOLD CLD FORRESTAL OK 10:05AM
 FORRESTAL CLD PATTERSON OK 11AM

JOHN B BLADFORD CLD GEN MARSHALL OUT LWC
 W J VINTON CLD JUDGE ROSENMAN OK 605PM

Nov. 16.

Nov. 17.

1100A SECY KNOX CLD SECY ICKES---LWC---OK 1125.
 1225P SECY KNOX CLD SECY STIMSON---OK.
 210P SECY KNOX CLD SECY WAR---LWC---OK 355P.
 235P JUDGE PATTERSON CLD MR. FORRESTAL ---LWC---OK 340P
 310P AG BIDDLE CLD WLES---OK.
 342P FORRESTAL CLD HAROLD SMITH---LWC---OK 515P
 422P SECY STIMSON CLD AG---AT HOME ILL---NM.
 445P VP CLD BRECK LONG---OK.
 515P JAMES FORRESTALL CLD JUDGE PATTERSON---OK.
 535P SUMNER WELLES CLD GEN. MARSHALL (ON MANEUVER)---NM.
 525P PMG CLD SECY HULL---OK.

Nov. 18.

900A MRS. KNOX CLD MRS. STARK---OK.
 922A PMG CLD SECY HULL---OK.
 922A SECY ICKES CLD SECY KNOX---LWC---OK 1002A
 1010A SECY KNOX CLD ICKES---OK.
 1010A SUMNER WELLES CLD GEN. MARSHALL---NM.
 1145A SECY KNOX CLD SECY STIMSON---OK.
 1246P MR. BLANDFORD CLD JUDGE PATTERSON---OK.
 1248P McCLOY CLD DIR. SMITH---OK.
 320P SECY HULL CLD GEN. MARSHALL---LWC---OK 436P
 505P SECY KNOX CLD SECY ICKES---OK.
 527P SECY KNOX CLD ADM. LAND---OK.
 1110A WAYNE COY CLD VP---LWC.

China, 4/2/41

May 15, 1941

Dear Lauch:

It is quite all right to go ahead and negotiate regarding the air program or any other thing that the Chinese request but I don't want to imply that I am at this time in favor of any of the proposals. Seriously that can only be finally worked out in relationship to our whole military problem and the needs of ourselves and the British. This should be taken up with General Burns and General Arnold.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Lauchlin Currie

HLH/lmb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5-14-42

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

For preparation of reply
to Currie.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Aircraft Program for China.

After spending a lot of time trying to inform myself on the general aircraft program and the various factors that have to be borne in mind, I have worked out a tentative program for the balance of this year. I don't think it will disrupt in any significant degree the Army or British programs and I believe that, though modest, it is probably as large as the Chinese can handle this year. I need not emphasize the actual importance of establishing a decent air force in China, nor the psychological importance of an early determination of a program that the Chinese can count on.

May I proceed to negotiate with the Army and the British on this tentative program with the understanding that while you are prepared to accept modifications in the plan, nevertheless you approve of the general magnitudes involved? This would give me a basis for negotiation.



Lauchlin Currie

May 9, 1941.

A TENTATIVE AIRCRAFT PROGRAM FOR CHINA

The following program is designed to supply China in 1941 with 244 pursuit ships, 112 bombers, 340 trainers and 22 transport planes.

1. Pursuit Ships.

a. The British are prepared to release 144 air-cooled engines Vultee 48 C's. This force could be replaced and augmented by the release by our Army in the first six months of 1942 of their 147 air-cooled Republic P 43's as the more advanced P 47's become available.

b. In order to replace and augment the initial Chinese pursuit force of 100 liquid-cooled Curtiss P 40 now en route, the Army could release 100 P40B, as the more advanced P 40 D's and E's come into production. This release could be continued in the first half of 1942.

2. Bombers.

It is suggested that the Army release 40 of its older B 18 bombers, of which it has 258, and which, though slow, are suitable for night bombing. It is further suggested that the Army and the British release from current production 72 bombers up to the end of 1941 according to the following schedule:

- 3 each monthly from the Army and the British in May, June and July.
- 4 each monthly in August and September.
- 5 each monthly in October and November.
- 6 each in December.

A gradually increasing monthly schedule could then be provided for throughout 1942 to provide for replacements and additions.

3. Trainers.

Heavy emphasis should be placed immediately on the creation of a first-class Chinese air force. To this end it is suggested that a group of instructors under the charge of a first-class army flying school officer be sent to China. It is further suggested that 340 advanced and primary trainers be diverted from the production of 7,170 scheduled for the army this year. A tentative schedule might be as follows:

May	20
June	30
July	40
August	50
September	50
October	50
November	50
December	50

-2-

3. Transport Planes.

It is suggested that ten additional B-18's be released by the Army for this purpose and that the twelve DC3's now detailed to Army generals be released. For personal Army transport service here the two-engined Beechcraft, seating six and faster than the DC3's, would appear to be a desirable substitution for DC3's.

The attached tentative program would call for the following
schedule of deliveries:

	Issued	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	1942
1. <u>Permit ship</u>										
Vulcan P 480	5	7	10	15	20	28	22	23	20	-
Curtiss P 40B					20	20	20	20	20	1
Republic P 43										147
Total										
2. <u>Engine</u>										
B 18	40									
Other medium or light		6	6	6	8	8	10	10	12	1
3. <u>Trainers</u>										
		20	30	40	50	50	50	50	50	
4. <u>Transport</u>										
B 18	10									
DC 3			3	3	3	3				

Secret

BRITISH EMBASSY,
Washington, 28th July, 1941.The Honourable FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herein two copies of the latest reports received from London on the military situation. They are dated July 25th and July 27th.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ HALIFAX.

TELEGRAM FROM LONDON DATED JULY 25TH—DELIVERED FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY
TO THE PRESIDENT, 28TH JULY 1941

Strongly escorted convoy of six merchant ships carrying stores and reinforcements arrived at Malta after continuous high-level dive-bombing and torpedo bombing but only one ship of over 12,000 tons hit by E boat torpedo in early morning. Her speed reduced to 10 knots but her cargo suffered little damage.

2. A. M. July 23rd explosion in number 1 bay of Alexandra Dock, Hull, damage to merchant ship, sank three lighters and was attributed to mine reported on night May 3rd, May 4th.

3. *Royal Air Force*.—Daylight June 24th. Heavy air attack on Brest, medium attack on Cherbourg, light attack on La Pallice: except for latter fighters provided escort. It is claimed that Gneisenau, Prince Eugen and Scharnhorst were straddled by sticks of bombs. Smoke screen rendered observation difficult and no direct hit could be ascertained. Merchant ship 10,000 tons may have been hit too. Heavy air fighting resulted in destruction by our bombers of 22 enemy fighters, four probable, eight damaged. Our fighters destroyed 12 enemy fighters certain, 5 probable, 6 damaged. We lost 16 bombers, 7 fighters. Off Norwegian coast A. M. July 24th small merchant ship was hit by coastal command aircraft and left beached and burning. Another small ship was attacked; crew abandoned the ship thought bombs not seen to explode.

Night of July 24th-25th our aircraft attacked successfully Kiel and Emden. A. M. July 25th small force despatched five hours to attack Scharnhorst at La Pallice. Four missing.

4. *Military*.—Japanese making military preparations Manchoukuo where Northern movements of troops is reported.

5. *Russian*.—Germans are trying to consolidate position along railway running south from Porkhov area. No further advance towards Leningrad reported. German pressure continues northeast of Smolensk also south of Kiev where thrust is southeastwards. German advance east of Mogilev Podolsk is said to be on fairly wide front.

TELEGRAM FROM LONDON DATED JULY 27TH—DELIVERED FROM THE BRITISH
EMBASSY TO THE PRESIDENT JULY 28TH, 1941

1. Achates mined July 25th 40 miles southeast Iceland (c) arrived in harbour.

2. British cruiser on July 25th intercepted German Erlangen 6 000 tons 480 miles south-east Montivideo. She was set on fire and flooded while endeavour was being made to save her.

3. Grisnez batteries unsuccessfully attempted to shell Channel convoy night of July 25th-July 26th.

4. Attempt to locate Scharnhorst on July 25th failed. 50 reconnaissance Brest and La Pallice also unsuccessful.

5. 0500/26 Grand Harbour Malta heavily attacked by E-boats and one-man T/Bs. St. Elmo mobile viaduct damaged by torpedo. About 10 E-boats and one-man T/Bs sunk by shore batteries and Royal Air Force fighters. 20 prisoners captured and various bodies recovered.

6. *ROYAL AIR FORCE*.—Night of July 24th-July 25th attacks on Kiel and Emden satisfactory especially in Deutsch and Krupp's shipyards. Night of July 25th-26th medium attack Hanover and Hamburg and light attack on Berlin. Nine bombers missing.

7. MEDITERRANEAN.—July 23rd.

An E-boat east of Pantelleria left sinking by Beaufighters which also destroyed two dive-bombers. One Beaufighter missing. Four Blenheims attacked shipping at Trapani Sicily. One merchant vessel about 7,000 tons last seen heavily on fire; another merchant vessel about 3,000 tons received two direct hits, set on fire, believed sunk. On July 25th at Malta Hurricanes shot down 5 enemy aircraft; one enemy fighter fell into cellar of demolished shop at Valetta.

8. RUSSIA.—German efforts are directed north-east of Smolensk and in clearing up Mogilev area. Russian formations west of armoured spearheads are still offering considerable resistance to enveloping forces.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Washington, D. C., October 14th, 1941.

Secret.

The Honourable FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herein a copy of the latest report received from London on the military situation. It was dated October 12th, 1941.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ HALIFAX

TELEGRAM FROM LONDON DATED OCTOBER 12TH, 1941—DELIVERED BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY TO THE PRESIDENT 14TH OCTOBER 1941

1. A supply convoy from the United Kingdom has arrived at Archangel.
2. Enemy aircraft attacked Faroe Islands p. m. October 11th; a Norwegian trawler was sunk and houses were machine gunned.
3. Small Greek merchant vessel in convoy was sunk by mine off Humber October 10th.
4. Small British merchant vessel was bombed and sunk off the East coast early this morning.
5. Canadian Government tanker has now arrived at Iceland.
6. TOBRUK.—To counter enemy night operations with tanks against our forward observation posts on October 9th 15 of our Infantry tanks successfully intercepted an enemy tank formation and obliged it to withdraw. 20 German tanks took part of which many were damaged. Ours sustained only minor repairable damage and we had two casualties.
7. ROYAL AIR FORCE.—October 9th–10th. Revised casualties. 10 bombers missing, 4 crashed, 1 crew killed.
8. October 10th–11th. Objectives were attacked as follows: Krupps Works Essen 58 aircraft, 59 tons of high explosives, 6,640 incendiary bombs.
COGNAC—53 aircraft, 76 tons of high explosives, 4,960 incendiary bombs.
DUNKIRK.—19 aircraft, 16 tons of high explosives, nil.
BORDEAUX—9 aircraft, 6 tons of high explosives, 1,060 incendiary bombs.
OSTEND.—16 aircraft, 27 tons of high explosives, 840 incendiary bombs.
ROTTERDAM.—7 aircraft, 10 tons of high explosives, 900 incendiary bombs.
Total—160 aircraft, 194 tons of high explosives, 14,420 incendiary bombs. Bad weather made accurate bombing impossible but many fires were started and one 4,000 pound bomb burst in the centre of Cologne.
9. October 11th. Small offensive operations were undertaken by our fighters over Northern France.
10. October 11th–12th. 39 aircraft were sent out, 27 to Emden and 12 as mining—all returned safely.
11. LIBYA.—October 9th–10th. Benghazi Harbour Derna and two aerodromes were successfully attacked. October 10th, 9 Marylands attacked about 50 tanks and 200 mechanical transports east of Tobruk, scoring three direct hits.
12. MEDITERRANEAN.—October 10th–11th. Naval aircraft from Malta attacked an enemy convoy—two merchant vessels, of about 6,000 tons were seriously damaged and stopped.
13. GERMAN AIR FORCE.—October 11th–12th. One Ju. 88 collided with aircraft, both being destroyed. Another enemy bomber which landed near

Dungeness was severely damaged and the crew of 4 being captured. Bombing was somewhat heavier than recently, but scattered.

No damage of national importance and casualties small. An air-raid precaution headquarters damaged at Tenby and some damage to utility services at Great Yarmouth and Whitstable.

14. BULGARIA.—50,000 men are said to be engaged on railway construction work and 32,000 on roads. The railway between Svilengrad and Edirne (Adrianople) will not be repaired until December.

15. JAPAN.—Since July 1941 daily average Japanese merchant ships outside Japanese waters has decreased from 172 to 40 on October 6th.

16. Aircraft casualties over and from British areas. German 2 destroyed and British nil.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Washington, D. C., December 3rd, 1941.

Secret

The Honourable FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herein a copy of the latest report received from London on the military situation. It was dated December 2nd, 1941.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ HALIFAX.

Paraphrase of a report from London on the Military situation, dated 2nd December 1941, delivered to the President from the British Embassy on 3rd December 1941.

(I) A British destroyer and a Drifter shot down two German bombers off the HUMBER yesterday. Two British cruisers and 2 destroyers on the evening of the 1st intercepted and sank one destroyer, one 8,000 ton tanker and one 6,000 ton merchant ship, all South-bound, about 80 miles N. N. W. of TRIPOLI (L). On the evening of the 1st a British cruiser intercepted in the South Atlantic, a ship of some 11,000 tons which scuttled herself when a warning shot was fired.

(II) MILITARY.

LIBYA.—30th-1st. The enemy attacked in strength with tanks and infantry and captured SIDI REZEGH. A counter-attack by our troops was unsuccessful. The 15th German armoured Division renewed the attack early on the 1st from the Southwest and captured BIR EL HAMED. Our armoured forces counter-attacked at dawn from the Southeast and by mid-day were reported in the BIR EL HAMED area where the position was confused.

In the frontier area on the morning of the 1st our troops attacked enemy positions Northwest of Libyan OMAR. This attack was stoutly resisted. Some progress has been made but the situation is obscure.

RUSSIA.—MOSCOW Sector—Heavy fighting is continuing but no appreciable change has been reported.

ROSTOV Sector—Information received establishing that the Russians hold ROSTOV but does not indicate how far to the West of the town the Germans have retreated.

(III) AIR OPERATIONS.

30th-1st. HAMBURG—122 aircraft attacked in good weather and dropped 160 tons of H. E. and 900 incendiaries. 64 tons of H. E. and 3,500 incendiaries were dropped on EMDEN. Ground haze and searchlight glare prevented definite pin-pointing but many fires were seen at both places.

1st and 1st-2nd. Bomber operations cancelled. At dusk Hudsons made several hits on two merchant vessels at KRISTIANSAND.

LIBYA.—Tomahawk fight reported yesterday was carried out by one British and one Australian Squadron. 15 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 15 damaged. We lost Tomahawks but all pilots are safe.

30th—5 Squadrons of light bombers attacked M. T. in the SIDI REZEGH-EL DUDA area. Bombers destroyed two and damaged 9 enemy aircraft on the ground at MARTUBA.

1st December—Offensive patrol of Naval Hurricanes and Tomahawks engaged 20 Ju. 88's escorted by 12 Me. 109's and some Italian G. 50's. They destroyed one Ju. 88 and 3 Italian fighters and probably destroyed two German and two Italian and damaged 3 German fighters. Two Tomahawks are missing. A reconnaissance Ju. 88 was also shot down Southeast of MADDELENA.

(IV) G. A. F.

1st-2nd. About 60 German aircraft operated principally off the East Coast.

(V) AIRCRAFT CASUALTIES.

In operations over and from the British Isles—German—3 destroyed.

(VI) The activities of the Russian Air Force over the last fortnight have been such as to indicate that they have more than 1,000 aircraft operating to the South of KURSK of which about 50% are serviceable. Recent activities in the Southern Sector have not been accompanied by appreciable falling off in operations in other sectors.

(VII) The number of Japanese aircraft now estimated in French INDIA-CHINA is about 250, of which about 160 are in the South, 88 Fighters (of which at least one Squadron and probably two are of latest type), 70 Light Bombers 83 heavy Bombers and 9 Reconnaissance.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Washington, D. C., December 4, 1941

Secret.

The Honourable FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herein copies of the two latest reports received from London on the military situation.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ HALIFAX

Paraphrase of a report from London on the Military situation, delivered to the President from the British Embassy on 4th December, 1941.

Resume of Operational Events covering period of 20th-27th November, 1941

(I) NAVAL.

MEDITERRANEAN.—Light forces operated off the Libyan Coast in support of our military operations and cruisers and destroyers have been disposed to intercept reinforcements by sea.

Our shipping losses were light. No casualties from submarines or mines were reported.

Enemy minelaying by aircraft in British waters continued on most nights but the situation is well in hand, particularly as regards rapid reopening of temporarily closed ports.

(II) MILITARY.

LIBYA.—The armoured corps had succeeded by November 22nd in bringing the greater part of the German 15th and 21st armoured divisions to battle and during the next two days there were heavy engagements ranging over the desert in which heavy casualties were inflicted and received. The burden of fighting then passed temporarily to infantry while armoured units were withdrawn for organization. New Zealand troops supported by British infantry tanks succeeded on the 26th in finally closing the routes to west. The enemy have been making desperate attempts to break out to west with their surviving tanks and with those remnants of HALFAYA and SIDI OMAR garrisons which succeeded in withdrawing from Frontier. In General Auchinleck's opinion it is "all satisfactory and shows that our pressure is telling increasingly".

RUSSIA.—After a period lasting several weeks, when the threat to MOSCOW seemed to be diminishing, the new and expected German drive at KLIN at North and East of TULA aimed at RIAZHSK and RAZAN from South have once more increased considerably the danger to the capital.

Every available man and vehicle is being thrown into this attack which however would be brought to a standstill if another thaw were once more to turn the roads into mud.

Northwest of ROSTOV.—Germans must still cross the River and consolidate their left flank before they can advance further South Eastwards. In CRIMEA

SEVASTAPOL is still holding out and Germans have not yet attempted to cross at **KERCH**.

JAPAN.—Land forces are believed to be disposed as follows: **JAPAN** 7 Divisions, 1 Tank Regiment: **KOREA** 1 Division: **SAKHALIN** 2 Divisions: **MANCHUKUO** 26 Divisions, 7 Tank Regiments: **NORTH CHINA** 9 Divisions, 12 Mixed Brigades, 2 Tank Regiments. **CENTRAL CHINA** 6 Divisions, 7 Mixed Brigades, 1 Tank Regiment: **CANTON** 3 Divisions, 1 Tank Regiment: **SWATOW** 1 Mixed Brigade: **FORMOSA** 3 Divisions: **HAINAN** 1 Division: **NORTH INDO-CHINA** 1 Division: **SOUTH INDO-CHINA** 3 Divisions, 1 Tank Regiment. Total: 62 Divisions 20 Mixed Brigades, 13 Tank Regiments. **JAPAN** is in a position to invade **THAILAND** whenever she wishes to do so.

EAST AFRICA.—After a lull of two months during the rainy season a final British advance of 30 miles ending with capture of **GONDAR** has concluded the East African campaign.

YUGO-SLAVIA.—Bulgarian troops have been moving into district round and south of **NISH**. The Germans are employing Bulgarian Army to repress the Serbians, having probably failed to induce Bulgarians to fight for them in **RUSSIA**.

GREECE.—The German garrison in **CRETE** has been increased from 14,000 to 30,000 roughly from 1 to 2 divisions. The total of German divisions in **BALKANS** remains however the same—14.

TURKEY.—A system of field defence is being constructed east of the Sea of **MARMORA** along a line of **SAKARIA** River.

(III) AIR OPERATIONS.

UNITED KINGDOM AREA.—Bad weather continues. Night bombing operations were cancelled on 4 nights; on remaining 3 a total of 193 tons of high explosive and more than 13,000 incendiaries were dropped. Principal objectives—**BREST**, **LORIENT** and **EMDEN**.

Attacks on enemy shipping were carried out successfully; several vessels of medium tonnage were claimed hit or narrowly missed but owing to difficulty of accurate observation a near estimate of total tonnage destroyed or damaged cannot be given.

There were several enemy attacks on our shipping but otherwise German air activity was slight. 3 enemy A/C destroyed by night and 1 Ju. 88 lost its bearings and landed intact.

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN.—Axis Convoys on Libyan Sea route were attacked on several occasions: 1 Italian cruiser was hit by aircraft-torpedo. Shipping in Tripolitanian Sicilian and Italian Harbour was raided and it is estimated 14,000 tons, at sea or in harbour were sunk or damaged by our aircraft.

LIBYA.—R. A. F., R. A. A. F., S. A. A. F. and a squadron of Free French Blenheims supported effectively our attack in Western desert. Every form of military objective was attacked by night bomber and/or by fighters and light bombers by day. Armoured units mechanical transport tanks lorries and aircraft in air and on ground were especially selected for destruction. Our fighters constantly patrolled battle area by day and also by night, and on at least one occasion caused an escorted German night bombing formation to jettison its bombs. The enemy armoured raiding column provided a good opportunity for air and ground co-operation; this force harassed by our aircraft before being brought to battle by our armoured troops. Aircraft from **MALTA** shared in many of these operations.

(IV) **EXTRACTS**—from photographic and intelligence reports on results R. A. F. air attacks—on enemy territory in Europe.

NURNBERG.—The Aluminium Works received several direct hits causing a stoppage of work.

DONGES.—About 600 tons diesel oil were lost in our raid of 28-29 September.

LILLE Area.—A report tells of recurring spread of disorganization of industry due to our attacks on the electric power supply.

Information received up to 0700, 3 December.

(I) NAVAL.

MEDITERRANEAN.—A British destroyer torpedoed on 1st December by enemy aircraft east of **TORBRUK** has returned to **ALEXANDRIA** under her own steam.

SOUTH ATLANTIC.—Attacks on shipping. 2nd. A ship of medium tonnage outwardbound to **FREETOWN** was shelled by a U-boat 200 miles South of the **AZORES**.

A British tanker of medium tonnage was mined and sunk off the Norfolk Coast.

(II) **MILITARY.**

LIBYA.—Nothing to report.

RUSSIA.—Nothing additional to official communiques.

(III) **AIR OPERATIONS.**

2nd and night 2nd-3rd. No offensive operations were carried out by Fighter or Bomber Command. Coastal Command report promising attacks on enemy shipping off STAVANGER and on Naval Barracks NANTES. Four aircraft are missing.

LIBYA.—Night November 30-1st December. 20 tons of bombs were dropped on BENGHAZI harbour; starting fires among railway sidings and at base of Cathedral Mole. 4 engined aircraft was destroyed on BARCE aerodrome. One of our bombers is missing.

1st December. A Beaufighter damaged 12 lorries Eastbound near SIRTE and set on fire 2 road tankers. Our fighters carried out over 220 Sorties on offensive sweep and bomber escort and, in combat, destroyed 9 enemy aircraft probably destroyed 4 and damaged 4. Our losses 6 fighters (2 pilots safe).

2nd. In MISURATA-HOMS LIBYA area a Beaufighter damaged 14 Eastbound lorries and set fire to 5 road tankers.

(IV) **G. A. F.**

2nd-3rd. 11 hostile aircraft operating between LANDS END—BRISTOL CHANNEL—ANGLESEY of which 6 flew over-land. Our night fighters destroyed 2 enemy Bombers.

(V) Aircraft casualties in operations over and from British Isles: German, 2 destroyed; British, 4 aircraft missing.

LIBYA.—Up to three o'clock p. m. 3rd December bad weather hampered air and ground operations only noticeable enemy movement was South from EL ADEM towards EL GOBI. Our mobile columns and patrols continue to harass enemy on SOLLUM, EL ADEM and BARDIA-TOBRUK roads. A small enemy vessel entered SOLLUM Harbour morning 2nd December, but was driven out by machine gun fire from SOLLUM Barracks.